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MEDIA FOR CITIZENS



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MEDIA FOR CITIZENS

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MEDIA FOR CITIZENS

BRANKICA PETKOVIĆ

This book presents the studies that were conducted as part of the project entitled Media For Citizens, which is concerned with media pluralism and citizens' communication rights. The project is an effort to enhance the ability of citizens, and minority groups in particular, to actively participate in media society.

Communication rights are threatened by media concentration and deficiencies that plague public service media. Access to the media is made difficult for various minority groups, which also face the problem of inadequate media representation. Neither the individual EU member states nor the EU as a whole have effective regulatory or self-regulatory mechanisms for ensuring media pluralism – diversity of media content and diversification of media ownership – and related accountable media operation.

Our activities within the Media For Citizens project were focused on the monitoring of and research into media policy and media practices, advocacy, training and publishing, with the aim of raising awareness among the public and initiating changes in media policy and media practices. We strive to bring changes that would ensure greater diversity of media content, greater dispersion of media ownership, more credible and responsible media operation, improved access to the media for minorities, and greater responsiveness of the media to citizens' proposals and complaints. Part of our effort is devoted to activities that enhance the ability of citizens, minority groups and young people in particular, to take an active and critical approach to the media.

The project includes four sets of activities. The first set comprises the monitoring of media ownership and its impact on media autonomy in Slovenia. The second set consists of activities focusing on the monitoring and comparison of topics and speakers featured by two prime time television news programs, one broadcast by public television and the other by the major commercial television station in Slovenia. The third set is concerned with the presentation of minorities, particularly the Roma, Muslims and gays and lesbians, in selected local and national media in Slovenia. The fourth set comprises integrating activities, including the publication of the findings, putting these to good use by providing training in active citizenship in the media field, and provoking public debate. Part of this effort is our web page Media For Citizens available at <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/media4citizens/>. It presents a clear overview

of the conclusions reached through the said activities, with the data being regularly updated to reflect the progress of the project. With the help of this page, among other things, we hope to initiate public debate about the media operation and encourage citizens to engage in media activism, or to put it differently, become active members of media society.

PROJECT TEAM

The team that carries out the Media For Citizens project, which is supported by the European Commission, includes: Brankica Petković, head of the project; Sandra Bašić Hrvatin, a researcher and the author of the report on media ownership; Lenart J. Kučič, a journalist, a co-author of the report on the monitoring of media ownership and the editor of the web page Media for Citizens; Iztok Jurančič, a journalist, the leader of the Union of Slovenian Journalists and a co-author of the report on the monitoring of media ownership; Roman Kuhar, a researcher and the author of the report on media representation of minorities; Marko Prpič, a researcher and the author of the report on main television news; Tomaž Trplan, the executive editor of the project's web page; Lana Zdravković, assistant to project manager; Olga Vuković, translator into English, and Grega Fras, a web page designer. The Advisory Board includes two representatives of foreign partner institutions, Ed Klute, the director of Mire Media, Utrecht, The Netherlands, and Granville Williams, the editor of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom newsletter, London, Great Britain.

CONCLUSIONS

The authors of the report on media ownership in Slovenia, Sandra Bašić Hrvatin, Lenart J. Kučič and Iztok Jurančič, focused on the implications of the current structure of media ownership and state interests in the media for the autonomy of Slovenian media. The stakes held by the state are the result of a specific form of media privatization during the early 1990s. The authors point out that the data on media owners found in company registers and lists of official media owners do not reveal the real state of affairs. In order to obtain the wider picture, it is necessary to expose the links among people sitting on boards of companies that are official media owners and of those which have no media stakes but are in the position to pull levers by which they

can influence media operation. To illustrate this, the authors present the ownership structure of the main national daily, *Delo*, and explain how it affects the autonomy of journalists and the newspaper. The exposure of the interplay of politics, media ownership and media content further reveals another form of political pressure, one exerted through advertising strategies employed by the largest advertisers, say, telecommunication and insurance companies whose significant shareholder is the state. The authors also examined some controversial legislative changes, particularly those introduced during the last two years, including state subsidies to the media. A comparison of the financial reports of broadcasters whose programs enjoy the status of special significance (and which were entitled to subsidies between 2002 and 2005) and financial reports of other broadcasters showed that subsidized broadcasters had a lower return on capital, but their labor costs were also lower than the average in this sector. Another peculiarity that emerged was that seventeen radio channels had no employees, and fifteen had only one employee.

Marko Prpič compared two prime time television news programs, *Dnevnik*, broadcast by public television TV Slovenija, and *24 ur* news by the major commercial television station, POP TV. He used quantitative analysis to study the topics covered by the two programs, the extent of reporting on these topics and the actors/speakers appearing in these programs. The period of monitoring was March 2006. The two news programs are similar in structure, with only minor differences in certain segments and in the length of airtime devoted to commercials. Analysis by thematic blocks showed relatively little difference between the two programs. The commercial station gave more airtime to the set of topics covering internal politics, wars, conflicts, crime and security, and the set dealing with culture, entertainment, sports and leisure time. Coverage of crime stood out in terms of the length of airtime given to it on the commercial channel, while public television placed more emphasis on international conflicts. Both news programs reported mainly on events related to the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, while the absence of regional and local coverage was most conspicuous within the set of topics dealing with economic issues. Topics related to minorities and vulnerable social groups were most noticeable by their absence. Analysis of the interlocutors who appeared in news programs revealed that politicians prevailed; women accounted for less than

one-fifth of the interlocutor group, and when they did appear in news programs, they usually gave statements about topics related to public services, the welfare state, humanitarian work, society and religion, or they were featured as anonymous interlocutors. Both news programs demonstrated an Euro-centric attitude in covering international affairs, so, for example, there was no report dealing with South America or Australia during March 2006. In the author's opinion, most worrying is the fact that all negative trends typical of commercial television – domination of politics, the absence, or at best modest representation of minorities and civil society, the prevailing Ljubljana-centric approach to domestic affairs and Euro-centric approach to international affairs, the inordinately low number of women appearing in news – are also characteristic of the public service broadcaster. One interesting piece of information is that the television audience ratings showed that the combined number of viewers of the two news programs analyzed in this study was lower than that of the prime time news program (*Dnevnik*) during the early 1990s.

Roman Kuhar analyzed media representation of minorities, the Roma, Muslims and gays and lesbians. The period analyzed was February 2006. Kuhar employed a quantitative method and discourse analysis to establish who was given opportunity to speak, what they said, whose views and interpretations were reproduced, what the underlying assumptions were and which discriminatory practices were present. The majority (78%) of the texts analyzed (249 altogether) related to Islam and Muslims, because of the protests provoked by the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. The authors were mainly male journalists, and men also prevailed in the interlocutor group. Of the 390 interlocutors, most of whom were politicians, 89% were men. The *Delo* and *Večer* dailies carried the greatest number of texts about Muslims (there were 194 of these altogether). The author describes the circumstances surrounding the cartoon episode and the ensuing protests as a form of moral panic among the media underpinned by stereotypical representations that created the impression that violence is characteristic of the entire Muslim community. Another problematic technique used was generalization, whereby the »voice of the Muslim world« was presented as unified and frequently identified with the most radical attitudes. Many texts lacked context, fostering the impression that all Muslims were non-civilized radicals. The group of interlocutors in media texts

about Muslims included 290 men and 26 women; 13% of interlocutors were representatives of the Roman-Catholic community. The topics related to Muslims and Islam were most frequently discussed by European and American politicians, and the ratio of “western” to Muslim interlocutors was two to eight.

Nearly 20% of all media texts about the Roma were featured in the crime section of daily newspapers and dealt with criminal offences committed by the Roma. Another issue in relation to which the Roma were most frequently mentioned was the debate about the umbrella law on the Roma. There were 45 male and 15 female interlocutors altogether, most of them non-Roma. In most media texts analyzed here, the Roma appeared as passive objects who present a problem, are uneducated and lazy. The most frequently used expression was “problematic Roma issues,” with education and employment being in focus. Generally, the media image of the Roma connotes negative, different, and uncivilized attributes. Even within one rare positive context, in a report covering a translation of poems into Romany, the translator was described as a freak character and an exception among the uncultured Roma.

The 14 texts covering gay and lesbian issues confirmed the thesis that homosexuality was a marginal topic. The media still present homosexuality as an excess or an exotic phenomenon. Recently, gay and lesbian issues have been most frequently addressed in relation to a political debate about the law on the registration of homosexual partnerships. Generally, the media no longer treat homosexuality as a medical phenomenon, as they did in the past, but discourses reproducing stereotyped images still find their way into the media. One typical approach is to enshroud homosexuality in a veil of secrecy. In contrast to the other two minority groups, gays and lesbians themselves are the most frequent interlocutors appearing in these texts, especially GLBT activists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Various collaborators of the Peace Institute, and in particular the participants in the Media Watch project ongoing since 1998, carried out a number of research studies and published many findings and reports. All were part of our efforts to achieve greater diversity of media content, greater dispersion of media ownership, more credible and account-

able media operation, better access to media for minorities and increased responsiveness of the media to citizens' proposals and complaints. During public debate on the new law on RTV Slovenia in 2005, and on the amendments to the Mass Media Act in 2006, we submitted remarks to the solutions proposed by the Ministry of Culture and compiled and argued for concrete changes to a number of legislative proposals that were inadequate in our opinion. We invariably explained in writing our alternative proposals and attempted to argue for them during their public presentation in Parliament. Practically none of our proposals that offered integral and conceptually alternative solutions to the controversial points in the two laws was accepted, apart from some minor ones that concerned corrections to other proposals. The bills that were eventually passed into laws implemented in practice the model of media policy tailored to the goals of the ruling coalition.

Based on the conclusions of the monitoring of the three segments described above, we give several key recommendations that reflect and reinforce our past efforts.

1. Media ownership and its influence on media independence

The provisions in media legislation stipulating restrictions on media concentration should be accompanied by effective mechanisms for supervision and penalizing of failures to comply with these provisions. Participation of governmental bodies responsible for this area should be ensured.

In addition to stipulating restrictions on media concentration, the government should adopt a proactive approach by stipulating and developing clear, independent and effective mechanisms for encouraging media plurality through state subsidies. State subsidies should be allocated by an independent body on the basis of clearly defined and transparent criteria and granted to those contents that cannot 'survive' autonomously on the media market. It is especially important to prevent the abuse of subsidies to exert pressure on media that are critical of the government, or to reward media that report favorably on the government.

In granting special status and benefits to non-profit, community, minority and other media for the production and dissemination of content in the public interest (in Slovenia such status is enjoyed by radio and television programs of special significance), the government should ensure regular supervision of whether the media meet the

requirements regarding the implementation of agreed responsibilities and content and whether they observe professional and social standards.

When debating and amending media legislation, the government should ensure the participation of representatives of the interested public during the preparation stage, promote public debate and the confrontation of various viewpoints and solutions, and allow sufficient time for reaching a consensus on key issues of media policy. The law makers should take a clear stance on the proposals and remarks submitted by the representatives of economic entities, professional unions, experts and NGOs, and explain their reasons if they decide to reject these proposals.

The state should withdraw from media companies because it has been proved that stakes owned by state funds and state-owned companies are exploited in order to exert political influence on the media, business and editorial decisions and the appointment of executives.

Journalists and their associations should make an effort to remedy the mistake they made in the past when they sold out their interests in media companies obtained in the privatization process. The situation could be improved by strategic pooling of resources to purchase ownership stakes in media companies or to establish their own media outlets.

Information on media owners, and on the owners of media owners, enables citizens to establish whether there exists conflict of interest. Therefore, this information must be accessible to the public, while the government should stipulate and take care that the data in publicly accessible databases are truthful and regularly updated. The transparency of data prevents the holders of political and economic power from abusing the media for the promotion of their own interests.

In the majority of countries, public service radio and television are in crisis as a result of scarce funding, continual interference from government in the media operation or the lack of serious political will to transform state-owned media into public service media. The situation in Slovenia is much the same. The legislation and the development of public radio and television should be steered towards greater participation of the public in the management and supervision of public radio and television, while ensuring their institutional and editorial autonomy in terms of funding and management. It is especially important to enhance the functions of public service broadcasters and strengthen their

role in providing social cohesion and inclusion of all groups and communities, especially minorities.

Legislation, internal documents and professional codes should include principles and mechanisms for the prevention and penalizing of publishers' or owners' attempts to exploit the media as an instrument for achieving particular political aims. The present codes of journalists' associations do not meet these requirements fully, and furthermore, publishers/broadcasters and owners should also be obliged by such documents to respect the codes. The complaints and adjudication mechanisms should be expanded to include journalists, publishers and the public.

Social circumstances of employees in the media industry affect the quality of work and responsibility demonstrated by journalists and other media workers. Media professions are vulnerable. However, the importance of their social role and their indispensability in exercising the right to freedom of expression, acquisition and dissemination of opinion and information mean that it is in the interest of society as a whole to secure favorable social circumstances for media people to perform their work. The transparency and stability of social circumstances should be established through collective agreements between the employers and employees.

NGOs concerned with the media field, expert associations, interested and professional groups should be strengthened in terms of organization, material conditions and staffing. They should cooperate among themselves, reach agreements, debate and negotiate on how to ensure the realization of interests they represent. Their common goal should be a developed, clear, and successful media operation in the public interest.

In order to achieve greater inclusion of citizens in media activities, civil interest groups and NGOs should aim for more active and creative use of new technologies and develop new, autonomous forms of media production and dissemination of content. In so doing they should establish links with similar civil initiatives abroad.

2. *Television news*

Television broadcasters, and the public broadcaster in particular, take into serious consideration the finding of our research that politicians dominate the group of interlocutors in the main news programs, and make an effort to

include more topics and interlocutors from outside the political arena, especially the representatives of civil society and minority groups.

They should also make an effort to move away from Ljubljana-centric coverage and include more topics relating to regions and localities outside the capital. In addition, television companies, and the public broadcaster in particular, should make a deliberate and systematic effort to increase the representation of women in the news. When covering international topics, more attention should be devoted to events and circumstances outside Europe, and topics from all continents should be included. Such measures towards elimination of the negative trends in the structure and content of television news should be developed systematically by introducing regular internal monitoring, editorial analysis and meetings, internal guidelines, mechanisms and decisions.

3. Reporting on minorities

When reporting on minorities the media should take utmost care to comply with the legal provisions and professional standards outlined in journalistic codes of ethics. On the other hand, individual media could develop their own internal ethical and programming guidelines for this delicate area. Media professionals, and editors in particular, should take heed of repeated alerts by media researchers pointing to the mistakes made in presenting various minorities.

With the help of internal rules of conduct, supervision mechanisms, careful editorial policies and continual analysis of editorial decisions, media companies should ensure that the members of ethnic, social and other minorities are not stereotyped or treated in a discriminatory manner.

The coverage of minorities should necessarily include the viewpoints of the representatives of these communities. In order to achieve this, journalists and media companies should cultivate contacts with minority groups. This could be realized by engaging a journalist who specializes in that specific area, is well informed about it and maintains contacts with the group.

Reported events should always be placed in a context, because conflicts between the minority and the majority group, or within a minority group, are not isolated incidents but usually have a long history.

There is no reason why the main actors appearing in media reports on minorities should be politicians. The media should seek topics and interlocutors out in the world and provide regular coverage of the life of minorities, instead of the current practice of covering excesses. This would enable the readers, listeners and viewers to obtain better knowledge and to better understand the situation of minorities.

The media could develop mechanisms for verifying the quality and suitability of the coverage of minorities in cooperation with representatives of these groups. The members of minority groups should regularly inform the media about their activities and efforts. They could provide feedback on media coverage through letters to the editor. All editorial offices should have available clear complaint mechanisms that make possible prompt and immediate publication of corrections.

Both the national and the local media should pursue a systematic employment policy that would ensure the inclusion of minority group members working as journalists and other media employees. This could be achieved by adopting one of the exemplary models involving scholarships, training and practical work that would increase the number of qualified journalists and media employees coming from minority groups.

By recruiting staff members from among the minority groups, media companies would increase employees' sensitivity to minority related topics and ensure that they are better informed about these issues.

MEDIA EMPIRE –
CONTEMPORARY MASTERS
OF INFORMATION

SANDRA B. HRVATIN,
LENART J. KUČIĆ,
IZTOK JURANČIČ

A Spectre is haunting multinational capitalism—the spectre of free information. All the powers of “globalism” have entered into an unholy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Microsoft and Disney, the World Trade Organization, the United States Congress and the European Commission.

Eben Moglen, *The dotCommunist Manifesto*¹

The Brass Check is found in your pay-envelope every week—you who write and print and distribute our newspapers and magazines. The Brass Check is the price of your shame—you who take the fair body of truth and sell it in the market-place, who betray the virgin hopes of mankind into the loathsome brothel of Big Business.

Upton Sinclair, *The Brass Check: A Study of American Journalism*.²

In his book entitled *Free Culture*, Lawrence Lessig, a US professor of constitutional law, looks into the historical shift that occurred in the area of the legal protection of copyright and its implications for the nature and future of creativity, and freedom of expression. In the chapter on (media) ownership and its effect on creativity he broached the issue of media concentration: “My view was that concentration wouldn’t matter. I thought it was nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the contrary, I am beginning to change my mind. [...] If a handful of companies controls access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.”³

Media property is important, and so is concentration in the media field. Those who own the media have an opportunity to influence what we will (and what we will not) read, hear or view, as well as how the events, individuals or phenomena will be presented. The Slovenian media space, along with its specific »local« traits, is part of the global

1 Eben Moglen, *The dotCommunist Manifesto*, <http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.html> (15.6.2006)

2 Upton Sinclair, *The Brass Check, A Study of American Journalism*; the English quotation was taken from the on-line edition of the book available at <http://www.teleread.org/brasscheck.htm>

3 Lawrence Lessig, *Free Culture*. The quotation in English was taken from the on-line edition available at <http://free-culture.org/freecontent/>.

media empire, and as such it is susceptible to global trends. The concentration of media in the hands of a small group of owners affects not only the offering but also working conditions within the media industry. The situation of journalists, the changed conditions of their work, interventions on the part of media owners in the production of programming content and control over the operation of media companies are all issues that affect not only the variety of content but also the citizens' right to free expression. Without free, open and professional media, there is no democracy.

This essay presents the basic outline of the situation in the media field in Slovenia and draws attention to certain trends that reduce journalists' (media) autonomy. The story about the Slovenian media is a story about the continual influence on the media of media owners and politics (with the government being one of the major media owners). It has a history that can be traced back to the early 1990s when Slovenia chose a specific form of media privatization. The present government's involvement in the removals and appointments of supervisory and management boards members, editors-in-chief and editors should be considered within the wider context of shifts that occurred during the period of transition in Slovenia. Instead of leading to less influence of politics on the media, media privatization in Slovenia resulted in politics having an even greater influence than in the past.

Amendments to the RTV Slovenia Act and the Mass Media Act, the introduction of a third national channel that would be part of public service television and would transmit, unedited, the sessions of the National Assembly and its committees, and demands for plurality and balanced media – these were the most important topics of public debate following the parliamentary elections in 2004. When in March 2006 the State Department published its regular annual report on the situation of human rights around the world, the part of the report that refers to freedom of expression and media freedom in Slovenia became the focus of polemical public debate joined by politicians and the media. From the 14 lines of this report,⁴ there were singled out only those parts that could serve as proof of the claim that there was no media plurality in Slovenia and that there were examples of direct governmental influence on the media. The government asserted that this problematic state of affairs

⁴ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March, 8, 2005. Available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61675.htm> (last accessed on June 10, 2006)

had been inherited from the previous government so the situation within the media must be put in order, while the opposition parties were of the opinion that these circumstances resulted from changes to media legislation and from staff replacements in media companies that were brought about by the current government.

What exactly does the report say? It states that media in Slovenia “were active and independent but did not express a broad range of political views. The major print media were supported through private investment and advertising; however, the government owned substantial stock in many companies that were shareholders in the major media houses.” The report also says that “there were reports of indirect government influence on the media.”

The fact that the deputies to the National Assembly eventually adopted a decision to translate the report in its entirety, arguing that the report as a whole, rather than its parts, should be the subject of future debate, illustrates one of the basic problems of Slovenian politics and politicians – their continual need to discuss the media and its reporting. Is there a lack of plurality on the Slovenian media market, and do we have “proof” that the government exerts influence over editorial policies through its stakes in the media? These are the questions that best describe the “underlying principles” of Slovenian media policy over the past 15 years. For Slovenian politics, the issue of media policy has always (and above all) been a political issue.

Despite everything, government representatives have repeatedly assured the public that the state was not a significant media owner. In support of this argument they listed the state’s interests in the media, but only transparent ones, while deliberately ignoring the fact that these stakes represent only a small fraction of the story about the Slovenian media owners, their property and the ways in which they manage that property. The thesis that the government does not have direct influence on the media was disproved by events that took place within a few months of the parliamentary elections in November 2004 and the subsequent change in government. This period was characterized by hasty drafting of new laws on public service radio and television and mass media, staff replacements in media companies and finally the non-transparent trading in shares. Today, one-and-a-half years later, most of the largest Slovenian media (public service radio and television and three daily newspapers, among others) are led by new executives

who succeeded their predecessors prematurely, before the expiration of the latter's terms in office. This reshuffle would not have been possible without interference on the part of the government.

In order to understand what (formal) media owners in Slovenia expect to gain from their property, we have to explain how they got hold of that (media) property and who these owners are. The owners of media owners in Slovenia are commercial companies whose majority owner, whether directly or indirectly, is the state. After enduring the nearly fifteen-year long privatization process, the majority of influential Slovenian daily newspapers "have come a long way" indeed - they are no longer socially owned but have ended up in the hands of the state. This unusual state of affairs is a result of the privatization of social property that began in the 1990s and was accompanied by debates on how to privatize the media while preventing an outcome in which the state would become their majority owner. However, media privatization has never been an (exclusively) economic issue. Media ownership is not an ordinary kind of ownership. Politicians have always seen media ownership as a tool that enables influence over potential voters and creates opportunities for controlling the space in which public debate takes place.

For this reason, the story about the privatization of the three major Slovenian daily newspapers, *Delo*, *Dnevnik* and *Večer*, has become just one among many similar incomplete and uninvestigated privatization stories.

DELO, OR HOW IT ALL BEGAN

To illustrate the process of media privatization in Slovenia, we will first describe the reorganization of *Delo*, the main daily newspaper in Slovenia. Originally owned by the state and later turned into a socially owned company during the socialist era, *Delo* became, after 15 years of privatization, a company worth 20 billion Slovenian tolar, with the state being its majority shareholder, thanks to ownership links among the companies in its possession.

Towards the end of 1989, the Reorganization Board of ČGP *Delo* announced a proposal based on the then Enterprise Law that *Delo* should become a parent company with five affiliated sister companies. The parent company was to be formed out of several existing units (then called Basic Organizations of Associated Labor or BOAL), i.e. *Delo*, *Naši razgledi*, *Revije*, *Prodaja*, *Stik*, and a part of the joint administration service. The sister companies were to include *Grafika*, *Novi Tednik*, *Globus*, *Gospodarski vestnik* and *Studio Marketing* (*Interno Delo*, November 1989, Referendumu na pot (Towards the Referendum), December 1989). In June 1990, *Delo* BOAL became the founder of the newspaper *Delo* by a resolution of the Worker's Assembly. The resolution was approved by the Worker's Council and its external members. On June, 18, 1990 the *Delo* daily carried the following statement: "In this way *Delo* will officially become an independent newspaper not affiliated to any political party and serving the interests of the Slovene public" (*Delo*, 18 June 1990). In a survey conducted by *Delo* (23 June 1990), 51.5% of respondents were of the opinion that *Delo* had made the right move because such a newspaper must be independent in a multi-party system; 15.9% of respondents thought that it was the right move but that the newspaper should be supervised by representatives of the independent public; 24.5% of respondents answered that politics and journalism were two completely separate worlds and that a newspaper should depend primarily on its readership and market success.

The transformation process of the former BOAL *Delo* into an independent, socially-owned enterprise was concluded with the registration of the company *Delo d.o.o.* (limited liability company) in Ljubljana in April 1991. *Delo*'s transformation gave rise to a number of public debates. The *Demokracija* weekly newspaper carried (on 24 July, 1990) a letter, signed by representatives of the Socialist Alliance

of Workers which founded the former ČGP Delo, in which they stated that they agreed with the transfer of founder rights. However, they explicitly stressed that the transfer did not apply to their ownership rights in ČGP Delo and that “the signatories do not renounce their ownership rights in the newspaper *Delo* and ČGP Delo.” *Delo* published in the same issue an answer by Stane Stanič, then the Minister of Information, in which he stressed that “in recent years Delo received more than three-quarters of the total budget resources allocated to daily newspapers in the republic” (Delo, 24 July, 1990).

In November 1995 the Privatization Agency issued an approval (the second in a series), by which *Delo* became a joint-stock company. The original capital, which was to be converted into shares in the privatization process, amounted to 670 million Slovenian tolar (SIT). A survey made by the company management at the time showed that 93% of *Delo*’s employees supported the ownership transformation by which the employees would become the majority shareholder. The goals of the privatization, as they were explained to the future shareholders, were as follows: to preserve the autonomy and independence of the company, to achieve better business results and to ensure the highest possible standard of living and working conditions for the employees, which would be based on capital gains, among other things. The company decided on the following privatization scheme: 40% of the social capital was allocated to state funds, namely the *Pension Fund* (10%, currently KAD), the *Indemnification Fund* (10%, currently SOD) and the *Development Fund* (20%), while the employees were to become 60% owners. The internal buyout scheme was as follows: 20% of the property was distributed to the employees, their close family members, former and retired employees in exchange for ownership certificates, 22% was to be sold through internal buyout, and 18% was to be sold to *Delo*’s readers.

In January 1999, *Delo* became the first media company in Slovenia listed on the Ljubljana stock exchange. Until that time the company’s shares had been sold on the gray market within the company, where their value rose to 7,000 SIT⁵ by the end of 1998. Once listed on the stock exchange, their value radically increased and amounted to 19,000 SITs within a single week (*Slovenski delničar*, 6 March, 1999).

5 The accounting value of *Delo*’s shares was 2000 SIT in 1997; by the end of 1997 it rose to 2500 SIT and by the end of 1998 to 3600 SIT.

At the end of December 2000, the share value was slightly over 15,000 SIT; at the end of December 2001 it was 13,600 SIT, and at the end of December 2002 it almost doubled. In December 2002 Delo share was worth 29,000 SIT, in August 2004 more than 30,000 SIT, and a year later, in August 2005, it was 30,700 SIT. In 1995, *Delo's* worth was estimated at 670 million Slovenian tolar, and today its value is more than 20 billion Slovenian tolar.

The original idea that *Delo* should remain in the possession of its employees, former employees, their family members and readers was betrayed. Employees mainly sold off their shares. The largest single owner among them today is Tit Doberšek, the former editor-in-chief of *Delo*. Journalists, employees and former employees, who actually had the opportunity to retain the ownership of *Delo*, simply sold this opportunity to the highest bidders. So the 60% stake held by internal owners was reduced to a less than 10% stake, while the share of external owners increased, and the reason is primarily the concentration of capital in the hands of a single owner. (Table 1)

Trading in *Delo* shares has never been motivated exclusively by business interests, despite the public assurances of those involved. Two weeks before he was released from duty in July 2000, the managing director of *Kapitalska družba* sold 5.5% of the company's stake in *Delo*. The price was approximately 700 million Slovenian tolar, and the shares were sold to *Cobito*, *Gorenje*⁶, and *Emona Maxi-market*. This was the maximum percentage of shares that could be sold without obtaining approval at the company meeting (given the political changes at the time, it is very likely that such approval could not have been obtained at all). This transaction provided clear evidence that media ownership (at least in the view of the government) is primarily a political asset.

When in 2003 *Pivovarna Laško* (Laško Brewery) purchased a one-quarter stake in *Delo* from *Krekova družba*, the other potential buyer, *DZS*, stated that *Pivovarna Laško* had overpaid. In reply to the question from the *Finance's* journalist, "Why does *Pivovarna Laško* want to invest in *Delo*?" the Chairman of the Management Board of *DZS*, Bojan Petan, answered: "I believe that *Pivovarna Laško* bought *Delo* for themselves [...]. I think that they paid around

6 After the fire destroyed some parts of the Gorenje production facilities, the government led by PM Andrej Bajuk required that Gorenje sell its share in *Delo* if it wanted to obtain aid from the government.

TABLE 1: CHANGES IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF DELO 2000 – 2006

%	SEPTEMBER 2002	%	DECEMBER 2003	%	SEPTEMBER 2004	%	JANUARY 2005	%	JUNE 2006
25.000	ZVON I PID	24.989	PIVOVARNA LAŠKO	24.989	PIVOVARNA LAŠKO	24.989	PIVOVARNA LAŠKO	24.990	PIVOVARNA LAŠKO
11.720	SOD	11.720	SOD	11.720	SOD	12.105	INFOND HOLDING	20.000	KD holding
7.630	MAKSIMA I	11.096	ID MAKSIMA	11.096	ID MAKSIMA	11.720	SOD	11.720	SOD
6.180	KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA	7.465	KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA	9.166	INFOND ID	9.166	INFOND ID	9.170	INFOND ID
5.130	NFD I INVESTICIJSKI SKLAD	6.803	INFOND ID	7.761	INFOND HOLDING	6.719	KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA	7.800	Maksima
4.650	INFOND ID	5.129	NFD I INVESTICIJSKI SKLAD	6.717	KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA	2.878	MODRA LINIJA	6.170	KAD
2.040	POTEZA NALOŽBE	2.878	MODRA LINIJA	3.129	KBM INFOND DZU	1.049	APIH JURIJ	2.490	MODRA LINIJA
2.020	GORENJE	2.160	BANKA KOPER	2.878	MODRA LINIJA	0.962	ZLATA MONETA	1.470	ABANKA
1.798	APIH JURIJ	2.023	GORENJE	1.453	APIH JURIJ			0.950	PETROL
1.510	ZAVAROVALNICA TRIGLAV	1.498	APIH JURIJ					0.830	TIT DOBRŠEK
1.495	MODRA LINIJA	1.113	KBM INFOND DZU						

Comments: In December 2000, small shareholders held 36.85% of all shares in Delo, but as early as September 2002 their share had decreased radically. In December 2003, Pivovarna Laško (Laško Brewery) became the largest single shareholder of Delo with a 24.99% interest. Other larger shareholders were sod, id Maksima, kad and Infond id. The latest major change occurred when kd Group purchased a 20% stake towards the end of 2005.

36,000 SIT per share, a price, which, in my opinion, is too high. It amounts to 6 billion tolar for a one-quarter stake in *Delo*.” (Finance, February 5, 2003). On February 5, 2003, the price of *Delo* shares was 26,407 SIT.⁷ Managers at *Pivovarna Laško* obviously decided that investment in *Delo* was so lucrative that it was worth paying a premium for the shares. Was the decision of *Pivovarna Laško*’s managers in harmony with the interests of its shareholders? Was their purchase of the stake in *Delo* a good business decision or a good political investment?

An overview of the „redistribution“ of *Delo* shares shows that the basic aim of the trading in *Delo* shares was to prevent the „right-wing“ owner from obtaining a more than one-half stake that would have given it the opportunity to influence the editorial policy of *Delo*. The argument that *Pivovarna Laško* purchased the stake in *Delo* (primarily) to secure the domination of the political „left-wing,“ rather than to pursue an (alleged) business interest, could be countered by another argument – that by selling the one-quarter stake in *Delo* for 6 billion tolar, *Krekova družba* closed a deal that was one of the rare (or the only) economically justified business transactions on the media market. However, the situation is not as simple as that. *Krekova družba* actually realized that, given the dispersed ownership structure and the links among individual owners of *Delo*, it could not possibly come by a majority stake, so it decided to make the best of what it had at hand. The buyers of *Delo* shares (at first glance unrelated companies, but in reality linked to the government) obtained the opportunity (and later exploited it) to influence its editorial policy. Those in the majority on the supervisory board appoint the management board members, who appoint the editor-in-chief, who appoints individual editors. The ostensibly “closed door” separating politics from journalism was in effect wide open all the time.

The ownership structure of the two daily newspapers with the largest circulation, i.e. *Delo* and *Slovenske novice*, may seem to many entirely self-evident from today’s perspective. Yet, like many other privatization stories from the period of transition, this one has its peculiar history too. How did *Slovenske novice* come to be owned by *Delo*? In 1993 the company HIT posed several public questions to *Delo*’s management board regarding alleged irregularities during the privatization process. *Delo* presumably founded a bypass company in order to exercise ownership control

⁷ <http://dd.delo.si/datoteke/podatki2003.xls>.

over *Slovenske novice*, in which capital injections by some leading people from *Delo* radically departed from those of other employees. Indeed the company's register of shareholders lists 148 journalists working for *Delo* and *Slovenske novice*. In an interview given to *Fokus* (9/10, July/August 1993), Danilo Slivnik, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Delo* at the time, commented on the journalist's observation that *Novice* was a classic example of a by-pass company: "This is not true. *Slovenske novice*'s capital structure is completely transparent, with 51% of the capital private and 49% of it socially-owned, with this ratio later being changed to 60:40 in favor of the former through capital injections. The socially owned part will now be privatized. This is similar to what happened with *Delo*. *Delo* granted *Slovenske novice* a loan at 8% interest. We take every precaution when it comes to the privatization process, since we know that many would readily impute irregularities to us".⁸ The questions that may be asked in this connection are which private and which socially-owned capital was used to establish *Slovenske novice*? How was socially-owned capital privatized? Who received the loan and under what terms, and how was the sale of ownership stakes carried out?

When in 1990 *Delo* launched its (pre)privatization plan, it created a mother company and five sister companies. What happened to these companies, and who are their owners today? The *Naši razgledi* weekly folded because it brought a loss to the *Delo d.d.* joint-stock company, despite generous subsidies provided by the Ministry of Culture. *Delo Revije* is owned by *Delo TČR*, *Alpress* and *Delo prodaja* (Vojko Pehtrevec and Igor Savič are two major individual shareholders). The largest owners of *Delo prodaja* are *Iskra commerce d.o.o.*, *DZS*, *Zvon ena holding* and *SOD*. Among its sister companies, the one-third owners of *Novi tednik* (*NT&RC*, *Novi tednik* and *Radio Celje*) are *Atka Prima d.o.o.* (whose CEO is Boško Šrot, the CEO of *Pivovarna Laško*, the biggest single owner of *Delo*), *Anica Šrot Aužner*, *SOD* and *Delo TČR*. *Gospodarski vestnik* was privatized through an internal buyout, whereby the shares were sold to its managers, and it then folded after 54 years of presence on the market. *Studio Marketing* became one of the largest advertising agencies in Slovenia (part of *JWT*).

8 Sandra B. Hrvatinić and Marko Milosavljević, 2001. *Medijska politika v Sloveniji v devetdesetih* (Media Policy in Slovenia in the 1990s), p.20.

WHO OWNS THE SLOVENIAN MEDIA?

The answer to the question of who owns *Delo*, *Slovenske novice*, *Dnevnik*, *Večer* and *Primorske novice* is not as simple as it may seem at first glance, since the list of owners based on the register of shareholders does not reveal the complete picture.

TABLE 2: THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF DELO

%	JUNE 2006
24.990	PIVOVARNA LAŠKO
20.000	KD HOLDING
11.720	SOD
9.170	INFOND ID
7.800	MAKSIMA
6.170	KAD
2.490	MODRA LINIJA
1.470	ABANKA
0.950	PETROL
0.830	TIT DOBERŠEK

Source: KDD.

TABLE 3: THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF VEČER

%	JUNE 2006
36.530	INFOND HOLDING
20.000	DELO
14.990	INFOND ID
10.001	SOD
7.150	LEYKAM
6.940	DELO PRODAJA

Source: KDD.

Comment: The ownership structure of the Delo daily newspaper is identical to that of Slovenske novice. Among its largest owners are Pivovarna Laško, with a 24.99% share, and KD Holding d. d., with a 19.99% share. KD Holding became a Delo shareholder on November 18, 2005, when it “handed over” to Infond holding its 3% stake in Mercator in exchange for shares in Delo.⁹ At the same time, Delo has a 20%

⁹ The price of Delo shares was 25% higher than its price on the stock exchange (on November 18, 2005 its price on the stock exchange was 30,030.82 tolar, while KD Holding paid 37,910.00 tolar). KD Holding explained this transaction as being a long-term investment from which they expected a corresponding profit. On

stake in Večer for which it paid 665 million tolar. Večer d. d. has a 6.5% share in Dnevnik d. d., the publisher of the Dnevnik daily.

TABLE 4: THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF DNEVNIK

%	JUNE 2006
51.050	DZS
25.740	STYRIA MEDIEN AG
10.110	KAD
6.520	ČZP VEČER
2.710	MOBITEL

Source: KDD.

Comments: Dnevnik d.d. is a 12% owner of Primorske novice.¹⁰ A 51% owner of the Dnevnik newspaper is DZS, which is also a 19% owner of Delo Prodaja. Delo Prodaja has a stake of nearly 7% in Večer and a 21.5% stake in DZS. DZS is a majority owner of the Direkt magazine.

A look at the stakes in daily newspapers held by the two pseudo-state funds, SOD and KAD, shows that KAD has a 6% interest in *Delo* and a 10% interest in *Dnevnik*, while SOD has an 11% interest in *Delo* and a 10% interest in *Večer*. Consequently, the state is the second largest shareholder of *Delo* through its two funds. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. A closer look at the ownership structure of the largest single shareholders in *Delo* (*Pivovarna Laško*, *KD Holding d.d.* and *Infond ID*) shows that KAD, *Infond holding* and *Infond ID* together have an interest in *Pivovarna Laško* that exceeds 30%. The remaining owners are investment companies founded by banks and insurance companies in which KAD and SOD have considerable interests and whose owner is still the state, either directly or indirectly. Significant shareholders of *Infond holding* and *Infond ID* are the *Radenska* company, whose majority owner is *Pivovarna Laško*, and *Nova KBM* bank, the mother company. The majority shareholders of *Nova KBM* are KAD, SOD and *Triglav*, with the combined KAD and SOD shares amounting to 80%. *Infond holding's* and *Infond ID's* combined share in the publisher of the newspaper *Večer* amounts to 63%. As regards the ownership of weekly newspapers, the picture is as follows: the *Mag* weekly is owned by *Delo d.d.*,

May 5, 2006 the price of Delo shares was 24,611.11 SIT, and on May 31, 2006 it was 25,819.20 SIT.

¹⁰ In addition to Dnevnik d.d., other large owners of Primorske novice are Banka Koper d.d., Primorje d.d., Forma Inn Koper, Luka Koper and Hit d.d.


and the *Demokracija* weekly is owned by the Slovenian Democratic Party (whose leader is the Prime Minister of Slovenia) and Dušan S. Lajovic. The significant owners of the weekly *Mladina* are *Delo* TČR, in which *Delo Revije* has a 10% interest. (Figure 1)


Neither does a simple listing of official owners reveal everything. A more complete picture emerges when one exposes the links between the members of management or supervisory boards of companies that are the official owners of individual media outlets and companies that are not direct media owners but are in a position to influence the interests they represent (and over which they have control). Power over the media is therefore closely connected with economic power and, undoubtedly, with virtually imperceptible yet definitely present political power. The appointment of a chairperson or a board member of a Slovenian daily newspaper is by no means (just) a business decision but primarily a political issue. “The political” aspect of media ownership is best demonstrated by the relationships among the supervisory board, management board, editor-in-chief and employees of a media company.

Unlike the owners of foreign media corporations, who openly expect that the media will operate in harmony with their interests, media owners in Slovenia have been repeatedly assuring the public that the media are “just a lucrative investment that earns good money” and that they (the owners) do not feel the need to influence editorial policy. When in early 2003 *Pivovarna Laško* became the one-quarter owner of *Delo* d.d., the chairman of its management board at the time, Tone Turnšek, stated in an interview for “his newspaper”: “We are aware that this is the main Slovenian daily newspaper that significantly influences Slovenian public opinion. Were we guided by political interests (when purchasing a stake in it), the investment would probably be more to our disadvantage than to our advantage. It is not our intention to influence editorial policy, and we do expect that *Delo* will treat us critically, but in a correct and honest manner” (*Delo*, February 22, 2003). It is hard to say which business objectives *Pivovarna Laško* fulfilled through this purchase, but what can be said with certainty is that in November 2005 it exchanged its one-quarter stake in *Delo* for a 3% interest in *Mercator*, the largest Slovenian retailer. The non-transparent trade in the shares of media companies escalated after 2000. One interesting question is when and why the two pseudo-state funds, KAD and SOD,

retained or sold their interests in the media. Why did they retain their stakes in *Delo*, but sell those in *Dnevnik* (SOD) and *Večer* (KAD)? Did they conclude that it was necessary to retain their influence over the most important national daily, while *Dnevnik* and *Večer* could be dropped? Let us consider the case of *Dnevnik*. In April 2002 SOD sold its stake in *Dnevnik* to DZS, without a public bid and without checking whether someone else was willing to offer more money. Indeed, there was at least one buyer who would have been prepared to pay more. That was *KD Holding*, which had a 25.57% interest in *Dnevnik* (0.9% lower than that held by DZS). By purchasing the ownership stake from SOD, DZS began to increase its share in *Dnevnik*, so within five months (by September 2002) it had a 43% stake in *Dnevnik* and in 2003 it became *Dnevnik*'s majority owner. If SOD's decision in 2002 to sell its interest in *Dnevnik* was based on business results exclusively, then it would be interesting to see what the price of this stake would be today. In 2002, DZS paid 372 million Slovenian tolar for an 8% stake in *Dnevnik*. Today, it is worth 1.1 billion Slovenian tolar. It is not the state that profited from such a difference in price, but DZS itself. The ownership structure shows that *Dnevnik* is owned by companies whose greatest owner is DZS itself. In May 2006, the German publishing corporation WAZ entered the Slovenian media market by purchasing a one-quarter stake in *Dnevnik* through the joint company DZS-WAZ Mediji. (Figure 2)


FIGURE 1: THE LINKS AMONG THE OWNERS OF THE SLOVENIAN PRINT MEDIA





Source: KDD (June 2006) and Media register.

FIGURE 2: OWNERSHIP LINKS BETWEEN DZS AND DNEVNIK



* The address is the same as for Fond Invest.
Source: kdb (June 2006) and Media register.

PROFITABILITY OF SLOVENIAN GENERAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

The high return on investment in the three main daily newspapers compared to the return on investment in other business areas is just one of two main reasons behind the incessant efforts of media owners to increase their interests. The other reason is the influence obtained through media ownership. What are the business results of the largest Slovenian daily newspapers? In 2004, net return on capital in *Delo* was 12.3%, in *Večer* it was 14.7% and in *Dnevnik* 27.8%. In 2004, net profit in *Delo* was 729,216 million Slovenian tolar; in *Dnevnik* it was 166,992 million tolar (this profit was 10.49% higher than in 2003). The picture emerging from the comparison of income per employee is somewhat different, though. *Dnevnik* exceeded the average by one quarter, *Delo* by five percentage points, while at *Večer* this index was a little more than 30% below the average. The net capital gain in *Dnevnik* is proportionally very high, among other reasons, because of lower labor costs with respect to business results, while in *Delo* capital gain was lower because of lower income. It is hence possible to expect that in the future *Delo*'s managers will focus on reducing labor costs (lower salaries and job shedding). *Večer* already has lower salaries compared to *Dnevnik* and *Delo*, but its income is also lower.¹¹

11 The author of table 5 and of the data analysis is Iztok Jurančič, the president of the Trade Union of Journalists.

TABLE 5: BUSINESS RESULTS OF THE DAILY

BALANCE SHEET DATA									
in '000 tolar									
Publisher	No. of employees	total revenues	sales revenues	assets	equity capital	net earnings	total expenses	salaries	labor costs
DELO D.D.	454	14,001.300	13,890.800	8,289.591	5,982.080	729.216	13,066.169	3,174.527	4,469.922
DNEVNIK D.D.	207	7,526.344	7,257.123	3,101.601	1,882.217	486.069	6,909.924	1,248.550	1,732.892
ČZP VEČER D.D.	221	4,326.450	4,261.555	1,550.095	1,132.444	166.992	4,109.105	1,134.729	1,571.947
SKUPAJ	882	25,854.094	25,409.478	12,941.287	8,996.741	1,382.277	24,085.198	5,557.806	7,774.761

Source: Balance sheet data AJPEŠ (IBON, September 2005).

Obviously, media owners reach decisions to buy or sell (or exchange) their stakes primarily on the basis of the “gain” expected on the rather carefully controlled “market of ideas.” Apart from the Austrian company *Styria Medien AG*, which owns a one-quarter stake in *Dnevnik* and is the sole owner of the weekly *Žurnal*, and the Swedish corporation *Bonnier* which owns *Finance*, other media owners in Slovenia manage their interests in media companies in accordance with their political interests.

The influence of politics on Slovenian media was clearly explained by Horst Pirker, the Chairman of the Board at *Styria Medien AG*: “In my opinion, the influence of politics in Slovenia is traditional, and it has been present for some time. Politics traditionally had control over the Slovenian media [...] The government’s control over the media has been increasing. *Delo*, the largest Slovenian newspaper publisher, is explicitly controlled. I’d say that the situation within the state television organization is not much different either. Even *DZS*, the main owner of *Dnevnik*, is probably under the government’s control. This means that all the important media, save for *Finance* and *Žurnal*, are under the government’s control [...] The Slovenian media do not deserve such an influence from politics. The attitude of the Slovenian political establishment towards the media is unacceptable and untenable.”¹²

¹² *Finance*, May 23, 2006 (pp.4-5), “Vpliv politike v Sloveniji je neznosen” (The Influence of Politics in Slovenia is Untenable), an interview with the Chairman of the Executive Board of *Styria Medien AG*, Horst Pirker.

NEWSPAPERS *Delo*, *Dnevnik* AND *Večer*

MARKET SHARES			SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX				
in percentages			in per- centages		in '000 tolar per employee			index =the observed avarage is 100				
								profitability		labor cost per employee		
total revenues	sales revenues	assets	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenues	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenues	labor costs	salaries
54.16	54.67	64.06	12.19	8.80	30.840	9.846	6.992	79.4	82.4	105.2	111.7	111.0
29.11	28.56	23.97	25.82	15.67	36.359	8.371	6.032	168.1	146.7	124.0	95.0	95.7
16.73	16.77	11.98	14.75	10.77	19.577	7.113	5.135	96.0	100.9	66.8	80.7	81.5
100.00	100.00	100.00	15.36	10.68	29.313	8.815	6.301	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

For more than a decade now, the state has been carefully guarding its interests in the media and using them to exert political influence. It sold its stakes only when it needed to ensure (political) interests. The ostensibly “silent” and “non-problematic” owner who has never been too particular about the profitability of the investment, guarded its political “added value”, or public opinion value, with the utmost care. The fact that politics has always felt the need to exercise control over the media and wished to exert influence over editorial policy is evident from the statement of the Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel. In his article, carried by the weekly *Mag* in the late spring of 2005, Rupel wrote critically about reporting in the Slovenian media. In his opinion, Slovenia “entered a new phase of the revolutionary settling of accounts with the government of Prime Minister Janez Janša, and that with a view to gaining advantages for the discarded socialist program. The media, which have capital and personal links with the former governmental parties, have special tasks and roles in this.” The minister then “asked” media and their owners “whether their war against the political side that won the elections and received much international recognition had paid off.”¹³ One month later, in an interview given to *Delo's Sobotna priloga* (Saturday Supplement),¹⁴ Rupel gave additional explanations about his view of the media. Asked by the journalist whether he could expand on his statement that some media owners should reconsider their “war against the side that

¹³ Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, “Prihajajo slabi časi?” (We Are In For a Bad Time), *Mag*, June 22, 2005.

¹⁴ “Sem liberalec. Sem vedno to, kar sem” (I’m a liberal. I’m Always What I really Am). An interview with Dr. Rupel in *Sobotna priloga*. June 7, 2005. All interviews with and texts by minister Dimitrij Rupel are available at (<http://www.mzz.gov.si/>)

won the elections”, he answered; “It is very simple and you understand well what I wanted to say.” To the journalist’s comment that in the societies that Slovenia should consider as models, the winning side does not control the media, the minister answered: “Well, it is like this: Slovenia has had too little time and too few opportunities to make real differentiation among the media. We have just one kind of media.”

Any naive conviction that the state has not actively interfered with editorial policies because of some (politically motivated) “pact on non-aggression” can most easily be disproved by considering a recent dismissal and appointment of the editor-in-chief of *Delo*. It is precisely such dismissals and appointments of editors-in-chief that point to the interference of owners with editorial policies.

REMOVAL, APPOINTMENT,
REMOVAL, APPOINTMENT ...

In mid July 2005, the supervisory board of *Delo d.d.* proposed that the management board replace the then editor-in-chief, Darijan Košir, and appoint Jani Virk to fill his position. Their statement read: “The decision about the replacement comes as a result of differing views on the editorial policy of the paper. The basic orientation of *Delo* as a quality, serious, relevant, and credible daily will remain unchanged. Darijan Košir will remain with *Delo d.d.* and will participate actively in the most important projects.”¹⁵ At meeting held on July 18, 2005, *Delo*’s management board adopted a resolution, in accordance with Article 9.2. of its statute, to begin a procedure by which Jani Virk would replace Darijan Košir as editor-in-chief. In mid September the board adopted a resolution by which it removed Darijan Košir. It was stated that Košir’s term would end when the supervisory board approved the appointment of the new editor-in-chief. At its session held on September 30, 2005, the supervisory board approved the proposal put forward by the management board and appointed Jani Virk editor-in-chief for a five-year term.

On October 7, 2005, the management board announced that Jani Virk had resigned. “The appointed editor-in-chief of *Delo*, Jani Virk, informed the board that he would not take up this position. Consequently, Darijan Košir remains editor-in-chief and retains full authorization until the appointment of a new editor-in-chief.” One week later (on October 12, 2005), *Delo* featured a text signed by the editor-in-chief, Darijan Košir and the editorial board: “On July 17, 2005, that is to say, one day before the replacement procedure was initiated, *Delo*’s editorial board proposed that the management board of *Delo d.d.* re-appoint the then editor-in-chief, Darijan Košir. Since the appointment of a new editor-in-chief ended with the resignation of the candidate, the editorial board proposed, in harmony with the media legislation and the statute of *Delo d.d.*, that the management board should declare void the replacement of Darijan Košir, which, although approved by the supervisory board had not been confirmed formally, nor had the date of the replacement been confirmed.” At its session on October 13, 2005, the supervisory board annulled the resolution on the

15 All communiqués by *Delo*’s supervisory and management boards cited in this text are available at <http://dd.delo.si/invest-cenovno.php>

appointment of Jani Virk. "For the time being, Darijan Košir remains the editor-in-chief and retains all authorizations."

In early February 2006, the Chairman of the Management Board, Danilo Slivnik, proposed the appointment of Peter Jančič (a journalist with and editor of *Večer*) as editor-in-chief. On February 17, 2006 a working group composed of *Delo*'s journalists rejected Slivnik's proposal (of 170 employees altogether, only 17 voted for Peter Jančič). Despite such an outcome, on February 28, 2006 the supervisory board of *Delo* approved the appointment of Peter Jančič, and on March 2, 2006, Jančič started as editor-in-chief. The board of the working group of *Delo* journalists commented thus on the developments: "The new management board and the new supervisory board continue to disregard the opinion of journalists, and in this case they even acted against the plebiscitary will of the editorial board."¹⁶ The new editor-in-chief soon announced staff replacements, including inside editorial board, and the replacement of the Saturday Supplement editor. The last issue of the Saturday Supplement that should have been edited by the previous editor, Ervin Hladnik Milharčič, appeared on April 29, 2006, but without the editorial commentary scheduled to appear on page 2,¹⁷ and without an announced interview with the former Chairman of Mercator's Management Board, Zoran Janković.¹⁸ These disputes among the editors and journalists were taking place before the eyes of *Delo*'s readers throughout April. The editor-in-chief, Peter Jančič, explained his programming and editorial decisions in a regular Saturday column. So, for example, on April 15, 2006, he wrote that the open letter from the board of journalists' working group,

16 Article 18 of the Mass Media Act stipulates that "before appointing or dismissing an editor-in-chief, the publisher must obtain an opinion from the editorial board unless stronger influence on the part of the editorial board is stipulated in the basic legal act".

17 According to *Delo* d.d.'s statute, "the editor-in-chief formulates editorial policy in collaboration with other editors. Within the framework of the adopted programming concept, the editor in chief is authorized to implement and is responsible for the implementation of the business and programming plan in coordination with the management board (Article 10.4). Article 10.7 of the Statute further stipulates that "based on solid reason an editor may reject the publication of any journalistic text. The editor-in-chief may invalidate any editorial decision of a subordinate editor based on solid reasons."

18 The controversies surrounding the last issue of *Saturday Supplement* edited by Ervin Hladnik Milharčič were recorded by Neva Nahtigal. See "Novinarska avtonomija utopljena v kozarcu piva, temnega" (Journalists' Autonomy Drowned in A Glass Of Beer, Dark beer), *Media Watch journal*, May, 2006, No 25-26 (pp. 30-31). One of the journalists who conducted the interview with the Chairman of Mercator, Mr. Zoran Janković, said in a letter addressed to the leader of the union of *Delo*'s journalists that, owing to pressure from the board members, he had been forced to drop the interview already conducted and to give up his intention to hand it to the deputy editor-in-chief of the *Saturday Supplement*.

in which they opposed his decisions, could appear in *Delo* only as a paid advertisement, while as the reason for the replacement of the *Saturday Supplement* editor, he cited insufficient education.¹⁹ “In the case of the top chiefs of *Delo*’s editorial boards, they must have completed at least a university course. No matter what journalists’ organizations, trade union and other activists say.”²⁰

In a public letter the president of the board of the journalists’ working group, Jože Poglajen said, “*Delo* is the most conspicuous victim of the political purge that has affected the print media in the country. The new chairman of the management board and ‘his’ new editor-in-chief are, despite their assurances to the contrary, simply executors of a political will that has nothing to do with the modernization of newspaper content or the improvement of business results. The motive behind the changes in the ownership structure and executive bodies is clear: full subordination of the newspaper to the current political leaders.”²¹

Since 2000, Slovenian daily newspapers have seen many replacements. The chairpersons of the management boards and editors in chief of *Delo* and *Večer* were replaced three times during this period. The editor-in-chief of *Dnevnik* was appointed in 2001; in April 2006 the newspaper *Finance* merged the functions of the director and editor-in-chief. The most recent changes took place at *Primorske novice*, where NS replaced the CEO, while the editor-in-chief resigned for personal reasons.²²

When editors are replaced, business results are poor, circulation decreases and the price of advertising space falls, the first task of an owner who truly cares about his property is to secure the investment. It is content and credibility that sell newspapers. However, if the newspaper itself and the relationship between its employees and managers become the topical story covered by other media, then the value of the investment is reduced day by day. And that is precisely what has been happening in Slovenia.

19 Before he became the editor in chief of *Delo*’s *Saturday Supplement*, Ervin Hladnik Milharčič was *Delo*’s us and Middle East correspondent. Before he came to *Delo*, he worked as a journalist for the *Mladina* weekly.

20 Peter Jančič, “Hoja po robu stolpnice” (Walking Along the Edge of a High Rise), *Delo*, April 15, 2006 (p.5)


21 A letter from the president of the board of *Delo*’s working group entitled “Poziv k uporni držbi” (A Call For a Resistance Stand), was published in the Readers’ Letters section.

22 For a detailed overview of personnel changes in Slovenian media companies, see Neva Nahtigal’s text in the *Media Watch* journal, May 2006, No. 25-26, (pp. 27-29).

TABLE 6: DAILY NEWSPAPERS – NUMBER OF COPIES SOLD

	Delo	Večer	Dnevnik	Slovenske novice	Finance
VII–IX 2004	78.125	50.878	46.839	89.758	8.078
X–XII 2004	76.574	50.363	46.406	88.322	9.033
I–III 2005	75.231	50.304	48.075	90.421	11.167
IV–VI 2005	73.329	48.902	47.076	89.403	11.326
VII–IX 2005	72.680	48.981	46.811	91.405	11.266
X–XII 2005	71.685	48.272	48.922	89.501	11.491
I–III 2006	69.810	47.425	49.248	91.370	12.019

FIGURE 3: DAILY NEWSPAPERS – NUMBER OF COPIES SOLD
(■ DELO, ■ VEČER, ■ DNEVNIK, ■ SLOVENSKE NOVICE, ■ FINANCE)



Comment: According to the revised data on the copies of print media sold during the periods July to September 2004 and January to March 2006, the number of *Delo*'s copies sold fell by more than 8,300, and that of *Večer* by more than 3,400. During the same period, the number of *Dnevnik*'s copies sold rose by 2,400, and that of *Finance* by 3,900 (almost one quarter).

PERSONNEL CHANGES AS AN INSTRUMENT IN THE STRUGGLE TO ATTRACT ADVERTISERS

According to *Marketing magazin*, in 2005 *Delo* had the most revenue from advertising of all the daily newspapers (more than 3.8 billion tolar). The combined advertising revenue of *Dnevnik* and *Večer* newspapers was lower than that of *Delo* (*Večer* 1.8 billion tolar, and *Dnevnik* 1.7 billion tolar). According to *Mediana*, the total amount spent on advertising in Slovenia in 2005 was 83.5 billion tolar. Of this sum, 11% was spent on advertisements in daily newspapers, and 10% on advertisements in various other magazines.

TABLE 7: THE MAJOR ADVERTISERS IN SLOVENIA

1	P&G	21	BOLTON TRADING
2	RECKITT BENCKISER	22	LOTERIJA SLOVENIJE
3	L'OREAL SLOVENIJA	23	CITROEN SLOVENIJA
4	HENKEL SLOVENIJA	24	OPEL
5	MOBITEL	25	ZAVAROVALNICA TRIGLAV
6	SIMOBIL	26	ENGROTUŠ
7	DANONE	27	COLGATE PALMOLIVE
8	BEIERSDORF	28	DELO REVIJE
9	WRIGLEY	29	GLAXOSMITHKLINE
10	PEJO TRADING	30	VZAJEMNA
11	MERCATOR	31	PETROL
12	DELO	32	MERKUR
13	PORSCHE SLOVENIJA	33	TOYOTA ADRIA
14	MASTER FOODS	34	STUDIO MODERNA
15	RENAULT NISSAN SLOVENIJA	35	BANEX
16	UNILEVER	36	JOHNSON&JOHNSON
17	DNEVNIK	37	PEUGEOT SLOVENIJA
18	JOHNSON WAX	38	SIOL
19	FERRERRO	39	HERVIS
20	SPAR SLOVENIJA	40	TELEKOM SLOVENIJE

Source: *Marketing magazin*, January 2006.

In 2005, the *Demokracija* weekly's revenue from advertising was 70 million tolar, meaning twice as much as in the previous year. The *Mladina* weekly's revenue from advertising was four percent lower than was envisaged in the annual plan. This information is interesting because it points to still

another frequently overlooked form of political influence on the media. *Demokracija* is a political weekly founded by the political party SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party) which over the past few years has frequently struggled because of a lack of advertising. In contrast, *Mladina* is regarded as a “left-leaning” political weekly that is close to the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), currently an opposition party. *Delo* and *Dnevnik* were among the largest advertisers in Slovenia in 2005, with *Delo* occupying position 12 and *Dnevnik* position 17 on the list. The list further includes a number of other companies over which the state exerts significant influence: *Mobitel*, the mobile telephone operator (place 5), other national telecom companies (*Telekom Slovenije* and *Siol*), then *Mercator*, *Slovenian Lottery*, *Triglav Insurance*, and so on. Representatives of these companies, who wished to remain anonymous, assured us on many occasions that their decisions as to where they should place their advertisements were frequently influenced by the state, which told them in which media they should place advertisements and where the “advertising tap” should be turned off. Foreign companies, too, have to observe the same rules of strategic advertising, since they have to cultivate good relationships with important business partners or local authorities. The story of *Hofer*, a discount retailer, which in early February 2006 suddenly withdrew from a contract signed with *Dnevnik* that was worth 100 million tolar, has never been fully explained. The reason stated by *Hofer* was the increase in the price of advertising space in *Dnevnik*, but *Dnevnik* denied this. *Hofer* then continued to advertise in *Delo*, which soon carried an interview with *Hofer*’s regional manager responsible for *Hofer*’s operations in Slovenia.

The struggle for advertisers and readers among the competitive daily newspapers in Slovenia led to the practice of (ab)using newspapers for attacks on various opponents. In an interview given to the *Finance* daily, the Chairman of the Board of *Styria Medien AG* (a 25% owner of *Dnevnik*), described the *Mag* weekly as an “exception in the media world”. “*Mag*’s manner of writing would not be acceptable anywhere else. I feel sorry for *Mag*’s employees” (*Finance*, May 23, 2006). The weekly *Mag*, on the other hand, wrote that *Styria Medien AG* “experienced a financial disaster on the Slovenian market” with its free weekly *Žurnal* (*Mag*, No. 20, 2006). *Mag* also frequently wrote about the business (and ethical) difficulties experienced by the tabloid *Direkt*, which was also a topic mentioned on several occasions in

the commentaries of *Delo*'s editor-in-chief, Peter Jančič. The Chairman of the Management Board of *Delo*, Danilo Slivnik, wrote in his regular column for the *Mag* weekly: "A publisher who wants to increase his profit on the Slovenian market must shift towards popular content in one way or another. It is only there that one can find enough room for higher circulation, and only there, as a rule, is one spared political problems. Experience of foreign investors in media confirms that this is true. The American owners of POP TV created a quite commercialized television station, the Austrian *Styria* laid foundations for the sale of a specific type of journalistic content with its free weekly *Žurnal*, and the Swedish owners of *Finance* allowed the transformation of a rather serious business newspaper into a tabloid that presents numbers in a quite questionable manner."²³ In April of 2006,²⁴ the *Demokracija* weekly featured the salaries of *Delo d.d.* employees, listing the sums received by 86 employees (managers and journalists).

The story about the media owners is also a story about journalism and journalists. As Serge Halimi says in his book "Novi psi čuvaji,"²⁵ "the journalist is more often the prey than the hunter." If journalists are frequently the "prey" of their media owners' interests, their position within the Slovenian media is even more delicate. We have shown that, owing to the specific ownership structure, the owners of general interest daily newspapers are mainly committed to the interests of politics, which manages "its" media property neither with readers' interest in mind nor with a view to earning profit. Political property serves the political interest only and, accordingly, politicians argue for a free (media) market only when they face demands to regulate it in the interest of citizens.

According to data from the Statistical Office of Slovenia, in 2005 there were 1 635 journalists employed at Slovenian media companies. The register of independent journalists maintained by the Ministry of Culture shows that in June 2006 there were 331 independent journalists, while a further 400 journalists had no their independent status legally regulated. According to the Employment Service of

²³ Danilo Slivnik, "Persil sive barve" (Gray Persil), in *Mag*, February 20, 2006 (p.19)

²⁴ Milijonarji na Delu (Delo's Millionaires), in *Demokracija*, April 13, 2006 (pp.18-20). In early June 2006, the officer for information protection issued a decree stipulating that a fine be paid by *Demokracija* for violating the law on the protection of personal data.

²⁵ Serge Halimi, *Novi psi čuvaji* (New Watchdogs). 2004. Ljubljana, Maska, Mediacije book series.

Slovenia, in March 2006 there were 43 unemployed journalists.²⁶ Since October 2004, when journalists went on general strike demanding the regulation of their social rights, no collective agreement to regulate this area has been signed. Neva Nahtigal, who has been focusing on the situation of independent journalists for several years now, has concluded that one third of journalists work without the employment contract and without even the basic legal or social security guarantee.²⁷ A considerable number of journalists are self-employed or they have fictitious contracts with some limited liability company. This type of employment is also found within Pro Plus (the owner of the two largest commercial television channels *POP TV* and *Kanal A*). The majority of executives are not Pro Plus's employees, but bill their services. The Managing Director of Pro Plus is a self-employed person, while the director of news and sports departments is the owner of a limited partnership company.²⁸ In contrast to Pro Plus's executives, the majority of independent journalists working for various media receive low payments for their work and work by contracts that are mainly harmful for them (with the situation of journalists working for local media being the most critical of all).²⁹ Such undefined legal and social situation of journalists has adverse effects on their independence, credibility and professionalism. Uncertainty (low payments, delayed payments, harmful contracts) makes journalists susceptible to pressures exerted by editors, owners and advertisers who require from them to write »paid articles« or PR articles that rather than serving the interest of the public serve the interests of owners

26 Data were collected by Lana Zdravković.

27 Neva Nahtigal. 2006. »Kolektivna pogodba za vse novinarje« (Collective Agreement For All Journalists), *Media Watch journal* (May, 2006), available at <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/26/polozej>

28 Silvester Šurla, »Operacija POP TV« (Operation POP TV), in *Mag*, No. 27, July 5, 2006 (p. 49)

29 Jasmina Potokar Rant analyzed 66 copyright agreements signed between 2003 and 2006 by self-employed and independent journalists working for the print media (25), television (20) radio (16) and a web portal (1) The analysis suggests that media companies are either not acquainted with the copyright law or they hope that journalists are not acquainted with it and will sign whatever is presented to them. The analysis of articles regulating economic rights showed that the media appropriated or wanted to appropriate more rights than legally allowed. Accordingly, 40 copyright agreements did not include the list of economic rights transferred to the media company. Twenty-one agreements had a non-competition clause, which is controversial since a copyright agreement should be signed for one individual piece of work. The majority of agreements (54) did not specify the extent of work, meaning that the quantity of work required from journalists could have been defined arbitrarily although the payment was fixed. See Jasmina Potokar Rant. 2006. *Urejanje statusa samostojnih in svobodnih novinarjev v Sloveniji. Analiza pogodbenih razmerij (Regulating the Status of Independent Journalists in Slovenia. The Analysis of Work Agreements)*. Ljubljana: FDV (a diploma work).

and advertisers. As a result, the once clear distinction between advertising (PR) and journalism has gradually become blurred, but the managers of media companies and their journalists have never alerted their readers, listeners and viewers to this fact.³⁰

The study of potential influence of media owners on whether or not a certain story will be featured and of their influence on editorial and journalists' autonomy should therefore be directed at uncovering the concrete pressures exerted on journalists. In one of the first research studies concerned with this problem, indeed conducted on a non-representative sample,³¹ the author³² used a simple questionnaire in an attempt to establish who exerted influence on journalists and in what ways. When journalists were asked who tried to influence their work, the answers were as follows: the representatives of the organization that felt affected (30% of respondents), politicians (24%), company executives (11%) and advertisers (10%). When asked how often this happened, one - third of respondents answered that it occurred frequently, 38% said rarely, and 23% said very rarely. As to the forms of pressure, the most frequent method was persuasion (30%), advice (31%), demand (14%) and the threat of filing suit against the journalist (12%).

However, journalists and media owners should be even more concerned with how their media are perceived by the viewers and readers. In May of 2006, while participants in the discussion series entitled *Trenja (Frictions)* on POP TV wrangled over whether or not media freedom in Slovenia was threatened and whether the democratic foundations were being undermined through staff replacements, viewers were asked the following question: Do you think that with the change in government media freedom improved, deteriorated or remained the same? Of the 9 492 viewers

30 Igor Drakulič lists additional problems faced by independent journalists: non-competition clause, forced »free-lancing«, economic dependence on one contractor only, the extent of work that equals to, or is greater than, the work performed by regular employees, low payments, dependence on the good-will of the editor/owner/customer, pushing journalists to perform PR and marketing work, and work without contract. Drakulič Igor. 2005. »Svobodni novinarji podpisali škodljive pogodbe« (Independent Journalists Signed Harmful Agreements), in *Media Watch journal* (November). Available at <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/24/polozaj>

31 The author conducted personal interviews with 29 journalists during an educational seminar for journalists held in November 2005. Among the respondents there were 12 journalists working for *Delo*, 6 for *Dnevnik* and 11 for *Večer*. Of these, 10 were editors, 3 were editors and journalists and 16 were journalists only (all holding full-time jobs with the said newspaper companies).

32 This survey was part of the MA thesis entitled "Vpliv lastnikov kapitala na uredniško politiko" (The Influence of Capital Owners on Editorial Policies) by Irena Ferluga-Jedlončnik, a journalist for *Večer*. Ljubljana: FDU.2006.

who voted by phone, 50% thought that media freedom had become greater with the change in government, 49% said that it had become smaller, and only 1% were of the opinion that nothing had changed. The conviction that the government has the potential to significantly influence media freedom, regardless of its political orientation, has obviously come to be taken for granted.

THE (NON)PLURALITY OF SLOVENIAN MEDIA SPACE

After several months of debate, on May 26, 2006, the National Assembly of Slovenia passed the amended law on the mass media (Amended Mass Media Act, hereafter AMMA).³³ One important new provision in this law is state support for certain programming content. Article 4.a stipulates that, with a view to ensuring the plurality and democracy of the media, the Republic of Slovenia shall provide, through the ministry responsible for culture, funds for realizing the public interest in the media. Budget resources will be provided to general interest print media, radio and television programs, on-line publications and radio and television programming of special significance (local, regional and student programming, and non-profit radio and television programming). One of the basic motives behind the legislator's decision to introduce this provision was the conclusion that there is a lack of media plurality in Slovenia and that the programming content in the "public interest", or greater plurality of the media environment, needs government support. However, a deficient and unidimensional definition of the notion of plurality persists.³⁴

The previous law on the mass media (passed in 2001, hereafter MMA) included several methods for ensuring media plurality. Article 4 stipulated that "the public interest in the area of mass media" was to be ensured through government support in disseminating certain programming content (in the public interest) and support for the development of technical infrastructure in the area of mass media. Section 9 of Title 1 (Protection of Media Plurality and Diversity), comprised articles that protected plurality and diversity of the media by restricting ownership concentration and regulating ownership shares in the media. It should be added, however, that the law did not provide a definition of the notions of plurality and diversity mentioned in the title of this section, nor did it explain the difference between plurality and diversity. We assume that by explicitly mentioning both terms the legislator wanted to emphasize that these were the two objectives of media policy, so corresponding

³³ *Uradni list RS* (Official Gazette of RS), 60/06, 9. 6. 2006 p. 6537.

³⁴ For more on the differences between the concepts of plurality, diversity and media diversity and their implications for the formulation of media policy, see Sandra B. Hrvatin, "Ali snovalci medijske politike razlikujejo pluralnost, različnost in raznolikost medijev?" ("Do the creators of media policy differentiate among media plurality, variety and diversity?" in *Media Watch journal*, May 2006, No. 25–26 (pp: 4–11).

mechanisms for their implementation should also have been in place. However, no such mechanisms were to be found anywhere within MMA.

The confusion over terms was compounded by the introduction of a new category, i.e. radio and television programming of special significance, stipulated in Section 3 of Title II. This kind of programming (including national programs produced by the public institution RTV Slovenija) was expected to ensure diverse content intended primarily for local and regional audiences. In addition to the said measures and mechanisms, we should also mention some additional support for programming stipulated by Article 110 of MMA. According to this article, the state was obliged to set aside part of the budget for the support of audio-visual production. To sum up, the previous law included both measures aimed at ensuring plurality (restriction of media concentration) and measures for ensuring diversity (Articles 4, 82, and 110). We shall now take a look at how budget resources were allocated to various media during the period 2002-2005 with respect to the provision described above.

TABLE 8: CO-FUNDING OF THE MEDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH MMA (ARTICLES 4, 82, AND 110) DURING THE PERIOD 2002-2005.

	Programming content (Article 4)	Technical infrastructure (Article 4)	Audio-visual projects (Article 110)	Content of special significance (Article 82)	Total
2002	126,462.100		96,902.500		223,364.600
2003	59,167.966	9,999.999	54,690.742	235,360.937	359,219.644
2004	160,619.847	66,958.462	79,999.925	522,976.588	830,554.822
2005	116,865.322	70,717.478	127,480.000		315,062.800
Total					1,756.817.066

Source: Ministry of Culture.

During the period 2002-2005, the government earmarked more than 1.7 billion tolar for the implementation of media diversity. The resources stipulated by Article 4 of MMA were to be allocated to the media for selected programming content in the public interest, resources stipulated by Article 82 to the broadcasters of programming content of special significance, and those stipulated by Article 110 to projects that enabled the development of audio-visual production in the area of mass media. The envisaged budget

resources arising from Article 4 alone amounted to 900 million tolar. However, the government never actually provided these funds, despite the explicit provision in Article 149 of MMA. Resources were allocated by special commissions appointed by the Ministry of Culture, whose members included people who had direct links with the broadcasters and publishers who competed at public tenders.

Even if we ignore the conflict of interest, the criteria for the selection of projects and the failure of the government to provide the legally stipulated amount, there still remains one problematic issue that has never been resolved. This is the question of how (if at all) to assess the efficiency of the exploitation of these resources. The aim was to increase media diversity through certain measures, yet during the five years while state support was provided according to this law, the government never conducted any research to find out whether the support was sensible and efficient. Or, to put it differently, it never tried to establish whether this model for supporting diversity actually produced the desired results. Did 1.7 billion tolar of state subsidy contribute to greater diversity of the media in any meaningful way? Nor did the government make an analysis of the efficiency of measures aimed at ensuring plurality (i.e. restrictions on media concentration) or of the consumption of available content (i.e. the diversity of exposure or assessment of the extent to which the citizens “consumed” this content).

Since one of the basic arguments for introducing a special budget fund for ensuring media plurality was the lack of plurality on the Slovenian media scene, the aim of our analysis is rather limited. We have already shown that ownership concentration and the significant presence of the state in media companies have implications for editorial policies and journalists’ autonomy. According to the data in the media register maintained by the Ministry of Culture, the number of media outlets in Slovenia is quite high. However, this is not all there is to plurality. It would also be necessary to establish the extent of the diversity of content provided by these media and the diversity of exposure to this programming content (media consumption).

We shall first consider the case of daily newspapers which, according to the conclusions of those who proposed changes in the media law, displayed a lack of plurality. There are four general daily newspapers in Slovenia (*Delo*, *Dnevnik*, *Primorske novice* and *Večer*), one business newspaper (Finance) and two tabloids (*Direkt* and *Slovenske novice*).

Their combined circulation is approximately 300,000 copies. Given that subscriptions account for the major part of the circulation of daily newspapers, we should start from the assumption that readers differ among themselves, as indicated by their choice of newspaper. If the plurality of daily newspapers is considered from the ownership perspective, it is evident that, of the seven newspapers on the market, six are in the hands of owners who are related through ownership links. However, what is more important for the reader is whether the chosen newspaper provides all the necessary information.

As a matter of fact, most readers read just one newspaper, so in obtaining information they depend on the sources and explanations offered by that specific/chosen newspaper. When studying the plurality of content the crucial question is not how much the contents of various newspapers differ among themselves, but rather, what content is not being provided by any newspaper. In assessing media plurality, one should primarily focus on that which is absent from all media, rather than on the content carried or presented in various ways by various media. In accordance with this, a media policy that aims for plurality should strive to ensure subsidies (state support) for that programming content not featured by the media, rather than for content that is already featured and should be presented in diverse ways. To put it differently, studies of media plurality should aim to establish what content is not present in the media, rather than to compare content that is present.

The study entitled “Media Plurality in Slovenia,”³⁵ commissioned by the Ministry of Culture for the purpose of facilitating the drafting of amendments to the media legislation, started from the assumption that there was “weak differentiation among the media in Slovenia in terms of opinions (views), as regards both internal and external plurality.” This assertion was supported by the results of the analysis of texts featured by four daily newspapers (*Delo*, *Dnevnik*, *Finance and Večer*), all of which addressed issues related to the Prime Minister or to the government’s proposal for reforms (during February and December 2005), and of the columns in *Dnevnik* (in 2005). The analysis included 582 texts dealing with the PM or the proposed reforms. The conclusions were as follows (the following is a selected list):

35 Stanje medijskega pluralizma v Sloveniji (Preliminarno raziskovalno poročilo) (The state of media plurality in Slovenia/Preliminary research report), 2006. Inštitut za razvojne in strateške analize (Adam Frane, Matej Makarovič, Matevž Tomšič and Peter Lah). Available at <http://www.kultura.gov.si/>

- *Večer* showed a greater tendency than other three dailies to refer to the views of the opposition parties; *Finance* is outstanding in this respect, as it allegedly explicitly focuses on the LDS opposition party;
- Approximately 40% of the text analyzed relied on government sources when writing about the PM or the proposed reforms; 15% of texts referred to the opposition parties in addition to government sources, while approximately 10% relied on the coalition parties;
- The analysis of the main actors' and authors' attitudes towards the government indicated that negative attitudes prevailed;
- It is obvious that the media are not pro-governmental, and there are no indicators that the media have recently become pro-government (because of alleged pressure or for other reasons).³⁶

And what were the conclusions as to the plurality of *Dnevnik's* columns? The researchers analyzed 292 columns by six authors and divided them into "left" and "right" oriented and "ideologically neutral" on the basis of their underlying standpoints. The conclusion was that 60% of the columns carried connotations of specific underlying standpoints; of these, 46% were left oriented, 39% were neutral and 15% right oriented.³⁷

Since the Ministry of Culture commissioned this study to meet the needs arising from the drafting of amendments to the media legislation, it is interesting to see what, in the opinion of the author of the study, the guidelines for media policy should be. If we start from the conclusion found in this study which says that "(1) the government has a legitimate interest in the area of the mass media" and that "(2) governments actually regulate the media," then it would be necessary to find "such criteria as won't be susceptible to subjective interpretation." The platform on which plurality-oriented media policy should be based could rely on the following principles: "(1) the government or the National Assembly cannot create plurality, but they can encourage it; (2) the objective of the regulation is to provide quality journalism reflecting a diversity of ideas. This means that it would be sensible to support those media that meet the objective criteria for journalistic quality. In addition, there

³⁶ Stanje medijskega pluralizma v Sloveniji (The state of media plurality in Slovenia), 2006: p.44.

³⁷ Stanje medijskega pluralizma v Sloveniji (The state of media plurality in Slovenia), 2006: p.49.

must be present a demonstrable interest of the public in these media.”³⁸

Among the criteria for the allocation of state support found in the AMMA are:

- Ensuring of regular, objective and balanced presentation of political activity and viewpoints of various organizations and individuals, and the governing political parties and opposition parties in particular.
- Quality, originality, communicativeness and currency of the author's approach.
- The average number of copies sold in the case of the print media.
- The average number of featured original articles in individual issues.
- The quantity of general interest, cultural, expert, research and educational content.
- The significance of the exercise of the right to public information and objective information.
- The extent to which the media create more jobs or more opportunities for contractual work for journalists or other workers creating programming content.
- The importance of the media for the region or local community.³⁹

On the basis of these criteria and regular annual analysis of media plurality in Slovenia, a special expert committee (appointed by the Minister of Culture) is envisaged. It will allocate state support to general interest daily newspapers with a view to ensuring greater plurality.⁴⁰ But to which general interest daily newspapers and to what content will the committee grant support? Will it give support to those

38 Stanje medijskega pluralizma v Sloveniji (The state of media plurality in Slovenia), 2006, p.16 and p. 18.

39 Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o medijih (Amended Mass Media Act), Article 4.a, paragraph 9.

40 In early June 2006, Barbara Žgajner Tavš, an MP from the Slovenian National Party posed in writing a question to the Minister of Culture: »With regard to the opinion of individual ministriy' representatives who do not perceive media plurality in Slovenia, I ask the minister responsible for this area on the basis of which criteria and in relation to the pluralization of the media environment, the ministry formulated the conditions for the allocation of subsidies? After all, it was the main argument for amending the media law and the law on RTV Slovenija.« The reply of the ministry dated June 21, 2006 was short. The subsidies will begin to be allocated only after the new law comes into effect, and the by-law that regulates the criteria for allocation is being considered by the government for harmonization. The Ministry stressed that »when reviewing the projects competing for subsidies the expert committee will take into account the findings of the regular annual study of the state of media plurality.« This MP's question and the reply are available at <http://www.dz-rs.si>. The First »regular study of the state of media plurality in Slovenia« mentioned in this reply was presented by the Ministry at the end of June 2006, but, as we have shown, this study does not comprise a complete analysis of media (non)plurality.

newspapers that treat the government critically, in order to encourage more balanced coverage of the work of the government? Or should it support the authors of columns whose views are more inclined to the right-wing? How large should be the sum allocated for launching a new, “right-wing” oriented newspaper in an environment already experiencing media concentration? Or, should the committee support programming content not provided by the existing media, which would, indeed, lead to greater plurality of the print media?

While the study commissioned by the ministry showed that the market in general interest daily newspapers is not plural, it did not answer the question of whether the radio and television media market is plural, since it did not investigate this segment. Yet despite this, a substantial portion of state support will go to radio and television programming content, and to content of special significance in particular.⁴¹

TABLE 9: THE REACH OF RADIO STATIONS IN 2005

	IN 000	IN %
VAL 202	239	14.00
SLO 1 (AI)	189	11.10
CITY	67	3.90
HIT DOMŽALE	59	3.40
OGNJIŠČE	55	3.20
POSTAJA CENTER	54	3.20
MODRI VAL (KOPER)	54	3.20
MARIBOR	45	2.70
KRKA	45	2.70
MURSKI VAL	44	2.60
VESELJAK	37	2.20
PTUJ	37	2.20
ŠTAJERSKI VAL	36	2.10
ANTENA 1	33	2.00
SRAKA	33	1.90
FANTASY	33	1.90
NET FM	32	1.90
BELVI	29	1.70
ROGLA	28	1.60
KOROŠKI RADIO	28	1.60
MAXI - PRLEŠKI VAL	26	1.50

41 Nineteen radio programs and 11 television programs in Slovenia enjoy the “special significance” status.

	IN 000	IN %
CELJE	26	1.50
RGL	25	1.50
ZELENI VAL	25	1.40
SALOMON	21	1.20
KRANJ	19	1.10
GOLDI	19	1.10
TRIGLAV	19	1.10
CAPRIS	17	1.00
RADIO SI	17	1.00
STUDIO D	16	0.90
GAMA MM	15	0.90
BREZJE (MARIBOR)	15	0.90
KUM	14	0.80
SLOVENSKE GORICE	14	0.80
MOJ RADIO	14	0.80
ŠPORT	13	0.80
BREŽICE	13	0.70
RADIO 94	12	0.70
SORA	12	0.70
VAL	11	0.70
RADLJE	10	0.60
VIVA	10	0.60
UNIVOX	10	0.60
BAKLA	9	0.60
DUR	9	0.50
POSLOVNI VAL	9	0.50
ENERGY	9	0.50
ODMEV	8	0.50
ROBIN	7	0.40
VELENJE	7	0.40
SLO 3 (ARS)	7	0.40
ALPSKI VAL	6	0.40
MAX	6	0.40
ORION	6	0.30
ALFA	5	0.30
PLUS	4	0.20
GORENC	4	0.20
NOVA	4	0.20
TEMPO	4	0.20
LASER	4	0.20
MORJE	4	0.20
ŠTUDENT	4	0.23
SNOOPY - STUDIO ZOS	4	0.20
SEVNICA	3	0.20

	IN 000	IN %
PRLEK	3	0.20
GEOSS	3	0.20
ODEON	2	0.10
SLOVENSKI POSLOVNI KANAL	2	0.10
CELJSKI VAL	1	0.10
ITR	1	0.10
URBAN	1	0.10

Source: NRB 2005.

TABLE 10: REACH OF TELEVISION STATIONS IN 2005

NATIONAL STATIONS	IN 000	IN %
POP TV	1031.4	60.40
SLOVENIJA 1	929.5	54.50
KANAL A	468.4	27.40
SLOVENIJA 2	441.9	25.90
TV 3	95.2	5.60
KOPER - CAPODISTRIA	22.0	1.30
LOCAL STATIONS	IN 000	IN %
NET TV	44.9	2.60
VŠ KANAL	26.7	1.60
VTV VELENJE	24.0	1.40
TV PIKA	21.2	1.20
TV PAPRIKA	12.8	0.70
TV CELJE	10.9	0.60
TV PRIMORKA	10.0	0.60
TVM	9.3	0.50
GORENJSKA TV	3.2	0.20
IDEA TV	1.9	0.10
STUDIO AS	1.8	0.10

Source: NRB 2005.

Comments: Data about the reach of radio and television stations in 2005 shows that the most viewed television channels were *POP TV*, *RTV SLO1*, *Kanal A*, *RTV SLO2* and *Prva TV*. *POP TV* and *Kanal A*, the two most watched commercial television stations, are both owned by CME. Among the five most watched local television programs are three commercial stations (*Net TV*, *TV Pika*, *TV Paprika*) and two programs of special significance (*Vaš kanal* and *VTV Velenje*). Among the five most listened to radio stations are two programs of the public radio station (*Val 202* and *Slo 1*), two commercial stations (*City* and

Hit Domžale) and a non-profit station of special significance, *Radio Ognjišče*.

The owners of content classified as having special significance proposed, through the Publishing, Printing and Media Association of the Chamber of Commerce, an amendment to the media legislation envisaging special support for their operation, on the grounds that their programming content serves the public interest. The government supported their proposal and allocated to these programs a sum equal to 3% of the support received by public television RTV Slovenia programs.⁴² Arguing for the adoption of this amendment, the Association said that “owing to the high costs of production, all programs of special significance, by nature of their activity, operate on the margins of profitability or even below the profitability threshold, virtually without earning any profit. In fact, the production costs are financed from other profit-earning activities of the economic organization.” They also argued that, with the minimal state support provided so far, which has not exceeded 10% of the total sum needed to produce programming content of special significance, “programming content of special significance will hardly be able to fulfill the requirements needed to preserve this status and obtain funds through public tenders, or the expectations of the public regarding quality local and regional content.” Without generous state support, they are allegedly “in danger, and particularly so are the job positions of journalists and other programming staff.”⁴³

42 AMMA, Article 4a, paragraph 3.

43 Remarks by the Print and Media Union on the amendments to the MMA, EPA 0699-IV, first reading (pp. 2–3). Print and Media Union with the Chamber of Commerce has around 460 members-media publishers.

TABLE II : BUSINESS RESULTS OF BROADCASTERS

PUBLISHER	CITY	MEDIA	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tolar	MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
					total revenues	sales revenues	assets
PODJETJE ZA INFORMIRANJE D.D.	MURSKA SOBOTA	RADIO MURSKI VAL (NGD)	35	571.900	2,55	2,47	1,45
NT&RC D.O.O.	CELJE	RADIO CELJE (NGD)	32	467.360	2,08	2,25	0,44
INFONET MEDIA D.D.	LJUBLJANA	NACIONALNA PROGRAMSKA RADIJSKA MREŽA	1	456.136	2,03	2,21	2,60
RADIO TEDNIK PTUJ D.O.O.	PTUJ	RADIO PTUJ	23	350.325	1,56	1,69	0,67
RGL D.D.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO GLAS LJUBLJANE	11	350.015	1,56	1,61	1,06
QUADRUM, D.O.O.	TOMAJ	RADIO VAL, INFORMATIVNI VAL	1	331.677	1,48	1,60	3,26
R DOMŽALE D.O.O.	DOMŽALE	RADIO HIT, RADIO ROCK FM	18	309.227	1,38	1,42	2,43
RADIO CITY D.O.O.	MARIBOR	RADIO CITY	12	271.536	1,21	1,30	1,01
RADIO OGNJIŠČE D.O.O.	KOPER	RADIO OGNJIŠČE	22	251.520	1,12	0,65	1,28
NAŠ ČAS, D.O.O.	VELENJE	RADIO VELENJE (PODRUŽNICA NČ) (NGD)	18	235.710	1,05	1,11	1,19
NOVICE D.O.O.	SLOVENSKE KONJICE	RADIO ROGLA (NGD)	13	203.912	0,91	0,98	0,46
RADIO KRANJ, D.O.O.	KRANJ	RADIO KRANJ	11	195.377	0,87	0,80	0,95
RADIO KRKA NOVO MESTO, D.O.O.	NOVO MESTO	RADIO KRKA	9	177.717	0,79	0,85	0,65
RADIO ŠTAJERSKI VAL D.O.O.	ŠMARJE PRI JELŠAH	RADIO ŠTAJERSKI VAL	13	147.202	0,66	0,71	0,28
RECAL D.O.O.	LJUTOMER	RADIO MAKI - PRLEŠKI VAL	7	143.466	0,64	0,58	0,82
RADIO TRIGLAV JESENICE, D.O.O.	JESENICE	RADIO TRIGLAV	10	133.091	0,59	0,54	0,44
RADIO 94 D.O.O.	POSTOJNA	RADIO 94, KRPAN	4	132.664	0,59	0,62	1,39
UNIVOX D.O.O.	KOČEVJE	RADIO UNIVOX	11	119.509	0,53	0,52	0,35
RADIO KUM TRBOVLJE, D.O.O.	TRBOVLJE	RADIO KUM	11	115.314	0,51	0,50	0,26
KOROŠKI RADIO D.O.O.	SLOVENJ GRADEC	KOROŠKI RADIO (NGD)	12	108.266	0,48	0,52	0,24
STUDIO D, D.D.	NOVO MESTO	STUDIO D	10	107.722	0,48	0,48	0,24
ALPE ADRIA ZELENI VAL PODJETJE ZA RADIOFUZIJO IN MARKETING, D.O.O.	SPODNJA SLIVNICA	RADIO ZELENI VAL	9	106.626	0,48	0,47	0,22
RADIO BREŽICE D.O.O.	BREŽICE	RADIO BREŽICE	8	106.612	0,48	0,49	0,20
RADIO SORA, D.O.O.	ŠKOČJA LOKA	RADIO SORA	10	105.182	0,47	0,46	0,23
RADIO CAPRIS D.O.O.	KOPER	RADIO CAPRIS	7	96.430	0,43	0,40	0,47
OPTIMEDIA, D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO ŠPORT	1	94.740	0,42	0,45	0,55
BIROTEH, D.O.O.	HRUŠICA	RADIO BELVI GORENJSKA (NGD)	0	92.953	0,41	0,45	0,41
RADIO ROBIN D.O.O.	NOVA GORICA	RADIO ROBIN	5	91.650	0,41	0,41	0,19

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

44 Table 11 and the data analysis were prepared by Iztok Jurančič, president of the Trade Union of Journalists in Slovenia.

BROADCASTERS OF RADIO PROGRAMS⁴⁴

SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX					subsidies by the Ministry of Culture (in tolar)
in percentages		in'000 tolar per employee			index =the observed average is 100					
					profitability		labor costs per employee			
profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	
5.89	4.12	16.340	6.850	5.074	21,1	31,4	59,4	155,6	159,6	12,250.800
-21.26	-4.21	14.605	5.826	4.307	-76,2	-32,0	53,1	132,4	135,5	-
68.49	3.77	456.136	5.928	5.928	245,5	28,7	1657,4	134,7	186,4	-
6.27	2.69	15.232	5.686	4.148	22,5	20,5	55,3	129,2	130,4	20,597.484
3.49	2.77	31.820	5.498	4.022	12,5	21,1	115,6	124,9	126,5	5,892.960
17,69	2.94	331.677	3.168	3.168	63,4	22,4	1205,2	72	99,6	-
6.34	2.08	17.179	3.996	3.177	22,7	15,9	62,4	90,8	99,9	10,019.897
14.40	8.59	22.628	4.363	3.210	51,6	65,4	82,2	99,1	100,9	-
-	-5.95	11.433	5.323	3.778	-	-45,3	41,5	120,9	118,8	-
10.75	7.93	13.095	6.282	5.604	38,5	60,4	47,6	142,7	176,2	-
15.57	11.90	15.686	4.212	2.895	55,8	90,6	57,0	95,7	91,0	1,256.450
16.33	13.99	17.762	7.130	4.989	58,5	106,6	64,5	162	156,9	14,160.000
18,60	11,13	19.746	6.339	4.573	66,7	84,7	71,8	144	143,8	-
37,26	19,08	11.323	3.747	2.670	133,6	145,3	41,1	85,1	84,0	-
53.00	18.72	20.495	3.149	2.252	190,0	142,6	74,5	71,6	70,8	-
3.68	3.09	13.309	6.663	4.812	13,2	23,5	48,4	151,4	151,3	10,275.000
16.88	8.61	33.166	1.966	1.417	60,5	65,5	120,5	44,7	44,5	-
9.17	3.53	10.864	3.308	2.408	32,9	26,8	39,5	75,2	75,7	11,260.198
3.95	2.86	10.483	5.973	4.256	14,2	21,8	38,1	135,7	133,9	9,524.050
5.52	4.25	9.022	6.330	3.062	19,8	32,4	32,8	143,8	96,3	6,455.400
15.99	12.94	10.772	5.154	3.495	57,3	98,5	39,1	117,1	109,9	15,208.695
14.67	7.43	11.847	2.759	1.894	52,6	56,6	43,0	62,7	59,6	7,052.337
-1483.79	-88.94	13327	3211	2242	-5318,3	-677,4	48,4	73,0	70,5	3,380.608
11.45	8.29	10518	5245	3680	41,0	63,1	38,2	119,2	115,7	8,911.619
55.73	8.68	13776	3921	2909	199,8	66,1	50,1	89,1	91,5	-
1.41	0.16	94740	4952	4952	5,1	1,2	344,2	112,5	155,7	-
25.14	1.74	-	-	-	90,1	13,2	0	0	0	-
41.69	26.08	18.330	4.270	3.168	149,4	198,6	66,6	97,0	99,6	3,645.860

					MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
PUBLISHER	CITY	MEDIA	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tolar	total revenues	sales revenues	assets
RADIO CENTER D.O.O.	MARIBOR	RADIO CENTER	5	91.620	0,41	0,44	0,33
RADIO GORENC D.O.O.	TRŽIČ	RADIO GORENC	8	81.331	0,36	0,25	0,33
RADIO NET D.O.O.	MARIBOR	RADIO NET FM	8	78.463	0,35	0,38	0,17
SRAKA INTERNATIONAL D.O.O.	NOVO MESTO	RADIO SRAKA (NGD)	6	74.366	0,33	0,35	0,09
NOVA NOVA D.O.O.	AJDOVČINA	RADIO NOVA	3	51.470	0,23	0,25	0,11
MEDIA INFO D.O.O.	MURSKA SOBOTA	RADIO VIVA	4	39.869	0,18	0,19	0,15
SANTI, D.O.O.	NOVO MESTO	RADIO MAX (NGD)	1	38.350	0,17	0,18	0,20
I RADIO D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	I RADIO	0	37.881	0,17	0,14	0,10
RADIO ALFA D.O.O.	SLOVENJ GRADEC	RADIO ALFA	4	37.380	0,17	0,18	0,18
RADIO CERKNO D.O.O.	CERKNO	RADIO ODMEV	3	37.344	0,17	0,17	0,11
RADIO BELVI, D.O.O.	KRANJ	RADIO BELVI KRANJ	1	36.895	0,16	0,17	0,13
RADIO SLOVENSKE GORICE D.O.O.	LENART V SLOVENSKIH GORICAH	RADIO SLOVENSKE GORICE	8	36.772	0,16	0,17	0,21
BORIS SUŠIN S.P.	VELENJE	MOJ RADIO (NGD)	2	35.996	0,16	0,17	0,11
RADIO ANTENA D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO ANTENA (NGD)	0	32.175	0,14	0,15	0,19
RADIO KOBARID D.O.O.	KOBARID	ALPSKI VAL	3	25.715	0,11	0,09	0,05
RADIO GOLDI SAVINJSKI VAL, D.O.O.	DOLENJA VAS	MIDI-RADIO GOLDI SAVINJSKI VAL	2	24.747	0,11	0,12	0,06
FANTASY - ŠPRAH, K.D.	ŠKOFJA VAS	RADIO FANTASY (NGD)	1	23.577	0,11	0,11	0,09
B.&B. BELNA D.O.O.	ŠENTIŮ V SLOV. GORICAH	RADIO PLUS MARIBOR	2	23.389	0,10	0,10	0,25
PUNTAR D.O.O.	KRŠKO	RADIO ENERGY	2	21.282	0,09	0,10	0,05
ITAK D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO MESTO, RADIO BTC (NGD)	2	19.332	0,09	0,09	0,05
RADIO SEVNICA D.O.O.	SEVNICA	RADIO SEVNICA	1	19.208	0,09	0,04	0,11
INTERTEH, D.O.O.	VNANJE GORICE	RADIO ORION	0	17.039	0,08	0,07	0,10
MAHKOVEC Š & D, D.N.O.	LITIJA	RADIO GEOSS	1	15.889	0,07	0,07	0,04
NOBLESSE, D.O.O.	REČICA OB PAKI	RADIO BAKLA (NGD)	1	15.732	0,07	0,08	0,06
RADIO TEMPO MATJAJŽ JERŠIČ S.P.	POLZELA	RADIO TEMPO	1	13.886	0,06	0,07	0,04
RADIO BREZJE D.O.O.	MARIBOR	RADIO BREZJE	1	13.671	0,06	0,07	0,09
ARTIST D.O.O.	ČRNOMELJ	RADIO ODEON	0	13.584	0,06	0,04	0,07
ŠU & CO, D.O.O.	PIRAN	RADIO TARTINI (NGD)	0	13.197	0,06	0,06	0,07
RADIO RADIJE D.O.O.	RADIJE OB DRAVI	RADIO RADIJE	0	10.774	0,05	0,05	0,02
NTR, LOGATEC, D.O.O.	LOGATEC	ITR	0	10.537	0,05	0,03	0,02
LASER VILKO PUSTOTNIK S.P.	SLOVENJ GRADEC	RADIO LASER (NGD)	1	8.931	0,04	0,04	0,05
R GAMA - MM D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO EKSPRES	0	8.704	0,04	0,04	0,05
RADIO AVA D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO AVA	1	7.137	0,03	0,03	0,05

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX					
in percentages		in'000 tolar per employee			index =the observed avarage is 100					
					profitability		labor costs per employee			
profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	subsidies by the Mi- nistry of Culture (in tolar)
34,07	10,25	18.324	2.406	1.798	122,1	78,1	66,6	54,7	56,6	-
-	-15,42	10.166	2.592	1.689	-	-117,5	36,9	58,9	53,1	25,099.000
49,95	6,95	9.808	2.007	1.388	179,0	53,0	35,6	45,6	43,7	-
38,04	18,36	12.394	2.961	2.267	136,3	139,8	45,0	67,3	71,3	4,376.000
21,78	7,48	17.157	2.298	1.723	78,1	57,0	62,3	52,2	54,2	-
-	-105,35	9.967	2.081	1.532	-	-802,4	36,2	47,3	48,2	-
0	0	38.350	9.180	9.020	0	0	139,3	208,6	283,6	1,805.624
177,22	57,36	-	-	-	635,2	436,9	0	0	0	-
-16,27	-7,03	9.345	3.576	2.508	-58,3	-53,5	34,0	81,3	78,9	-
24,99	7,30	12.448	3.683	2.554	89,6	55,6	45,2	83,7	80,3	13,575.000
31,17	6,40	36.895	4.109	4.109	111,7	48,7	134,1	93,4	129,2	2,334.247
49,79	7,14	4.597	2.451	1.739	178,5	54,3	16,7	55,7	54,7	18,433.000
48,07	40,53	17.998	2.266	1.375	172,3	308,7	65,4	51,5	43,2	-
5,76	0,99	-	-	-	20,6	7,5	0	0	0	1,393.510
-116,25	-25,65	8.572	1.947	1.336	-416,7	-195,4	31,1	44,2	42	8,271.600
81,03	0,72	12.374	1.840	1.301	290,4	5,5	45,0	41,8	40,9	-
42,07	11,57	23.577	516	362	150,8	88,1	85,7	11,7	11,4	-
-	-12,31	11.695	2.453	1.986	-	-93,8	42,5	55,7	62,4	-
21,29	8,90	10.641	2.454	1.664	76,3	67,8	38,7	55,7	52,3	-
-116,32	-7,06	9.666	1.920	1.083	-416,9	-53,8	35,1	43,6	34,0	-
-18,73	-16,66	19.208	5.927	3.087	-67,1	-126,9	69,8	134,7	97,1	4,515.136
13,27	6,10	-	-	-	47,6	46,4	0	0	0	1,785.323
2,31	0,97	15.889	2.591	1.873	8,3	7,4	57,7	58,9	58,9	-
32,26	10,77	15.732	2.079	1.599	115,6	82,0	57,2	47,2	50,3	-
22,32	3,04	13.886	2.334	1.566	80,0	23,1	50,5	53,0	49,2	-
4,99	3,10	13.671	3.625	2.706	17,9	23,6	49,7	82,4	85,1	-
-452,85	-12,26	-	-	-	-1623,1	-93,4	0	0	0	3,557.832
9,80	1,61	-	-	-	35,1	12,2	0	0	0	-
0,00	0,00	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	-
-24,92	84,61	-	-	-	-89,3	644,4	0	0	0	-
15,95	10,31	8.931	1.347	1.120	57,2	78,5	32,5	30,6	35,2	-
-	-31,17	-	-	-	-	-237,4	0	0	0	-
-23,84	-5,90	7.137	2.228	1.883	-85,4	-44,9	25,9	50,6	59,2	-

					MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
PUBLISHER	CITY	MEDIA	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tolar	total revenues	sales revenues	assets
MOŠKOTEVČ MARKETING D.O.O.	STOPČE	RADIO CELJSKI VAL (NGD)	0	6.468	0,03	0,03	0,01
SKUPINA KAOS, D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO KAOS	0	4.850	0,02	0,02	0,07
ENIMAR D.O.O.	KOPER	RADIO PORTOROŽ	0	4.574	0,02	0,02	0,11
RADIO URBAN D.O.O.	RIBNICA	RADIO URBAN	0	4.565	0,02	0,02	0,03
RADIO MORJE D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO MORJE	0	1.906	0,01	0,01	0,13
SODA D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO LJUBLJANA	0	108	0,00	0,00	0,01
SVET IDEJ D.O.O.	GORICA PRI RAZTEZU	RADIO IO5 (5M POSLOVANJA)	0	3	0,00	0,00	0,01
MEDIA TON D.O.O.	RADENCI	RADIO RADIO (NGD)	0	0	0,00	0,00	0,02
RADIO KLASIK - OBLAK K.D.	LJUBLJANA	RADIO KLASIK	0	0	0,00	0,00	0,00
ZAVOD MARŠ	MARIBOR	MARIBORSKI RADIO ŠTUDENT	3-4	-	-	-	-
ZAVOD RŠ	LJUBLJANA	RADIO ŠTUDENT	2	-	-	-	-
ZAVOD ZA INFORMIRANJE	ORMOŽ	RADIO PRLEK	1	-	-	-	-
ZVEZA ROMOV SLOVENIJE	MURSKA SOBOTA	RADIO ROMIC	1	-	-	-	-
SKUPAJ IZDAJATELJI RADIJSKIH MEDIJEV			400	6.912.556	30,82	31,16	27,82
SKUPAJ IZDAJATELJI RTV MEDIJEV			815	22.429.651	100	100	100

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

Source: Balance sheet data AJPEŠ (IBON, September 2005), Media register (April 2006).

Comment: Podjetje za informiranje d. d., RTV RC d. o. o., Radio Ted-nik Ptuj and Naš čas d. o. o. are broadcasters of radio programs and publishers of print media. The radio programs classified as programs of special significance are Radio Robin (local), Radio Murski val (regional), Radio Kum (regional), Radio Kranj (regional), Radio Triglav (regional), Radio Sora (regional), Radio Marš (student), Studio D (regional), Radio Ptuj (regional), Radio Odmev (local). Radio Alpski val (local), Koroški radio (regional), Radio Slovenske gorice (regional), Radio Gorenc (local), Radio Celje (regional), Radio Univox (local), Štajerski val (regional), Radio Ognjišče (non-profit), Radio Velenje (local).

SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX					
in percentages		in'000 tolar per employee			index =the observed avarage is 100					
					profitability		labor costs per employee			
profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	subsidies by the Mi- nistry of Culture (in tolar)
1420,59	19,46	-	-	-	5091,7	148,2	0	0	0	-
0,16	0,10	-	-	-	0,6	0,8	0	0	0	6.473.400
4,38	0,90	-	-	-	15,7	6,9	0	0	0	-
0,38	0,14	-	-	-	1,4	1,1	0	0	0	-
-	-3,62	-	-	-	-	-27,6	0	0	0	-
-4,19	-3,88	-	-	-	-15,0	-29,6	0	0	0	-
-12,06	-12,03	-	-	-	-43,2	-91,7	0	0	0	-
-	-0,86	-	-	-	-	-6,6	0	0	0	-
-10,98	-9,00	-	-	-	-39,3	-68,5	0	0	0	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.450.175
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.500.000
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10,04	3,60	17.281	4.728	3.440	36	27,4	62,8	107,4	108,2	248.461.205
27,90	13,13	27.521	4.401	3.180	100	100	100	100	100	589.509.555

TABLE 12: BUSINESS RESULTS OF

publisher	city	media	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tola	MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
					total revenues	sales revenues	assets
PRO PLUS D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	KANAL A, POP TV (LASTNIK) (NGD)	138	9.006.706	40,16	42,32	50,08
EVJ ELEKTROPROM D.O.O.	LOKE PRI ZAGORJU	ETV (NGD)	140	2.560.228	11,41	11,94	9,88
SKYLINE D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	STUDIO SIGNAL (NGD)	10	513.521	2,29	2,47	1,17
TELE-TV D.O.O.	KRANJ	GORENJSKA TELEVIZIJA-GTV (NGD)	14	337.972	1,51	1,57	1,02
TELE 59 D.O.O.	MARIBOR	RTS	2	288.640	1,29	0,74	1,43
PRIVAT D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	TV PAPIKA	4	169.098	0,75	0,82	0,34
PRVA TV D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	PRVA TV	10	852.237	3,80	0,81	1,59
VTV STUDIO, D.O.O.	VELENJE	TV VELENJE	13	160.311	0,71	0,77	0,78
NAKLO, D.O.O.	LOGATEC	TV LEP LOGATEC (NGD)	7	157.657	0,70	0,75	0,48
ALENKA CAMLEK S.P.	RAVNE NA KOROŠKEM	TOP RTV	5	147.470	0,66	0,57	0,94
VA D.O.O.	ŠEMPETER PRI GORICI	TV PRIMORKA	8	138.536	0,62	0,60	0,49
POP TV D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	POP TV (NGD)	0	137.967	0,62	0,67	0,02
TELEVIDEO D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	TV PIKA (NGD)	1	136.192	0,61	0,66	0,28
KANAL A D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	KANAL A	0	131.565	0,59	0,61	0,97
TV CELJE D.O.O.	CELJE	TV CELJE	10	128.592	0,57	0,59	0,23
MINI GO D.O.O.	SOLKAN	MESTNI STUDIO (NGD)	4	125.185	0,56	0,60	0,68
TV IDEA - KANAL IO D.O.O.	MURSKA SOBOTA	KANAL IO	11	68.959	0,31	0,30	0,12
KTV DRAVOGRAD D.O.O.	DRAVOGRAD	KOROŠKA TV DRAVOGRAD (NGD)	1	68.554	0,31	0,33	0,16
POSEIDON D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	GOLICA TV, ČARLI TV (V STEČAJU) (NGD)	2	55.536	0,25	0,26	0,05
HI-FI D.O.O.	MURSKA SOBOTA	TV AS	7	45.552	0,20	0,22	0,18
EURO 3 TV, D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	EPTV	1	44.499	0,20	0,22	0,05
LOKA TV, D.O.O.	ŠKOFJA LOKA	DEŽELNA TELEVIZIJA LOKA	0	37.329	0,17	0,17	0,26
DOMATES D.O.O.	LUCIJA	SPONKA TV	2	24.410	0,11	0,09	0,12
ATV BABNIK & CO D.N.O.	LITIJA	RTV SIGNAL LITIJA	2	24.103	0,11	0,07	0,06
BRANKO VESELIČ S.P.	MARKOVCI	SKUPNI TELEVIZIJSKI PROGRAM OBČIN (NGD)	5	20.764	0,09	0,10	0,23
		DESTRNIK, DORNAVA, GORIŠNICA, MARKOVCI	–				
VI-TEL D.O.O.	DORNBERK	VITEL	4	18.162	0,08	0,08	0,05

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

45 Table 12 and the data analysis were prepared by Iztok Jurančič, president of the Trade Union of Journalists in Slovenia.

TELEVISION PROGRAM BROADCASTERS⁴⁵

SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX					
in percentages		in'000 tolar per employee			index = the observed avarage is 100					
					profitability		costs per employee			
profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	subsidies by the Ministry of Culture (in tolar)
35,12	22,73	65.266	5.091	3.547	125,9	173,1	237,1	115,7	111,5	-
9,09	2,26	18.287	3.537	2.625	32,6	17,2	66,4	80,4	82,5	-
64,20	24,70	51.352	3.350	2.396	230,1	188,1	186,6	76,1	75,4	-
18,98	9,50	24.141	6.064	4.592	68,0	72,3	87,7	137,8	144,4	-
2,77	1,22	144.320	1.785	1.416	9,9	9,3	524,4	40,6	44,5	90.091.961
1,11	0,06	42.275	2.033	1.483	4,0	0,4	153,6	46,2	46,6	-
-24,13	26,20	85.224	5.225	4.011	-86,5	199,5	309,7	118,7	126,1	-
-82,38	-16,99	12.332	2.685	1.926	-295,3	-129,4	44,8	61,0	60,6	108.041.700
26,65	1,61	22.522	4.651	3.343	95,5	12,2	81,8	105,7	105,1	-
0	0	29.494	2.314	1.671	0	0	107,2	52,6	52,5	-
-25,35	-15,99	17.317	6.095	4.394	-90,9	-121,8	62,9	138,5	138,2	10.481.848
4,44	2,87	-	-	-	15,9	21,9	0	0	0	-
26,01	19,41	136.192	12.284	9.145	93,2	147,8	494,9	279,1	287,6	-
5,44	4,00	-	-	-	19,5	30,4	0	0	0	-
116,10	12,95	12.859	4.750	3.505	416,1	98,6	46,7	107,9	110,2	8.108.765
12,69	9,85	31.296	3.541	2.666	45,5	75,0	113,7	80,5	83,8	-
0	0	6.269	3.053	2.179	0	0	22,8	69,4	68,5	95.738.183
55,96	23,23	68.554	2.971	2.243	200,6	176,9	249,1	67,5	70,5	-
-	-504,79	27.768	1.562	1.013	-	-3844,5	100,9	35,5	31,8	-
430,53	-4,85	6.507	2.265	1.553	1543,1	-36,9	23,6	51,5	48,8	-
0	0	44.499	3.131	2.280	0	0	161,7	71,1	71,7	-
-	-13,20	-	-	-	-	-100,6	0	0	0	-
35,90	13,98	12.205	1.681	1.213	128,7	106,5	44,3	38,2	38,1	8.137.448
28,28	14,78	12.052	2.947	1.913	101,4	112,6	43,8	67,0	60,2	14.352.500
0	0	4.153	1.751	1.333	0	0	15,1	39,8	41,9	-
-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	-
-	-95,91	4.541	2.243	1.709	-	-730,4	16,5	51,0	53,7	-

					MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
publisher	city	media	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tolar	total revenues	sales revenues	assets
LOKALNA TV GROSUPLJE, PODRUŽNICA S.P., AUDIO VIDEO SIGNAL, ZORC MIRAN	GROSUPLJE	TV GROSUPLJE (NGD)	–	14.121	0,06	0,06	0,05
VIDEOPRODUKCIJA MARTIN IVANUŠA S.P.	PTUJ	TELEVIZIJA PTUJ (NGD)	0	13.086	0,06	0,06	0,05
MOJ TV D.O.O.	SELNICA OB DRAVI	MOJ TV	1	12.093	0,05	0,06	0,04
PINTERIČ & CO., D.N.O.	BREŽICE	ROPOT TV	1	11.506	0,05	0,05	0,02
STUDIO FORMA, SAMO SADNIK S.P.	ŽALEC	SAVINJSKA TELEVIZIJA (NGD)	1	10.417	0,05	0,05	0,03
PROSPERA D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	TV PETELIN	3	10.298	0,05	0,05	0,03
LOKALNA TV TRBOVLJE, PODRUŽNICA S.P., AB VIDEOPRODUKCIJA, ANTON BERAKOVIČ	TRBOVLJE	LOKALNA TV TRBOVLJE; I M POSLOV. (NGD)	1	9.074	0,04	0,04	0,03
TV SRK-II JOŽE ČOŠIČ S.P.	GORNJA RADGONA	TV STUDIO RADGONA- KANAL II	0	8.211	0,04	0,04	0,01
TELEFILM SILVO LEŠNIK S.P.	ZGORNJA VOLIČINA	TELEVAL	0	7.914	0,04	0,04	0,03
M 3 PLUS D.O.O.	MARIBOR	METKA (NGD)	2	7.058	0,03	0	0,11
JTV, D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	TELEVIZIJA ŠIŠKA	0	4.118	0,02	0,02	0,03
J & V D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	TELEVIZIJA LJUBLJANA (NGD)	0	3.916	0,02	0,02	0,03
VIGRED D.O.O.	LAŠKO	TV KR PAN LAŠKO (NGD)	2	3.059	0,01	0,01	0,04
AJKOM D.O.O.	GMAJNICA	TV PLUS	0	2.215	0,01	0,01	0,01
MEDIA TEAM TIMOTEJ PEČOLER S.P.	UZENICA	TV PROMETEJ	0	249	0	0	0
KABELSKA PRODUKCIJA D.O.O.	NOVO MESTO	I-TV; 3M POSLOVANJA	0	15	0	0	0,01
KABELSKA TELEVIZIJA MEDVODE, ZAVOD	MEDVODE	TELEVIZIJA MEDVODE (NGD)	2	–	–	–	–
KTRC RADEČE, JAVNI ZAVOD	RADEČE	VIDEO STRANI KTRC RADEČE (NGD)	5–9	–	–	–	–
KTV ORMOŽ, ZAVOD	ORMOŽ	KABELSKA TELEVIZIJA ORMOŽ (NGD)	–	–	–	–	–
MTV ADRIA D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	MTV ADRIA (NGD)	–	–	–	–	–
ORON, ZAVOD	LOŽ	TELEVIZIJSKI KANAL LOŠKA DOLINA (NGD)	1	–	–	–	–
UPC D.O.O.	LJUBLJANA	PLAY TV	–	–	–	–	–
VASCOM, ZAVOD ZA IZOBRAŽEVANJE IN VIDEO- PRODUKCIJO, PIVKA	PIVKA	VASCOM PIVKA (NGD)	–	–	–	–	–
XTENSION D.O.O., PODRUŽNICA MARIBOR	MARIBOR	NET TV, NET XXL (NGD)	–	–	–	–	–

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

[illegible]

					MARKET SHARES		
					in percentages		
publisher	city	media	No. of employees	total revenues in '000 tolar	total revenues	sales revenues	assets
ZAVOD NEVIODUNUM	KRŠKO	TV KRŠKO (NGD)	5-9	-	-	-	-
ZAVOD ZA KTV IN INFORMIRANJE SLOVENSKE BISTRICE	SLOVENSKA BISTRICA	STUDIO BISTRICA (NGD)	3-4	-	-	-	-
SKUPAJ IZDAJATELJI TELEVIZIJSKIH MEDIJEV			415	15.517.095	69,18	68,84	72,18
SKUPAJ IZDAJATELJI RTV MEDIJEV			815	22.429.651	100	100	100

NGD: radio and television broadcasting is not registered as the publisher's main line of business (in many cases, broadcast activity is in fact the main line of business although not registered as such).

Source: Balance sheet data AJPEŠ (IBON, September 2005), Media register (April 2006).

Comment: Eleven television programs are classified as having special significance: *Vaš kanal* (regional), *ATV Signal* (local), *TV Primorka* (local), *Vaša televizija – vtv* (regional), *Kanal 10* (local), *Televizija Celje* (local), *Loka TV* (local), *CTV* (local), *RTS* (regional) *i-TV* (non-profit) and *Čarli TV* (non-profit).

Business results for 2004 indicate a relatively high average profitability within the private radio sector. The average return on capital amounted to nearly 28%; this percentage for radio stations was 10%, and for television stations almost 33% (especially good were the business results of Pro Plus, the owner of two largest commercial television channels, POP TV and *Kanal A*). The comparison of business results shows considerable differences between individual broadcasters. Many declared low profits, indicating that the main line of business for which they are licensed (and which they carry out using a limited public resource – frequencies) earns virtually no profit at all. Furthermore, according to the business results declared, the labor costs at these companies are far below the average within the radio sector, with this average being low in general, as well. Some broadcasters had serious difficulties with financial stability, given that in 2004, in addition to negative profit they also reported negative capital. However, apart from one radio program (*Radio Gorenc*), there are no radio or television

SELECTED INDICATORS					COMPARATIVE MATRIX					subsidies by the Ministry of Culture (in tolar)
in percentages		in'000 tolar per employee			index = the observed average is 100					
					profitability		costs per employee			
profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	profit/ capital	profit/ assets	revenue	labor costs	salaries	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,711.009
32.69	16.80	37.391	4.085	2.929	117.2	128.0	135.9	92.8	92.1	341,048.350
27.9-	13.13	27.521	4.401	3.180	100	100	100	100	100	589,509.555

programs of special significance in this group. It is a fact that the broadcasters who received state support between 2002 and 2005 as a rule have returns on capital and labor costs that are lower than the average in this sector. A look at the business results of radio stations in 2004 also shows that 17 radio stations had no employees, and 15 had only one employee.

After 2000, the owners and their interests in radio stations changed frequently and at a fast pace. Given that the government never provided frequencies for a commercial radio station with national coverage, the owners of individual radio stations were buying ownership stakes in other stations. In so doing, they not only consolidated their property but also extended the geographical coverage of the programs in their possession.⁴⁶ The consequences of this “consolidation” are most evident in the programs themselves. Many radio stations offer little diversity of content.

⁴⁶ The MMA of 2001 made possible the foundation of radio and television networks. The largest radio network is Infonet, comprising *Poslovni val*, *Slovenski poslovni kanal*, *Radio Antena*, *Radio Belvi Gorenjska*, Celje's and Postojna's radio *Fantasy*, *Radio 1*, *Max*, *Morje*, *Portorož*, *Šport*, *Urban*, *Val*, *Vrhnika* and *Koroški radio*. Infonet prepares news and sells it to ten radio stations; they have business partnership with 14 radio stations. (Petra Šubic, “Kako je Oblak postal radijski mogotec” (How Oblak Became a Radio Tycoon), in *Manager*, No. 5, May 2006, pp:48–49.).

MORE DIVERSITY = LESS UNIFORMITY

The notions of plurality and diversity reflect various objectives of media policy that can be ensured through certain measures. Plurality may be achieved by restricting media ownership, and diversity through a proactive media policy not limited exclusively to the allocation of state support or subsidies for certain media and the content they offer. Media concentration, the decline of independent editorial policies and their “submersion” within large editorial offices of media corporations, the disappearance of content that is unattractive to advertisers, lower access to the media for minorities, uniformity of opinion and views – all these are the trends typical of contemporary media. The decades-old concept and related policy for regulating the media market has proved unsuccessful. Rather than offering more diverse views of the world, a greater number of media brought uniformity and monotony instead. Therefore, the main problem of media policy in the 21st century, on the national level and globally, is how to ensure and protect plurality and diversity.

The passing of three media laws over the last 14 years, all of which placed stress on plurality and diversity as important aspects of media policy, clearly show that the Slovenian government has no suitable strategy in this area. It is true that the two previous laws on the mass media, one from 1994 and the other from 2001, had two sections dedicated to plurality and diversity, but the practical implementation of these provisions was problematic. The 1994 law attempted to ensure plurality and diversity by restricting ownership stakes in the media to 33%. Unfortunately, this provision was formulated loosely, leaving ample room for circumventing it in more than one way. Although the legislator set a two-year deadline for harmonizing controversial ownership stakes with this provision (by 1996), and although it gave a green light to the ministry responsible for this area to remove from the register those media outlets that failed to fulfill this requirement, no one checked how the requirement was actually met. So despite the 33% limit, during this period CME acquired a majority stake in the commercial television station POP TV. The implementation of the legal provision obliging the government to make a declarative commitment to providing support for non-commercial media is similarly unclear. We do not have information whether the then government met the 60-day deadline as stipulated

by Article 91, within which it should have defined the criteria and methods for allocating state support. Neither do we have information on whether any media outlet received state support on the basis of this provision.

The Mass Media Act of 2001 also attempted to ensure plurality and diversity by restricting ownership shares in media companies. These provisions met the same fate as those in the previous law, since the law did not provide an adequate definition of the relationship between the broadcaster/publisher and the media owner. All prohibitions in this law applied to broadcasters/publishers, but in practice ownership stakes are concentrated in the hands of media owners. However, there is a difference between the two laws with respect to the allocation of state support. The 2001 Mass Media Act introduced mechanisms for the allocation of state support, so from 2002 to 2005 the government earmarked 1.7 billion tolar. However, there was no systematic policy to accompany this provision, and accordingly, no analysis was made of the effect of this support, that is, whether the declared objective, greater media diversity in Slovenia, was achieved. The Amended Mass Media Act is bound to repeat the same story all over again. The only difference is that today the legislator has a clear picture of how, why and to whom the resources should be allocated. But the question of whether the support thus allocated will indeed ensure plurality and diversity remains open.

POLITICS AND JOURNALISM

Janja Koren (journalist): Do you, after everything that you went through, regret entering politics? Would you do the same given your present experience?

Miro Petek: The experience is interesting and good. Above all, it is about some link between politics and journalism. Politics and journalism have many points in common. Perhaps there exists some hostile relation between politics and journalism from time to time, but we cannot do one without the other. We cannot do without you, and you cannot do without us.

Odmevi, August 7, 2006

In February 2001, unknown perpetrators beat and seriously injured Miro Petek, a journalist working for the *Večer* daily. Before the attack, Petek mainly wrote critical articles about the consequences of the transition in the Koroška region and links between public persons in the fields of economics and politics.⁴⁷ One of the stories traced by Petek explored the operation of a branch office of the bank that was the majority owner of *Večer*. In 2004, Miro Petek was elected a deputy to the National Assembly as a candidate of what is currently the largest coalition party, SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party). Petek never had the satisfaction of seeing his attackers (or those who ordered the attack) sentenced in court. After more than five years and many imbroglios, the Higher Court in Maribor (allegedly) decided that five suspects accused of attacking Petek were innocent. The decision of the court was leaked to the public even before it was handed to the defendants, and that occurred during the Court's summer recess. When Petek was asked by the journalist on the evening news program *Odmevi*, Janja Koren, whether after everything that he had gone through he was sorry that he had decided to enter politics, the former journalist turned politician answered that journalism and politics had many points in common. "Perhaps there exists some hostile relation between politics and journalism from time to time, but we cannot do one without the other."

There undoubtedly exists a relationship between journalists/journalism and politics. But this is a relationship in which limitations and prohibitions are clear. Politicians cannot be journalists, and journalists cannot be politicians. A

⁴⁷ Exhaustive information on the "case of Petek" is available at www.primerpetek.net. The report prepared on behalf of the International Federation of Journalists by its researcher Alexander Sami, dated June 14, 2002 is available at www.novinar.com/petek/petek-case.pdf (The Miro Petek Case. A Threat to Press Freedom in Slovenia).

politician writing for the media is not a journalist, and such contributions are at their best political viewpoints disguised as a journalistic text. When a journalist becomes a politician, he can no longer expect that his/her operation is in the interest of the public. He/she is simply a politician who represents partial (political) interests. In democratic societies these dividing lines are clear and transparent. Politics will always attempt to influence the media, and the media, on their part, should incessantly strive to prevent politicians from influencing their editorial policies. In democratic societies, politicians have very few points in common with the media. Independent media can operate and exist without politics. For them, politics is just one among the many subjects on which they report, and nothing besides that. But many politicians and many journalists still seem unable to accept this fact. For a number of editors and journalists, politics still provides the meaning of their existence.

In today's society in which media ownership has been concentrated in the hands of a few owners, and news production serves the purpose of increasing the price of shares and profit, politics has become a serious partner of media owners. Politics make possible the passing of "friendly" media legislation (elimination of anti-monopoly measures, less rigorous protection of copyright, protection of children etc.) and in exchange it obtains "amiable" media treatment or even free access to editorial policy.

Despite some specific features (e.g. considerable government stakes in media companies), the Slovenian media environment demonstrates all the typical traits of media development found in other European countries. The media transition that began in the 1990s and ended in the early 21st century has acquired the features of a new "democratic Leviathan." New-age censorship, whose implications are in no way different from "hard" censorship interventions of the past, is based on the rights of owners and the laws of the (free) market, thus producing extreme forms of (informational and communicational) exclusion and stratification.

The fact that during the drafting of the new media law in Slovenia the articles referring to the right of reply and right of correction were proposed and publicly defended (including at the session of the National Assembly's committee for culture, education and sport) by a powerful media owner, confirms that media owners and politicians in Slovenia indeed have many points in common.

REPORTING DAILY EVENTS IN PRIME
TIME NEWS

COMMERCIAL AND PUBLIC TELEVISION

MARKO PRPIČ

European broadcasting media were deregulated a quarter of a century ago. The process began in Italy and Germany and spread to East European countries in the 1990s following political changes. Pressure to end monopolies in East European countries first began in the area of telecommunications, followed by the demand to end state monopolies over public services as a result of the increasing use of computers, information digitalization and the ensuing convergence of various media. Suddenly, everyone started to talk about media markets. And a market it was, indeed, since powerful US production companies began to seek opportunities to increase sales of their products (media “software”). So the great shift within the media began – a shift away from satisfying the needs of society towards satisfying the needs of individual associations and media tycoons. Forgetting the positive effects of the regulatory model employed by Great Britain, where private television stations were required to ensure diversity of content, Europe consented to a much more liberal approach.

The formal framework was set by the European Commission’s “Television Without Frontiers” Directive,¹ which, as regards content, addresses only the rights of minors and the right of reply. It further sets quotas for European audiovisual works and protects the interests of the public by ensuring it access to important events, but the emphasis is on the regulation of television advertising, sponsorship and TV sales. Behind these seemingly content-related provisions, it is possible to discern the protection of the interests of European production companies (i.e. the interests of film and television companies presented as the national interests of individual states). Nevertheless, new commercial television stations have not invested much in their own programs but have based their offerings on American serials instead.

The interests of citizens were relegated to the background. Europe has adopted the model that replicates that used in America, in which the protection of the public interest is left to market forces, while diversity and quality have been replaced by the option of choice.

In Slovenia, the deregulation process first affected radio, since during the 1980s there were many radio stations that were receiving far too little money from their founders (i.e. state or local communities) and had to rely on the market for their income. The first non-state providers of television

¹ The “Television Without Frontiers” Directive was adopted on October 3, 1989 and amended on June 30, 1997.

programs were cable operators who utilized “their own” infrastructure to offer additional content, ranging from local announcements and programs to commercials. The first private terrestrial television broadcaster and the first independent television in then Yugoslavia was *Kanal A*.² Established in 1989, it began broadcasting in November 1990. At that time, this lone private television station did not pose any serious threat to public television as it did not have sufficient capital to purchase either attractive foreign programs or good technical equipment.

The great change on the Slovenian media scene occurred in 1995 with the appearance of a new player on the market – the production company Pro plus that produces programs for the POP TV and TV3 channels.

The majority owner of Pro plus is the American company Central European Media Enterprise (CME). Pro plus, employing the model pursued by American national networks, acquired one-third stakes in the television stations MMTV, *Tele 39* and *tv Robin*, ensuring the transmission of POP TV programs. In so doing, the majority owner circumvented the provision in the then Mass Media Act that restricted ownership shares and management rights of foreign legal and natural persons to 33%.³ POP TV programming included a number of successful American serials that quickly attracted an audience.

In contrast, the bland and initially religiously flavored programming broadcast by TV3, whose owners were the dioceses of Maribor and Koper, and various Church-related organizations including the publishing and broadcasting organization Ognjišče, Gospodarski forum krščanskih demokratov (Economic Forum of Christian Democrats) and Mohorjeva družba from Celje, failed to attract a large audience.

Pro Plus confirmed its serious ambitions to produce its own programs by establishing a news production department and introducing a daily news program entitled *24*

2 For more on the emergence and development of Slovenian broadcasting media, media legislation and ownership, see Sandra Bašić Hrvatin and Marko Milosavljević: *Media Policy in Slovenia in the 1990s: Regulation, Privatization, Concentration and Commercialization*, Peace Institute, Ljubljana, 2001 (available at <http://www.mirovni-institut.si/>) and Sandra Bašić Hrvatin and Lenart J. Kučič: *Monopoli: Družabna igra trgovanja z mediji* (*Monopolies: The Social Game in Media Trading*), Maska, Ljubljana, 2005.

3 The same provision applied to Slovenian legal and natural persons. See Article 39 of the *Zakon o javnih glasilih* (Mass Media Act), *Uradni list Republike Slovenije*, No 18/94.

ur, which became RTV Slovenia's first serious competitor.⁴ Over the previous decade, *24 ur* had succeeded in winning over a wide range of viewers. Television audience ratings show that it was the most watched daily news broadcast in Slovenia as well as one of the most watched broadcasts in general. To date executives with the News and Educational Programs department at TV Slovenia have not managed to find the right formula to prevent the shrinking of their audience. In March 2006, the *24 ur* rating was 16.71% (45.97% of all viewers), compared to a 12.43% rating for the one-hour *Dnevnik* news block on TV Slovenia (34.32% of all viewers).⁵

To our knowledge and based on publicly accessible data, these two news programs have not been the subject of any comprehensive comparative analysis during the past decade.⁶ Knowing that television is the most influential media and largely responsible for shaping public opinion, and that these two programs have an average daily audience of 525 708 viewers older than 10 years,⁷ such an analysis is certainly in order.

This report attempts to provide answers to several questions:

- Which topics were included in the agenda and in what proportion?
- Who was given an opportunity to address the public and express their opinion?
- What was the proportion of domestic to foreign events in coverage?
- What was the length of individual segments in the two news programs?

4 The public institution RTV Slovenija is a legal successor to RTV Ljubljana. Radio Ljubljana began broadcasting in 1928, and Televizija Ljubljana in 1957. During the 1980s both played an important role in the democratization of society, and during the 1990s they were important actors in the process of Slovenia's gaining of independence.

5 In the same month (March) in 2005, *24 ur*'s rating was 15.73%, and in 2004 it was 16.67%; *Dnevnik*'s ratings were 13.18% in March 2005 and 13.39% in March 2004, meaning that its rating is still decreasing. Source: AGB Nielsen, media research. We would like to express our thanks to Pro Plus and RTV Slovenija for authorizing the publication of this data.

6 A comparison was made by Gašper Lubej, who compared the broadcasts from February 28 to March 6 in 2005. His observations appeared in an article entitled *TV Slovenija praviloma "pokrije" več dogodkov kot POP TV, Primerjava osrednjih informativnih oddaj* (TV Slovenia Covers More Events than POP TV on the Whole. A Comparison of the Main News Programs). See: *Media Watch journal*, May 22, 2005, p. 16.

7 *24 ur* has 301, 453 viewers while *Dnevnik* has 224, 255 viewers (viewers include all individuals aged over 10 living in households in Slovenia that have a functioning television set). Source: AGB Nielsen, media research.

The aim of our research was to check the practical implementation of a quarter-century old promise that the media environment would become more open, that more content providers would mean more information, and that more people would be given a chance to express their opinions. Apart from that, we also wanted to establish what kind of content these two programs offered to their viewers, and what similarities and differences existed between them.

RESEARCH⁸

The subject of our research was two news blocks: *24 ur* by POP TV and *Dnevnik* by TV Slovenia, prime time news programs whose similar structures and time of broadcast make them fully comparable.

The period of monitoring was March 2006. March was deliberately selected, since we wanted to avoid summer months when the pace of life is somewhat different, owing to summer vacations, and consequently ratings are somewhat lower.⁹

Our analysis was conducted at four levels:

1. First we made a quantitative analysis of broadcasts, measuring the length of all segments in their order of appearance in the two news blocks broadcast between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. The identification data for every segment included the name of the broadcast of which it was a part, the type of report, its length, the time when it appeared in the broadcast, the name of the coding person and the date of coding.
2. The quantitative analysis was followed by a qualitative analysis aimed at establishing the role of the newscaster.
3. The qualitative analysis of journalists' reports was aimed at establishing several elements: subjects treated, the actors appearing in reports and the relation of actors to topics; furthermore, we compared the order of appearance of event announcements and topics within the two programs, the length of journalists' reports, the coverage of regions, countries that were the subject of reports etc.
4. We also established the source of televised pictures in the section dealing with news presenters and journalists' reports.

Both newscasts analyzed here begin with the *Napovednik* (an overview of the main headlines)¹⁰ comprising five

⁸ The researcher would like to express his thanks to Alja Brglez, PhD, the director of the Institute for Civilization and Culture, who provided video material, premises and the technical equipment for carrying out this research. I am especially indebted to Mitja Čepič, who processed the collected data and prepared analysis in accordance with author's wishes.

⁹ Since this research is part of a wider research project that will include analysis of the main news programs in 2004 and 2005 (one month will be selected in each year), we had to choose a month without special events that can affect the structure of the news program, such as local or national elections, or elections for the European Parliament. This made the selection of the month for the analysis even more difficult. After reviewing the events of the past years, we concluded that March best met our criteria. Despite this, we could not avoid some extraordinary events (the terrorist attack in Madrid, the death of Slobodan Milošević etc.).

¹⁰ The *24 ur* newsroom uses the term *Napovednik* (Main Headlines) to announce news at the beginning of the news block; the segments announcing news inside the news

events selected by the news editor as the most important events of the day.

Napovednik (Headlines) is followed by the main news segment, which combines journalists' reports and agency news presented by newscasters.

Other segments shared by both news broadcasts are Weather, Sport, Coming Up (the announcement of the news items to be presented next), stings (a short musical passage and graphics sequence punctuating a news program), trailers for other broadcasts, announcement of the broadcast following the news program, and commercials.

Both news programs also contain specific segments. In *Dnevnik* these are *Denar* (finance and stock exchange figures), *Magnet* (cultural topics), trailers for *Odmevi* (the late night news), *Utrip* (a weekly overview of domestic events), *Zrcalo tedna* (a weekly overview of international events) and *Žarišče* (discussion on a topical subject); in *24 ur* these are *Pop in* (culture and entertainment), *TV klub* (a weekly discussion of a topical subject with invited guests), *Vizita* (medical and health topics) and *V središču* (topical issues).

Since the subject of our analysis was the Main Headlines segment and the main part of the program (news), the segments mentioned above were measured only for their length.

The analysis was based on a set of pre-defined subject areas that were applied regardless of the country featured in the news. The name of the country in which a featured event occurred was also noted. Bilateral and multilateral relationships among countries were treated separately. We devoted some extra attention to the EU. Events relating to the UN, OPEC or the ICTY were categorized as the operation of international institutions to avoid the classification of these events according to the country in which these international organizations have their headquarters.

The topics were divided into meaningful categories in order to permit analysis by individual subject areas and by sub-topics within these areas. With certain topics specific to Slovenia, an additional (third) sub-level was used.

If a journalist's report addressed several topics, we established the main topic and only listed other (sub)topics

block are called *V nadaljevanju 1*, *V nadaljevanju 2* (Coming Up 1, Coming Up 2) etc., while the announcement of the Sports segment (a conversation with the host of the Sports segment plus a sport item) is called a teaser. The *Dnevnik* news producers use the expression "General Overview" for the announcements at the beginning of and within the news block (Coming Up) with 5 news items announced at the beginning and four during the news block.

covered in the report. Identification of the main topic and sub-topics was carried out at the time of coding and was based on pre-defined guidelines. If needed, corrections were made by the researcher during control checks. Since in certain examples it was difficult to pinpoint unambiguously the main topic, the decision necessarily involved personal choice by and the value system of the coding person (the same could be said of the procedure used to identify the actors, in cases when there were several appearing in the same report).

In defining subject areas, we relied on the test coding of programs broadcast outside the period analyzed here. Practice showed that it was impossible to anticipate all possible topics. We resolved this predicament by categorizing such reports into subject areas that were most suitable in terms of content and listing these under the heading *Other*, with a footnote about the topic.

The subject areas are as follows:

- Society, religion
- European Union
- Economy/economic policy
- Public services/welfare state/humanitarian work
- Culture/entertainment/sports/leisure
- Domestic politics
- Judicature
- Wars/conflicts/crime/security
- Foreign Affairs

For easier understanding we provide below the explanation of each subject area.

Society, religion. This subject area includes the coverage of religious ceremonies, holidays and events. The second group of topics includes the operation of civil society organizations and the rights of various social groups (e.g. homosexuals).

European Union. This area comprises the coverage of the EU. The topics were divided into subsets in such a way that we were able to monitor the coverage of general EU policies, the relationships between the EU and its individual members, EU-related events within individual EU member states, and the EU's international policies. Within this group of topics, we devoted particular attention to the EU's special policies that elicited the widest response within member states (the issue of the EU Constitution, agricul-

tural and foreign policy) and to the supervision of the EU institutions' operation.

Economy/economic policy. This subject area includes a number of subsets. The aim was to enable an accurate analysis of reports dealing with economic events in the country, ranging from those dealing with overall economic issues (statistical data) and the economic position of the country, regions or local communities, to those dealing with the situation of individual branches of the economy (industry, tourism and leisure activities, service, transport, information and communications sectors, the financial sector, the insurance sector etc.), individual private companies (small, medium-size and large) and state-owned companies, the stock market including the supervision of its operation, business crime, employment, job loss, liquidations, strikes, trade unions' operation and so on (altogether there were 28 sub-topics).

Public services/welfare state/humanitarian work. This subject area includes 18 subsets relating to activities belonging in the area of the public sector: education and science (funding of elementary, secondary, and higher education), health care, social security, issues relating to disabled people, private education, health institutions, strikes within the public sector etc. One subset comprises veterinary issues, which were quite frequently on the agenda during the period analyzed here, owing to the monitoring of bird flu. Those reports that placed emphasis on the general protection and security of citizens were included in the *Wars/conflicts/crime/security* group.

Culture/entertainment/sports/leisure. This subject area comprises topics that deal with culture in general, the funding of culture, operation of cultural institutions and the coverage of cultural events, then the coverage of the media, sports and sporting events, the operation of sports institutions, the funding of sports and recreational activities, and events related to the lives of public persons and celebrities.

Domestic politics. This is a comprehensive group divided into a number of subsets relating to a wide range of policies at the level of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Among these are domestic policies (general), economic, taxation, defense, educational, cultural, social, agricultural, environmental and local policies. It also includes human rights issues, elections, political parties, supervision of the operation of domestic political actors and

corruption in politics. The subset *Other* includes several topics specific to Slovenia and dealing with minorities and particular social groups (the Slovenian minorities in Austria, Italy, Hungary and other countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; Slovenian emigrants; Italian and Hungarian minorities in Slovenia; the Roma; issues relating to citizens who come from other republics of the former Yugoslavia, the “erased” citizens¹¹, homosexuals),¹² and denationalization issues.

Judicature. This subject area includes topics relating to the operation of the judiciary in general, the operation of courts, including the Constitutional Court and the coverage of its decisions, the operation of lawyers and notaries and their associations, and the supervision of courts. It also includes the coverage of court cases divided into two subsets, i.e. cases of general significance and violent crimes (murders, robberies etc.).

Wars/conflicts/crime/security. These are topics dealing with conflicts between countries or within individual countries, terrorism (within a particular country or international), demonstrations (peaceful and violent), unrest (without a political message), war crimes and other conflicts. Criminal acts are divided into two groups – crimes involving bodily injury and property crime. The group also includes topics related to public order and general security, traffic security and traffic accidents, the activities of the police and the military, along with natural and other disasters.

Foreign Affairs. These are topics dealing with foreign affairs in general, bilateral and multilateral relations among countries, operations within international organizations, operations within international military organizations, peace processes, and the supervision of the operation of international protagonists. As regards Slovenian foreign policy, special attention was devoted to its relationship with neighboring countries (Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia).

For each report, we registered the name of the author. This information enabled us to establish whether the report was contributed by a journalist working in Ljubljana

¹¹ The “erased” is a name commonly applied to a large group of non-Slovenes from ex-Yugoslav republics who lived in Slovenia at the time when it gained independence but who had their residence and work permits revoked, either because they failed to apply for Slovenian citizenship or because they were refused it. They were erased from the register of permanent residents.

¹² The media presentation of homosexuality is part of the analysis conducted by Roman Kuhar. See also *Media Representations of Homosexuality: An Analysis of the Print Media in Slovenia 1970–2000*, Peace Institute, Ljubljana, 2003. Available also on <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si>.

(in the main office), or by a correspondent located abroad or in some other place across Slovenia. On the basis of this information, we estimated the share of content contributed by correspondents, indicating the extent of regional coverage. However, the picture of the regional coverage of Slovenia obtained in this way cannot be taken as accurate, because editorial offices sometimes send journalists working at the central office to cover events on the spot. On the other hand, information on the share of reports by foreign correspondents gives a more accurate picture, since these journalists only occasionally appear in daily news programs during their stay in Slovenia.

Every person who appeared in a report was attributed a role. It was an active role if the person in question gave a statement, and a passive one if the person did not give a statement but was nevertheless the focus of attention (because he/she did something that provoked reaction, or the report was about a specific person, or the person was quoted although he/she did not appear in the report).¹³ The passive role was invariably attributed at the level of text analysis, rather than at the level of television picture analysis.

The information about individual actors reveals the number of their appearances in the news (the frequency of active and passive appearances), but says nothing about the length of their statements (the length of individual statements was not registered). Similarly, we did not register the number of statements by one actor in a report, since the inclusion of several statements is frequently a result of a subsequent editing of recorded events (e.g. recordings of press conferences, coverage of debates in the National Assembly or within its individual bodies, statements etc.). Neither did we note separately the appearances of these actors in the part read by news presenters (such as, for example, in the overview of events which, often includes short statements by various actors).

For every actor, we registered the function attributed to him/her in a specific report. This caused some difficulties because in many cases information on actors was lacking (the surname and/or function were missing)¹⁴ or the names were not reproduced correctly. These deficiencies were established during the coding checks or double-checking of records. In such cases we took into account information

¹³ Another term found in literature to denote a passive actor is "target". However, in our view it has negative connotations so we decided not to use it.

¹⁴ In March 2006, there were 8 actors in *24 ur* whose names were not given and 6 in *Dnevnik*.

given in the screen subtitles, since that was the information received by a viewer who has an average knowledge of domestic or global events and actors.

Anonymous persons accounted for a large part of the Actors group. These included, for example, passersby who gave a statement or expressed their opinion on some issue or event in a survey. We should add that the inclusion of brief surveys in news programs is highly controversial, since the sample is non-representative, and the choice of statements depends on the editor's decision.

The group of anonymous appearances further includes statements by witnesses or participants in an event whose names alone are supplied. Although their role could be discerned from the report, the manner of their name presentation qualified them as anonymous protagonists.

Another item of information we registered was the gender of actors, which enabled us to establish the extent of women's presence in news broadcasts and the topics in relation to which they usually appeared.

RESEARCH FINDINGS¹⁵

During the period analyzed here, the news blocks *24 ur* and *Dnevnik*, broadcast between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m., had 60 hours, 17 minutes and 20 seconds of airtime. The total length of *24 ur* news on POP TV was 30 hours, 57 minutes and 29 seconds (the average daily length was 59 minutes and 55 seconds). The total length of *Dnevnik* on TV Slovenija was 29 hours, 19 minutes and 51 seconds (the average daily length was 56 minutes and 46 seconds).¹⁶ Both news blocks are similarly structured, with differences appearing only in certain segments specific to one or the other broadcast.

A distinctive trait of both newscasts involves *journalistic texts/reports*. On average, journalists' reports accounted for 37.3% of each news block, or in other words, journalists' reports were given 12 hours and 12 minutes (or 39.4%) of airtime in *24 ur*, and 10 hours and 17 minutes (or 35.1%) in *Dnevnik*. This puts *24 ur* ahead of *Dnevnik*, with almost two hours more time allotted to journalists' reports.

News presenters in both news programs were given 18.2% of airtime (18.5% in *24 ur*, i.e. 5 hours and 43 minutes, and 18.0% in *Dnevnik*, i.e. 5 hours and 17 minutes). This amounts to a 25-minute difference at the monthly level in favor of *24 ur* news presenters.

There is a significant difference in the airtime devoted to commercials – almost 5 hours in *24 ur* compared to 3 hours and 18 minutes in *Dnevnik*. To put it differently, *Dnevnik* had 1 hour and 40 minutes less airtime devoted to commercials at the monthly level. In *24 ur*, commercials accounted for 16.1% of airtime, and in *Dnevnik* for 11.3%.

24 ur also featured more trailers for other broadcasts, but this does not affect the structure of the program, since trailers add up to somewhat less than 8 minutes per month (compared to 1 minute and 21 seconds in *Dnevnik*).

In both news programs, the Sports segment accounted for roughly one - tenth of total airtime. In *24 ur*, sports received 2 hours and 52 minutes of airtime, or 9.2%, while this figure for *Dnevnik* was 3 hours and 33 minutes, or 12.1%. A more detailed analysis shows that the shorter length of the Sports segment in *24 ur* is offset by the fact that one significant sporting event is invariably included in the main news segment of the program (presented as a conversation

¹⁵ Since this research is part of a wider research project that will be presented in the doctoral thesis, these findings should be regarded as preliminary.

¹⁶ This time includes all segments that appear from the opening to the end of *24 ur*, or to the end of the Sports segment in *Dnevnik*.


between the news presenter(s) and the host of the Sports segment, followed by a sports-related news item). At the monthly level, this amounts to 19 minutes and 16 seconds, which reduces the difference between the lengths of the two sports segments; nevertheless, public television gave more airtime to sports coverage.

TABLE 1: SEGMENTS SHARED BY BOTH NEWS PROGRAMS.

SEGMENT	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Journalists' reports	12:12:04	10:17:18	22:29:22	39.4%	35.1%	37.3%
News presenters	5:42:52	5:17:08	11:00:00	18.5%	18.0%	18.2%
Commercials	4:58:11	3:18:36	8:16:47	16.1%	11.3%	13.7%
Sports	2:51:43	3:33:09	6:24:52	9.2%	12.1%	10.6%
Weather	1:22:52	1:15:42	2:38:34	4.5%	4.3%	4.4%
Stings	0:21:12	0:26:29	0:47:41	1.1%	1.5%	1.3%
Main headlines	0:12:55	0:13:28	0:26:23	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%
Coming up	0:12:34	0:10:22	0:22:56	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%
Trailers						
for other broadcasts	0:07:45	0:01:21	0:09:06	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%
Next on our channel	0:02:19	0:01:29	0:03:48	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

GRAPH 1: SEGMENTS SHARED BY BOTH BROADCASTS

(■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)



The lower half of the graph shows segments that add up to less than half an hour at the monthly level. The top position in this half of the graph is occupied by Stings (separators). These form an important part of the news block, since they essentially contribute to the overall image of the pro-

gram by drawing the viewers' attention, visually and audibly, to individual segments and transitions between them.¹⁷ Stings accounted for 21 minutes and 12 seconds in *24 ur*, and 26 minutes and 29 seconds in *Dnevnik*. Although the difference at the monthly level is ostensibly small, i.e. just 5 minutes and 17 seconds, it is nevertheless significant, considering that the average length of a sting is 7 seconds in *Dnevnik* and 10 seconds in *24 ur*. *Dnevnik* had 98 separators more than *24 ur* during the observed month.

The next place is occupied by the Main Headlines appearing at the beginning of the broadcast. Their task is to attract viewers' attention and emphasize the most important events of the day. The Main Headlines segment amounted to 13 minutes, or 0.7% of the program.

The segment entitled Coming Up has the same function as the Main Headlines except that it appears within the broadcast and draws viewers' attention to news that will be presented later in the program. Occasionally, it is used as a separator between two unrelated topics. This approach is employed to stir interest and keep viewers in front of the television screens until the end of the program or at least for the most part of it. This segment accounts for somewhat more than 10 minutes a month in each news broadcast (12 minutes and 35 seconds in *24 ur*, and 10 minutes and 22 seconds in *Dnevnik*), i.e. 0.6% of the total airtime on average, meaning somewhat less than the time given to the main headlines presented at the beginning of the broadcast.

The trailers for other broadcasts are pre-recorded pieces classified as advertisements. In absolute value they are small in number, but there is an obvious difference between *24 ur* news (7 minutes and 45 seconds) and *Dnevnik* (1 minute and 21 seconds).

The news presenters occasionally *announce the broadcast that follows* the news block, sometimes by going live to the studio and speaking to the host journalist. POP TV uses this approach most frequently to announce the broadcast *Trenja*, while *TV Slovenija* employs it to announce documentary programs (*Pod Žarometom* and *Tarča*) and live broadcasts of various events. These announcements occupy only 0.1% of the total time in both news programs (2 minutes and 19 seconds in *24 ur*, and 1 minute and 29 seconds in *Dnevnik*).

17 In addition, stings help the news presenters to make a transition between topics that have nothing, or very little, in common.

Analysis of segments specific to the individual news block showed that the lengthiest segment in *24 ur* was *POP In* (1 hour and 30 minutes or 4.9% of airtime) and *Magnet* in *Dnevnik* (1 hour and 17 minutes, or 4.4% of airtime). These two segments share certain traits, since both deal with culture in the broad sense of the word. *24 ur* more frequently covers celebrities and show business, while *Dnevnik* more frequently deals with serious genres (classical music, exhibitions, poetry etc.). We should again point out that these segments were not the subject of our analysis but were measured only for their length.

In addition to the two segments mentioned above, other segments that stand out for their length are *TV Klub* in *24 ur*, and *Zrcalo tedna* and *Utrip* in *Dnevnik*. The length of these segments is slightly more than one hour a month. In *TV Klub* the political topic that dominated the week is discussed by the host and several guests in the studio. *Utrip* is a weekly overview of domestic political events, while *Zrcalo tedna* is a weekly summary of international events.¹⁸

TABLE 2: SEGMENTS SPECIFIC TO ONE NEWS BROADCAST.

SEGMENT	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Pop In	1:30:29		1:30:29	4.9%		2.5%
Magnet		1:16:53	1:16:53		4.4%	2.1%
TV Klub	1:05:22		1:05:22	3.5%		1.8%
Zrcalo tedna		1:00:24	1:00:24		3.4%	1.7%
Utrip		1:00:18	1:00:18		3.4%	1.7%
Denar		0:32:51	0:32:51		1.9%	0.9%
Žarišče		0:29:57	0:29:57		1.7%	0.8%
napoved Odmevov		0:24:26	0:24:26		1.4%	0.7%
Vizita	0:13:16		0:13:16	0.7%		0.4%
V središču	0:03:55		0:03:55	0.2%		0.1%

As regards the length of individual segments, the trailer for the late night news program *Odmevi* stands out – 24 minutes and 26 seconds, i.e. 1.4% of the airtime. This makes *Odmevi* the most advertised broadcast by TV Slovenia during peak time.

¹⁸ Until April 14, 2003, when *Dnevnik*'s start time was moved to 19.00, these were independent broadcasts. *Utrip* was broadcast on Saturdays and *Zrcalo tedna* on Sundays, both immediately following *Dnevnik*. After April 14, both broadcasts were made part of the news block between 19.00 and 20.00.

WHICH TOPICS WERE COVERED?

Every news item in the news block, appearing either as part of a journalist's report or as part of one read by a news presenter, was classified into one of the subject areas described earlier. If the news item dealt with one topic only, that topic was entered as the main topic. If the news item or the journalist's report addressed several topics, we defined the main topic and the subtopics.

Our analysis showed that *24 ur* featured 554 news items, meaning 17.9 news items on average per day. Of these, 321 (57.9%) addressed topics that were not addressed in *Dnevnik* on the same day. *Dnevnik* featured 598 news items (and as many main topics), meaning 19.3 news items, on average, per day. Of these, 365 (61.0%) covered news topics not covered in *24 ur* on the same day. There were in total 233 news items featuring the same topics in both news broadcasts on the same day, meaning, on average, one-quarter of all news items in both news programs (25.4%).

TABLE 3: TOPICS FEATURED IN ONE OR BOTH NEWS BROADCASTS
(ON THE SAME DAY).

DATE OF BROADCAST	24UR	DNEVNIK	IN BOTH
Wednesday, March 1, 2006	6	10	10
Thursday, March 2, 2006	12	14	7
Friday, March 3, 2006	10	13	8
Saturday, March 4, 2006	11	7	6
Sunday, March 5, 2006	6	9	5
Monday, March 6, 2006	7	13	10
Tuesday, March 7, 2006	20	16	3
Wednesday, March 8, 2006	11	9	9
Thursday, March 9, 2006	9	12	12
Friday, March 10, 2006	12	19	4
Saturday, March 11, 2006	9	10	2
Sunday, March 12, 2006	7	7	2
Monday, March 13, 2006	13	12	9
Tuesday, March 14, 2006	16	13	7
Wednesday, March 15, 2006	15	22	5
Thursday, March 16, 2006	7	13	11
Friday, March 17, 2006	7	9	6
Saturday, March 18, 2006	5	11	3
Sunday, March 19, 2006	7	5	6
Monday, March 20, 2006	13	9	10
Tuesday, March 21, 2006	12	14	9

DATE OF BROADCAST	24UR	DNEVNIK	IN BOTH
Wednesday, March 22, 2006	9	10	10
Thursday, March 23, 2006	12	14	11
Friday, March 24, 2006	11	9	11
Saturday, March 25, 2006	11	7	8
Sunday, March 26, 2006	9	10	6
Monday, March 27, 2006	9	12	8
Tuesday, March 28, 2006	12	17	8
Wednesday, March 29, 2006	10	13	9
Thursday, March 30, 2006	13	12	8
Friday, March 31, 2006	10	14	10

CHART 3: TOPICS FEATURED IN ONE OR BOTH NEWS PROGRAMS
(ON THE SAME DAY) (■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)



Results by days show that *24 ur* presented the greatest number of news items on Tuesdays (21.8 news items on average), and *Dnevnik* on Thursdays (23.6 on average). Thursday was also the day with the greatest number of topics that were featured by both broadcasts (10.3, on average). This may be attributed to the fact that the Government holds its sessions on Thursday, so related topics dominate the news programs.¹⁹

**TABLE 4: THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF NEWS ITEMS
BY DAY OF THE WEEK**

DAY OF THE WEEK	24UR	DNEVNIK	IN BOTH
Monday	10.5	11.5	9.3
Tuesday	15.0	15.0	6.8
Wednesday	10.3	12.8	8.5
Thursday	10.0	13.3	10.3
Friday	10.0	12.5	7.3
Saturday	9.0	8.8	4.8
Sunday	7.3	7.8	4.8

**CHART 4A: THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF NEWS ITEMS
BY DAY OF THE WEEK (■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)**



**CHART 4B: THE SHARES OF NEWS TOPICS THAT APPEARED
IN ONE NEWS BROADCAST OR IN BOTH
(■ 24UR 34.9% ■ DNEVNIK 39.7% ■ V OBEH 25.4%)**




¹⁹ We excluded March 29, 30 and 31 so that we could have an identical number of weekdays.

The fewest news items were presented at the end of the week, which explains why special segments (tv Klub, Utrip, Zrcalo tedna) are scheduled for the end of the week.

Each news item was given a number corresponding to its position within the broadcast, and each particular topic was given an identification number. This enabled us to compare the order of appearance of particular topics in the two news broadcasts. Since the two news programs featured a different number of reports, the sequence number of the topic was divided by the number of topics – events in the program. So each concrete topic was ascribed a value between 0 and 1.²⁰

The dispersion graph below shows that topics appearing in similar positions within the two newscasts are located close to the axis and vice versa – the greater the “distance” between featured topics within the newscasts, the greater the distance from the axis.

**CHART 4C: “DISTANCE” BETWEEN FEATURED TOPICS
IN THE BROADCASTS ANALYZED.**



²⁰ Example: in a broadcast featuring 20 reports, a difference of 0.3 means that the reports dealing with the same topic were 6 items apart.

ANALYSIS BY SUBJECT AREAS

The division of news items by subject areas²¹ yielded the table below clearly showing that the top three positions in both news programs were occupied by the same topics.


The majority of both programs was devoted to topics belonging in the category of *domestic politics*. *24 ur* allotted to it 7 hours and 34 minutes (or 40.11 % of airtime) compared to 6 hours and 3 minutes in *Dnevnik* (or 37.4 % of airtime). Next come the topics in the group *Wars/conflicts/crime/security* (*24 ur* – 2 hours and 34 minutes, i.e. 13.6 % of airtime, *Dnevnik* – 1 hour and 51 minutes, i.e. 11.4 % of airtime), followed by the *Economy/economic policies* topics, which account for approx. one-tenth of airtime (10.8 %) in both news programs (*24 ur* – 1 hour 44 minutes, i.e. 9.2 % of airtime, *Dnevnik* – 2 hours and 2 minutes, i.e. 12.6 % of airtime). These three subject areas occupy, on average, 62.2% of airtime in both news programs.

TABLE 5: REPORTS BY SUBJECT AREAS
(REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY FEATURED IN THE REPORT).

SUBJECT AREAS	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Domestic politics	7:34:09	6:02:56	13:37:05	40.1%	37.4%	38.9%
Wars/conflicts/ crime/security	2:33:48	1:50:35	4:24:23	13.6%	11.4%	12.6%
Economy/ economic policies	1:43:38	2:02:27	3:46:05	9.2%	12.6%	10.8%
Public services/ welfare state/ humanitarian work	1:28:25	1:09:24	2:37:49	7.8%	7.2%	7.5%
Judicature	1:30:12	0:48:52	2:19:04	8.0%	5.0%	6.6%
Foreign affairs	0:56:35	1:15:16	2:11:51	5.0%	7.8%	6.3%
Other	0:51:30	0:51:42	1:43:12	4.5%	5.3%	4.9%
Culture/entertain- ment/sport/leisure	1:02:27	0:35:50	1:38:17	5.5%	3.7%	4.7%
European Union	0:29:21	0:56:34	1:25:55	2.6%	5.8%	4.1%
Society, religion	0:41:49	0:36:26	1:18:15	3.7%	3.8%	3.7%

21 The analysis covers the journalists' reports, the news read by news presenters and conversations with guests (either those invited to the studio, or those contacted by phone or video link).

CHART 5: REPORTS BY SUBJECT AREAS
 (REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY FEATURED IN THE REPORT)
 (■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)



A detailed analysis of the *Domestic politics* group showed that within this group most time was allotted to the subset of topics entitled *Domestic politics - general* (24 ur – 1 hour and 21 minutes, or 17.7 % of airtime, *Dnevnik* – 58 minutes, or 16.0 % of airtime). A great deal of time was devoted to social policy (24 ur – 49 minutes and 20 seconds, or 10.9 % of time, *Dnevnik* – 34 minutes and 39 seconds, or 9.5 % of time) and economic policy (24 ur – 45 minutes and 3 seconds, or 9.9 % of time, *Dnevnik* – 33 minutes and 15 seconds, or 9.2 % of time), with the differences between the two news programs at the monthly level being negligible.

Within the subject area *Wars/conflicts/crime/security*, both news programs gave the greatest portion of airtime to the coverage of natural and other disasters (24 ur – 37 minutes and 52 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 29 minutes and 54 seconds).

24 ur extensively covered the topics categorized under *crime – violent crimes*, which were allotted 23 minutes, and *crime – property crime*, allotted 18 minutes. The total time given to these two subsets was 41 minutes and 29 seconds, putting this pair at the top of this group. This is also related to the extensive coverage of the work of courts in 24 ur and the correspondingly high ranking for *Judicature* on the list of subject areas. In *Dnevnik*, these two groups account for only 17 minutes. Because of the extensive coverage of

criminal offenses in *24 ur*, a correspondingly large portion of time is devoted to the work of the police – 14 minutes and 23 seconds (compared to just 3 minutes and 39 seconds in *Dnevnik*).

In *Dnevnik*, the second and third places within this group of topics are occupied by the subsets *conflicts between countries* (11 minutes and 46 seconds) and *violent protests/demonstrations* (10 minutes and 39 seconds), which may be attributed to the coverage of events in crisis regions (Iraq, Iran, Israel).

Dnevnik allotted more time to the *Economy/economic policies* group (*24 ur* – 1 hour, 43 minutes and 38 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 2 hours, 3 minutes and 27 seconds). At the monthly level this amounts to 19 - minute and 29 seconds difference, meaning slightly more than half a minute a day. Taking into account that *Dnevnik* includes the segment entitled *Denar* (Money), featuring business and stock exchange news, and that its length is 32 minutes and 51 seconds, this difference is even greater, since *24 ur* does not include any segment dedicated to financial and business news in particular.

In *24 ur* the most extensively covered subset was *business crime* (10 minutes and 26 seconds), putting it in first place in this group. Both news programs obviously place emphasis on the economic position of companies (*24 ur* – 9 minutes and 49 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 18 minutes and 28 seconds). In *Dnevnik*, the two subsets that received special attention were employment and strikes (8 minutes and 16 seconds and 7 minutes and 1 second, respectively).

24 ur devoted more time than *Dnevnik* to *Public services/welfare state/humanitarian work* topics, i.e. 1 hour and 28 minutes (compared to 1 hour and 9 minutes allotted to these issues in *Dnevnik*). A closer look at these subsets shows that the difference may be attributed to a more extensive coverage of health care in *24 ur* (*24 ur* – 31 minutes and 40 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 18 minutes and 23 seconds).

A considerable portion of airtime was devoted to the coverage of private education, health care and veterinary issues (*24 ur* – 21 minutes and 15 seconds; *Dnevnik* – 7 minutes and 51 seconds). These topics formed a subgroup separating them from the coverage of other public services in this subject group. The subtopic *Veterinary medicine* ranked high on the list of sub-topics in this group in both news programs, the reason being the monitoring of bird flu (*24 ur* – 19 minutes and 34 seconds; *Dnevnik* – 19 minutes

and 41 seconds). Some reports on bird flu were classified into the subgroup *security – general* (part of the *Wars/conflicts/crime/security* subject area), if the emphasis was placed on the protection and security of citizens.

There is a difference between the two news programs in coverage of the *Judicature* group of topics. Within this group, *24 ur* dedicated the greatest portion of time to *court cases (violent crimes)* – 31 minutes and 4 seconds. *Dnevnik* allocated only 9 minutes and 38 seconds to the same subset. Next is the subset entitled *court cases (of general significance)* – for example, reports on war crimes.²² *24 ur* gave these topics 29 minutes and 58 seconds, compared to 12 minutes and 56 seconds in *Dnevnik*. These two subsets represent as much as two-thirds (67.6%) of the *Judicature* group coverage in *24 ur*, and somewhat less than one half (46.3%) of that in *Dnevnik*.

The *Foreign Affairs* group received 2 hours and 12 minutes of coverage in total (*24 ur* – 56 minutes and 35 seconds or 5 % of airtime, *Dnevnik* – 1 hour, 15 minutes and 16 seconds, or 7.8 % of airtime). Both news programs gave the most time to bilateral relationships between countries (*24 ur* – 23 minutes and 30 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 26 minutes and 38 seconds). In *24 ur*, the next most covered topics were those in the group entitled *operation within international military organizations* (6 minutes and 1 second), followed by *operation within international organizations* (5 minutes and 7 seconds); in the case of *Dnevnik*, the next most covered topic was *operation within international organizations* (7 minutes 57 seconds), followed by the subset *foreign affairs – general* (4 minutes and 31 seconds). However, the differences are so small that they become insignificant at the monthly level.

The topics that were classified as *Specific to Slovenia* and were part of the groups *Domestic Affairs* (minorities, marginal social groups, denationalization issues) and *Foreign Affairs* (e.g. relationships with neighboring countries) were allotted virtually the same amount of time in both news programs (*24 ur* – 51 minutes and 30 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 51 minutes and 42 seconds). Most of the airtime was devoted to coverage of Slovenia's relationship with its neighbor Croatia, i.e. 9 minutes and 59 seconds in *24 ur*, and 18 minutes and 16 seconds in *Dnevnik*. *Dnevnik* devoted considerable attention to the Slovenia-Italy relationship (11 minutes), while

22 Since we coded items by subject areas that applied to all countries and international organizations, this subject area also includes the ICJ proceedings.

24 *ur* placed somewhat more emphasis on denationalization issues (6 minutes).

The *Culture/entertainment/sport/leisure* group occupied eighth place on the ten-item list of subject areas. It received 1 hour and 38 minutes of airtime altogether (24 *ur* – 1 hour and 2 minutes, *Dnevnik* – 35 minutes and 50 seconds). In 24 *ur*, the greatest portion of time was given to the subset *sporting events* (17 minutes and 45 seconds), *sport* (9 minutes and 56 seconds) and *entertainment events* (7 minutes and 17 seconds). *Dnevnik* placed somewhat more emphasis on *sports* (6 minutes and 17 seconds), *sporting events* (6 minutes and 16 seconds) and *culture – general* (4 minutes and 37 seconds). Most of the other subsets in this group were given only 2 to 3 minutes of airtime, which is a value negligible at the monthly level.²³

The subject area *European Union* was allotted 1 hour and 26 minutes of airtime in the two news programs. 24 *ur* allocated these topics 29 minutes and 21 seconds, or 2.6% of airtime, and *Dnevnik* 56 minutes and 34 seconds, or 5.8% of airtime, meaning twice as much as 24 *ur*. That the EU and related events are considered important by tv Slovenia is also confirmed by the fact that it has two correspondents in EU institutions in Brussels, while the program of POP TV is prepared mainly in Ljubljana.

The group *Society, religion* occupies the last place with slightly more than one hour of total time (1 hour and 18 minutes altogether; 24 *ur* – 41 minutes and 49 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 36 minutes and 26 seconds). This category includes reports on the assembly of Cardinals in the Vatican and the activities of President Janez Drnovšek related to the Darfur crisis.

SLOVENIJA – LJUBLJANA AND REGIONS

In both news programs, most events are covered by journalists working in Ljubljana. Events in other parts of Slovenia are covered by field correspondents, and, in the case of tv Slovenia, by journalists working for its regional centers in Koper/Capodistria and Maribor. We also included in this group the correspondents who cover the Slovenian minority in Austria (Klagenfurt) and Italy (Trieste), since in our opinion the nature of the subject is such that this group seems the most appropriate. The table below clearly

²³ Let us stress again that this time does not include special segments that were analyzed in the broadcasts devoted to coverage of culture and sports.

shows that, on average, as much as 81.0% of all reports related to Ljubljana. Although TV Slovenia has more journalists and local offices, which should ensure better coverage of the country, it devoted less time to field reports than its competitor *24 ur*. At the monthly level, this difference amounts to slightly more than 2 hours (*24 ur* – 10 hours and 4 minutes, *Dnevnik* – 7 hours and 57 minutes). The share of content prepared by correspondents shows that *24ur*'s correspondents contributed 1 hour and 34 minutes (15.6%) of reports referring to Slovenia, while *Dnevnik*'s correspondents contributed 1 hour and 51 minutes (23.3%).

TABLE 6: GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE BY THE AMOUNT OF AIRTIME
(SLOVENIA)

REGION	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Ljubljana or other	8:29:33	6:06:11	14:35:44	84.4%	76.7%	81.0%
Celje	0:29:47	0:07:39	0:37:26	4.9%	1.6%	3.5%
Koper	0:14:28	0:20:12	0:34:40	2.4%	4.2%	3.2%
Maribor	0:13:52	0:20:20	0:34:12	2.3%	4.3%	3.2%
Kranj	0:18:17	0:09:04	0:27:21	3.0%	1.9%	2.5%
Nova Gorica	0:05:52	0:12:05	0:17:57	1.0%	2.5%	1.7%
Murska Sobota	0:12:13	0:03:07	0:15:20	2.0%	0.7%	1.4%
Slovenj Gradec		0:09:30	0:09:30		2.0%	0.9%
Novo mesto		0:07:49	0:07:49		1.6%	0.7%
Idrija		0:04:41	0:04:41		1.0%	0.4%
Krško		0:04:36	0:04:36		1.0%	0.4%
Postojna		0:03:23	0:03:23		0.7%	0.3%
Trbovlje		0:03:02	0:03:02		0.6%	0.3%
Trst		0:02:41	0:02:41		0.6%	0.2%
Celovec		0:01:31	0:01:31		0.3%	0.1%
Kočevje		0:01:27	0:01:27		0.3%	0.1%

CHART 6: GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE BY THE AMOUNT OF AIRTIME
(SLOVENIA) (■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)






Both POP TV and RTV Slovenia have foreign correspondents in the areas that are considered to be the most interesting at the moment. In March 2006, foreign correspondents produced 57 minutes of programming for *24 ur*, and 1 hour and 57 minutes of programming for *Dnevnik*. The most obvious difference occurs between the reports originating in Brussels, where TV Slovenija has two correspondents. In *Dnevnik*, reports from Brussels account for one - third of all reports from abroad (33.6% of airtime), while *24 ur* mainly relies on news agencies sending out their own correspondents to cover special events only.

TABLE 7: GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE BY THE AMOUNT OF AIRTIME (WORLD)

WORLD	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Brussels - EU	0:09:35	0:39:32	0:49:07	16.8%	33.6%	28.1%
Belgrade	0:09:12	0:18:32	0:27:44	16.1%	15.7%	15.9%
Washington	0:14:46	0:09:52	0:24:38	25.9%	8.4%	14.1%
Rome	0:11:06	0:08:44	0:19:50	19.4%	7.4%	11.3%
Moscow		0:13:54	0:13:54		11.8%	8.0%
Jerusalem		0:13:40	0:13:40		11.6%	7.8%
Berlin		0:10:33	0:10:33		9.0%	6.0%
Zagreb	0:05:27	0:02:57	0:08:24	9.5%	2.5%	4.8%
London	0:06:59		0:06:59	12.2%		4.0%

CHART 7: GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE BY THE AMOUNT OF AIRTIME
(WORLD) (■ 24UR ■ DNEVNIK ■ SKUPAJ)



In March 2006, *24 ur* featured 41 reports by foreign correspondents, compared to 73 featured in *Dnevnik*.

ANALYSIS BY COUNTRIES

For every news item/event we noted the country to which it referred. If more than one country was mentioned in the report (bilateral or multilateral relationships), we established the secondary country as well. In March 2006, there were 55 countries mentioned in both news programs. Understandably, the greatest number of events related to Slovenia (*24 ur* – 77.4 %, *Dnevnik* – 74.2 %). The fact that Serbia and Montenegro occupied second place can be attributed to the coverage of the death of Slobodan Milošević. International organizations were categorized separately so that the coverage of their operation did not affect the frequency of the appearance of countries in which they have their headquarters.

TABLE 8: PRIMARY COUNTRIES IN NEWS PROGRAMS.

COUNTRY	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Slovenia	1098	983	2081	77.4%	74.2%	75.9%
Serbia and Montenegro	45	32	77	3.2%	2.4%	2.8%
usa	37	33	70	2.6%	2.5%	2.6%
France	23	29	52	1.6%	2.2%	1.9%
Iraq	18	26	44	1.3%	2.0%	1.6%
European Union	16	27	43	1.1%	2.0%	1.6%

Belarus	22	19	41	1.6%	1.4%	1.5%
Italy	19	16	35	1.3%	1.2%	1.3%
Germany	13	19	32	0.9%	1.4%	1.2%
Netherlands	5	14	19	0.4%	1.1%	0.7%
Austria	12	6	18	0.8%	0.5%	0.7%
Iran	9	8	17	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Russia	6	10	16	0.4%	0.8%	0.6%
International organiza- tions	4	11	15	0.3%	0.8%	0.5%
Palestine	2	13	15	0.1%	1.0%	0.5%
Vatican	9	6	15	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%
Great Britain	10	5	15	0.7%	0.4%	0.5%
Israel	9	5	14	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%
Ukraine	7	7	14	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Croatia	8	4	12	0.6%	0.3%	0.4%

The secondary countries that were most frequently mentioned in connection with Slovenia were as follows:

**TABLE 9: THE COUNTRIES MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED
IN CONNECTION WITH SLOVENIA
(SECONDARY COUNTRIES).**

SECONDARY COUNTRIES	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Sudan	19	8	27	24.7%	10.5%	17.6%
Croatia	11	15	26	14.3%	19.7%	17.0%
Italy	8	13	21	10.4%	17.1%	13.7%
Serbia and Montenegro	8	2	10	10.4%	2.6%	6.5%
Palestine	2	6	8	2.6%	7.9%	5.2%
Great Britain	5	3	8	6.5%	3.9%	5.2%

Sudan and Serbia and Montenegro topped the list in March 2006 owing to President Janez Drnovšek's humanitarian efforts and the death of Slobodan Milošević.

Slovenia most frequently appeared as a secondary country in reports dealing with the following countries:

TABLE 10: FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH SLOVENIA APPEARED AS A SECONDARY COUNTRY.

SLOVENIJA AS A SECONDARY COUNTRY	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Italy	4	5	9	26.7%	23.8%	25.0%
Croatia	3	2	5	20.0%	9.5%	13.9%
Germany		5	5		23.8%	13.9%
Serbia and Montenegro	3	1	4	20.0%	4.8%	11.1%
Cyprus		2	2		9.5%	5.6%
European Union		2	2		9.5%	5.6%
Israel	2		2	13.3%		5.6%
Russia		2	2		9.5%	5.6%
Sudan	2		2	13.3%		5.6%

Let us note that more in-depth analysis is not possible in this case because of the dearth of examples in which Slovenia appeared as a secondary country.

ANALYSIS OF ACTORS

During March 2006, 1, 271 persons altogether appeared in the news programs analyzed here.²⁴ Of these, 291 or 22.9%, appeared in both news programs; 511 (40.2%) appeared only in *24 ur*, and 469 (36.9%) only in *Dnevnik*. At first glance, this is surprising, because the choice of actors is determined by events. However, a look at these figures from a different perspective shows that 291 persons who appeared in both news programs accounted for 56% of all appearances in these broadcasts, in which they either gave a statement (1, 041 altogether) or were just mentioned therein (372 times).

The information on the country of origin of every person who appeared in the news programs shows that 926 actors came from Slovenia (72.9%) and 345 (27.1%) from other countries or international organizations.

²⁴ This is the number of persons with both first and second names supplied. We also established 343 anonymous appearances (150 female and 193 male), while the names of 17 actors were not supplied (9 female and 5 male).

TABLE II: NUMBER OF ACTORS.

ACTORS	TOTAL	SLOVENIA	WORLD	TOTAL	SLOVENIA	WORLD
24ur	511	364	147	40.2%	39.3%	42.6%
TVD	469	344	125	36.9%	37.1%	36.2%
both	291	218	73	22.9%	23.5%	21.2%
TOTAL	1271	926	345			

Each actor²⁵ was attributed one or more functions based on information supplied in the report. Using these attributes, we divided actors into 13 groups. The table clearly shows that by far the greatest number of actors belongs in the group we called *the political sub-system – the state* (40%, on average). The group *Other* comprise actors for whom we could not establish a function, plus anonymous persons (participants in surveys and events and witnesses of events with only their name supplied). Next come actors from the economic sector.

TABLE 12: ACTORS BY ROLES THEY WERE ATTRIBUTED.

FUNCTION/SOCIAL ROLE	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Political sub-sistem - the state	554	622	1176	37.0%	43.1%	40.0%
other	269	219	488	18.0%	15.2%	16.6%
economy	123	170	293	8.2%	11.8%	10.0%
education, science, culture, sport	123	93	216	8.2%	6.4%	7.3%
Law, courts	105	62	167	7.0%	4.3%	5.7%
Repressive apparatus/crime/military/protection and rescue	107	52	159	7.2%	3.6%	5.4%
Civil society	72	65	137	4.8%	4.5%	4.7%
Political sub-sistem – local communities	26	53	79	1.7%	3.7%	2.7%
Health care, social care, retired people	35	35	70	2.3%	2.4%	2.4%
Media	30	28	58	2.0%	1.9%	2.0%
European Union	22	29	51	1.5%	2.0%	1.7%
International organizations	16	14	30	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%
Entertainment event/show business	14	1	15	0.9%	0.1%	0.5%

²⁵ Includes all actors in the report regardless of their country of origin.

If we add the repressive apparatus and local communities to the group *political sub-system*, the total number of actors in this group amounts to almost half of all actors who appeared in the two news programs (48.1%).

A further analysis of the largest group, i.e. *political sub-system – the state*, shows that government employees are at the forefront. If we add various government departments, the group amounts to 51.9% of all actors.

TABLE 13: ACTORS BY FUNCTION –
SUB-DIVISION OF THE GROUP POLITICAL SUB-SYSTEM – THE STATE.

POLITICAL SUB-SYSTEM – THE STATE	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL	24UR	DNEVNIK	TOTAL
Government	226	273	499	40.8%	43.9%	42.4%
National Assembly/Congress/ Lower House	110	105	215	19.9%	16.9%	18.3%
Political party	92	94	186	16.6%	15.1%	15.8%
President	49	78	127	8.8%	12.5%	10.8%
Government – Government departments	54	58	112	9.7%	9.3%	9.5%
Representatives abroad	12	3	15	2.2%	0.5%	1.3%
Other	5	5	10	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%
National Council/Senate/ Upper House	3	6	9	0.5%	1.0%	0.8%
Central bank	3		3	0.5%		0.3%

The analysis of this group by gender and by the subject areas in connection with which they appeared shows that the greatest number of women appeared in connection with events in the groups *Public service/welfare state/humanitarian work* and *Society/religion*.

TABLE 14: ACTORS BY GENDER AND SUBJECT AREAS
IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THEY APPEARED.

SUBJECT AREAS	WOMEN	MAN	TOTAL	WOMEN	MAN
Domestic politics	159	964	1123	14.2%	85.8%
Wars/conflicts/ crime/security	87	270	357	24.4%	75.6%
Economy/ economic policies	63	239	302	20.9%	79.1%

Other	38	150	188	20.2%	79.8%
Judicature	36	151	187	19.3%	80.7%
Public services/welfare state/humanitarian work	57	116	173	32.9%	67.1%
Foreign Affairs	16	141	157	10.2%	89.8%
Culture/entertainment/sport/leisure	26	109	135	19.3%	80.7%
Society, religion	38	90	128	29.7%	70.3%
European Union	21	83	104	20.2%	79.8%

CHART 14: ACTORS BY GENDER AND SUBJECT AREAS
IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THEY APPEARED
 (■ MAN ■ WOMEN)



CONCLUSIONS

In the news programs analyzed here, the average number of news items per day was 18.6. Of these, 4.7 news items, on average, (or 25.4%) were included in both *24 ur* and in *Dnevnik*. What is worrying is the fact that these preliminary findings that are part of the wider research for the period 2004–2006 show that the number of news items in the two news programs has been decreasing. The number of news items featured by the two news programs went down from 1057 in 2004 to 919 in 2006.²⁶

As regards subject areas, considerable differences in terms of the airtime allotted to these are observable only in the *Domestic politics* group (*24 ur* gave it one and a half hour more time), *Wars/conflicts/crime/security* (43 minutes more in *24 ur*) and *Culture/entertainment/sports/leisure* (27 minutes more in *24 ur*).

The analysis of subject areas shows that differences between the two programs were not great. Within the *Domestic Politics* group, both programs devoted most airtime to general affairs of a political nature (new government premises, the law on telecommunications etc.), social and economic policies and domestic affairs. Within the group *Wars/conflicts/crime/security*, both stations predominantly reported natural and other disasters, criminal offenses, terrorist attacks, protests and violent demonstrations. *24 ur* placed more emphasis on criminal offenses (which were allotted 1 minute and 20 seconds of airtime, on average, per day), while *Dnevnik* devoted more attention to international conflicts, protests and demonstrations. In general, *Dnevnik* devotes more attention to international developments. The group *Culture/entertainment/sports/leisure* occupies third place. Within this group, sporting events, sports in general and entertainment received the most extensive coverage in both programs, while culture was more extensively covered in *Dnevnik*.

The majority of events covered by *24 ur* and *Dnevnik* were related to Ljubljana. This was established on the basis of the names of authors who contributed reports, although we are aware that this criterion is not one hundred percent reliable. Local correspondents (and journalists employed by TV Slovenia's local offices in Koper/Capodistria and Maribor) contributed on average 19% of all news in the

²⁶ During the same period the share of topics featured by both news programs increased from 23.9% to 25.4%.

two news programs.²⁷ This could form a basis for concluding either that the decision-making process in the country is quite centralized or that the editors of the news programs analyzed here do not accord significance to events in other parts of Slovenia.

The time allocated to local politics – the *Domestic Politics* subject area – was 37 minutes and 34 seconds in total, or 4.6% of airtime (24 *ur* – 13 minutes and 37 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 23 minutes and 57 seconds). The absence of regional coverage in the two prime time news broadcasts is most obvious within the subject group *Economy*, where certain subsets of topics received very little time or no time at all (e.g. *the economic situation of the region/local community*: 24 *ur* – 0, *Dnevnik* – 4 minutes and 26 seconds; *agriculture, fishery, hunting*: 24 *ur* – 4 minutes and 11 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 2 minutes and 29 seconds; *tourism and recreational activities*: 24 *ur* – 0, *Dnevnik* – 7 minutes and 32 seconds). The groups mentioned above were, on average, allocated 8.1% of the total airtime in the two news programs.

Our research devoted special attention to certain subjects that were categorized as “specific to Slovenia” and were part of the groups *Domestic Politics* (e.g. minorities in Slovenia, Slovenian minorities in neighboring countries, denationalization issues etc.) and *Foreign Affairs* (e.g. relationships with neighboring countries). The conclusion is that these topics did not attract significant attention - 24 *ur* gave them 22 minutes and 12 seconds, *Dnevnik* 41 minutes and 6 seconds. More accurately, in March 2006 neither of the two news programs featured a report on Slovenian emigrants, or Slovenians living in other ex-Yugoslav republics, or the “erased” citizens, or the Hungarian minority in Slovenia. The Roma community also received very little coverage (24 *ur* – 2 minutes and 12 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 3 minutes and 58 seconds). Marginal social groups (lesbians and gays) were completely marginalized in prime time news programs, as well.

Similarly, it is possible to conclude that expert and scientific subjects were also modestly covered in daily news programs. The operation of civil society groups received 33 minutes and 23 seconds of airtime (24 *ur* – 15 minutes and 59 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 17 minutes and 24 seconds). This

²⁷ The importance of gatekeepers who decide what will be included in the agenda has been extensively covered by many authors. Our research on this issue included a small-scale project involving fourth - year students of the Faculty of Social Sciences as participants. The results are found in Appendix 1. See page 117.

leads to the conclusion that news programs have not accorded civil society the place it deserves.

This approach is also reflected in the structure of actors who appeared in the news programs analyzed. A great majority of actors come from the group *the political sub-system – the state* (40% on average). Within this segment, representatives of the lower houses of parliament (the National Assembly in Slovenia) accounted for 18% of the group. If the actors from the *political system – the state* group are combined with the actors belonging in the *local communities* (2.7%) and the *repressive state apparatus* groups (5.4%), their combined number amounts to 48.1% of the group.

The data about the number of actors is supposed to corroborate the thesis that media space has become more open. The number is truly high, since in March 2006 the number of actors who appeared in the two news programs was 1271 in total.²⁸ Of these, only 291 appeared in both programs. Their social influence is reflected in the fact that they gave 1072 statements and that they were mentioned 372 times in various reports. This represents 56% of all appearances in the two news programs.

Over the past fifteen years, the principle that has gained currency in reporting has been that, with respect to important events, several representatives of political or social life are asked to give their opinion (the authors of the proposal and their opponents, the ruling political parties and the opposition parties etc.). This tendency towards balanced reporting can be established on the basis of the fact that one-fourth of all journalists' reports (25.3% on average) included two actors and one-fifth (22.1%) included three actors (combined, this amounts to 47.4% of all reports).

Women accounted for 18.9% of all actors. The blame cannot be placed on the media only, since in this case they just mirror the state of affairs in society, where an extremely low number of women occupy important positions in all segments of social life. However, when women do appear in news broadcasts, in 62.6% they appear in connection with the subject areas *Public services/welfare state/humanitarian work* and *Society/religion*. The same proportion can be observed within the group of guests invited to the studio to explain a particular event. In March 2006, 27 individuals

²⁸ We should again point out that preliminary research findings for the period 2004–2006 show that the number of persons appearing in both news programs has decreased, falling from 1395 in 2004 to 1271 in 2006.

were invited to the studio, and there were 5 women among this privileged group (18.5%).²⁹

Among the anonymous actors who were featured in opinion surveys or were witness to or participants in some event, there were as many as 44% women, which indicates that editors strive to achieve balanced reporting.

Our data also show that women predominate as the authors of reports. The total number of journalists who contributed reports featured in the broadcasts analyzed was 143 (24 *ur* – 59, *Dnevnik* – 84). Of these, two-thirds were women journalists (24 *ur* – 40 or 67.8 %, *Dnevnik* – 57 or 67.9%).³⁰

While the coverage of Slovenia is “Ljubljana-centric”, data on the reports about international events show that both news programs offer a “Eurocentric” view of the world. In 75.9% of reported events, Slovenia was classified as the primary country. Of all events covered, 9.0% referred to the EU and its member states;³¹ 2.6% referred to the US. On the other hand, Russia, India, Canada, Australia and China barely amounted to 1% of the total coverage, while the conflict-ridden countries, i.e. Iraq, Israel, the Palestinian territories and Afghanistan, accounted for 2.8% of the reports. There was not one report on Latin America or Australia during March 2006. We further established that *Dnevnik* devoted more time than 24 *ur* to the subject areas *European Union* (24 *ur* – 29 minutes and 21 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 56 minutes and 34 seconds) and *Foreign Affairs* (24 *ur* – 56 minutes and 35 seconds, *Dnevnik* – 1 hour 15 minutes and 16 seconds). These figures suggest the conclusion that geographically distant countries become the subject of attention only in case of extraordinary events (terrorism, natural disasters, traffic accidents etc.).

Fifteen years after the introduction of the dual media system in Slovenia, it seems appropriate to ask how we are informed on matters that affect the life of all citizens. It is important to know which individuals are given access to the media and an opportunity to shape public opinion. Equally important is the question of which voices were silenced and

29 A similar proportion has been observed in the *TV Klub* segment (part of 24 *ur*) in which 10 guests altogether appeared during March 2006; of these two were women (20 %).

30 During 2006, the two broadcasts analyzed here featured 22 (or 2.7 %) journalists' reports signed by two or more authors. For the purpose of our research, we took into account the first author as the main author of the report.

31 The following EU members states were not mentioned: The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia.

pushed to the margins of social life, either incidentally or deliberately. Reporting events in the “pro or contra” manner polarizes society and reduces the space necessary to reach consensus, which is one of the basic elements of democratic society and a guarantee for minorities of all kinds that their voice will be heard and taken into account. Every citizen should have a feeling that he/she has contributed something to the community, and to achieve this we will have to make extra effort to give a voice to civil society and the expert public.

While the above-presented distribution of subject areas according to the airtime they received in the news programs may be in accordance with the image of the commercial media, such a state of affairs certainly deviates from the anticipated role of public service television. It is expected to offer content that helps its viewers to make decisions about important matters in order to be able to function as members of a democratic society.

In our opinion, Slovenian citizens cannot be satisfied with the kind of reporting emerging from this analysis. That something is not right is corroborated by the fact that the two news programs combined do not garner as many viewers as did *Dnevnik* in the early 1990s, when it was the only Slovene – language news program in the country. Citizens have the right to be better informed, and only public television may be required to ensure the exercising of this right. The experience of other European countries shows that high quality public service television is a precondition for quality commercial stations, since the latter are forced to keep pace with public television if they want to ensure good ratings and attract advertisers.

APPENDIX I

Prior to the commencement of the Media for Citizens project, the Advisory Board held a meeting³² at which the proposed research studies were reviewed and critically assessed. Several participants proposed possible upgrades to the project, while Ed Klute presented a comparative analysis conducted in the Netherlands several years ago. Since everyone present found this idea interesting, we decided to realize it and include it in the project, because it offers readers the most illustrative picture of the influence of editors (gatekeepers) on the selection of news.

Accordingly, a group of students the Faculty of Social Sciences³³ was presented with an overview of the day's events supplied by the *Slovenian Press Agency* (STA) and by Reuters on March 15, 2006.³⁴ Their task was to read 107 news items and select 15 among them which, in their opinion, should have been included in prime time news.

The second step consisted of the ordering of the 15 news items selected and ascribing to them an order of appearance in the news program.³⁵ First place was worth one point, second place two points etc. The students selected as many as 71 events altogether. After ranking the news according to the number of points they received based on the order of appearance, we calculated the average number of points and divided it by the number of points it received. In this way, the results were weighted for those events that received more points.

In the third step we compared the results thus obtained with the ordering of events as selected by the editors of *24 ur* and *Dnevnik* on that day. The differences were considerable so the presentation of the results inspired a lively discussion.

32 The meeting was held on January 6, 2006. The participants were Sandra Bašič Hrvatin (FDV, Ljubljana, Slovenia), Ed Klute (Mira Media, Utrecht, Netherlands), Branka Petković (Peace Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia), Marko Prpič (Ljubljana, Slovenia) and Granville Williams (Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, London, UK).

33 The project included 36 students in their 3rd or 4th year at the Faculty of Social Sciences who attend the course *Komunikacijske pravice* (Communication Rights) lectured by Sandra Bašič Hrvatin, PhD. I'd like to express thanks to the faculty, Sandra Bašič Hrvatin and her students for their collaboration.

34 The day was selected in February 2006, when we opened talks with Reuters and *Slovenian Press Agency* to supply data for the practical test. The two agencies provide their services to both *POP TV* and *TV Slovenia*. We want to express our thanks to both agencies for supplying data and for permission to use them.

35 We wanted to avoid making the task too complex, so we omitted the inclusion of five main headlines.

TABLE 15: ORDER OF TOPICS IN *24 ur*
(MARCH 15, 2006)

MAIN HEADLINES

- 1 Heated debate on media freedom (slo)
- 2 Qualms about broader authority for Sova
- 3 Simobil allegedly intends to buy Vega
- 4 Milošević will be buried in Požarevac
- 5 President Drnovšek plans to dispatch the first humanitarian aid package

ORDER OF APPEARANCE

- 1 State Department's report – media freedom
- 2 Government wants to extend the authority of Sova
- 3 Reduction of salaries in the public administration sector
- 4 Simobil allegedly plans to buy Vega
- 5 Court of Audit and the uniform portal for public procurements
- 6 Istrabenz – the meeting of the Supervisory Board
- 7 Aktiva – the situation of small shareholders
- 8 President Drnovšek plans a visit to Darfur
- 9 Humanitarian org. collected a large quantity of aid for Darfur
- 10 Prime Minister Janša visit's the German Chancellor
- 11 Milošević's funeral will take place in Požarevac
- 12 Press conference by the Serbian Socialist Party
- 13 Russian Parliament and the abolition of the international court
- 14 Russian pathologists agree with Dutch colleagues regarding the cause of Milošević's death
- 15 NATO – arrests in connection with war crimes suspect Karadžić

TABLE 16: DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS IN *Dnevnik*
(MARCH 15, 2006)

MAIN HEADLINES

- 1 Prime Minister Janša and Merkel on EU reforms
- 2 Istrabenz announced its intention to take over Kolinska
- 3 Milošević's body brought to Belgrade
- 4 Nine-year elementary school – biology as the third subject
- 5 Biserka Meden did not lend money unlawfully

ORDERING OF NEWS ITEMS

- 1 Prime Minister Janša on a visit to Germany
- 2 Milošević's body brought to Belgrade
- 3 Russian Parliament – investigation of the cause of Milošević's death
- 4 NLB must return money to Croatian clients
- 5 Istrabenz will take over Kolinska
- 6 Court of Audit, information portal of the government
- 7 Aid for Darfur collected, President Drnovšek to Sudan
- 8 Palestinians on strike, foreigners kidnapped

- 9 us Army kill several civilians in Iraq
- 10 Student protests in France
- 11 Belarus government expelled 8 election monitors
- 12 Bird flu (Sweden, Serbia, Denmark, Afghanistan)
- 13 Floods in Greece and Turkey
- 14 Association of War Veterans and the War Veterans Act
- 15 Islamic community handed over a request to the governmental commission

TABLE 17: STUDENTS' ORDERING OF TOPICS
(MARCH 15, 2006)

MAIN HEADLINES

- 1 N/a
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

ORDERING

- 1 Prime Minister Janša on a visit to Germany
- 2 Milošević's death
- 3 State Department's report – media freedom deteriorated
- 4 Russian Parliament and the abolition of the international court
- 5 Milošević's death
- 6 The governmental commission for the resolution of open issues regarding religious communities (announcement of the session)
- 7 Haag - Hadjihasanović and Kubura verdicts
- 8 National Council – discussion on the direction of the country's operation within the EU
- 9 Humanitarian organizations collected a large quantity of aid for Darfur
- 10 G-8 in Moscow – the issue of energy security
- 11 The proposal of direction for the operation of Slovenia within EU institutions in 2006
- 12 The governmental commission for the resolution of open issues regarding religious communities (announcements of statements L. Šturm, D. Čepar)
- 13 Security Council on Iran's nuclear program
- 14 The state of affairs and the outlook for the collaboration of NGOs in the preparation of regulations and strategies of the Government of RS
- 15 Klinični center Ljubljana (Medical Center Ljubljana) – the beginning of the humanitarian action for the collection of contributions entitled Darujmo za CT

A look at the tables above shows considerable discrepancy between the daily news programs *24 ur* and *Dnevnik*. There was only one topic that appeared in both announcements, that is, the funeral of Slobodan Milošević (appearing in 4th place in *24 ur* and in 3rd place in *Dnevnik*).

Not only was the ordering of events different, but also the number of topics that appeared in both programs was low. *24 ur* gave priority to three topics, i.e. the discussion of the State Department's report on the situation of the Slovenian media, the discussion of the Government's proposal to extend the authority of sova (the intelligence agency), and the announced reduction of salaries in the public administration sector. *Dnevnik* did not feature these news items. It gave priority to the visit of Prime Minister Janez Janša to Germany, and two events related to the death of Slobodan Milošević. In *24 ur*, these events were ranked between 10th and 15th place on the list of events (as many as four reports related to the death of Slobodan Milošević). The two news broadcasts displayed most similarity in the segment devoted to economic issues (Istrabenz), the Court of Audit, the public procurements portal and President Drnovšek's initiative to collect humanitarian aid for Darfur. *Dnevnik* devoted more attention to international events, which occupy places 8 to 13 on the list of news.

The students gave priority to the same events as *Dnevnik*. First on their list is the visit of Prime Minister Janez Janša to Germany, followed by three reports related to the death of Slobodan Milošević, with the State Department's report intervening as the No 3 item. To the report on humanitarian aid for Darfur they ascribed a place similar to the two news editors, i.e. it is news item 9 on the student list (item 8 in *24 ur* and item 7 in *Dnevnik*). The initiative by President Drnovšek overshadowed the press conference in the Medical Center held on the occasion of the beginning of collection of humanitarian contributions for the Medical Center, although it was not completely overlooked.

Economic issues were not included in the list supplied by the news agencies, so the students could not include these topics on the agenda.

There are two topics found on the list composed by students that point to the greater sensitivity of the young generation to questions that belong in the area of civil society operations. These are the session of the governmental commission responsible for resolving the open issues concern-

ing religious communities,³⁶ and the state of affairs and the outlook for the participation of NGOs in the preparation of regulations and strategies of the Government. Both news items were neglected in *24 ur*, while in *Dnevnik* the governmental commission's session was news item number 15. Furthermore, the students included the session of the Security Council regarding Iran's nuclear program and the proposal for the direction of the operation of Slovenia in EU institutions in 2006, discussed by the National Council.

This practical test was aimed at demonstrating the important role of the editors of daily news programs who decide what viewers will see on their television screens and which information will reach them. This again takes us back to the importance of professional criteria, education, general well-informedness and commitment to the mission that should be accomplished by the media in modern democratic societies. An important role here is played by journalistic codes prescribing norms that journalists should observe.

The experiment presented above points to the need for regular monitoring of the approach to programming and for the continual enhancement of journalistic standards, since only these can assure better quality of information provision. Viewed from this perspective, we can conclude that the students fulfilled their task extremely well.

36 The announcement of the session of the governmental commission for the resolution of open issues concerning religious communities was selected twice by the students – news item 6 and item 12 – because the *Slovenian Press Agency* announced this event twice, once as a session and then again as an announcement of the statements by Lovro Šturm and Drago Čepar, the director of the governmental Office for Religious Communities. The combined number of points would put this event in 5th place on the list.

MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES

ROMAN KUCHAR

INTRODUCTION: THE SAMPLE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Our discourse analysis of media reporting on three minority groups, i.e. Muslims, Roma and gays and lesbians, covers the period of February 2006. During this month, the media were fully occupied with texts dealing with cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and the resulting response, putting media texts¹ addressing this minority at the top of the list in this group. Another topic that contributed to the coverage of Muslims was President Janez Drnovšek's intention to mediate in the conflict between the government and the rebel groups in Darfur. The construction of a mosque in Ljubljana, which in the past was the topic that generated most reports on Muslims and Islam, was relegated to the background during the period analyzed here, with only a few reports dedicated to this issue.

The event that generated several reports on Roma was the adoption of the so-called umbrella law on Roma representatives in the National Council. Other sporadic reports dealing with this target group looked into the life of Roma and related issues.

Compared to these two minority groups, gays and lesbians occupied the fewest media texts, most of which were related to *Brokeback Mountain*, an Oscar front-runner depicting the life of two gay cowboys.

This study report is divided into two parts. In the first we present a statistical analysis of the sample. For all media texts, we identified the author, the type of text and the interlocutor. In the case of the print media, we also took account of any graphics accompanying the text analyzed. The statistical analysis was performed using the SPSS software.

The second part of the report presents a discourse analysis of the texts in the sample. The methodological postulates used were those of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Fairclough (1992), the founder of this approach, emphasized that media texts reflect and represent social entities and relations, while also construing and constituting them. Since language and ideology stand close together, a systematic analysis of the language of media texts (written or spoken), says Fairclough, can reveal the systems of repression inside specific social structures. Fairclough understands

1 "Media text" is here used as a generic name denoting various types of printed and broadcast reports, including feature stories, interviews, news briefs, reports, reportages and so on.

discourse or the use of language, whether written or spoken, as a form of social practice, meaning that there exists a two-way, dialectic relationship between a specific discursive event and the situation, institution or social structure constituting the framework of that event. In other words, a discursive event is co-shaped by the situation, institution or a social structure within which it appears and, in turn, it influences and reshapes its own social framework, that is, the situation, institution or social structure. Discourse is therefore socially constituted, and in turn, it constitutes the situations, the objects of knowledge and identities of people and groups.

Several theoretical and methodological approaches have developed within CDA, with the main differences among them being the extent to which they observe the historical perspective in discourse analysis, their understanding of the relationship and mediation between the text and the social, their orientation towards predictability and reproduction of a specific discursive practice in contrast to the analysis of creativity and innovation, their interpretation of discursive events and the like. Since CDA, much like any other form of discourse analysis, is primarily an interpretative and qualitative sociological method, the existing methodology of discourse analysis does not provide any “recipes”, or verifiable, exact methodological rules. The results and conclusions of research are therefore inevitably the individual interpretation of the researcher. Despite this, CDA lays down several principles (cf. Fairclough, Wodak, 1997, Wodak, 1996), of which we observed three in the first place:

- a. The nature of power relations in modern society is largely linguistic and discursive in its essence. An important question that emerges in this connection is who has access to the media, whose “voice” is heard and whose is left behind. With respect to power relations, discursivity is significant in relation to three issues, i.e. the reproduction of power through discourse, the power over discourse and the power of discourse.
- b. All common sense assumptions within a discourse are in their essence ideological. An ideology not only involves the issue of representation of social reality, but it also (or primarily) constructs identities, particularly collective identities (in our example, that of the Roma, Muslims, gays and lesbians).
- c. Racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic and the like discourses are forms of media texts that have specific effects

on and implications for the real world. These are primarily manifested as categorization of or discrimination against specific social groups and the legitimization of the practices of power-holders. Accordingly, the main task of CDA as an anti-discriminatory, political scientific practice is to disclose power relations and the implicit within the text. Critical linguists particularly emphasize that their research work is essentially political rather than an end in itself. The task of critical linguists is not only to describe, but to explain how a discourse is shaped through power relations and ideologies, how it influences social identities, social relations, the systems of knowledge and value.

Our research subject is therefore concerned with the media presentations of selected minorities and the question of who speaks, what and how they speak, whose views and interpretations are reproduced by media discourse, which implicit (common sense) assumptions about the target groups underlie these media texts, and which discriminatory/intolerant practices are given legitimacy. Much like the CDA methodology itself, in analyzing media texts we theoretically drew on Foucault's (2001 [1969]) understanding of discourse as constituting a particular subject, i.e. the members of specific minorities in our example. "Discursive constitution" of subjects means that the minority groups that are the subject of our analysis exist only within a specific discursive field (e.g. media), which has realistic implications for these groups; media representations in fact co-create the image of these groups and thereby contribute to a greater or lower tolerance towards minority groups. We should add here that there does not exist a direct causal relationship between a discourse on a specific subject and the attitude of wider society towards that subject or a group of individuals, despite the fact that the media are frequently described as the sole source of "hostility, stereotypes and intolerance" with respect to minority groups. However, this criticism overlooks the fact that interposing between the reader/viewer of a media text and the text itself is interpretation. And for this same reason, a discourse analysis, too, is ultimately (and inevitably) an interpretation. This is not to say that the media cannot (or do not) reproduce specific images, nor that the subjects of their representation, the "products of discourse", are entirely powerless. Foucault asserts that resistance is contained in the very idea of power, meaning that wherever power is being exerted (e.g. through

discourse) there exists the potential for resistance. Discourse does not simply translate systemic domination into language. Rather, it is precisely discourse because of which and for which these battles are fought.

Foucault's work does not provide a clear methodological concept ready to be applied to studies of mass media, yet his concept of discourse and the discursive nature of subjects can nevertheless be used as a theoretical framework for discourse analysis. Foucault's argument that power produces the framework of knowledge, one that is perceived as truthful, helps us to understand power that operates through mass media and produces the subject, in our example the Roma, Muslims, gays and lesbians. Power is closely connected with the media.

When studying discourses as understood by Foucault, the primary target of analysis is the set of statements about a specific subject that mediate knowledge about that subject. In other words, discourse analysis looks at how the language testifies to the existence of a specific phenomenon, primarily concentrating on the rules guiding the presentation of a phenomenon, meaning rules that, in turn, disqualify other and different ways of thinking. Foucault further argues for caution when considering the question of how the knowledge about a specific subject obtained credibility and came to be accepted as the truth about that subject during a specific historical period. It is also necessary to take into account the subjects that personify a specific discourse and institutions. Hall (1993) holds a similar opinion, saying that those who are not directly involved in the shaping of norms and definitions within problematic areas of political life are primarily dependent for their "working definitions" on agents, institutions and channels that have access to power and are the primary means of signification. Mass media are certainly among these. As Alwood (1996) says, the media suggests convenient solutions when the society is faced with a new problem. Hall further warns against being excessively complacent towards the media. We are not mental *tabulae rasae*, so despite all, the media cannot instill in us meanings and interpretations. But they do have the integrating, explanatory and legitimate power to shape and define political reality, particularly in unprecedented, problematic or threatening situations. What is involved here is an act of organizing social reality that has not existed before, or re-shaping the meaning of existing tendencies in such a way that the resulting new relationship is presented as a so-

cially acceptable form, while the incapacity to accept such a relationship is denoted as a social deviation.

Our study of media reporting on Muslims, Roma and gays and lesbians tries to illuminate the question of how media discourse constitutes these subjects, i.e. the members of these groups. To put it differently, we were interested in how, when and in what ways the Roma, Muslims, gays and lesbians enter the media space and what the media-created images of these groups are. We were interested in who speaks, when and how. In so doing we tried to define and categorize the ways in which these groups enter the media texts and to put our findings into the context provided by previous research in this field (Bošnik, 2002, Pašić, 2002, Kotnik, 2003, Dragoš, 2003, 2004, Erjavec, Hrvatin, Kelbl, 2000, Kotnik, 2002, Petković, 2002, 2003, Urh, Žnidaršič-Demšar, 2005, Cigler, Bukovec, 2006, Kuhar, 2003, Tratnik, 2000, Velikonja, 2001, 2004, Greif, 2001). In selecting the minority groups for our study, we were guided by the existing studies mentioned above.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE

Our sample included 15 media. The clips were provided by the company Kliping d.o.o. which used selected key words or topics (e.g. gays and lesbians, Muslims, the Roma) to identify relevant texts. The analysis covered eight print media: *Delo* (212 000), *Dnevnik* (180 000), *Dolenjski list* (68000), *Družina* (157 000), *Mag* (46 000), *Mladina* (99 000), *Murski vestnik* (74 000) and *Večer* (191 000) and four broadcast media (Radio Slovenia (1 210 900), *Radio Ognjišče* (58 900), *Televizija Slovenija* (1 1018 400) and *POP TV* (1 111 500)². In the case of the broadcast media, we monitored only news programs, or more accurately, the afternoon news program on *Radio Ognjišče*, *Druga jutranja kronika* (second morning news) and *Dogodki in odmevi* (the main news program) on *Radio Slovenia*, *Dnevnik* (prime time news program) and *Odmevi* (10 o'clock news) on *Televizija Slovenija*, and *24 ur* prime time news on *POP TV*. Four commercial radio stations were also included: *Radio Antena*, *Radio Center* and *Radio City*. On the 22nd and 24th of February, *Radio Antena's* and *Radio City's* programs were monitored around the clock, while *Radio Center's* program was monitored around the clock only on February 22, 2006. These three commercial stations are not included in the statistical analysis of the sample presented later in the text, since they constitute a special type of media production analyzed at the end of this report.

During February 2006 these media featured or broadcast 249 texts dealing with issues relating to Muslims, Roma, gays and lesbians. The majority of these media texts were concerned with Muslims (78%), followed by Roma (16%), and gays and lesbians (6%).

FIGURE 1 – DISTRIBUTION OF MEDIA TEXTS BASED ON THE TOPIC
(IN ABSOLUTE VALUES).




The majority, i.e. somewhat more than 66% of texts analyzed were featured by the print media, while the remaining

² Numbers in brackets show the reach of the specific media. This information was provided by the Kliping d.o.o, media monitoring and analysis service. *Murski vestnik* and *Dolenjski list* are regional newspapers covering the region with a large Roma population. All other media analyzed here have the national coverage.

34% were broadcast. The greatest number of media texts relevant to our analysis appeared in *Večer* (53), followed by *Delo* (52) and *Radio Slovenija* (27), and the smallest number on *Radio Ognjišče* (6) and in *Murski vestnik* (3).


FIGURE 2 – THE SHARES OF MEDIA TEXTS BY MEDIA SOURCE.



Contrary to the frequently heard conclusion that women have come to dominate the journalistic profession, our analysis shows that most of the media texts featured by the print media were written by male journalists (43%) and only a smaller share by women (19%). Undoubtedly, this statistic does not disprove the assumption/fact stated above, but what it does show is that media topics are gendered. The discrepancy is particularly obvious if we concentrate on the topic of Muslims, the group that was “politically exposed” during the period observed, given that half of the reports in our sample were produced by male journalists, with women contributing just slightly more than 14% of texts. The remaining texts comprised agency news, or media texts by unknown authors, or texts signed with initials only.

The graph below shows the shares of male and female authors in the print media (N=184).

FIGURE 3 – THE AUTHORS OF MEDIA TEXTS IN THE PRINT MEDIA.



The disproportion in gender representation becomes even more conspicuous when we add broadcast media and look at the gender of interlocutors, although this does not mean that the print media are characterized by more gender-balanced reporting. The statistical analysis shows that the interlocutors or authors of media texts were mainly men (89%), with women accounting for only 11% of the group.

FIGURE 4 – THE GENDER OF THE INTERLOCUTOR BY THE MEDIA TYPE.

	PRINT MEDIA	RADIO	TELEVISION
Male interlocutor	88.0%	89.6%	91.7%
Female interlocutor	12.0%	10.4%	8.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 249 media texts, there appeared 390 interlocutors who were invited to give a statement or whose words were quoted or recapitulated.

FIGURE 5 – THE GENDER OF INTERLOCUTORS BY THE MEDIA TYPE.

Television	19.7		1.8
Radio	11.0		1.3
Print media	58.2		7.9

Generally, politicians account for the greatest number of both male and female interlocutors appearing in media reports, and the same can be said of our sample. As far as politicians are concerned, the male to female ratio was balanced: there were 45% male politicians and 47% female politicians featured in media reports. This balance may be mainly attributed to the fact that the media in question frequently featured foreign female politicians, since for Slovenian politicians this ratio is 14% to 9% in favor of male politicians.

MUSLIMS

"The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule. It is certainly not always attractive and nice to look at, and it does not mean that religious feelings should be made fun of at any price.... we are on our way to a slippery slope where no-one can tell how the self-censorship will end. That is why *Jyllands-Posten* has invited members of the Danish editorial cartoonists union to draw Muhammad as they see him."

(Fleming Rose, *Jyllands-Posten's* editor)

"The publishing of the cartoons *of the* Prophet Muhammad in Denmark definitely has a context without which it is not possible to understand the anger of the crowds. If we turn a blind eye to this context, our blindness will prevent us from seeing anything but simply another proof of their fundamentalism."

(Borut Mekina, *Večer*, February 16)

"European media reversed cause and effect: they were more indignant over Muslims' indignation than over the causes of their indignation."

(Marcel Štefančič, jr., *Mladina*, February 27)

A number of analyses of the media representations of Islam and Muslims in Slovenia, mainly conducted after 9/11 (Bošnik, 2002, Pašić, 2002, Kotnik, 2003, Dragoš, 2003, 2004), show that the representation of this group is comparable to that of other minority groups. Particularly conspicuous is the "we-they" type of discourse, which ultimately boils down to Eurocentric or West-centric representations of Muslims and Islam. Bošnik (2002), who recapitulates the Danish study by Bashy Quraishy on media reporting on Islam, writes that the West created its own, western image of Islam that suits and matches the political and psychological needs of the west. Analyzing media commentaries about the construction of the mosque in Ljubljana, Kotnik (2003), too, draws attention to this fact, adding that in dealing with Muslims the media took freedom of speech to mean an "imperative in itself." On many occasions, the absence of the awareness that freedom of speech is delimited by the democratic principle of non-discrimination led to stereotypical media representations of Islam, with more

or less explicit incitement to religious intolerance also appearing from time to time.

The media's creation of a uniform image of Muslims (seen as a threat) and the equation of terrorism with Islam as a religion, both constituting conspicuous traits of the coverage of Islam to which the aforementioned studies drew attention, were also identified in the texts in our sample. This points to the complete disregard of the fact that Islam is a religion spread across sixty countries around the world with more than one billion followers, as Bošnik (2002) explains. "Muslims are not a uniform mass. They differ among themselves with respect to culture, the way of life, history, color, ethnicity, language, mentality, dress codes, social status, education and experience" (Bošnik, 2002:60).


In his study of the media representations of Muslims covering the period from September 2001 to February 2002, Dragoš (2003) concluded that intolerance towards Muslims was not caused by 9/11 events, but that Islamophobia was present in Slovenia even before that. He argues that Islamophobia is created, or generated, primarily in the field of politics, and that the media operate as the reproducers of this intolerance. Although his analysis indeed showed that the coverage of Muslims in the print media was predominantly professional and that problematic or unacceptable texts were rare, these exceptions are not insignificant. Dragoš divided the media techniques generating intolerant discourse towards Muslims into three types: the humorous approach, stigmatization and dichotomization. The first type generates intolerance through ridicule and the second through stigma, even in examples in which Muslims are not a direct target, but where the content of stigma, although aimed elsewhere, is connected with Islam, Muslim extremists and the like. Dichotomization as a third technique denotes the selective and biased presentation of facts by means of which the desired image of reality is created (Dragoš, 2003:37-47). The majority of traits identified by past studies were also identified during our critical discursive analysis.

In February 2006, the media under analysis featured or broadcast 194 texts relating to Muslims. As has been established, this extensive media attention was a result of the controversy caused by the cartoons published in the Danish paper *Jyllands-Posten*, which several months later led to a series of protests, debates on the separation of Church and state, freedom of speech and the like. The greatest number of texts connected with Islam was carried by *Delo*

(42), followed by *Večer* (38), Radio Slovenia (26), *Dnevnik* (23), *Televizija Slovenija* (20), *Mladina* (12), POP TV (10), *Mag* and *Družina* (8), *Radio Ognjišče* (6) and *Murski vestnik* (1). We should stress at this point that these media texts do not make up the “entire media production” concerned with this target group during the period observed. This especially holds true of *Radio Slovenija*, *Radio Ognjišče* and *Televizija Slovenija*, as these stations broadcast several news programs not all of which were included in our sample.

Islam is the subject treated in virtually all types of media reports, but since during the period observed this political question was at the forefront, Muslims were most often dealt with in news programs/reports and news briefs.

FIGURE 6 – REPORTING ON MUSLIMS BY THE MEDIA TEXT TYPE.



The cartoon episode and ensuing protests can be described, at least in some respects, as a form of media (and wider) moral panic. The concept of moral panic (Cohen, 1980 [1972], Watney, 1997, Weeks, 1999) denotes a short period during which a specific group of people or an event is defined as a threatening element, which leads to the adoption of extreme positions, in this example manifested as binary divides, e.g. between the civilized West and the uncivilized East, peace loving Catholics and fanatic, fundamentalist Muslims, through the notion of the clash of civilizations and the like. Such absolutist positions were further reflected in the frequent absence of the context of events. The early media coverage inadequately presented the reasons for the protests, providing only sparse information about Islam forbidding the portraying of the Prophet Mohammad. Only later did the media report how the Prophet was actually depicted (e.g. with a headdress shaped like a bomb etc.). A moral panic is also characterized by stereotyping of the “enemy,” who is presented as absolute evil. In the media texts analyzed here, the stylization and stereotyping

created the image of a Muslim as a terrorist, flag burning, screaming, herd-following and semi-civilized man. Such an image was reinforced by expressions borrowed from military discourse and those applied to natural disasters, here used to describe either the protests or Muslims themselves. So, for example, the media spoke about a “*storm*” among Muslims”,⁴ about “*fire raging* across Muslim countries”,⁵ and the “*incendiary* response of the Muslim world”;⁶ Muslims were said to have “set fire”;⁷ the offence taken by the Muslim world was described as “spreading like *wildfire*”;⁸ the streets were “*flooded* with thousands of protesters”;⁹ journalists spoke of “the *avalanche* of protests”,¹⁰ “an Islamic storm”¹¹ and “the *tide* of protests”¹² that was not likely to recede soon. The media also made use of “military diction” referring to “*cultural war*”,¹³ “the cartoon *war*”¹⁴ and so on.

Based on these texts, our conclusion is that during the period observed Muslims were introduced into the media space through generalizations and “we-they” discourse. Apart from that, a large part of the coverage was not placed in context.

GENERALIZATION

One problematic language technique used by the media to report on minorities is generalization. This takes two forms:

- a. The attribution of stereotypical personal or behavioral traits to all members of a specific group. This usually involves negative stereotyping, although not necessarily (e.g. Toni was, as most gays are, very polite).
- b. The turning of the specific trait of some event/individual into a general characteristic of such an event type or a group. Here, the actions of individuals are attributed to the group as a whole (e.g. a media text covering a shooting that involved two Roma individuals generalized this act to the

3 All emphasis in quoted texts is by the author unless remarked otherwise.

4 *Delo*, February 9, 2006.

5 *Dnevnik*, February 9, 2006.

6 *Delo*, February 16, 2006.

7 *Dnevnik*, February 14, 2006.

8 *Večer*, February 20, 2006.

9 *Delo*, February 18, 2006.

10 *Družina*, February 19, 2006.

11 *Mladina*, February 20, 2006.

12 *Večer*, February 20, 2006.

13 *Mag*, February 15, 2006.

14 *Delo*, February 17, 2006.

entire Roma population by saying in the title: *Roma shoot one another*).

The reporting on Muslims contained both types of generalization, with the second one being more frequent, since acts of violence or protests staged by particular Muslim groups were reinterpreted as riots and protests whose protagonists were Muslims in general. This created the impression that violence was the most general trait of all Muslims, which by the same token suggests that the same is not characteristic of the group of which the author is a member.

For example, on February 19, 2006 *Radio Slovenija* reported as follows:

"The unrest in Libya that killed 11 people was followed last night by turmoil among *Nigerian Muslim believers* who burned Catholic churches. The death toll of the most violent protests reached 11, most of them Christian victims."

Were all Muslim believers in Nigeria in the streets and were they all burning Catholic churches? Or was that the act of particular groups or individuals? How many people actually took to the streets? The report does not provide these answers, although it is deducible that the said criminal acts were not committed by all "Muslim believers in Nigeria". Depending on the variant of discourse chosen, there are two possible effects a report may produce. In the example above ("Muslim believers in Nigeria burned Catholic churches") the generalized image of Muslims portrayed as criminals is applied to the stereotyped image of the *Other* as a violent person (our opposite). The other possible variant, e.g. "Several Muslim believers in Nigeria burned Catholic churches", would not delude one into generalization, although this effect cannot be completely ruled out.

We shall now make an absurd reversal making use of a local event of a few years ago when four secondary school students were discovered to have tortured and killed cats. Imagine that this event attracted international attention (as did the protests in the example above) and that the media reported it using the technique of generalization. The headlines would have read something like this: "Slovene students slaughter cats" or "Slovenes slaughter cats".

Both examples would appear as absurd and nonsensical to Slovene readers, and by all means inaccurate and unfair to all who have not committed such acts. All Slovenes

would be blended into the image of cat-slaughterers, and it would become our (internationally) recognizable feature: the nation that slaughters cats. To extend this comparison, let us imagine what would have happened if the cats had been slaughtered by Roma students rather than Slovenes. The titles would have read: "Roma students slaughter cats" or "Roma people slaughter cats." These would probably not appear to Slovene readers as absurd and disturbing as the titles mentioned above because what they say has nothing to do with Slovenes and, on top of that, Slovene readers can readily associate this act with the image of the Roma as reproduced by the media, political and similar discourses. We would not find it strange that Roma people slaughter cats, since this would be consistent with their general image as people who kill one another, steal, are lazy, uncivilized and the like.

By contrast, some authors proceeded cautiously and clearly defined (in numbers and descriptively) the protagonists of individual acts, thus avoiding generalization. Below are two such examples from *Radio Slovenija*:

"Several hundred Muslim protesters today demonstrated in front of the Danish consulate in the Philippines capital city of Manila, but there were no reports of serious riots" (*Radio Slovenija*, February 15, 2006).

"A group of armed Palestinians today broke into the EU office in Gaza in protest" (*Radio Slovenija*, February 2, 2006).

However, this type of wording was rare. The media spoke of "enraged Palestinians"¹⁵ who attacked the consular office of Germany, of protesting "Muslims around the globe",¹⁶ a "violent response by Muslim crowds"¹⁷ and so on. The example below is particularly interesting because *Delo*'s journalist not only exploits the technique of generalization to attribute specific acts to all Muslim believers, but he also presents all Muslims as speaking with one voice. This creates the impression that Muslims are a uniform, undifferentiated group who all think alike:

"Muslims argue that the cartoons are insulting and blasphemous, since the Koran forbids the portraying of the Prophet Mohammad and God ... Muslims still demand more direct apology." (*Delo*, February 2, 2006).


¹⁵ *Radio Slovenija*, February 4, 2006.

¹⁶ *Radio Slovenija*, February 2, 2006.

¹⁷ *Dnevnik*, February 7, 2006.

This was not the sole example presenting the Muslim voice as uniform. Furthermore, there was an obvious distinction made between “the voice of the Muslim world”, on the one hand, and western voices on the other, whereby western speakers were identified with their first and second names, job positions and the titles of media for which they work. The “Muslim voice” was frequently, although not always, non-defined, presented as a single opinion or view, and many times equated with the voice that is loudest or most radical. This is clearly confirmed by the table below showing who the persons behind 290 male and 26 female “voices” were, that is, who was given the opportunity to be heard during the period observed, either through quotation, recapitulation of their ideas or views, or through interviews. We also took into account the multiplication of “voices”, since certain speakers appeared several times, particularly Kofi Annan, Janez Drnovšek and Denmark’s PM Anders Rasmussen.

FIGURE 7 – WHO SPEAKS ABOUT MUSLIMS?¹⁸



Some journalists avoided the above-described generalization by using expressions such as “demonstrators” or “protesters” and avoiding attributes such as Muslim, Islamic, radical and the like. The homogeneous image of Muslims was also disrupted by an apparent heterogeneity created by introducing two distinct but seemingly internally homoge-

¹⁸ Into the category “Islamist extremists” we placed those speakers described as Islamist extremists by the media themselves, or the representatives of radical Islamist groups. Journalists and politicians with the “non-EU” or “non-US” denotation come from countries in which Muslims are the majority.

neous groups, that of European and non-European Muslims. Muslims living in Europe were represented as “more civilized and less violent”, while those living in other parts of the world were described as fitting the image of a Muslim holding the Koran in one hand and a gun in the other. The journalists therefore established internal differentiation by reproducing the “we-they” discourse, which in this case was based on the geographical location of Muslims. Since “we” of the western world includes Muslims as well, they were “purified” of the criminal images clinging to the Muslims of the non-western world. Here it is not possible to avoid the implicit assumption of this internal differentiation; Muslims living in the west have been “civilized” by the western world; hence they are better (more *western*).

So, for example, *Mag*'s journalist (February 15, 2006) concluded that “European Muslims were significantly more peaceful than believers in their homelands, which points to the increasing rift between Muslim emigrants living in the West and believers in African and Asian countries. The former have tasted democratic freedom in their new homelands, whose transfer to the Muslim world mainly failed.” The journalist here implicitly introduced the reproduction of the *Other* (a geographically distant *Other*), which was by the end of the text translated into the implicit reproduction of the *Other* in terms of identity. “And although they (Muslims living in Europe, note by R. K.) do not approve of violence in Gaza, Karachi or Beirut, they undoubtedly feel some satisfaction at the shock felt by the arrogant West.” Even though Muslims in the West have been peaceful, the journalist suggests that they are still “guilty”, therefore different from us, since they derive satisfaction from the violent response by other Muslims.

Delo's journalist, on the other hand, established a somewhat different differentiation (February 14, 2006) when she wrote that the media images showing “enraged crowds of bearded men” make it difficult for us to imagine that in these countries, too, “there are people, mainly the educated, whose emotions were not clouded by reason and whose view on these things differ from that of the majority.” Even here one should not overlook the implicit reproduction of the *Other*; that *Other* is still represented as someone whose emotions were “clouded”. The journalist managed to rise above generalization but at the same time she created new binary divides, where reasonable (Europeans (“we”) and

several Muslim intellectuals) are set against the non-reasonable (the major part of the Muslim world).

It should also be mentioned that media texts occasionally did stress that violent response to the cartoons should not be attributed to the entire Muslim world and that some Muslims held peaceful protests and condemned violent ones. The author of the commentary in *Dnevnik* (February 9, 2006) wrote that “numerous peaceful protests against publication of the cartoons [...] were submerged by the images of hooligans burning embassies more favored by the media.” It seems that it was precisely media commentators, in addition to scientists and cultural workers, who were most critical of the media representation of Muslims and who also warned against the generalization underlying the “we-they” discourse and the most exploited syntagm “the clash of civilizations.”

“WE-THEY” OR HUNTINGTON’S CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

One of the questions most frequently asked by journalists during the period of protests was whether this was a clash of civilizations. Furthermore, it was the subject most frequently discussed by various commentators and experts who were invited to explain the roots of the conflict. Regardless of the answer, it is clear that at least some media texts generated a discursive clash of two civilizations. As with other two groups analyzed here, the basic position taken by journalists in covering protests was the “we-they” position, that is, the Eurocentric position. It created the impression that there existed two homogeneous groups, Europeans and Muslims. Europeans were positively valued and positioned higher, while Muslims were negatively valued and positioned lower as the opposite pole with respect to Europeans. Such a representation is problematic not only because it represents Muslims as a homogeneous mass sending a uniform, fanatic religious message, but also because it represents the West as no less homogeneous. Yet the West’s view of the cartoons was by no means uniform; some defended the cartoons’ publication on the grounds of freedom of speech, while others were appalled.

The majority of the texts in these media still reproduced the well-known relationship between “us” and “them”, or “the Other.” The threat posed to Europe was projected onto “them”, and in the media it was expressed through stylized

and stereotyped images, or, as Aleš Debeljak (*Večer*, February 18, 2006) said, “the imaginary portrait of an unshaven Arab fighter who has no ethical qualms and mercilessly slaughters Christian civilians, holding the Koran in one hand and a gun in the other.” This image, appealingly called the “cartoon vision of Muslim societies” (*Večer*, February 18, 2006) by Laurent Hassid, was reproduced in various ways:

- a. *Through generalization.* (described in the previous section).
- b. *In Eurocentric discourse.* This stresses the differentness of the Muslim world and presents the Muslim world as incomprehensible, less civilized and fanatic; presumably its defining traits are “strange” non-European values, and it is the opposite of the West.
- c. *Through the victim discourse.* This presents Europeans/Christians as innocent victims of Islam, while concealing the fact that it was the West that frequently perpetuated violence against Muslims. The debates about terrorism make extensive use of this technique.
- d. *Through the discourse of threat.* This is a radicalized version of the two discourses mentioned above, and its main characteristic is that Europe is presented as a victim while its democratic values are also said to be threatened. The implicit trait of this discourse is a call for more intense resistance, since the Muslim world is interpreted as a conspiracy that wants to “take over and Islamize” the democratic European world.

Let us now have a look at several illustrative examples of this kind. In a sub-title in *Večer* (February 10, 2006), the journalist mentions the Slovenian President’s statement about the straining of relations between the Muslims and the west, or, in the journalist’s words, between the Muslim *world* and western *civilization*. This world vs. civilization image was additionally encouraged by emphasizing radical statements by particular violent groups, whose voice made its way into the forefront of media texts, thus drowning all other alternative voices. Another article carried by *Večer* on the same day (February 10, 2006) was entitled “Kilos of gold for a suicide” and the sub-title highlighted just one voice – the most radical one. “The Taliban allegedly offered one hundred kilos of gold to anyone who would kill those responsible for the publication of the cartoons, and five kilos to anyone who would kill a Danish, Norwegian or German soldier.” This stress on one voice leaves little room for other

voices. Below are further examples of the above-mentioned caricaturing of the Muslim world.

"In Europe, the Enlightenment, the bloody experience of religious war and gradual modernization in all areas consigned Christianity to the private sphere. State and religion are separated, and society is widely secularized. The extent, the intensity and the duration of Muslims' response to the cartoons confirms that things are different in Islam. [...] According to a certain view,¹⁹ the Arab regions are a kind of black hole located between the successful West and the fast developing East. They cling to a glorious past, live in a miserable present and seek an outside culprit for their own backwardness and stagnation." (*Delo*, February 17, 2006)

"[T]he fact is that traditionally circumspect, multicultural and "pacifist" Europe found itself in the grip of the fundamentalist revenge. It is pushed towards the clash of civilizations [...]" (*Dnevnik*, February 7, 2006).

"The perception of values in Islam is different from that in Christianity, and we should be aware of this." (*Večer*, February 11, 2006).

"Extremist Islam responded to the cartoons with violence, including the burning of Danish, German, French and other European flags. Isn't this equally insulting for us, Europeans?" (TV Slovenija, *Dnevnik* news program, a question posed by a journalist, February 4, 2006)

"Probably one part of the responsibility for the deeply rooted prejudices against Islam lies with Muslims themselves, because they did not make sufficient effort to convince us of the contrary?" (*Večer*, a question posed by a journalist, February 7, 2006).

"Muslims demand heads for the slightest insult, writing or cartoon; at any rate, in their view a believer is not worth much! If Muslims were to predominate somewhere, sometime, the first to go will be non-believer liberals, their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren! That's where the heads would first roll, if there is no religion and bowing!" (*Družina*, a reader's letter, February 26, 2006)

"At this historical moment they [Muslims, note by R. K.] blackmail the west to cede geopolitical space to a new caliphate whose borders would be, given the wide interpretation of jihad philosophy, wherev-

¹⁹ The author does not explain to which view he refers or who its author is. Since he is aware that this description is stereotyped (and problematic), he transfers the burden of stereotyping to an anonymous author, while excluding himself (although he does mediate this description) as not being "responsible."

er a Muslim lives (meaning that our Constitutions would no longer be valid), and any prudent answer from our side will be interpreted as impotence, serving only as a justification of their pride in the holy war. [...] Our potentially weak answer, if it is too weak, will provide them with the reason for even more intense challenge and will boost negative self-confidence. Apologizing for every step they object to is senseless, since terrorists would be given new reasons. The problem lies in them, not in the cartoons." (*Mag*, February 22, 2006).

"Well, while the storm caused by insults to Christianity ends with the war of words, when Muslims are insulted it turns into violence, threats of death, boycotts, street unrests [...] [I]f we agree to respect their rules in their territories, then we expect *qui pro quo* [original emphasis]. If I, a non-Muslim woman, veil myself when walking the streets of the Arab world as a sign of respect for their culture, I expect their religion to have respect for the postulates of my culture that speak of freedom of speech." (*Mladina*, February 6, 2006).

The representatives of the Catholic Church, who account for 13% of all interlocutors, introduced a special aspect of the victim discourse. They indeed expressed sympathy for Muslims, but they also clearly stressed the distinction between us (Catholics) and them (Muslims). They pointed out that Catholics, too, were frequently the victims of such blasphemies, except that their response has never been so violent. The implicit assumption here is that Catholics, too, are victims, but that they endure such offenses in a more peaceful (civilized?) manner than Muslims. This position exhibits all the features mentioned above: generalization, victim discourse and "we-they" discourse. This type of discourse, in particular the generalization and the binary division into good Christians (victims) and bad Muslims (violent persons), became reinforced after some radical groups attacked Catholic priests and killed some of them. Below are some examples of this discourse.

"These cartoons are neither the first nor the lone instances in which journalistic freedom has transgressed the limits of good taste and sound reason. The only difference is that in most cases the targets were Christian symbols and that we, Christians, living in the west do not defend our identity in the same way as Muslims do." (*Dnevnik*, February 17, 2006.)

"It is puzzling how and why our liberals work towards the construction of the Muslim center in Ljubljana with such fervor and even impatience

(even Communists in the past were not like that). One is left with the impression that they do not know, or do not want to know, what it is all about. The only thing that is important for them is that it is not Christian or Catholic. [...] It is high time they became serious and gave more support to our side, the recently increasingly pacifist Christian religion, which does not force anyone into going to church or accepting religion, tries to be good to all, knows how to forgive even brutal offences, and – despite all material concerns – is still the main love.” (*Družina*, a reader’s letter, February 26, 2006)

“Islam’s essence and development have been different, so contrary to Christianity, it does not allow criticism of religion” (*Družina*, February 19, 2006).

“President Drnovšek has apologized to Muslims for the cartoons, but he has not apologized, for example, to Slovenian Christians for a similar offence, although he is our president and should stand up for his citizens in the first place” (*Radio Ognjišče*, February 17, 2006).

Despite everything, some media managed to rise above this type of debate, and although it is difficult to single out any particular one, *Večer* and *Mladina* seem to stand out. It is much easier to identify individual journalists who rejected this type of debate (which points to the absence of consistent editorial policy). For example, Marcel Štefančič jr. wrote for *Mladina* (February 20, 2006) the following:

“Many were quick to proclaim that what we see is the ‘clash of civilizations’. This, of course, is not true: it is the clash of two extreme right wings, or two fundamentalisms –eastern and western fundamentalism, or Muslim and Christian fundamentalism.”

THE ABSENCE OF CONTEXT

The absence of context is another trait of discursive media construction of reality during the period observed. Media reported on the response of Muslims as if these incidents and reactions had no background to them or historical context. Initially, the reports focused on Muslims’ violence, whereby Muslims were represented as shattering European values. Owing to the exceptional allure of sensationalism for the media, we cannot speak about sensibility or contextualization of events during the initial period of coverage when a Muslim was equated with an uncivilized radical. *Mag* (February 15, 2006), for example, wrote: “The

only God does not joke and especially does not tolerate jokes about him, *while his believers are not extremely particular about choosing targets.*"

During the following stage, which could be described as a the sobering up stage, the media established a dividing line between radical groups and other Muslims who felt offended but did not respond violently. During this second stage the cartoons were put into wider context, the media sought to explain the background to the events and in some cases the Eurocentric victim discourse was replaced by self-questioning about the attitude of the West towards Islam. So, during the second half of February there also appeared critical texts that provided a wider picture. This especially holds true of the print media, which featured more comprehensive and deeper analysis of the events, and to a somewhat smaller extent of broadcast media.


For illustration, let us mention the concluding part of the report included in the tv *Dnevnik* news program (February 2), in which the journalist asked: "What provokes more prejudice against Islam? These cartoons, or the cutting of hostages' throats in front of tv cameras? Or suicide attacks on wedding guests?" Here, the journalist stressed acts that deserve our condemnation, but she also succeeded in reversing cause and effect: she actually justified our prejudice against Islam by pointing to violent acts, but swept under the carpet the fact that these acts came in response to other violent acts (e.g. the US military intervention in that part of the world). Therefore, by omitting/non-thematizing the context, the journalist became trapped in victim discourse and the legitimization of intolerance towards Muslims.

GRAPHICS

In the three main dailies (*Delo*, *Dnevnik* and *Večer*), the texts dealing with Muslims were featured on the front page ten times; the majority of texts about Muslims appeared on pages one to four of these daily newspapers. In weeklies, this topic occupied the central place (the highlight of the week, reportage etc.). Similarly, it received emphasis on television and radio, where it was featured during the first few minutes of the news programs (in contrast to issues relating to the other two minorities analyzed here, i.e. the Roma and gays and lesbians). However, as the analysis presented above shows, this does not mean that the voice of Muslims was at the forefront.

The statistical analysis showed that the issues relating to Muslims and Islam were most frequently discussed by European and US politicians. The ratio of western to Muslim representatives speaking about these issues was eight to two. However, a look at the graphics gives a somewhat different picture. While the media texts created the impression that all protests were violent, because of which countless Muslims “were absorbed” in the prevalent image of the extremist Muslim world, the pictures accompanying texts in the print media were somewhat more balanced.

FIGURE 8 – GRAPHICS IN THE PRINT MEDIA.



The pictures featured by the print media showed both peaceful and violent protests, with the latter depicting protesters burning the flags and consular offices of western states. However, despite these balanced graphics, violent protests seem to have made a stronger impact on readers because they were emphasized by the texts. In addition, the pictures of violent protests are also more memorable because violence attracts attention (and sells the paper/broadcast) and because they can be easily incorporated into the predominant image of the Muslim world depicted by the western media (and discourses) as “violent, uncivilized and extremist” and presented as the opposite pole of European civilization, pacifism and tolerance.

To sum up, media coverage of Muslims’ response to the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad created a picture of two internally homogeneous worlds by exploiting generalization and the “we-they” discourse. This type of binary distinction was easily incorporated into the deeply rooted image of the Muslim world that is identified with terrorism, and the West, which is civilized, innocent and, above all, *their* victim. Media frequently reported the reactions of Muslims as if these were isolated incidents without a wider

context, in this way making easier their incorporation into the stereotypical image of a Muslim with “the Koran in one hand and a gun in the other.” This image has been persistently reproduced by the media ever since 9/11, and its roots run deep in Europe. In order to constitute itself as a civilized world, Europe has always needed its opposite, an external “intruder.” Muslims were (and still are) a handy excuse for perpetuating this blind belief in one’s own superiority.

THE ROMA

Previous analyses of the media coverage of Roma in Slovenia (Erjavec, Hrvatin, Kelbl, 2000, Kotnik, 2002, Petković, 2002, 2003, Urh, Žnidaršič-Demšar, 2005, Cigler, Bukovec, 2006) reveal a largely uniform media image also confirmed by our research. It seems that no essential qualitative leap has occurred in the meantime; every media text about the Roma is motivated by some problem. Problems are the most frequent reason leading the media to cover this minority group, and particularly so if the problem turns into a conflict. Petković (2002:18) pointed out that in public debates about the Roma and in the media, “handy (racist) arguments imputing a specific (criminalized) cultural pattern and the (innate) social inferiority of the Roma people appear time after time.” The authors of the study about the discriminatory media discourse on the Roma (Erjavec, Hrvatin, Kelbl, 2000) arrived at a similar conclusion, saying that media representations of Roma focus primarily on those traits interpreted by the media as negative. Using generalization and stereotyping, Roma people are presented as culturally different (they are lazy and rely on social aid), deviant (stealing is presumably their inherent trait), and as being a threat to our cultural pattern and in turn to the majority population. The authors further established that the Roma only rarely appear in the media as individuals. A few years on, however, Petković (2002, 2003), who analyzed a parliamentary debate about elections of Roma representatives, found that the Roma voice was increasingly present in the media. She also concluded that in recapitulating the arguments put forward by politicians who reject the settling of the “Roma issue”, journalists increasingly drew attention to stigmatization and intolerance. Petković noted that this was “a new and positive aspect of the debate about Roma identity in Slovenia,” but she also pointed out that “journalistic practices and discourses that discriminate, criminalize and racially proclaim Roma people secondary citizens also persist in the expected places” (Petković, 2003:69).

During the period analyzed in this research, the media featured 41 texts that were directly or indirectly concerned with Roma issues. National media covered the Roma primarily in connection with the adoption of a so called umbrella law about the Roma. The debate on this issue in the National Council was held on February 21. The major part of the media coverage, however, was carried by a regional


paper, *Dolenjski list*,²⁰ which regularly covers this issue in the section dedicated to local events. In February 2006, *Dolenjski list* carried the greatest number of texts about the Roma (14), followed by *Delo* and *Večer* (9 each). *Dnevnik*, *Mladina*, *Murski vestnik* and *Televizija Slovenia* carried two texts each, and *Radio Slovenija* featured only one. *POP TV*, *Radio Ognjišče*, *Družina* and *Mag* did not have reports covering the Roma during this month.

The analysis showed that the media most frequently employed the techniques of criminalization, problematization and stereotyping and “we-they” discourse when covering the Roma.

DISCURSIVE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE ROMA

The results of the statistical analysis of media texts dealing with the Roma clearly point to the manner in which Roma are introduced into the media space. Almost 20% of all texts about the Roma appeared in the crime section or were part of reports on criminal offences. Had this not been the time of the debate about the above-mentioned law, which placed Roma issues into the context of politics and contributed to an increase in the number of “reports” dealing with Roma issues, the media texts criminalizing Roma would have been predominant. The law-related debate also explains the placement of some of these texts on page two of the newspapers, although the greatest number appeared on pages three through six.

FIGURE 9 – COVERAGE OF THE ROMA BY THE MEDIA TEXT TYPE.



The texts that appeared in the crime sections presented Roma in three contexts: as participants in attempted murders, as traffickers or owners of illegal firearms and as those who threaten employees of the Center for Social Work. In none of these texts was a particular criminal offence attributed to an individual; rather, it was generalized to the Roma

²⁰ Dolenjska is a region with a comparatively large Roma population.

population as a whole. For example, the media reported that persons who were caught with illegal firearms had bought these “at a Roma settlement” (*Delo*, February 11, *Večer*, February 13, 2006). The very title carried by *Večer*, “Weapons were bought at a Roma settlement”, suggests a semantic leap deluding one into associating the entire Roma population with weapon trafficking. The same image was also encouraged by the interlocutors who appeared in these texts. The Interior Minister, Dragutin Mate, as *Delo* reported (February 2, 2006), “urged more frequent actions to seize firearms from the Roma.”

In news briefs appearing in the crime section, the authors frequently passed judgment on the Roma before any guilt was actually proven. For example, *Delo* (February 3, 2006) reported that during house searches at a Roma settlement, police officers confiscated a portable computer that “was allegedly obtained in a burglary.” It is interesting that “allegedly” is omitted in the sub-heading of the same text, so that it appears to have been confirmed that the portable computer had actually been stolen. “In Trebnje and in Črnomelj police officers found weapons, and in a Roma settlement they found a *stolen computer*, USB keys and mobile phones.” No arguments or explanations corroborating this assertion are presented. Once again, this pre-judgment perfectly matches the image of the Roma as criminals.

In the same text, the author says that certain goods were confiscated in other house searches (outside the Roma settlement, in Trebnje and Črnomelj), but this time she does not leap to the conclusion that these goods *could have been* stolen, but only stresses that the owners did not have owners’ registration. This discrepancy is obvious in the introductory part of the article where we find another interesting detail: when referring to Roma suspects, she uses the term “man”, but the other two suspects of non-Roma origin are referred to as “a citizen” and “a local.” We will return to this distinction (we-they, civilized-uncivilized) later in the text.


Similar prejudgments could be read in *Večer* (February 6, 2006) in a report about that same event. It says that “it is suspected” that the seized objects “were obtained through criminal acts.” The above-mentioned computer was described as “*having been obtained in a burglary.*”

An author identified only by initials and reporting for *Dolenjski list* on problems experienced at the Center for Social Work in Črnomelj, wrote that employees at this center were increasingly exposed to “insults from the clients.”

This is followed by a story about one of three male clients. When he learned that he was no longer entitled to receive social aid, he promised the social worker that he would “make a mess they will remember and reminded them that years ago he was involved in the shooting in front of the Črnomelj post office.” The author presented this story as an example or illustration of customers’ complaints and threats, but what is essential is that the person in question is not described as just one of the clients receiving social aid; instead, his main identity signifier is his ethnicity – a Roma client. This semantic transfer creates the impression that all the clients who threaten are Roma people without explicitly generalizing the story to the entire Roma population. The semantic leap from the general (insulting clients) to the specific (the story of a Roma man who was insulting) attaches a Roma face to the unspecified clients mentioned in the introduction to the text. This is by no means surprising, as it easily ties in with the image of the Roma as those who do not respect the law and behave aggressively. This image is additionally supported by the photo of a man taken from behind, in which a man is behaving violently and threatening some employee in an office. Although the man in the picture is definitely not the Roma from the story, the purpose of a picture is to create the illusion that it is the violent Roma mentioned in the text threatening an employee at the center for social work.

This said, it should be added that this graphic image was an exception during the period observed. Pictures accompanying articles about the Roma in the print media are not out of the ordinary; as a rule, they show the event reported or the interlocutor. A smaller number of photos depicts the “life of the Roma.”

FIGURE 10 – PHOTOS ACCOMPANYING MEDIA TEXTS
ABOUT THE ROMA.




WE : THEY / CIVILIZED : UNCIVILIZED

"So there are two Roma settlements in the municipality, one in Lepovče and the other in Goriča vas, with an estimated 30 Roma people in each. 'Other Roma people are socialized, they work and live in residential apartment blocks,' says Majda Vrh" (*Delo*, February 24, 2006).

During February 2006, 45 male and 15 female interlocutors spoke to the media about the Roma. Janez Obreza, the director of the governmental office for nationalities, and Jožek Horvat Muc, the president of the Roma Union appeared most frequently. The table below shows whose "voice" (opinion, statement or answer) could be heard in the texts analyzed.

FIGURE II – WHO SPEAKS ABOUT THE ROMA?



Even though the Roma to non-Roma speakers ratio is 4 to 6, meaning better than in the case of Muslims, even in this example it is possible to say that media predominantly present the voices of those who are not part of the Roma community. Furthermore, this ratio would have been lower were it not for one comprehensive feature story about the Roma carried by the *Mladina* weekly in which statements were given by several Roma.

The interlocutors, much like the journalists, establish the division "we-they". They project onto the Roma whatever is negative, different and uncivilized, while the identity of "we", who are civilized, cultured and above all unproblematic, is established in relation to them, the Other. The "we" hence becomes a platform from which everything else is assessed and valued. The issue of media representation of the Roma does not differ from that of the other two groups analyzed here. The Muslims are seen as the opposite of the developed western world, while gays and lesbians are the opposite of the heterosexual world considered a standard and a norm, or of heteronormativity, to borrow

the term from Warner (1999), a post-structural queer theoretician. The logic of representation is obviously the same. It is the logic pointed out by Edward W. Said (1996) in his renowned study about “western views of the Orient.” The Roma as the Other forms in fact the implicit framework of all media representations, since they appear in the media as an “external problem” and as a community that is both inside and outside the wider (Slovene) community.

“In our municipality Roma owe 5 million for drinking water alone (although there are only 350 Roma); on the other hand they have mobile phones, expensive cars, guns and machine guns ...” (Jože Povšič, the director of the Komunalna municipal services, *Dolenjski list*, February 2, 2006).

“We do not have a Roma representative and we won’t have one! We gave them houses, electricity and water for free – students have to come by these things on their own. The term Roma is too nice for them – we have difficulties with Gypsies!” (Srečko and Rok from Ivančna Gorica, *Mladina*, February 27, 2006).

The “we-they” discourse is extensively present in media representations of the Roma depicting them as problematic citizens, with two problematic issues being most emphasized: the issue of education (educated Slovenes vs. uneducated Roma) and that of employment (employed (diligent, hardworking) Slovenes vs. idle (exploitative, lazy) Roma). It is interesting that such divisions are not generated by non-Roma interlocutors exclusively (for example, the mayor of Semič, Ivan Bukovec, maintained that the umbrella law on the Roma would “legalize idleness” and confer upon them rights without imposing obligations as well), but also by Roma themselves. For example, the President of the Roma Union of Slovenia spoke about the “weak working habits of the Roma” (*Delo*, February 22, 2006), although he also problematized the context by saying that another side of the problem is prejudice on the part of employers.

THE ROMA AS A PROBLEM

The most frequently used expression in media texts about the Roma is “Roma-related problems.” Accordingly, the Roma are most frequently presented as passive objects (not subjects) who represent a problem. There was only one exception during the period observed, in which the Roma

were not contextualized as a problem. That was the report on TV Slovenia (February 7, 2006) on the translation of Prešeren's poems into Romany. However, when introducing the translator, Rajko Šajnovič, the journalist presented him as an original character. In so doing, she did not use a directly expressed opinion, but rather a modified statement attributed to the entire Roma community ("Among his people he is known as an original character"). This type of modified statement is an integral part of the introduction of stereotypes into the media environment (Mitten and Wodak, 1993). In the example above it is used as a presentation of an exception that should confirm the majority image of the Roma as not (sufficiently) cultured people.

In the context of representing the Roma as a problem, they are "subjectivized" only when speaking about social aid. In this connection they appear as *active subjects* who take away money from the state, that is, from us.

"Unfortunately the existing legislation diverts Roma parents from sending their children to kindergarten, since if they keep the child at home their child's bonus is 20% higher, so they exploit this en masse" (*Dolenjski list*, February 9, 2006).

"In the past they used to scrounge, but now they don't have to do that, because they get aid from the municipality" (Ivanka Javornik, a citizen of Grosuplje, *Mladina*, February 27, 2006).

"That it [the Roma issue] is a burning issue is mainly the consequence of unemployment among the Roma, which is widespread because, among other reasons, we take excellent care of their social security" (Janez Drobnič, Minister of Work, Family and Social Affairs, *Dolenjski list*, February 2, 2006).


"And who will seek employment through public works when the social aid is higher than the payment for this type of work?" (Ivan Bukovec, the mayor of Semič, *Večer*, February 2, 2006).

It seems that media apply dual interpretational criteria when speaking about the receivers of social aid. The Roma people receive social aid, so "they" do not want to find employment and exploit this situation "en masse." This creates the impression that "we" do not exploit this same opportunity, although we could. A Roma man, as a receiver of social aid, is interpellated as an individual who exploits (and is therefore problematic), but this interpretation is not

applied when “we” are involved (or, this fact is not equally highlighted by the media, because it is overwhelmed by the (media) image of Slovenes as hard-working and as the opposite of the Other, i.e. the Roma).

Stereotyped media representations stick one to another and become reproduced in this way. Based on the material analyzed, the “sticking pattern” is as follows:

FIGURE 12 – THE “STICKING” PATTERN OF STEREOTYPICAL MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ROMA (IN THE WE-THEY CONTEXT).



To stay with the same metaphor, media reports on money invested in “the resolution of Roma issues” here function as a glue binding the images shown above. The information on money invested is not in itself problematic, but it “re-acts” in the context of the above-presented pattern, since the already established image of the Roma as exploiters is compounded by information about the cost of the “Roma problems” underwritten by the state. This reaction is further supported by the method of introducing this information into the text. In the example below, the word ‘alone’ points up the size of the investment, which in turn, by the logic of null sum, says that the sum remaining for “us” must be smaller.

“This year alone the state will earmark around 314 million tolar for this purpose [improvement of Roma settlements, note by R. K.]” (*Večer*, February 22, 2006).

“350 million tolar of this year’s budget is earmarked for building infrastructure in Roma settlements, roads and even street lighting [...] From this source alone 46 million tolar is secured for the operation of these [Roma] associations.” (*Delo*, February 20, 2006).

To sum up, during the period observed Roma issues were part of the two basic thematic frameworks: crime and the debate on the umbrella law on the Roma. Within the former, the Roma were presented as perpetrators of criminal acts, whereby suspects were conflated with the community to which they belong, so the entire community was criminalized. It was an act of a priori criminalization, without proof or final judgment. The debate on the umbrella law in the National Council opened room within the media for a repeated consideration of “Roma problematic issues.” The framework of these media representations was the binary discursive relationship “we-they” implying the relationship “civilized-uncivilized.” “They” were constituted as a problem primarily in relation to the issues of education and employment, and to these images adhered images of the Roma as criminals and as exploiters of social aid. The majority of media texts problematized the Roma population without providing the context (as well), which strengthened the image of “them” as being outside our society (different from us) but also as being an internal problem.

GAYS AND LESBIANS

A study of print media coverage of homosexuality in Slovenia for the period 1970 to 2000 (Kuhar, 2003) indicated that, on the whole, the media coverage was favorable or at least neutral. During this period homosexuality was a marginal journalistic topic, and it is no different today. Accordingly, media generally do not engage journalists specializing in this area. It appears that during the period 1970-2000, this topic was handled by journalists who were sensitized to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, or who took a kind of humanistic approach to the issue. Not rarely, their reporting was patronizing, although with good intentions. Homosexuality was understood as excess, or an exotic behavior, and an attractive media topic. Tratnik (2000), for example, concludes that starting in the late 1990s representations of homosexuality began to shift to the realm of the entertainment industry dominated by personal and spectacular themes. Velikonja (2001:397) adds that "editorial policies concerning the issues of homosexuality are virtually consistent across the board in that there is no consistent editorial policy." Accordingly, says Velikonja, one cannot say that the media is homophobic, but rather that the producers of media texts are such.

Despite this generally well-disposed attitude towards gays and lesbians, the analysis of the thirty years of media coverage of homosexuality (Kuhar, 2003) showed that media representations of homosexuality invariably left enough room for discourses that reproduced the stereotyped images of gays and lesbians. Furthermore, it revealed that homosexuality still caused uncertainty and uneasiness, frequently manifested as stereotyped media images that readily tie in with the readers' picture of homosexuality and hence do not appear upsetting. It can be said that homosexuality enters the media world through five basic techniques. One is stereotyping, primarily the result of a rigid understanding of sexual patterns and relations between the sexes. Next is psychiatric discourse on homosexuality, which rests on the uncontested notion of the complementarity of the two opposite sexes. This medicalized approach, therefore, problematizes homosexuality (what is the cause of homosexuality?), while heterosexuality in media representations remains unchallenged, natural and consequently common sensical. The sexualization of homosexuality, the third type of media representation of gays and lesbians, reduces gays

and lesbians to the issue of sexuality (this is particularly conspicuous in the accompanying graphics and photos). Next is secrecy, whereby homosexuality is presented as a secret that should be regretted and of which one should be ashamed. Even though this type of media representation was characteristic primarily of the 1970s and the late 1980s, it persisted into the 1990s, for example, within the Catholic weekly *Družina* (cf. Greif, 2001:389). Kuhar further concluded that during the 1990s increasingly normalized images of homosexuality began to enter the media. This indeed was a qualitative shift, yet not unproblematic. In fact, it was heterosexual normalization, or to put it differently, the media images of homosexuality have been fashioned on the acceptable model of heterosexuality so that they are not perceived as threatening. Homosexuality is therefore acceptable only if it is depoliticized and placed in the context of the spectacle, entertainment and the personal. The inclusion of gay and lesbian characters in comic programs/serials is a clear sign of this.

During February 2006, there were 14 media texts addressing homosexuality. The majority of these texts related to lesbian and gay cultural production, either books (reviews of the gay and lesbian book collections *Vizibilija* and *Lambda* published by Škuc), the exhibition entitled *Homocaust* dealing with the persecution of homosexuals under the Third Reich, or the big-screen gay image provided by *Brokeback Mountain*, at that time an Oscar front-runner.

Recently, issues concerning gays and lesbians have been (most) frequently addressed in the context of current political questions, primarily in connection with the debate on the law on registered homosexual partnerships. There were also several reports of this kind during the period analyzed, and these could not avoid the trap of the classical pattern for reporting on homosexuality in which the listing of pro and contra arguments (including the quoting of “juicy” (homophobic) statements by parliamentarians which frequently provided a platform for the reproduction of intolerance) is followed by the voice of “public opinion,” presented as the *alpha and omega* of the entire debate on the issue of registered homosexual partnerships. Here the media as a rule do not problematize the fact that intolerant public opinion on the issue of registered partnerships legitimizes intolerance and homophobia; one type of intolerance is used to justify another type. It seems that, with the help of media representations public opinion may quite arbitrarily create

definitions of and impose the limits on human rights. As Velikonja (2004) says, these media representations particularize the general, whereby the principle of universal equality as civil political culture is media-constructed as a particular opinion held by supporters of this legislation.


"The media, therefore, present as equal two options, one that expands the fund of rights, and another that reduces it. However, they do not emphasize this difference, but rather neutralize it, so they are responsible for the erosion of modern civil culture, which may have unpredictable and extremely destructive implications for social peace. (Velikonja, 2004:12).

In so doing, the media do not pay attention to the fact that this type of media particularization of opinions, which in a debate on human rights is expressed in the form of pro and contra arguments, contributes to the dangerous "weakening of the universality of law." It is necessary to point out here that this type of particularization is especially illustrative because it appears only in relation to certain groups, that is, gays and lesbians, Roma and the like, while media representations of some other groups, although not unproblematic, are usually not "counter-balanced" by opposite opinions. For example, in debates about Jews, neo-Nazis are not invited to give their opinions. By contrast, media representations of homosexuality relating to current political issues are always accompanied by the opinion of the "other side", ostensibly introduced for the sake of balance, but in reality supporting the implicit agenda that counts on excess as that which sells the media.

Even though it is possible to observe a qualitative leap in media representations of homosexuality – for example, homosexuality is no longer medicalized– the practice of presenting two opposing sides does persist. In the past, in medicalized contexts, the opposite side was represented by psychiatrists who asserted that homosexuality was a psychological disorder. Today, in the politicized context, the opposite side is represented by opponents of the law on registered partnership which, in their view, puts homosexual relationships on a par with heterosexual ones. Here one should not overlook the fact that their argumentation relies on the same platform as that once produced by psychiatry: homosexual partnerships are allegedly different "by nature" and hence they should enjoy (by the law of nature?) fewer rights.

The debate on registered homosexual partnerships is not limited solely to the legal aspect involving rights and obligations (it is not a debate on equality only), but goes beyond this. It seems that the debate on homosexual partnerships and even more so on homosexual families undermines traditional views on male/female and their relationship. It exposes these “foundations of western civilization” as not unproblematic and challenges these taken-for-granted assumptions. However, the said issues were not at the forefront of the media agenda in February 2006. This period was dominated by cultural issues related to homosexuality, with the coverage nevertheless adhering to certain typical media representations of homosexuality.

FIGURE 13 – REPORTING ON GAYS AND LESBIANS
BY THE MEDIA TEXT TYPE.



The greatest number of texts on gays and lesbians was carried by *Večer* (6), followed by *Mladina* (4), with *Delo*, *Dnevnik*, *Mag* and *Družina* featuring only one text each. Other media analyzed here did not carry any text about gays and lesbians.

For an illustration of typical media representations of homosexuality, we selected three media texts; the first two are reviews of *Brokeback Mountain*, one published in *Mag* (February 1) and the other in *Družina* (February 26, 2006); the third, featured by *Večer*, speaks about the everyday life of gays and lesbians. All three texts rely on secrecy, normalization and eccentricity as thematic frameworks for the media representations of homosexuality.

HOMOSEXUALITY IS A SECRET.
HOMOSEXUALITY IS NORMAL.

In media texts homosexuality is presented as secret in two ways. On the one hand, secrecy is manifested as the masking of interlocutors, gays and lesbians, who are introduced only by their first (imaginary) name, and, under-

standably, without a face (there is no picture of the interlocutor). On the connotative level, such a representation creates the impression of something shameful, concealed, dirty and unacceptable; such representations are, after all, encouraged by the interlocutors themselves, who strive to avoid media exposure by hiding “their faces.” The other level of secrecy is that of language. For example, the texts contain, or at least imply, the *identification of homosexuality with secrecy*. Previous studies of media representations of homosexuality (Kuhar, 2003) indeed showed that secrecy was predominantly characteristic of the 1970s and the early 1980s, but obviously, it persists. During the period analyzed here, it was particularly conspicuous because the story of *Brokeback Mountain* itself is built on the image of homosexuality as a secret and a shame.

Even though it may seem that the representation of homosexuality as a secret is exclusive of the normalization of homosexuality (homosexuals are not out of the ordinary/homosexuality is “normal”), in the media analyzed here these two representation techniques often appear alongside each other. *Mag’s* (February 1, 2006) review, for example, opens with the conclusions that cowboys in this movie are quite ordinary, that “there is nothing *unusual* about them, and that they are in no way *different* from countless other cowboys that still graze their herds across the expanses of North America.” But this has not prevented the author from entitling the review “A Secret from the Mountain.”

The review in *Družina*, on the other hand, places normalization in a different context. The author says that a modern movie must show something “fascinating, eccentric or simply ‘freakish’” to stand out from the average. The text hints at, and also represents, homosexuality as one such eccentricity, but it also adds that the stress lies on the normalization of homosexuality, albeit represented as problematic and threatening for the majority. The text adheres clearly to the “we-they” discourse, where “we”, heterosexual partners, is threatened, while “they” is the generator of that threat, which the author calls an “intensive gay campaign.”

“Gay culture does not want to remain on the level of a subculture but wants to break away from it and rise to the level of general culture by permeating all social pores [...] The movie in fact received nine nominations [...] All these awards and nominations obviously show that there is an *intensive gay campaign behind it*, which has led to its ban

in China.²¹ While last year it was the campaign for euthanasia that was at the forefront (Million Dollar Baby and The Sea Inside [...]), this year gay culture is on the agenda. The purpose is to promote it and put it on a par with heterosexual partnerships and hence normalize it" (*Družina*, February 26, 2006).

THE "WE-THEY" DISCOURSE,
OR I'M NOT A LESBIAN!


The "we-they" discourse is the constant trait of media representations of homosexuality. Journalists actually like to begin their texts by stressing that they themselves are not members of this group. The message is not only that theirs is an external view (and hence supposedly more objective), but it also conveys their fear (internalized homophobia?) of being identified as "one of them." So, for example, one author thus begins her text:

"Fortunately, all gays and lesbians who gathered at Media Nox this week are tolerant towards those of us who like the opposite sex and are called 'straight'" (*Večer*, February, 4, 2006).

An interesting difference with respect to two other minority groups investigated in this study has been observed in connection with the interlocutors chosen by the media authors writing about homosexuality. Although based on a limited sample, it is possible to conclude that at least during the period analyzed, it was gays and lesbians themselves, and GLBT activists in particular, whose voices could be heard. The ratio is six to four in favor of the representatives of gay and lesbian groups, but we should not neglect the above-mentioned problem of secrecy when identifying the interlocutors.

21 The logic used by the author is not clear, since he uses the banning of the movie in China as "proof" that the movie is part of an intensive gay campaign. However, if a conspiratorial gay campaign were really behind it, then it would probably be successful owing to the proverbial limitations of communist leaders.

FIGURE 14 – WHO SPEAKS ABOUT GAYS AND LESBIANS?



Similar to what we have concluded in connection with the Roma, graphics accompanying media texts on homosexuality are not exceptional in any respect. In most cases the pictures showed the title pages of gay and lesbian literature or images from *Brokeback Mountain*. Furthermore, there was no sexualization or secrecy in these graphics (homosexuals have faces), as in the past (cf. Kuhar, 2003).

COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS

Our analysis included three commercial radio stations: *Radio Antena*, *Radio Center* and *Radio City*. We did not monitor their programs throughout February, but only during randomly selected 24-hour intervals. On February 22 and 24, 2006 we monitored the 24-hour program on *Radio Antena* and *Radio City*, and on February 22, 2006 that on *Radio Center*.

Intolerance and ridiculing of minorities most frequently penetrates the airwaves through the statements of listeners who send SMS messages which are then read, uncensored, by radio hosts, or read without reacting to the “problematic” parts of particular messages. *Radio City* includes a short program called “Your 30 seconds on air” advertised as an uncensored broadcast without restrictions. Although it can be said that these thirty seconds of airtime are insignificant, the broadcast and the editorial policy could be interpreted as being in contravention of Article 8 of the Mass Media Act that prohibits the dissemination of content inciting national, racial, religious, sexual or other types of inequality, or violence and war, as well as national, racial, religious, sexual or other type of hatred or intolerance. Non-selective reading of SMS messages, and even more so the advertising of the opportunity to appear on air “without restrictions” definitely cannot contribute to the prevention of intolerant discourse. On the contrary, it seems that this non-selectivity encourages intolerant messages. I’d like to mention at this point a positive example provided by *Radio Antena* (February 22), when the host decided to read the following message by one Jože: “What kind of radio is this? You turn the folk stupid and make fun of them. This is real ‘čefur’²² radio, shame on you!” The host made several comments on the message during the show and ultimately concluded: “Jože, here is one comment from the background...: they, čefurji, or we, čefurji, must live too. Čefurji, too, have their rights. Jože, go to sleep, Slovenia will be glad!”

The analyzed segments of programs on the three radio stations did not address Roma issues save for one short report on the Roma Act. Muslims were not at the forefront either. There was only one indirect reference (*Radio Antena*, February 22) when the host mentioned Hasan Ibn Sab in connection with the book entitled *Alamut*, prompting the other host to add “the name tells all.” Of all the groups stud-

²² “Čefur” is a derogatory term denoting people from ex-Yugoslav republics.

ied here, gays and lesbians were most frequently mentioned. References to them were included in sms messages and they were the subject of live shows discussing relations between the sexes. In these examples, the discourse was frequently sexist, related to the implicit reproduction of the traditional gendered division of roles placed in the context of biological necessity, complementarity and nature. So in this context homosexuality appears as being contrary to the natural and therefore abnormal. It should be noted that in this case we are speaking not about a debate on homosexuality but about hints that created the impression of some kind of secrecy and indecency. Hints about homosexuality, predominantly homosexuality among men, were accompanied with laughter and smirking on the part of hosts; homosexuality apparently entertained listeners and made them laugh.

Below are several examples:

When announcing "Your 30 seconds on air," the hosts at *Radio City* (February 22, 2006) hinted at homosexuality, and then made a jocular remark saying "something is not right here."

Male host: "Your thirty seconds. I'll be glad to hear from anyone who dials 290 290 or demonstrates some hidden talent, or praises a wife, a brother, a son, an aunt, a mother-in-law ... well... only rarely a mother-in-law, isn't it ..."

Female host: "Husband, husband ..."

Male host: "Yes, preferably a husband."

Female host: "Yes."

Male host: "So, gentlemen, call us and your husband... no, something is not right here ..." (*Radio City*, February 22, 2006).

A similar outcome could be heard on *Radio Antena* (February 22) when the presenter read the news about the arrest of the film director Lee Tamahori. A hint at homosexuality, here combined with the transgression of the social gender schema, made the host laugh, and it was supposed to have the same effect on listeners.

"If you ever wondered what filmmakers do in the meantime, while not shooting movies ... Recently, the director of the movie ... the most popular James Bond movie *Die Another Day*, when was that ... some years ago ... in 2002, he directed *Die Another Day*. We speak about Lee Tamahori, he got three years probation and he will now perform community service. He engaged in various things during his spare

time and they caught him dressed in women's clothing offering to perform a sex act... can you imagine that ... a movie director in women's clothing and what was his year of birth? 1950, fine, yes ... well, he probably looked like an experienced woman. He was caught offering a sex act dressed in women's clothing. He was arrested on January 8 this year. He entered a car with an undercover policeman in it. Sexy Lee in women's clothing offered sex for money to the policeman. He got 36 months probation and was ordered to perform community service. So say the prosecutors from Los Angeles, and primarily his ... so this Lee Tamahori, a movie maker, will have to see that the parks in Hollywood look nice, will remove graffiti. Allegedly ... Interesting, isn't it ... I mean, it would be most interesting if someone took such a woman for sex, ... that would be interesting, hey .. I'd say that he charges a lot, the James Bond director, hey ... and probably this was not an ordinary sex act (laughter) a special one! (laughter)" (*Radio Antena*, February 22, 2006).

CONCLUSION

The elusiveness of media discourse and the shifting meanings of messages that may be interpreted in one way or another is what sets discourse analysis apart from more exact, more concrete, and perhaps more threatening, “products” of science. Texts have a specific meaning, but not an absolute one. Neither do they have just one “relative” meaning; one can say that there is a myriad of relative meanings that are shaped through interaction between the text (the picture, image, or message) and the recipient of that text, the reader, listener or a viewer. Verschueren (2000:136) concluded that the mental state of viewers, readers or listeners co-creates meaning as much as do the statements of speakers. However, while emphasizing that discourse analysis always ends with interpretation, and that it is therefore inevitably the individual interpretation of the researcher, two problematic conclusions may be drawn. One is that the “products” of other scientific analysis not concerned with meanings are objective, and the other that the shifting meanings of texts indicate that nothing “definite” can be said about media discourse. As to the latter, Hall (1997) indeed emphasized that the media cannot impose interpretations, meanings and views upon their consumers, since, as he said, we are not mental *tabulae rasae*. But despite this, he argues, the media have the integrating, explanatory and legitimate power to shape and define political reality, especially in unprecedented, problematic or threatening situations. The media then offer a “convenient answer” and an explanation of events that could be, and frequently is, received uncritically. As Luthar writes (1998), the media play an important role in legitimizing identities. Not only is our identity shaped on the basis of discourses and representations to which we are exposed, but we also establish the identity/image/picture of the Other through media (and other) discourses. This analysis once again leads us to the conclusion that the image mediated in this manner and reproduced time after time, is most often a one-dimensional image of a person, rarely contextualized, and fully determined by some fact of specific identity, for example, a Muslim, a Roma, a gay or a lesbian. The reduction of the image of a Muslim to an anonymous bearded protester, or a Roma to an uneducated receiver of social aid, or a gay or lesbian to the secrecy of his/her unusual love/sexuality, does not leave much space in the media world for any other perception of the Muslim

or Roma but as a problem, and a gay or a lesbian as someone with a problem.

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