



"Civil war
is not synonymous
with death,
but by establishing itself
it may become
a way of life
and even to organize itself
in a social system !"

Ahmad Beydoun

Kuzmanic & Truger - Yugoslavia, War ...

Yugo sla via WAR



**Edited by
Tonči Kuzmanić & Arno Truger**

Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution Schlaining
Peace Institute Ljubljana

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Yugo sla via WAR



**Edited by
Tonči Kuzmanić & Arno Truger**

Second Edition

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Peace Institute Ljubljana**

Ljubljana, Schlaining, 1993

MAIKÄFER, FLIEG!

DER VATER IST
IM KRIEG!

DIE MUTTER IST
IN POMMERLAND,
POMMERLAND IST
ABGEBRAUNT.
MAIKÄFER, FLIEG!

Preface

The present book is the result of close scientific cooperation between those Central European research institutes which have joined together in a "*Consortium for the Study of European Transition*" (CSTE). This comprises the following institutes: The Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Stadtschlaining), the Peace Institute in Ljubljana, the Institute for European Studies (Belgrade), the Centre for European Studies (Budapest), and the European University Institute (Florence). The Consortium was formed with the aim of studying the relationship between European integration and national identity within the context of the (West) European integration process on the one hand, and the East (Central) European transformation on the other. The situation in Yugoslavia was selected as the first "case study" even before it had escalated into a war. *Three conferences* organized by the **Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Stadtschlaining** and by the **Peace Institute in Ljubljana** formed the "backbone" of the study. The most significant results of the "case study" are presented in this publication.

*Tonči Kuzmanić
Arno Truger*

Ljubljana, Schlaining, April 1992

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Arno Truger

The Contribution of Peace and Conflict Research to a Current Conflict

**Report on the international conference on
Non-Violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia held
at Stadtschlaining from 13th - 17th November 1991**

The developments in Yugoslavia, like those in other Eastern (Central) European countries, represent both a threat and a challenge. The country's far-reaching economic, political, ecological and military interdependence demands a great amount of responsibility not only of the Yugoslav people and their political representatives, but also on the part of people outside Yugoslavia and from the international community. It is up to all them to strive for a peaceful solution of those conflicts that lead to acts of war.

The satisfaction of the Yugoslav people's basic needs, such as survival, economic prosperity, democracy, and cultural development should be the point of departure and the goal of any such endeavours. And since these people, regardless of their nationality or religious beliefs, will continue to depend on good relations with their neighbours as well as with other European peoples, any wholesale condemnation must be avoided. Instead, every effort must be made to promote a dialogue both between and with the conflicting parties. Only a concerted effort of all peace-loving forces will lead to a peaceful solution of the conflicts.

The conference at Stadtschlaining was an attempt to work in that direction. It can be considered as an example of how peace and conflict research are able to make a practical contribution in dealing with an on-going conflict. This report is intended to help evaluate and define the position of the project and its results, and, above all, to make the lessons learned from it available for similar projects that may be initiated in the future.

Some of the main features of the conference can be outlined as follows:

- Preparation and organization of the conference was largely done in a close cooperation between the institutes at Stadtschlaining and Ljubljana. This cooperation was based on long-standing personal contacts and the confidence that has grown out of them, as well as on the knowledge and expertise contributed by both institutes. This refers particularly to the selection of the Yugoslav participants and the preliminary analysis of the conflict by the Peace Institute in Ljubljana.

- The Yugoslav scholars participating in the conference received support in their struggle for peaceful development in their country. They need this support because they are frequently isolated in their endeavours even within their immediate environment, and the choices are often reduced to either fully supporting the "right" side or else siding with the "enemy".

- The conference facilitated a dialogue with colleagues from extremely varied - and at times even opposing - backgrounds (regional, national, political, religious, etc.) at a time when such a dialogue was no longer possible inside Yugoslavia. Unfortunately it was not possible for all the participants who had been invited to travel and come to Stadtschlaining. Communication, particularly with the southern parts of the country, was difficult, and most male participants required a special permit issued by the military authorities in order to leave the country. (Several participants were not granted that permit, while one cancelled his visit because he did not want his name to reappear in army and police files).

- The basic approach of the conference was to study the current state of the crisis from different regional, national, religious and political perspectives, as well as from the perspectives of different academic disciplines. Since it was primarily the needs and problems of Yugoslavia that were dealt with, it was the Yugoslav scholars who did the groundwork. At the two preliminary conferences held in early September at the Study Centre for Peace and Conflicts Resolution at Stadtschlaining, and the other in late October at the Peace Institute in Ljubljana, they analyzed the current state of the crisis and worked out parameters and pointers for its evaluation and solution. The participants were then sent written summaries of both preliminary conferences before the November conference commenced.

- At the beginning of the conference, the Yugoslav participants were given the opportunity to add to this analysis, while the other conference participants were only allowed to ask questions for their own better understanding, but not to contribute to the discussion. The purpose of this was to widen and update the analysis (apart from getting to know the people who were responsible for it).

Furthermore, this procedure facilitated a "protective" way of presenting controversial positions in a situation in which a considerable emotional stress of the Yugoslav participants had to be taken for granted. This stress was due to their personal positions (e.g. as doctors, psychiatrists, political activists, etc.), worries about families, friends and property that they knew to be in the fighting area or that they had even already lost, and to difficulties they had experienced in travelling to the conference (applications for permits, conditions of travel, etc.)

- The results and evaluations produced by the Yugoslav participants formed the basis for the subsequent work of experienced and internationally renowned peace researchers and conflict resolvers. Naturally enough, the mix of Yugoslav participants and participants from the international peace research and conflict resolution community not only enriched the conference, but also provided a potential for a conflict. While the former were directly involved in the problem, the latter had much more indirect view of it. Even without the emotional stresses caused by the situation in Yugoslavia, dialogue, let alone cooperation, between people of different nationalities, political parties, and religious beliefs is something quite unfamiliar and difficult. This unfamiliarity and difficulty was increased by the great variety of professions and academic disciplines that came into contact with one another (political scientists, sociologists, experts in international law, psychiatrists, psychologists, doctors, etc.). Interdisciplinary cooperation of this kind is difficult, yet it turned out to be most exciting and productive. By contrast, the problems of interdisciplinary competition and the personal ambition of some participants, notably those from the conflict resolution community, were less productive. Such problems included attempts to have one's own contribution placed as prominently as possible (i.e. before that of a colleague), and the publicize of some of the results of the conference.

- Taking as its basis the analysis of the status quo, the conference worked out principles and approaches for a non-violent solution of the crisis in Yugoslavia, components of a comprehensive peace plan, and the priorities for future activities. The task of basing one's work on practical applicability is unfamiliar for most scholars and therefore a particular challenge. In the academic world the "three step approach" - analysis, prognosis, therapy tends to get bogged down in the attempt to produce a usable analysis (while activists seem to have a tendency to doctor the symptoms and skip the analysis stage). Nevertheless, the conference succeeded in progressing from analysis all the way to therapy proposals. At this stage, three working groups elaborated proposals concerning (1) the internal Yugoslavian situation, (2) the international community, and (3) the "civil society" within and outside Yugoslavia, and these were subsequently presented to and discussed by the plenary session. As it turned out, too little time was allowed for this phase.

- The discussion of the results of the conference that followed a talk by Johan Galtung, and at which a wider public was present, facilitated the involvement of the "civil society". For politicians and representatives of international organizations, the discussion was an opportunity to prepare themselves for the round table discussion of the conference results scheduled for the following day. Unexpectedly, and in marked contrast to the course of the conference up until that point, fierce controversies developed around a paper intended to summarize the results of the working groups. It would seem that this was mainly due to the following factors:

- The paper was put together in a very short time on the basis of the report of the working groups and was not discussed prior to the round table discussion. It was not clear to everybody what was its purpose: was it meant to be a summary of the conference results, produced and agreed upon by all participants, or merely a discussion paper that was not to be published?

Some participants attempted to start an international campaign based on parts of the paper (those referring to the cease-fire proposal made by Žarko Puhovski). These participants were not interested in producing a common summary of the conference that would include a revised proposal.

- The fact that this was a written paper triggered off discussions of details which, while highlighting differences of content, impeded any productive controversies. Although it was pointed out by the chairman that the paper was not intended to be published, numerous editing proposals were made. By opening the conference to the public, the shielded and exclusive professional environment no longer existed. The conference participants began to view themselves as political actors in a political arena and behaved accordingly (e.g. one Serbian scientist declared that he would be compelled to leave the room if a uniformed policeman continued to be present).

- The work of the participants during the conference was so intense that towards the end of it signs of fatigue became noticeable, proving detrimental to a constructive dialogue.

- The involvement of representatives of political institutions in the round table discussion meant that

- the conference and some of its results became known to a wider public. In particular the presence of the President of the Yugoslavian State Presidency, Stipe Mesić, was helpful in this respect;

- representatives of different groups began to communicate: politicians from various Yugoslavian republics and from Austria, representatives of international organizations such as the European Council and the Helsinki

Citizen's Assembly, and scholars from various Yugoslav republics, from the USA, the Netherlands, Norway, and Austria;

- different and changing positions became clear. For example, Stipe Mesić spoke of stationing UN troops in buffer zones, while the Croatian side had until then insisted on stationing them along the borders between the republics.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to bring together at the round table representatives from all the republics and autonomous territories, and in particular politicians from Serbia. This seems to have been due at least partly to unwillingness on the part of the military authorities and the Serbian leadership. For example, a delegation from Montenegro, consisting of a member of parliament who is also president of the Liberal Party, together with his vice president, foreign affairs spokesman and press secretary, was refused an exit permit. In such circumstances it is difficult for an independent party to organize a dialogue between political representatives which is balanced with regard to the participants involved; in my opinion, this fact emphasizes the importance of dialogues below the official political level.

- Finally, the conference also provided a major contribution to this publication.

By way of summarizing, it can be said that, broadly speaking, the experiment was successful. The difficulties, which were consciously taken into account by us beforehand, proved to be not so much obstacles to a quiet conference as important impulses for a very exciting meeting in which the participants were indeed able to learn a great deal. The work of preparing and organizing the conference also strengthened the competence and the cooperation of the organizing institutes. The conference itself brought a wealth of new insights to all the participants. While the Yugoslavian participants had already learned a lot before the actual conference started, the non-Yugoslavian peace and conflict researchers benefitted from the experience and the insights of their Yugoslavian colleagues. Furthermore, the perspective from outside provided many new aspects for the Yugoslavian participants.

The dialogue between colleagues from different regional, national, and party-political backgrounds - a dialogue that would not have been possible inside Yugoslavia - as well as the coming together of extremely varied professional approaches, helped to make the conference an exiting and productive event. This is also true of the endeavour to work with a view to practical applicability. Although no final communique could be produced, a great number of suggestions met with wide approval. They were definitely impulses for activities which were later initiated in the wake of the conference. A revised form of the cease-fire proposal referred to above subsequently became the centre-piece of an international campaign.

Translation by Wolfgang Sutzl

**Part 1:
Conflict Genesis**

Johan Galtung
**Reflections
on the Peace Prospects
for Yugoslavia**

**Conflict genesis;
conflict processes, conflict perception**

To see bombs fall on Dubrovnik and the presidential palace in Zagreb, to see Vukovar and Osijek in ruins, is to see ourselves as the Europeans we are: aggressive, unable to handle conflict in a mature manner, destroying some of the best in ourselves. For one who lived over a period of four years (1973-1977) in Dubrovnik as the first Director-General of the Inter-University Centre this holds no surprise. The tension was there all the time. The emotions are centuries deep. But that in no way diminishes the tragedy, and does not explain why Yugoslavia had a generation of relative peace.

There were many reasons: the function of Italian fascism, and particularly of German Nazism as common enemy strong enough to bridge the many gaps, of which the Serb-Croat gap may be the broadest; the charismatic leadership of Tito the Croat; the myth, and reality, of the *partisans* as all-Yugoslav in spite of the strong Croat leanings toward Italy-Hungary and Austria-Germany. The idea of building a New Man through a Third Way socialism, including *samo upravljanje*, the self-management which in principle was a gigantic decentralization effort, decreasingly credible, was also used to transcend these gaps. So was nonalignment as foreign policy, building links to all countries.

This lasted Tito's lifetime. After that, most forces became centrifugal, not centripetal; particularly after the end of the Cold War made nonalignment meaningless. By the end of the 1980s the Second World War was more or less forgotten, the charisma died before its physical carrier died in 1980, socialism of any kind was no match to the market capitalism of some neighbour countries. But nonalignment between two poles became meaningless even if neutrality still remains an option.

The second unquiet corner in Europe, the first being the London-Dublin-Ulster triangle, is now in ever higher flames, with neighbours killing each other and people engaging in futile games of deciding who fired the first shot, declaring and breaking a dozen armistices. Let us try some reflections instead.

And the first introductory reflection would be how unaware Western politicians, media and people seem to be of how their deeply embedded, unreflected anti-Serbian attitudes, are being produced and reproduced daily, and not only because the Croats are more talented than the Serbs at public relations. Several factors underlying this general syndrome should be identified.

Of course there are the coinciding historical divides onto which such prejudices can easily be grafted: Serbs are Orthodox (Schism of 1054), use Cyrillic letters and were under Ottoman rule (from 1459); Croats (like the Slovenes) are Catholic, use Latin letters and were under Austro-Hungarian rule (from 1102).

The latter welcomed hundreds of thousands of the former as refugees into what today is Croatia as a frontier bulwark of Serbian peasants (*Grenzer*) against further Turkish advances. These were the (2 million) Serbs that were seen as being in the way during the Second World War, leading to the genocide (much like Hitler exterminated Jews and others "in the way") in the concentration camp Jasenovac of as many as 700,000 (the total possibly being one million) Serbs¹. This certainly led to Serbian retribution, killing Croats in Serbia. But there is an asymmetry here, and not only in numbers. The Ustashe program was to convert one third, expel one third, kill one third of the Serbs in Croatia, and they were also exterminating Jews and Gypsies. To forget this is as misleading as to base attitudes to the conflicts in Yugoslavia on nothing else. But the West often seems to take over Croat attitudes, lumping all Serbs together as expansionist, neglecting that most effective communicator through generations, centuries of history: traumata, wrapped in my this.

One victim of this anti-Serbian bias is the failure to see the present conflict as triangular between Croats, Serbs, and Serbs in Croatia, personified by President Tudjman, President Milošević and General Adžić, who as a young boy experienced the massacre of 37 members of his family by the Ustashi. With 85% of the Yugoslav Federal army being Serbs from outside Serbia, the army becomes an instrument for their protection, particularly for the 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia (in Slavonia and Krajina; perhaps one million as they may conceal their identity).

Beograd control seems to be low in spite of the Federal Army being the recipient of 60-80% of the federal funds. These Serbs may bear a sell-out and,

¹ Figure mentioned in the museum pamphlets of the former concentration camp.

consequently, declare their own independence², and may be very hostile to any form of "peacekeeping", also by the UN. But such points do not fit the bilateral model most people entertain in conflicts and consequently tend to be neglected. History can only be neglected at considerable risk.

In recent history three more factors reinforce the historical divides: Beograd, in Serbia, was the capital of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ, still on the caps of the police in Beograd); Serbs were probably more Communist; and privatization/market economy is seen in the West as having been embraced with more enthusiasm in Slovenia-Croatia.

The distant past is with us in everyday life, in material and symbolic culture. The recent past is present as memory. But then there is the intermediate past which has not yet sedimented archaeologically and is no longer so easily recalled. Slovenia was absorbed under Nazism, and Croatia was a puppet and fascist regime now hailed by the Croatian President Tudjman. There was a German/Nazi and an Italian/fascist project in Yugoslavia (with its origin in the 1915 London Treaty, rewarding Italy for fighting Austria-Hungary); aborted by the defeat of those two regimes. The Yugoslavs killed by the Germans during the war were mainly Serbs, to the point of working them to death building roads and railroads in northern Norway; the Germans killed by Yugoslav *partizans* during the war were mainly killed by Serbs. Are those Germans today seen, by both parties, as the instruments of Nazi ambitions to be repudiated by Bonn and Beograd alike, or are they seen just as Germans? The ambiguity of this situation should lead to some withdrawal. But in this case the only withdrawal is verbal, not behavioral like when the European Community recognizes Slovenia and Croatia, at the behest of Germany, from 15 January 1992; with little or no public justification. The painful intermediate past is known to most. But it is spoken by very few.

A little deeper in the archaeology of neither recent, nor past history is, of course, the beginning of the First World War. If we accept the theory that the shot in Sarajevo 28 June 1914, killing Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife precipitated that war, and eventually also led to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, then this must have been a world record in political effect per bullet. The *ressentiment* left behind must have been enormous, including the hatred of that Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip, a member of "Young Bosnia", with weapons supplied by the Serbian organization "Black Hand". This organization seems not to have been controlled by the Serbian government; but was perceived as such

² Thus the, *International Herald Tribune* reported (14-15 December 1991), from Erdut, a "Defense Ministry" and an "Agriculture Ministry", and a deputy minister of information saying "We are our own little state. We have our own parliament and ministries".

by Vienna, with deep consequences for the First World War. One more triangular situation that was construed as bilateral, with Serbs lumped together? Or is this a more general habit of the West, and what are the political consequences?³

This all comes together as a reconstruction of the Cold War drama on Yugoslav soil, with Serbia as East, encroaching on everybody, Croatia as West, and Muslim, Hungarian and Albanian minorities as nonaligned (so far). Cancelling the autonomy for Vojvodina (Hungarians) and Kosovo (Albanians) paves the way for Greater Serbia. But cancelling constitutional clauses protecting the Serbian minority also paves the way for Greater Croatia. The two concepts overlap for vast territories of the country of the South Slavs; spelling major civil war after recognition.⁴

The point here, however, is the ease with which the Yugoslav complex of conflicts seems to have fitted into the dying Cold War East-West syndrome, with Serbia having the major vice of being to the East and Croatia the virtue of being to the West. There was a mental framework available and enough factors that fitted, including the ambiguity, encased in silence, of the "aggressive" Russians/Serbs as the victims of German Nazism.

Is somebody now missing a chance to win a mini Cold War militarily? Is Germany seeking revenge for the many Germans killed by Serbian partisans? Is Austria seeking revenge over Gavrilo Princip in addition to trying to recreate some of ties to Slovenia and Croatia? For the Cold War was not really won by the West. What happened was that one side self-destroyed and might have done so earlier had the Stalinist regimes not been legitimized by Western threats, not imaginary as seen by the Western forces, U.S., U.K. and France, contemplating the "risk of war if necessary" over the Berlin Wall August 1961.⁵

Was the ending of the Cold War 1989 too peaceful, too much the work of civil society (dissident movement, peace movement) and of a statesman on the wrong side (Gorbachev)? If so, this would be one more enactment of the old

³ Thus, a political commentator in the Vienna *Die Presse* (16-17 November), **Andreas Unterberger**, compares the attack on Dubrovnik 1991 with Lockerbie 1988, and welcomes U.S. calls for action but deplors the lack of action against Serbs, compares Milošević with Hitler and is totally silent on the pre-history.

⁴ This point is made very forcefully by **Milovan Djilas** in an article in *Aftenposten* (Oslo), 14 July 1991.

⁵ See "*Allies Were Ready to Risk War Over Berlin, Paper Shows*", IHT, 2 January 1991

adage that diplomats and generals tend to fight the last war⁶. Within the same framework the present author, a peace researcher, may contribute his piece: Greater Serbia will self-destroy, not as a result of outside pressure, but as the result of the joint working of the dissident movements, such as the opposition parties and the peace movement inside Serbia.⁷ In other words, there are parallels, the problem is which ones the peoples of former Yugoslavia could ride on towards a more peaceful situation.

However that may be there is no doubt that the terrible mutual killing of South Slavs also carry the seeds of diachronic and synchronic escalation. Many must be the young boys⁸ today who are so traumatized by the horrors happening to their families that they are already contemplating revenge. The danger that violence, including preemptive violence, will also burst out along intra-Yugoslav Hungarian-Serbian, Albanian-Serbian, Macedonian-Serbian and Muslim-Serbian lines is considerable. It is difficult to see how this can happen without involving, one way or the other, most of the direct and indirect neighbors: Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria-Greece over Macedonia, and, more remotely, Turkey. Serbia, with Montenegro certainly a topdog inside the old Yugoslavia, is an underdog in a European context where the West automatically sides with the most similar and homologous, acting out old conflict readiness, and even in the Balkans because of the fault lines between Serbian communities and all others. Except for Romania, Serbia would have few friends, and present day Romania may not count for much.

But the danger of escalation goes beyond the Balkans. The Yugoslav conflict sets a pattern for conflicts with real or perceived similarities elsewhere. Hungary/Romania also embody the Catholic/Orthodox and Habsburg/Ottoman divides; Poland and (West) Ukraine/Russia only the former. Identification processes

⁶ Like Stalin being seen by the West as Hitler, i.e., not only as despotic but also as expansionist; like the Chinese expecting interventionist war after the 1949 revolution and identified the Korean War this way. On the other hand, such factors are rather natural given the power of a mental *Gestalt* shaped by forceful events on youthful, receptive minds.

⁷ Contrary to impressions in Western media opposition seems not only to be more frequent but also more tolerated in Beograd than in Zagreb.

⁸ One is struck by the practical absence of girls and women among the combatants. If this is different from the Second World War situation, then what is the implication? Violence becoming less legitimate, having to survive as *Maennerspiele*? Is this linked to the high proportion of women in the Yugoslav peace movement?

might easily lead to imitative role-playing. Violent conflicts are very easily imagined.⁹

But the possibility of violence goes beyond that. All of this is embedded, as has so often been the case, in big power politics. Obviously, there is a German-Austrian/Catholic implicit alliance backing Slovenia and Croatia, with (Catholic) Hungary providing the Croats with surplus Kalashnikovs (origin Eastern Germany?). But who is backing Serbia? The only neighbor not at odds with Serbia would be Romania, backing Serbia with Remington rifles, possibly as a result of the present close cooperation with the British army.¹⁰ Who else?

Obviously the Yugoslav conflict offers a tremendous opportunity to the new Germany, after the unification of East and West. Old spaces for political-economic-cultural penetration open up and become like new. The European Community, hesitatingly, but with an urge "to talk with one voice", yields to the strongest member and follows up. Who might be skeptical?

The United States, of course. But exactly what form that will take is difficult to predict. One important negative fact (in the sense of a fact not there, a non-fact) is the absence of U.S. interventionism, the U.S. contenting itself with a former foreign secretary, Cyrus Vance, playing a very positive third party role under UN auspices, unlike what Lord Carrington is doing under EC auspices. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. will simply stand by letting Germany have a *de facto* expansion eastward, on behalf of the European Community, or alone. After all, was the Second World War not exactly about that?

The problem is that many of the Allies are now in the European Community in an "ever closer union", including - although with some hesitation - the country with a "special relationship" to the U.S. In a sense the U.S. would be the only one left to stem the German tide after the demise of the Soviet Union.

In so doing they might also be inspired by the old German tradition of trying to build a Berlin-Baghdad axis, passing through Turkey. Even if Istanbul moved to Ankara, and Berlin (so far) to Bonn, the Germany-Turkey-Iraq connection may still make some geopolitical sense. Yugoslavia as the Balkan superpower was not only too close but also too capable of absorbing what could be German *Hinterland*. With Turkey as an ally and Austria cut down to size (like at present)

⁹ "The Ukraine Resolves to Create Army of 400,000" was headline 23 October 1991 (IHT). Then came the Commonwealth of Independent States. Then came the decision to have separate armies.

¹⁰ See "Britain to Train Romanian Army", The Guardian Weekly, 16 June 1991.

the in-between countries are easily controlled militarily-politically and penetrated economically-culturally by Germany. And Iraq might offer access to the Arab/Persian Gulf with a regime more amenable to Turkish interests than the present one. Was that the reason why Germany so eagerly provided Saddam Hussein with arms, even with weapons of mass destruction? Possibly doing the same for Tudjman?

In other words, the Yugoslav "situation", to use a slight euphemism current in UN circles, has broad implications. One implication is negative: the more the conflict escalates in terms of violence, the worse for the future and for other conflicts. But the corollary may also be true: If this conflict could be processed in a reasonable way a model might be formed for other nationalities conflicts. No doubt all the parties are keenly aware of both implications and use them for all they are worth; for their nuisance value ("if you do not submit to me, I cannot guarantee the consequences") and for their edifying value ("if we solve this one, maybe we do not have to worry about the three possible fields of escalation, within the old Yugoslavia, relative to the neighbors and even beyond that"). But how?

Conflict processing

The following are ten reflections not so much on what the solution might be, but on some of the *Randbedingungen* for these solutions. Nobody knows today what the final outcome will be except that it will not be final. There is too much conflict material in the area to talk about final solutions. Moreover, this may be a conflict so deep and so complex, much like in the Middle East, that the best is to talk about process rather than goal; about who and how, when and where rather than what and why.

(1) To maintain the Yugoslav federation is not a goal in itself. Obviously, the federal construction of 6+2 republics is no longer viable; the marriage has gone stale, the federation was too close. Like for the Soviet Union the conditions bringing them into existence, some acceptable, some not, are no longer there.

For the strongest group, the Serbs, to impose its will on the rest is equally nonviable. All three Yugoslavias of the past, December 1918, November 1943 and 1974, are exactly that, of the past.¹¹ The last one was not a confederation as currency, foreign policy and armed forces were common even if some of the army was divided by the institution of territorial defense.

¹¹ For a good overview, see Zoran Djindjic, "Jugoslawien: Nationalitaeteneintopf", Transit, No. 1, pp. 153-166.

Is this a tragedy? Not necessarily; tragic is the way the break-up is acted out. There are good divorces and bad ones; this is a bad one. Moreover, the bigger the states the bigger wars are they capable of making, a good argument in favor of smaller states. Those who raise the question of viability should have a look at Iceland. There is no virtue to size as such. Virtue is the ability to minimize direct and structural violence within and between states; not easily available to the big.

(2) A Yugoslav confederation is a reasonable goal, meaning a construction where each part has its own financial policy, foreign policy (with separate UN membership) and security policy (preferably based on defensive forces only, building on the territorial defense/militia tradition) and yet keeps borders open, for all kinds of personal, commercial, cultural, even political cooperation, some of them stipulated in a treaty, some decided ad hoc. For a country so dependent on tourism to close its borders is suicidal economically, as they will soon see. The alternative to marriage is not total divorce but to live together as good friends, calibrating the level of closeness to the circumstances. And as they change rapidly, the structure should be flexible.

It should be pointed out that the units confederating do not have to be the six or eight usually talked about. Some might prefer to remain together in a Yugoslav federation, even with that name. Serbia and Montenegro, with a record of recent independence as monarchies, may feel more inclined to yield sovereignty to a federation than Slovenia and Croatia with no such record. In a sense, national independence is like personal independence, much pursued during puberty, then gradually yielding to marriage and a new family, with surrender of some "sovereignty". Thus, it is hardly by coincidence that the two Nordic countries with the longest record of independence, Denmark and Sweden, are entering the European Community/Union whereas the three with independence only from this century, Iceland, Norway and Finland (so far) are hesitating.

(3) There is no alternative to self-determination for the republics, and that also holds for the minorities within them. The Serbs are both majority and minority, much like Russians in the Soviet Union. Of course the Croats must give to the Serbs in Croatia the same as they want for Croats in Yugoslavia: the right to be ruled by themselves. Some redrawing of borders and some population transfers are probably inevitable, to the point that Croats may even repent they started it all with their June 1991 independence declaration.

Slovenia is not the problem, having no comparable minority situation; handling their own situation skillfully. Croats and Serbs seem to join in seeing them as rats leaving the sinking ship; possibly in search of a new ship, Austria and/or the EC.

In principle, there are four solutions to the problem posed by extending the principle of self-determination not only to the republics, but to the minorities inside the republics, and not only for Croatia but also for the much more complicated Serbian situation even though the Serbs do not have the fascist reputation of the Ustashi regime. Croatia will serve as an example.

First, Croatian rule. Given the gruesome record of the recent past the Serbs in Croatia have no reason to accept a guarantee of "minority rights" based on signatures and pledges only. Something more solid is needed; as evidenced by the independentism of the Serbs in Croatia. This option is ruled out.

Second, Serbian rule. This option is also ruled out. A reason commonly given is not to "reward aggression". But what happened cannot be understood merely as a Serbian invasion of Croatia. These were internal administrative borders drawn under great haste, partly by Tito the Croat (and hence repudiated today in Serbia with pledges to send his remains to Croatia "where he belongs"). To change them would not have been impossible under international law. But any major redrawing of the borders under Serbian rule would expose a Croatian minority to the same problems; there being no simple arithmetical/geographical formula available.

Third, condominium, joint Croatian-Serbian rule over the contested areas. This would have been the ideal solution, but the option is no longer available (it might have been even as late as sometime during the first half of 1991). A highly cooperative and tolerant relationship would be needed, like joint custody of children.

Fourth, the areas where Serbs are living would belong neither to Croatia, nor to Serbia; but to the inhabitants themselves, to the Serbs in Croatia who are already experimenting with ministries of agriculture, defense, etc. Whether real or imagined, they would feel the need for continued military protection against Croatian violence; to get rid of this "inconvenience" in their midst, or as revenge for Serbian violence committed recently. A Yugoslav federal army, or the remains there of, might serve them but would, for good reasons, not be trusted by the Croats. The best alternative is certainly UN peacekeeping forces, but not only along the old Croatia-Serbia border. They have to constitute a densely woven guarantee against violence in all directions so that civilian life can be resumed and civil society be reconstituted; possibly preparing for a referendum, in all municipalities concerned.

(4) The outside world should not withhold recognition from governments based on self-determination and democracy. More particularly, the European Community as a whole is now undergoing a transition from confederation to

federation, the "ever closer" European Union, so what happens in Yugoslavia may look counter-historical to them. Moreover, major EC member states do not grant self-determination to important minorities inside their own borders (England for Ulster and Scotland, France for Corsica, Spain for the Basque country and Catalonia, only to mention some). Any precedent might boomerang on them. But these were never valid reasons for the EC to try to withhold recognition from, for instance, Slovenia and Croatia. Rather, they should encourage and help in any process freely determined by those peoples.

The valid reason to withhold recognition would be if the internal problems have not been adequately sorted out. Recognition defines the former republics as independent states, meaning that the borders are no longer internal administrative borders but international borders. That, in turn, means in principle that Serbian military activity inside Croatia can be construed as aggression of Serbia on Croatia, triggering the whole machinery available to the international community, such as open military assistance from powerful allies, UN Charter Chapter 7 enforcement processes legitimized by the UN Security Council, etc. Given the anti-Serbian bias of the West, Serbian visions of a Gulf type operation with Serbia-Milosević prepared by Western media for the roles of Iraq and Saddam Hussein cannot be dismissed simply as paranoid. Moreover, mainly due to policies of their own making Serbia might be attacked from Albania and Hungary in addition to Croatia, even with U.S. naval support if rumors that the U.S. is buying into the old Soviet Flora base on the Albanian coast prove to be true.

Through Hungary, foreign troops would have access to the Serbian heartland when the roads from Slovenia-Croatia are blocked. In other words, premature recognition without an adequate peace process running at the same time could endanger peace for a very long period. Obviously, Serbia is very lonely in this context. But the Serbian tradition, given the historical record is not to submit but to become more pugnacious. Like Iraq, they may be forced into a state of temporary submission only to reemerge later with more grievances than ever.

(5) The peoples of the former Yugoslavia, so far not able to sort this out with other means than the primitivism of violence, need the help of third parties. The European Community has too many vested interests; much better would be the United Nations, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or both of them combined; in addition to the peace movement and civil society in general.

First, and most basic, it does not take much reflection to see what is going on: the enactment of the basic principles of the New World Order. The EC stays off the Middle East, playing only a very marginal role in return for the U.S. keeping

off this issue, in accordance with old "backyard" concepts. The EC is using the situation to gain a foothold as political hegemon in Eastern Europe. In other words, the Yugoslav crisis came just in time after the U.S. had established *de facto* its hegemony in (part of) the Middle East for the EC to try to do the same in (part of) Eastern Europe.

The UN has no such hegemonic role to play in specific regions. However, making use of the good services of a former U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, there may be the suspicion that the U.S. plays on the UN as an instrument not so much to promote own interests as to block the economic advances of Germany/EC in Eastern Europe.

Second, there is the importance for the EC to prove to itself and the world its ability to have a joint foreign policy, meaning a unanimous foreign policy, speaking with one voice. The EC did not pass that test in the Gulf crisis; doing better in the Yugoslav case.¹²

However, this means that as a third party it becomes more important for the EC to achieve consensus than to design a third party policy helpful for the peoples of Yugoslavia in their predicament. Occasionally the two criteria may produce the same result. But given the anti-Serbian bias in the EC countries a consensus platform is more likely than not to be loaded against the Serbs; an example being the German-led EC consensus on recognition of Croatia from 15 January 1992. The date is ominous whether chosen for that reason or not: the anniversary of the ultimatum to Iraq, introducing the brutal, if not unjustified, attack on Iraq. However, with the act of recognition the EC has evidently overcome the fear of the counter-historical and the precedent for secession even if unable to handle adequately the Serbian minority.¹³

The UN, with a nonaligned majority presumably with great sympathy for the Yugoslav peoples (although perhaps with an anti-Croat bias, Croatia possibly being seen as ruining the old co-founder of the nonaligned movement through its declaration of independence) has no problem of this kind; consensus politics is not a part of the system except for Security Council veto powers.

¹² "Whatever the outcome of the crisis, the community cannot now be accused, as it was during the Gulf crisis, of impotence and a failure to act"; N. Gnesotto, "Political Union After the Revolutions", Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, Quarterly Newsletter, No. 3 1991, pp. 1-4.

¹³ Thus, reading the Hague Process document Treaty Provisions for the Convention, Corrected Version 3 November 1991 (about "the new relations between the republics") there is no guarantee given to the minorities beyond pledges.

Third, the European Community is rich and easily falls into the temptation to use economic rewards and punishment to steer the complex conflict process the way they want where issues should better be decided on their own merits. "You do as I say and you'll get more trade, you don't do it and you'll get less" is an easy, but lazy and very often irrelevant approach to conflict, more in the interest of the third party than of the first and the second. In addition, it does not even look as if the economic sanctions have worked.

At this point the UN has the obvious advantage of having insufficient funds available for carrot economics. On the other hand, stick economics (sanctions) can be used, the costs being less to the wielder of the stick than of the purse. In general the UN may be said to be almost forced to deal with an issue on its own merits as a deed of necessity.

The objection to the UN and the CSCE is that these bodies are not quick at acting. But look at the EC: it acted quickly, and wrongly, first neglecting the recognition issue, then jumping into it prematurely, all the time using sticks and carrots, getting nowhere. Also, it is much more beneficial for Europe as a whole to strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of these universal organizations (seeing the CSCE, then, as linked to the UN) than to use a conflict to build a hegemonic system in the old European tradition. In addition, the hegemon is now entirely Western European, unlike the Vienna Congress system from 1815 with Austria and Russia as members (in addition to Britain, Prussia, France and the Papacy). There is also the crucial difference that Yugoslavia is a member of these organizations and not of the EC; a difference the Serbs would do well not to exploit too much to their advantage lest it would drive the Croats even more toward the EC.

(6) There is obviously a need for peacekeeping in Yugoslavia preferably as a Chapter 6 UN operation and delegated to CSCE as regional body. One problem is the nationality of the blue helmets to be deployed in Yugoslavia. Any country that has occupied parts of Yugoslavia in the past, like Austria-Hungary, Italy and above all Germany (and Russia!) should be ruled out lest freedom fighters like Gavriilo Princip (the shot in Sarajevo) and Josip Broz (Tito) reemerge, and not only on the soil of former Yugoslavia. To insist on total cease-fire before any troops can be deployed will probably be counterproductive given the complex combination of the Serb-dominated Federal army forces, the Croatian National Guard, the Serbian territorial defense forces and Serbian (and Croatian) irregulars. Rather, that desirable state has to be created through the, mainly moral, presence of lightly armed forces in (parts of) Slavonia and Krajina, with observers

on the spot, not in hotel rooms in Zagreb, etc., depriving EC observers of legitimacy.¹⁴

The CSCE has disappeared from this process possibly because it is neither in the interest of the EC/Britain/Lord Carrington nor the UN/U.S./Cyrus Vance. More will probably be known about this later. In the meantime this is to be regretted since third party experience in peacemaking and peacekeeping would then have been deposited right in the heart of Europe, not with a Western European coming superpower, nor with the UN in New York. The linkage to the UN could have been obtained through Article 52 of the UN Charter.

Any stationing of UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia is going to be costly, among other reasons because of the duration factor. The healing and negotiation processes will be time consuming; hopefully to be handled better than for the Cyprus case. The funds should come from general UN funding, already in the red where peacekeeping is concerned. Heavy EC contributions might be counterproductive for the many reasons mentioned above.

One possibility would be for Yugoslavia to pay for much of the operation of being "peace kept". Given the ambivalence of the governments an interesting possibility could be for municipalities to come forward, offering board and accommodation. Civil society in general could offer hospitality and helpfulness in ways not too incompatible with government interests.

(7) The role of the media has been mainly counterproductive during the entire conflict, and must be improved for peace to have a chance. The sensationalist aspects of a cruel war are obvious, whether the media have the partisan interest of showing the cruelty of the other side and the suffering of one's own, or the nonpartisan interest of simply showing high drama. The pattern of war as TV porno, of CNN Gulf War fame, has been reproduced. Of analysis there is little, of debates about the conflict and the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy triangle even less. Little attention is paid to peace forces. The heroic work of civil society in bridge-building, normalizing relations has been given very little prominence, both abroad and in Yugoslavia. The anti-Serbian bias has set the tone and the discourse.

¹⁴ A frequently made point in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the excerpt from the diary of a Danish observation team member, **Georg Petersen**, in *Politiken*, 15 December 1991, certainly indicates that they have been very close to the horrors of war, and at their own considerable risk.

(8) The process of peacebuilding in former Yugoslavia will essentially have to be the work of the peoples themselves; what outsiders can do is very limited. Let one thousand conferences blossom, at the level of governmental organizations and governments, at the level of people's organizations and people; above all between the two levels. A permanent conference modeled after the Helsinki Conference with all issues on the table and all parties around the table, with much time at their disposal, would be excellent. Another model would be the roundtable of governmental and opposition forces from all over, already tried.

Outsiders can ask questions, suggest inputs to the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy triangle, serve as catalysts and media within which the concerned parties can meet and feel welcome. But they cannot impose any solution, backing it up with threats and promises. And outsiders would do great damage to the peoples of Yugoslavia by treating them differently. More particularly, the EC should give them the same status, e.g., as "associate member", not treating some as more "European" than others because they prefer Catholics to Orthodox, and Latin writing to Cyrillic (which actually, from the EC point of view, constitutes a bridge between the two alphabets already used, Latin and Greek). But much better would be a Balkan federation.

One condition for peace is that the images the parties to the conflict have of the future coincide. There is a negative version to this: they agree on the outcome of a violent conflict; A wins, in which case B submits; B wins, in which case A submits; there is a stalemate, in which case they both stop fighting. The positive version is a view of the future that both or all parties find acceptable; in other words, they can cohabit the future. We might even add a version which is neither negative, nor positive: both parties get equally tired of the conflict and withdraw from it. But this conflict is too important to permit that to happen.

(9) The rest of Europe should reflect more on why the Balkan countries are so "unquiet", blame them less and blame their own interventions more, and above all the failure to build adequate pan-European institutions. Solutions are located in the future, not in distributing blame for the past. But to detach what happens in the Balkans from centuries of Central Western European meddling in the region can only lead to distorted perspectives. The same applies to Turkey, although their interests may be more in the direction of the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union than toward the Ottoman part of the former Yugoslavia.

In other words, the track record of the outsiders leaves much to be desired. Is there any reason to believe that the present generation of rulers in those countries have developed more sense of diversity and equity, enjoying differences rather than wanting themselves reproduced through submissive acceptance by other countries of Western values and patterns, particularly the 19th

century values of liberalism and nationalism? The German/EC rush into the conflict, handling it badly and then exacerbating it through premature recognition does not bode well for the future.

(10) The peoples of Yugoslavia should not reject their own recent past since the present and possibly also the future are not that much better. To use the divorce metaphor again: neglecting the good aspects of the past partnership is to kill a part of oneself. They can build on a tradition of nonalignment and multiculturalism with contacts all over the world, and a relatively healthy and well educated population. The country is rich. The Yugoslav system was not functioning that badly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Relative to today the absence of direct violence, the economic growth, the roads, and the railroads, the cars and the buses, the PTT, all that worked bear witness to the potential, also of a confederation. The country was a one party state, but the League of Communists was in itself a relatively pluralistic body.

True, the issue of nationalities, with the class aspects of at least potential repression and exploitation, and the horrible memories from the past, were looming over the country. Nobody would belittle its real significance. And those who talk disparagingly about the Balkans should have a look at their own history and compare the nationalities maps of Western and Eastern Europe: near coincidence with the borders so many places in the West, a patched quilt in the East. How do the critics of the Balkans think that nation-state map came about in the West? The bloodshed in Britain, France and Germany, to mention the three most arrogant countries in the West, was unspeakable, possibly much more so than has ever been the case for the Balkans. Tolerance was an unknown commodity; tolerance in the vacuum produced by centuries of intolerance is more easily practiced.

What can and should be regretted, however, is the lack of foresight when the leaders of former Yugoslavia built politics only on the negative and not on the positive aspect of the Yugoslavia of yesterday. To see this much more of the conflict energy has to go into visioning the future. The richer the visions, and the more options, the higher the chances that the conflict energy will turn toward the future, away from the counterproductive concern with guilt distribution.

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Vesna Pešić and Julie Mostov

A New Challenge for Conflict Resolution: The Case of Yugoslavia

The challenges to peaceful conflict resolution presented by the disintegration of Yugoslavia have been particularly difficult because of the very nature of the conflict. That is, the conflict is both about the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a political subject and a signal of its immanent breakdown as a federal state. It is a conflict over the very nature of dissolution compounded because of the absence of crucial common reference points. Elements of this process of dissolution are present in other Eastern European countries and past communist federations, including the USSR; thus, analysis of the nature of this conflict and its escalation to armed confrontation is particularly important. While, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of such conflict and the conditions under which dissolution leads to violence, the breakdown of such multiethnic states poses an additional threat, particularly, when justified by claims to national or ethnic self-determination and that is the further dissolution of newly constituted states into ethnically "pure" communities, endless local wars and social disintegration.

These disintegrative conflicts are not comparable to the breakdown of old colonial empires, to international conflicts between different states, or to internal state conflicts over competing group or class interests. Because of this we can not easily apply existing models of conflict resolution.

As this process of disintegration has emerged as an armed conflict in Yugoslavia, it is instructive to examine the specific features of this case as a contribution to the understanding of this new challenge to peaceful conflict resolution. To this end we outline three major elements of the conflict as it developed in Yugoslavia and offer possible avenues of response that could create the space for peaceful rather than violent resolution of such conflict. The major elements of conflict as we see it in the Yugoslav case are: 1) the effects and consequences of communist rule and its sudden breakdown in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia; 2) the specific nature and history of multinational states in the Balkans or the "Balkan paradigm"; and 3) conflict in the absence of any viable common institutions or frameworks for cooperation.

The Effects and Consequences of Communist Rule and Its Breakdown

The institutional frameworks established by the ruling communist regime in Yugoslavia created a quasifederation in which joint interests were not developed as an expression of the interests of each federal unit from below but were imposed from above. There were no real avenues for the free expression of republican (national), regional, or individual interests by the citizens directly or through freely elected republican assemblies, despite the declared promotion of collective national and working class interests in the federal and republican constitutions. Thus, we could say that this type of union or federation, typical for the former regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, created a kind of "bad togetherness". Here the bases for union were not defined by the real interests of the separate entities, but by the ruling party and, as in the Yugoslav case, federal and republican based elites.

Under such conditions, each territorial or federal unit and each corresponding national and minority (ethnic) group felt that its interests were being systematically neglected to the advantage of others and often undermined by the federal organization of the state. At the same time, political and civil rights and the legal institutions that formally guarantee their exercise under the rule of law were undermined or deformed by quasidemocratic structures and processes (for example, the delegate system constructed for political decision-making) or entirely repressed (for example, freedom of association in oppositional parties). There was an absence of real opportunities for the expression of different interests or the development of democratic practices and social linkages (institutions of civil society).

With the breakdown of the federal communist party and republican communist regimes, people responded to their frustrated expression of interests and their sense of having been denied the opportunity to define these interests for themselves by rejecting the institutions and values of the former regime and reclaiming their national pride through nationally identified myths, religions, and values.¹ Regional political leaders eager to consolidate their political power played on these national feelings, encouraging the development of national euphoria, reviving ethnic conflicts and old fears from World War II, and instilling hatred of "others" as past or potential obstacles to the fulfillment of national goals.

¹ For a discussion of this aspect of the reemergence of nationalism, see, **Nathan Gardels**, *"Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin,"* New York Review of Books (November 21, 1991): 19-23.

Under the rule of the communist party or "real existing socialism", the working class was designated as the political constituency. With the breakdown of these systems and the formation of nationalist-oriented governments, national identity came to define the constituency. The working class was replaced by an ethnically or nationally defined community, for example, the Serbian or Croatian people and working class interests were replaced by national interests. A leader's success in getting votes and establishing power would depend on his ability to realize nationally defined interests or his ability to convince the voters and other elites that he (his party) best represents these interests.

This is the process that unfolded in Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Serbia. The victory of these national leaders and nationally defined parties and interests in the various republics then immediately posed the question of minority rights and interests within these territories. Given that there were no effective mechanisms in place for the protection of individual rights as essential components of a democratic system, minorities felt they were left entirely at the will of the majority and its nationally defined interests. This fear provided an opportunity for ethnic/national groups in other republics to expand their political agenda to the protection of national interests beyond existing federally defined borders.

At the same time, the particular type of socialist system that existed in Yugoslavia allowed room for some forms of social decision making and individual expression of interests, particularly in cultural and intellectual spheres. Few people came into direct conflict with the state. So that while the political system did not allow for the development of a recognized, legal political opposition, the "soft" nature of the regime did not stimulate the development of organized resistance. The breakdown of the communist regime in Yugoslavia was in some ways more a by-product of the breakdown of similar regimes throughout Eastern Europe than of domestic democratic struggles. The little civil opposition that existed in small oppositional groups was not strong enough to offer a real alternative to the nationalist political elites in Serbia and Croatia. Leaders were chosen because of the nationalist ideologies which they promoted. Thus, instead of a new kind of political leadership, the governments that emerged from the first round of multiparty elections in Croatia and Serbia were still headed by authoritarian leaders. They changed their rhetoric and their political platforms, but did not relinquish the old techniques for consolidating power.

The Balkan Paradigm

The second element of this specific form of challenge to conflict resolution is the particular nature and history of multinational communities in the Balkans. Here we are talking about a part of Europe in which numerous small national groups live in mixed communities. Their relationships have often been characterized by their attempts to gain dominance over one another and all of these groups have at one time been dominated by larger powers. These relationships of domination have been distinguished by acts of cruelty and even genocide, particularly in those cases where domination was achieved by depending on stronger third parties.

The different historical experiences of the individual nations of this region also created different national goals and interests. The peoples who lived for longer periods under the domination of empires, for example, Slovenia and Croatia, asserted their independence as nation-states only after they had been part of Yugoslavia. Serbia, on the other hand, entered Yugoslavia as a sovereign state, seeing in Yugoslavia a way in which all Serbs could finally live together under one state. At the moment at which Slovenia and Croatia felt that the time had come to establish the sovereignty of their respective states outside of the Yugoslav framework, their interests came into direct conflict with the Serbian interest in maintaining the existing state as the common home to all Serbs.

Serbian nationalism appeared later on the scene. Within the context of the breakdown of the federal regime, it developed dramatically insisting on only two possibilities for the country: either the federal arrangement as defined by the Serbian leadership or the incorporation of all Serbs within a Greater Serbia. This either/or standpoint implied, as much as did the Croatian declaration of independence, the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state. On one hand, the Croatian project called for the complete independence of Croatia without considering the position of the Serbian minority in Croatia and, on the other hand, the Serbian project posed the creation of an expanded Serbian state uniting all Serbs under one roof. The clash of these two projects directly brought about the armed struggle. That is, both sides threatened to redefine internal and external borders and exacerbated existing conflicts between the two republics. These conflicts reopened old animosities and wounds with the help, in particular, of the mass media and created the conditions under which the interests of one nation (people) were seen directly to undermine the interests of the other. In gaining support for these positions, both sides heavily relied upon old histories and unsettled accounts from the past, undermining all positive achievements that had been developed in the interim between Serbs and Croats under the post-war regime.

In order to consolidate their positions, nationalist leaders insisted on the incompatibility of their respective nation's interests and on the impossibility of further common life.² Each used a variety of means to assert the moral and legal legitimacy of its position. The mutual exclusivity of national interests explained the inevitability of war. National goals could only be realized by defeating the "other" through force. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of new states was to be achieved through military force and war.

Conflict in the Absence of Common Frameworks

The nature and effects of the communist system and the peculiar history and development of ethnic and national relations in Yugoslavia underpin the third element characteristic of this crisis, which has significantly contributed to the difficulties of its peaceful resolution. This is the readiness of each side in the conflict to reject any common values or frameworks for resolving the conflict and to take as given the fact of the federal community's dissolution. "Norms are relevant to conflict because they specify the outcomes to which one is entitled and hence the aspirations to which one has a right."³ When social norms are weak and changing, conflicts increase in number and intensity. "In low-conflict communities one typically finds a broad normative consensus involving wide acceptance of certain goals, rules of conduct, role definitions, procedures for decision-making and authority and status systems...By contrast, many conflicts are often found in communities whose norms are breaking down, because some community members begin to aspire to outcomes that others are not willing to let them have..."⁴ The breakdown of a community presupposes that for at least some of the members there is no longer any basis for normative consensus or any joint frameworks worth maintaining. Rejection of common goals, procedures, or rules of conduct has been a very part of the process of dissolution in the Yugoslav case.

2 This is what Pruitt and Rubin refer to as rigidity of aspirations. When aspirations seem incompatible conflicts are more profound. According to them, there are two main sources of rigidity in aspirations: 1. Very important values underlie these aspirations. Examples include security, identity, and recognition for most people and probably for all nations. 2. The values underlying the aspirations are of the either-or variety; one either achieves them or one does not. Such values produce rigid aspirations, because making any concession requires giving up the value altogether. **Dean G. Pruitt** and **Jeffrey Z. Rubin**, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 12.

3 "When rightful aspirations seem incompatible with another party's apparent goals, the result is often quite explosive." *Ibid.*, p.15.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

As we noted above (under section I), the conflicts emerged under conditions in which democratic institutions had not yet been sufficiently introduced or developed and in which the ruling elites were neither committed to nor familiar with the application of democratic principles of conflict resolution. While, the existence of democratic institutions would not have prevented the process of dissolution, a commitment to democratic principles would have been a common reference point for peaceful conflict resolution. That is, a commitment to values that support tolerance, while recognizing competing and even conflicting interests may have prevented these conflicts from erupting in violence. But these values were not available as part of the existing political culture or practice. If the newly forming states had stressed their foundation in the individual rights of citizens, rather than purely national interests, they may have been able to resolve the dissolution of Yugoslavia in a peaceful way by creating the conditions in which people could feel secure in the exercise of political and civil rights and the appreciation of cultural differences and similarities.

Recognizing the importance of common reference points and communication as the basis for peaceful resolution of conflicts, democratically motivated activists in Yugoslavia first sought to introduce some democratic frameworks - common institutions - on the federal level in order to destroy the existing central organs of power and to create a space for further peaceful and constructive negotiations. Here the idea was to reconstitute the federal parliament on the basis of free democratic elections, if only for the purpose of dissolving the existing federal association. None of the sides in the conflict, however, saw their interest in protecting or maintaining institutions or spaces that could be seen as a common framework for cooperation. Slovenia and Croatia were not interested in attempting to establish democratic relations in the existing federal institutions, because they saw their interests in establishing independent states. Serbia, the last to introduce free elections, was not prepared to accept democratic solutions to the federal crisis.

Thus, those common institutions that did exist, for example, federal institutions, were rejected along with the idea of Yugoslavia. The republics began to withdraw from these common institutions: the federal parliament, federal government offices, the presidency, and finally, the army. With the dissolution of the presidency as the civil authority over the armed forces, the army remained practically free of any civilian control. The army aligned itself with the Serbian ruling party, in part, for ideological reasons, and in part in order to secure a home for itself. So in the conflict between the various national interests in Yugoslavia, the army became a third party to the conflict particularly escalating the war. As new conditions for cooperation or communication were not created to replace the old ones being destroyed, there were no internal frameworks for the peaceful resolution of conflict.

In the absence of such frameworks, outside parties including the European Community, the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, and the United Nations and its special envoy Cyrus Vance, have attempted to create a minimal set of principles and alternative frameworks for conflict resolution. But these must be complemented by some internal processes and reference points. Efforts such as those of the Round Table of Authorities and Opposition seated in Sarajevo are a step in this direction.

Conclusion

"Escalated conflict often weakens a community's capacity to deal effectively with further conflict."⁵ Once armed conflict has broken out, the immediate task is to achieve a stable cease fire. This has been particularly difficult to achieve in the Yugoslav case because of a lack of adequate political solutions to the crisis or even a baseline for negotiating minimally acceptable temporary solutions. The community's already weak foundation for conflict resolution was shattered by the "aggressor-defender" interpretation of conflict, unwillingness to recognize common values, and readiness to reject any existing institutions for communication, and, thus, by the escalation of conflict to armed combat.

The danger of such intractable conflict has forced both outside communities and leaders of the former federal units of Yugoslavia to seek a truce and some grounds for diminishing, if not resolving conflict. This task has been made much harder because the dissolution of any foundation for conflict resolution has itself been both the goal and result of the conflict. Recognition of the inherent dangers of this type of conflict, which could potentially break out in other multinational communities in Eastern Europe and the past Soviet Republics, makes the above analysis of the Yugoslav challenge to conflict resolution particularly important. On the basis of this analysis, we offer the following points for consideration:

(1) The process of dissolution is complex and long-term and, thus, those involved in this process must secure a suitable framework within which to carry out negotiations and dialogue. Destroying frameworks for decisionmaking without creating new ones leads to extremely dangerous conflicts and violent confrontation. The Yugoslav example shows this clearly. The withdrawal of republican elites from federal institutions and their unwillingness or inability to retain some lines of communication resulted in a kind of anarchy and left the military free of civilian control. The military then turned to the side closest to its own national composition and interests.

⁵ Ibid., p. 94.

(2) Unilateral decisions absolutize one's own interests and display a desire to realize them at any cost - even force. Strategies that see conflict resolution on one's own terms and that consist in making threats, imposing penalties, taking preemptive actions, making demands that far exceed what is actually acceptable, committing oneself to an "unalterable" position,⁶ inevitably result in war in multinational communities. That is, such strategies force an actual showdown, a demonstration of the actual relationship of power between the sides in conflict. Attempts to dominate one's opponent by force do not provide solutions to conflicts, but further undermine the capacities of the conflicting sides to realize their interests and achieve some understanding as neighbors who will need to have regular contacts in the future. Peaceful resolution of future conflicts must stem from strategies that recognize the interests of the contending parties and attempt to provide solutions that allow the minimal satisfaction of crucial interests on both sides.

(3) In the dissolution of multinational states, conflicts about boundaries are almost impossible to avoid. In order to deal with these conflicts through peaceful methods, it is important to engage in theoretical and practical attempts to define the notion of self-determination and the right of secession before further conflicts arise. This is particularly important because of the number of different ethnic and national communities living within the territories of these multinational federal states and within the newly forming states. In order to avoid further fragmentation of the newly formed states, which could lead to years of warfare and block the economic and political development of these regions, the terms under which the right to secession is applicable need to be fixed as general principles. Otherwise, responses appear as arbitrary or ad hoc reactions to group demands.

(4) Common grounds for conflict resolution must be created and nurtured. In whatever bodies are established for short and long-term cooperation the terms of association must be such that each member state could envision itself negotiating on equal footing and on the basis of mutual trust. This perception must be supported by the terms of association established within the newly formed states for their own citizens, particularly, because of the probability that among these citizens will be members of the neighboring nations. Common grounds for peaceful conflict resolution can be seen in the following: a) guaranteed individual civil and political rights for all inhabitants, guaranteed rights and opportunities for the cultural and political expression of all people in minority positions, and protections against any form of discrimination (this suggests that cooperation is best promoted through the establishment of civil constitutions, in which citizenship and corresponding rights belong to individu-

als as such); b) inclusion of generally accepted principles and procedures of democratic decision-making and international conventions in the new state constitutions; c) and cooperation between the new states based on their rights as independent nations and the individual rights of citizens living within them and compatible with their respective economic interests. Cooperation should promote possibilities for individuals divided by old or new boundaries to retain their relationships, to maintain and develop cultural bonds, and to express their cultural identity and unity with others of their same ethnic group or nation and, at the same time, promote possibilities for entry into the broader European integrative process. We have in mind a two-directional process of communication: inward looking, that is, to the old federal space, and outward looking, toward the broader integrative process in Europe.

(5) In order to create the atmosphere for such cooperation, governmental leaders and political parties in these states must realize that using nationalist ideology to gain power leads to dangerous conflicts. Stirring up hatred for other nations and peoples, turning to the past, nurturing national myths, recreating national histories, and closing up within national boundaries all undermine the capacity for peaceful resolution of conflicts and block the possibility for any stable peace, economic and social growth.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

Tonči Kuzmanić

Stalinism as a Problem of Methodology

The aim of this paper is an attempt to call into question the structure of existing conflicts in former Yugoslavia which have culminated in the War in Croatia and Bosnia also to question the dominant picture which oversimplifies a very heterogeneous and complex conflict situation at the matrix of the "national" or the so called "ethnic" strifes and battles.

There will be an attempt to offer a different interpretation of a "conflict net" which has risen in this country by putting forward some kind of explanation which would be more or less deduced from the position of the *structural elements of the Yugoslav situation*. My intention is to reduce the blown up picture of the so-called ethnic problems to a more realistic value. There is no motive to search for an exclusive and an appropriate explanation, hence I will try to work out some analytical elements which will challenge the predominant Yugoslav ethnic matrix¹.

Questioning Stalinism

First of all I would like to make a remark concerning the methodology of understanding the current Yugoslavia's problems, or, more precisely, the distinction between the situation in Yugoslavia and that of the other so-called post-socialist or post-communist countries. It seems to be possible to work out at least a part of this distinction at the *conceptual level*.

¹ Perpetuating interpretation of the current conflict situation in categories of democracy vs. totalitarianism is becoming more and more inadequate, yet it is apparently an obvious wishful thinking especially in Croatia and Slovenia.

Different attempts to explain the so-called post-socialist situation(s)² most frequently begin with a very conventional assumption, namely, the concept of Socialism which is more or less a unique term and that it is possible by and from this term to extract a sort of "general understanding" of the different post-socialist constitutions and structures.

The very inherent part of this assumption is also a belief (usually suppressed and more or less looked over in silence) that the proper way to comprehend what Socialism is (was), basically leads to the concept of Stalinism. In brief, the most decisive point of understanding is that: the post-socialism(s) is *firstly, an ideological reduction of different kinds of socialism (concepts and practice) to the "Socialism", and secondly reduction of the latter to the concept of Stalinism.* This is, of course, a very old and well known ideological (in fact, a religious) operation, which belongs to the past. However, in the nineties this very reduction became the corner stone of the revolutionary changes in East Europe and of the self-understanding of the revolutionary movements which have appeared in this part of the world under the name of post-socialism.

Stalinism, by definition, means the worst social and political system. It is also a dictatorship of the Communist Party, with very low living standards, oppression of the human rights (e.g. personal, sexual, religious, national, etc.). In brief, Stalinism means *the worst possible system* a mind could imagine. However, it is obvious that the concept of Stalinism was constructed around diabolization of the enemy, rather than that of strict analytical assumptions. This is somewhat an emotional concept rather than an empirical or an analytical one, which belongs to the satanology and not to the corpus of the so-called social sciences.

However, observing this problem from the other (Yugoslav) side of the coin, it is evident that the prevailing way of thoughts and observations and, even more so, the dominant *model of understandings and actions (!)*, was deduced from an extremely concrete situation. In other words, one concrete situation (relatively and absolutely bounded by time and space) has become the content of the concept which today plays an extremely delicate and important role: the one which explains all different sorts of socialism, in all various countries, situations, structures, etc.

² The designation "post-socialism" is rather a certain mask, a sort of statement enclosing a question with no answer: post-socialism is functioning as a kind of a "floating signifier" through which it is possible to invest various analytical desires, metaphysical assumptions, or, in other words, as an essence of the very pre-theoretic move. Perhaps it is not appropriate to discuss the concept of post-socialism in this text, nevertheless I would like to introduce the plural form (post-socialisms) which - if nothing else - furthermore complicates the matter.

In order to clear up the cloudy (war!) picture of the situation in former Yugoslavia perhaps it is necessary to make a clear-cut distinction between the general concept of Socialism/Stalinism and that of the system of self-management which was experienced in the former state. My hypothesis is that, in practical terms, the self-management *was not the same as Stalinism.* and any serious attempt to grasp "what's going on in Yugoslavia", based on Stalinism as a conceptual mirror of explanation, will imply failure.

The distinction between Stalinism and self-management was somehow an identity card for Yugoslav self-management system especially in the period from 1950 to 1980. Meanwhile, in order to carry out the post-socialist system, this very distinction was destroyed in the 80s. What Yugoslavia experienced from post-socialism in the last two years requires a *reevaluation of the reinterpreted (by post-socialists) system of self-management.* Bearing in mind that I neither wish to bring back the self-management system to action, nor to "defend" it, but somehow to search for ways and means of understand, unmask and reveal the ideology of the so-called post-socialism, which is the very basic step towards grasping the situation, not only in the Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, but also for recognizing the "spirit of the time" in the nineties as such.

Self-management and Stalinism

The problem which rises from the above perspective is related to the ways of determining the differences between self-management and Stalinism, or making room for explanation of the differentia specifica of self-management in Yugoslavia, and of the present conflict net in this country.

A possible paradoxical answer may be that: self-management was (for at least thirty years) an *attempt to abolish Stalinism without giving up the leading role of the Communist Party.* Some of the results of that "mad project" are as following:

1. at the level of the system as such the presence of some rudimentary distinction between the state and society, between two "corporative entities" which were connected and *forced to cooperation* by the role of the so-called "subjective factors" (the Communist Party organisations or by communists as individuals);

2. from the end of the fifties also the presence of some rudimentary distinction between the realm of "politics" (political space reduced to the Communist Party activities) and "economy", which was regarded as a structure with "its own,

relatively autonomous logic" on which revolutionary subject(s) by definition had limited guiding possibilities;

3. at the level of the federal state organization, not only the equality of different nations but also the equality of nations that mattered and national minorities. The self-managing form of the leading communist role was productive even in forming "new nations". Not only in the meaning of creation, or better, re-creation of so-called Yugoslav-nation (Yugoslavhood, Yugoslavism as a concrete form of patriotism), but most of all in the creation of the two new (nation-)republic entities. After the second World War these new (nation-)republics had emerged: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. The emergence of two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Voivodina) was also part of this Communist creativity;

4. on the basis of communists leading role in Yugoslavia we must also specify not only the equality among the three main religious communities (Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim) but also those of the tolerant relations of other numerous religious communities and groups;

5. for a while, there existed some kind of Welfare state (civil services, social security...) with a relatively high standard of living, particularly in the seventies;

6. Yugoslavia had a somehow successful economic system (in comparison with the other socialist countries) with a relatively small but, symbolically important role of the workers' participation (self-management in concrete enterprises);

7. at the level of the so-called day-to-day life Yugoslavia had (from the beginning of the sixties), wide open borders with legal possibilities of traveling and working outside the country. Bearing in mind that Yugoslavia was also an important tourist country in Europe;

8. last but not least (from the beginning of the seventies) Yugoslavia had quite liberal laws in relation to some indicative matters, as for example on abortion rights for women, etc.

In brief, throughout the lasting period of the "mad project" (about thirty years) self-management manifested an array of features and details which, at the level of the definition, made *any kind of identification or "standardization" of that system with Stalinism quite impossible*, hence self-management was something *more or less quite similar to Stalinism. However it worked out some new structures, which made it impossible to explain when using the concept of the Stalinism.*

Before the emergence of post-socialism in Yugoslavia it was common to think about the above mentioned development of self-management as if they had been achieved *in spite of* the communist leading role. But today in the so-called post-socialist circumstances it is more and more obvious that (at least in the case of Yugoslav history), it is becoming a necessity to question and think more deeply about the "creative and progressive role" of the communists. In order to slot-in the theory of modernization in perspective, the questions of reevaluation of the elements of (re)traditionalization which were imposed on the position of communist rule, and simultaneously about *the modernization potentials of the former communist system in concrete Balkan circumstances can be risen.*

Self-management and Communism

On the basis of previous assumptions and explanation I am intentionally talking about communism and self-management as *two different concepts*. It was true, of course, that self-management was "discovered", imposed and controlled (yet not fully) directly by communists and indirectly by central Communist Party/state. As a matter of fact, during the years of development, self-management "*escaped*" the communist control and became what was particularly important for poor classes³, and what was more than communism or just a product of communism. In other words, *self-management outgrew, and "transcended" communism as well as communists*⁴. In addition, it is possible to claim that self-management was a wider concept than communism and a concept which was accepted on a wider basis than communism. If the Communist regime or communism (as a project for the future) was by definition the "property" of the Communist Party as a state-organisation, than self-management would be the "property" of not only the communists, but also of a relatively wider scale of ordinary, working people, of the "nondifferentiated population". Only a small part of this relatively simplified picture of "divided properties" can be explained in terms of structuralist concept of interpellation, with the influence of the propaganda and communist ideology (media, etc). The very first problem regarding this topic still exists as that: self-management at the same time brought in relatively and absolutely wide benefits to the "working masses". Of course, not solely in positive terms (for example by the high material standard, although this moment was important too, especially with respect to the standards of living in

3 While self-management was a sort of *forced* "one-class society" or "Organic Labour State", using **Neil Harding** terms, post-socialism is enforcing the development of class society!

4 It is not a joke if the outside world observed the War in Croatia and Bosnia in terms of a "self-managing War" or if some of them categorise the process of disintegration of the state as self-managing disintegration.

other socialist countries), but firstly with the *concept and reality which stand on the grounds of equality* (in the meaning of revolutionary *egalite, egalitarisme*). The other side of self-managing egalite was referred to as blocking any serious kind of differentiation, stratification, or else, *discrimination*.

Namely, the very inherent and the most important part of the self-managing equality (egalite) was precisely that of blockade of all possible discriminations be it national, religious, sexual, and even "standard discrimination", which was carried out by the imposition of The Discrimination. This Discrimination between Communists and Non-communists was also that of self-managing population by communists. "Transcendence" of discrimination was not only applied in a "positive way", for example by the "abolition of discrimination as such", using Marx language, but also with the imposition of new discrimination which *oppressed all previous, "less important" discriminations*. A relatively surprising fact and result was that: the New, Communist discrimination was *not only recognised as a discrimination as such, but also (for numerous strata of inhabitants) it was a certain "step forwards" or even a sign of development - especially on the basis of the so-called day-to-day life*.

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Furthermore it could be said that with the inauguration of the post-socialist constitutions and structures in various parts of the former state, at the present, we have the opportunity to observe the interesting situation which reveals that it is untrue if only some strata of the previous regime (army, party and police staff, leading people from the "communist enterprises"...) deprived. Actually, there is also problem of *deprivation among large parts of this population*, especially with the *majority of the mixture between workers and peasants* who were and still are the dominant strata of ex-Yugoslav "global society". And just this vast population became the origin of the general conflict and war!

Post-stalinism?

With the transition from communism/socialism to post-socialism, *instead of the Society of The communist deprivation, which contained numerous small privileges for exceptionally large parts of that population, we arrived to One-nation societies of national liberation containing numerous small deprivations of vast share of population!*

For the post-socialist governments in different parts of the former state, *destroying the communism was equivalent to the abolition of self-management*. Since self-management in their eyes is the same as communism, communism is the same as Stalinism, and Stalinism is - from the religious point of view - a pure form of Evil. Post-socialist opposition believe that it is possible to argue that the

abolition of communism is the same as abolition of the self-management at the level of the "macro-project" (integral system of self-management), but not at different "lower levels", (eg. industrial democracy, civil services, etc.).

This is also true for the public opinion. For less developed parts of the former state the impacts and the expectations from the previous system were more important. Not at the "integral" level of self-management but as a system of small, everyday privileges and most important of all as *a system of "small securities"*. Yet, the self-management system in public eyes initially works as a verified model of security and stability, and, in the past few months, it was regarded as a sign of good old times when everything was safe.

In conclusion one of the most important conflicts in Yugoslavia can be derived from the distinction which is *directly a part of the everyday existence*, which is that between self management and communism, or more precisely, *neglecting this distinction*. Lack of respect to this distinction is the foundation of post-socialist ideologies in former Yugoslavia and the corner stone of self-understanding, and a part of self-legitimization of the new power structures. It is not accidental at all that post-socialist power structures are composed of the ex-communists who cannot understand the fall of socialism as a result of differentiation between a limited and suppressing system producing a structure which has surpassed and transcended itself, but the decline of socialism viewed in a typically communist manner, that is: as a product of their own revolutionary activity.

Referring to the theory of diabolisation of the enemy, it seems that *post-socialism could be equilibrated to post-stalinism*.

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Miroslav Stanojević

Regulation of Industrial Relations in Post-selfmanagement Society

In the present text I am commencing with the following theses:

1. Selfmanagement used to be relatively successful in the protection of the (manual) workers' interests and it was practically successful in achieving the authoritarian culture and egalitarian values in Slovene/Yugoslav society.
2. After the disintegration of selfmanagement at the level of industrial organizations, no adequate system of trade-union protection of workers has been established.
3. As a consequence of the above, the most rigid forms of industrial relations and regulation were practiced. This tends to induce a "authoritarianism from below", increasing the probability of violent conflict "resolution" in Slovene/Yugoslav society.

I

The empirical surveys conducted by Arzenšek in the seventies revealed an authoritarian orientation of all socio-professional groups - agents of social systems in (Slovene) working organizations. Arzenšek convincible indicated in his surveys conservatism used to be strongly expressed among workers and that in all employee categories the motives of autonomy were among the least important. Other prominent representatives of Yugoslav critical sociology, also regarded authoritarianism and intolerance as the important features of Yugoslav (political) culture. It has been assessed that in such a cultural context (a context in which radical egalitarianism used to dominate over the complex of societal

values), selfmanagement had no chance to succeed.¹ Although, on principle, selfmanagement had no possibility to develop, comparative empirical surveys² tended to indicate that (in seventies) the intensity of worker participation in decision making was stronger in Yugoslav working organizations than in other systems of industrial democracy in the West.

The only conclusion that can be derived from these (seemingly contradictory) findings is that the workers in Yugoslav enterprises (in spite of numerous limitations) were, in some ways, successful in their selfmanagement: the coalition blocks of (manual) workers were actually incorporated in the decision-making processes. The above coalitions were used to design their interests in an authoritarian pattern and within those coordinates of radical egalitarianism; institutional selfmanagement enhanced such "interests" and installed them into the organizational targets... From the point of view of the issue in question it is important to bear in mind that inclusion of coalition blocks of (manual) workers into decision making represented a relatively efficient method to protect the interests of manual workers and to resolve and neutralize industrial conflicts in Yugoslav working organizations. Precisely because it successfully functioned in the authoritarian culture and values, selfmanagement was capable of also protecting the interests of (manual) workers.

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Contrary to the rigid systems of command economy, that mechanism was limiting concerning the "management autonomy"; an obstruction of the autonomy of market "from below". Such "parallel" effects of selfmanagement would reproduce the need for a non-market regulation of social reproduction: at the micro level - in the capillary level of the entire social power system - selfmanagement produced the foundations of oligarchic macro-power. These effects of selfmanagement in a primarily non-market context are understandable. In spite of the many "parallel" functions selfmanagement in Yugoslavia also facilitate (relative) satisfaction of interests of the industrial proletariat.³

II

In the context of disintegration of the whole structure of "real-existing socialism", there was also a dramatic destruction of selfmanagement in Yugoslavia. The industrial proletariat was left without the mechanism of

¹ Arzenšek, V. *Struktura i pokret*, Institut za društvena istraživanja, Belgrade, 1984.

² Županov, J. *Samoupravni socializem - konec neke utopije, Socializem in demokracija*, FSPN, Ljubljana, 1989.

³ Rus, V. *Odločanje in moč*, Založba Obzorja, Maribor, 1986.

(self)protection, and the labour sphere without the mechanism of industrial conflict regulation. This is a quite specific problem resulting in disintegration of the "real-socialist" structure of societies in Yugoslavia: in the "post-selfmanagement" variant of "post-socialism", a problem of vacuum at the level of factory social systems appeared. Because the deterioration of selfmanagement was not followed by the "set-up" of trade unions, such constellations were emerging which were opening space for the formation of new despotic regimes⁴ in the sphere of labour. If we add the dramatic decline of the economic situation (1989-1991) to the above, a considerable lowering of wages, etc., then it becomes clear that in Yugoslavia such circumstances were created in which masses of working population (in the ambience of an authoritarian culture and egalitarian values inevitably looked for any type of protection: the fear of poverty and mass frustrations were resulting in quick political and global authoritarian solutions.

On the basis of data collected during the research conducted in 1991⁵ it can be concluded that the situation in Slovenia does not vary much from the general "post-socialist" Yugo-trend. The level of wages in Slovenia is (also) dramatically low: one third (32.2%) of all respondents in the beginning of 1991 were paid up to 5500 dinars, another third (33.7%) received wages between 5500 and 8000 dinars, and less than one fifth were paid between 8000 to 11000 dinars a month.⁶

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⁴ The author of the factory regime concept is M. Burawoy, see *The Politics of Production*, Verso, London, 1985.

⁵ We are referring to a poll that, between June 25 and July 29, 1991, encompassed 262 respondents from five work organizations located in five different regions of the Republic of Slovenia. With regard to the time of the survey, it is understandable that the polling in each of the enterprises from our sample was adjusted to the current "war-political situation": despite such adjustments the attempted polling in one case failed because part of respondents were mobilized by the Territorial Defense. In the mentioned case, the polling was repeated after the "ten-daywar", of course.

The enterprises in which our survey was conducted were from diverse industrial branches various sizes of performances, one half (51.0%) of our respondents were born in the town of their present residence one third (34.0%) were born elsewhere in Slovenia, and 15% in other Yugoslav republics. One fifth (21.5%) of the sample were unskilled and semiskilled workers, one third (32.0%) skilled and less than one third (27.8%) workers with secondary professional education. The smallest share had high school (8.2%) and university studies (4.3%). One half of respondents (47.8%) were production workers. This percentage coincides roughly with the total number of unskilled, semiskilled and skilled workers referred to in our poll.

⁶ In order to express the approximate amounts of monthly pay in AS, for instance, each of the quoted sums should be divided by 3.

Respondents referred to this situation as considerable worsening when compared this with "the past": almost one half of respondents (47.7 %) stated that the material and social status of the workers in an enterprise (in comparison with the time before the so-called Marković's reform), is considerably worse, and a good third (37.9 %) believed that it is worse (total 85.6 %).

Table 1: Assessment of the present material and social status of workers in comparison with the time before the beginning of the "Marković's reform" (in %).

	1	2	3 ⁷	total
1. much worse	63.6	53.7	41.9	47.7
2. worse	20.0	28.0	48.6	37.9
3. unchanged	9.1	7.3	4.1	6.6
4. better		3.7		2.3
5. much better				
6. no opinion	7.3	7.3	5.4	5.5

A sign of an increasing fear among workers is also the change in the perception of basic reasons of conflicts in working organizations: the new basic reason is "the danger to lose one's job". The ranking of reasons for conflicts in industrial organizations (Slovenia) is now the following: (1) allocation of means for personal incomes, (2) organization of work, (3) danger to lose one's job; those of lesser importance are: (4) work conditions and (5) other violations of workers' rights. The most significant ways of conflict resolution are: (1) negotiation, (2) involvement of wider trade union in the dispute, and (3) enquiring for help from the republic agents. Less frequently the respondents chose the option of strikes as the method of conflict resolution.

In four out of five enterprises in which we conducted our research, the Free Trade Union (the so-called "old regime trade union") is the majority trade union (68.4 % of respondents are members of Free Trade Union).

Table 2: Dissemination and structure of trade-union members (in %).

	1	2	3	total
1. non members	10.9	15.9	12.2	17.6
2. Free Trade Union	74.5	69.5	74.3	68.4
3. other trade unions	14.5	14.6	13.5	14.1

⁷In all the tables the numbers 1 - 3 (horizontal) denote: unskilled/semiskilled, skilled workers and secondary school education.

Among respondents the conviction about solidarity of workers in a trade-union action was very frequent: nearly one half (46.1 %) of respondents thought that a shop-steward might have succeeded in negotiations if he had support from other workers. Since an absolute majority of respondents were members of Free Trade Union, these data expressed quite an advanced stage of development of the power (which is otherwise hard to measure) in the trade union.

A considerable number of Slovene workers trusted the trade unions. This is supported by the fact that - in case of the problems concerning the workers in the largest group of respondents (39.6 %) - would seek help from the trade union. Slightly less than a third (29.2 %), would not react at all since, according to them, complains never changed anything.

Table 3: The following results were the data collected when this question was put forward to the workers. In case you feel that your superiors assign working tasks improperly to their friends, you would turn for help first of all to:

	1	2	3	total
1. co-workers	14.8	14.8	9.9	14.0
2. director	3.7	4.9	8.5	8.0
3. trade union	37.0	48.1	36.6	39.6
4. worker council	13.0	8.6	7.0	9.2
5. no reaction	31.5	23.5	38.0	29.2

The orientation of workers towards a "strong leadership" and distrust in a "democratic procedure" (even when their own interest is endangered) can be observed in the answers to the question through which we have tried to determine the leadership qualities of the trade unions.

Table 4: What can assure the workers that the trade union would work in the interest of the workers and not the trade-union (t-u) leadership? (in %)

	1	2	3	total
1. honesty of (t-u) leadership	50.0	42.7	25.7	34.4
2. possibility to express membership interests	5.6	4.9	9.5	5.9
3. expertise of trade-union functionaries	16.6	23.2	27.0	26.1
4. possibility to change t-u leadership	1.9	4.9	5.4	3.6
5. protection of workers, not "democracy training"	25.9	24.4	32.4	29.6

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Data from Table 4 indicate that, according to respondents, the viable mechanisms of internal trade-union democracy are not adequate to secure the work of trade unions in the interest of the workers. In other words, respondents thought that the trade union can work in their interest even if the common members within the trade union do not express their views and interests... In their eyes, the most efficient trade union, which regards the workers interests as the most important factor, lies in the hands of honest and expert trade union officials. The representative data suggest that the workers interest in Slovene society has been quite successfully consolidated after the disintegration of selfmanagement. On the other hand, the transitional nature of the trade union is quite clear. Namely, the union president at the enterprise level is paid by the enterprise management. A major political implication of the illustrated strength of the transitional trade union is in the fact that the trade union in question is (for the time being) not "regime related", hence it represents a equilibrating force balancing the relationships between the forces in Slovenia's political life somewhat indirectly.

III

Even in the post-selfmanagement variant of a post-socialist society, it is very likely that despotic regimes in industrial organizations may reform. Since such micro regimes generate authoritarian value orientations in society and prevent a productive resolution of everyday conflicts in the sphere of labour, these industrial regulation inevitably induce "waves of authoritarianism from below". Generation of authoritarianism from the labour sphere increases the probability of global authoritarian "solutions" and, hence, the probability of violent conflict "resolution" in society.

The danger of the spreading of "authoritarianism from below" seems to be (at least in the case of Slovene society) somehow modified. Since trade-unionism has (relatively successfully for now) filled up the imminent vacuum that occurred after the disintegration of selfmanagement, we may hope that less dangerous constellations may be created. In the sphere of industrial relations of Slovene society, the possibility of setting up the classic relationship "trade union vs employer" still exists. The implementation of this possibility depends on the abolishing of union leaders' attachment to the management. Only an entirely autonomous trade union can considerably hinder the synchronization of the authoritarian wave; and only such trade-unionism of workers can stop appearance of global social conflicts, and thus decrease the possibility of "resolving" them in a violent manner.

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Part 2:
Nationalism

Rudi Rizman

Sociological Dimension of Conflicts Between Ethnonationalisms

What is happening these days in what was geographically and politically for more than 70 years called Yugoslavia is certainly not easy to translate into sociological language. In the last two decades researchers have had to modify many assumptions that for too long had maintained that ethnic sentiments in general, and nationalisms in particular, are destined to wither away. Since this was evidently not the case, they direct their attention toward identifying the deeper roots of ethnic revival and self-identification. Thus they were trying to correct by intellectual means their previous ignorance of this social problem. It is significant to note, however, that all prevailing orientations or "isms" in the social sciences failed to acknowledge in time the manifest emergence of ethnic demands on the planetary scale - the fact that itself questions some of the capital premises of modernity and its "real-civilizational" pattern of development. Dogmatic belief in progress has led not only to ecological disasters but has failed to offer tolerable perspectives to those ethnic/national groups which did not acquire for themselves the privilege of a nation-state.

Discussing the crisis of modernity would lead us too far and can be left for some other opportunity. Suffice it to say that the ethnic dimension of conflicts in Yugoslavia belongs to a much wider disruptive process in the world and not just to the unique dialectic of "Balkanization". The question of why so little attention has been paid both in theory and political practice to violent "resolution" of ethnic conflicts is quite justified and even more the follow-up question of how to manage and resolve this very sensitive sort of conflict? To respond properly and in time, one has first to understand the complex nature of ethnic conflicts with the help of already available sociological concepts ("tools") and those that have to be yet produced.

John Stuart Mill already in 1861 in one of his main works argued in favor of the still widespread view that democracy is somewhat incompatible with ethnically

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complex societies. Can we, according to Mill, speak at all about democracy in the world when we know that only 14 states are more or less ethnically homogeneous in composition. To "translate" this figure further, we are confronted with the fact that the proportion of the world population living in "self-determined" states does not surpass four percent. And if we remove Japan from the list, the share is hardly one percent. Thus, the nation-state function as an ideal-type which exists almost nowhere in reality. However, we are well aware that the whole international order operates under this "false" - or, to put it more properly, self-constructed ideological - assumption with really existing powers and privileges. The pattern of historical development in the last 200 years was many times more pleasing to states than to ethnic nations, its organizational principle cares exclusively for the former and only in the second instance for the purposes of ideological legitimation for the latter. There is no other field as spread with misnomers as is the field of our present concern: the United Nations is actually an organization of states. The same applies to international law and almost all uses of the concepts "international" or (to a slightly lesser extent) "national". The conceptual confusion is only the logical result of - be it intentional or accidental - legitimating the present state subdivisions of mankind. Until recently, the field of ethnic conflicts seemed to social scientists rather a transitory phenomena functioning against modernization. To understand it in its entirety, it was argued, demands the application of those analytical tools which have already been tested in confronting other similar irrationally-motivated social problems. On the political level ethnic conflicts were tied to the colonial world and thus isolated from developed industrial states which have, especially after the experience of World War II, resented any expression of explicitly nationalist claims. On the other side, many sociologists considered ethnic conflicts to be of an episodic nature, something that comes and goes and which one cannot predict with precise certainty. In short, ethnic affiliations have been in disrepute for many different reasons - some of them based on historical grounds and others of a different intellectual sort, that is dogmatic acceptance of purely universalist and linear development in the tradition of Enlightenment thinkers.

While surpassing all these limitations, sociologists still had to fight against many other dogma: take, for example, the dogma of the inevitability of ethnic subordination or the passion to dig out the very first causes of the ethnic conflicts. We consider as more fruitful efforts to try to solve ethnic problems on the basis of their motivation by rational calculation of gains (or losses for that matter). This approach can help policymakers to organize rewards in such a way that ethnic individuals and collectives can expect certain and increasing gains. It can lead to a positive result if it can identify the rationalistic and materialistic motives in the existing ethnic conflicts. If the motives are much less visible, or if they are even irrational, then the resolution and the very understanding of conflicts demand not only more time, but also sustainable intellectual innovation. In order

to accumulate new knowledge, sociologists do not suffer so much from lack of data: in order to categorize, synthesize and to discriminate, they need enough discriminating power to be able to class the cases and thus produce what some researchers in the field call "data containers". This can be only a general rule since we should keep in mind that theories often explain ethnic conflicts on opposite assumptions. If the theory of cultural pluralism sees in ethnic conflict the clash of incompatible values, the other - modernization and economic-interest theories - conceive of conflict as the struggle for limited resources and opportunities.

It is obvious therefore that theories with such diverse approaches stress different features of ethnic conflict. On the other hand it is quite transparent that both mentioned theories fail to address the significance of symbolic issues in ethnic conflicts. Neither deals with the important role of ethnic-group anxiety on one side or the intensity and violent character of ethnic conflict. Needless to add that this dimension of conflicts plays an extremely important role not only in more recent clashes in Yugoslavia but also much earlier - during World War II.

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Efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts obviously do not depend only on good or weak theory. Ethnic leaders may represent the main obstacle. Some of them build their role and even charisma on maintaining ethnic conflicts. It would therefore be very naive if well-intentioned researchers projected their peaceful aims onto policymakers who are themselves very much interested and influential participants in their societies. Not very rarely, they show more or less passively or more or less actively hostile attitudes toward members of other groups. There are not many rewards, if any, for those policymakers who really care for ethnic harmony, or for that matter for those who are trying to correct historical injustices to underprivileged ethnic groups. Even if we are witnessing sound pro-ethnic ideology, its execution may take a long time and stubborn resistances both in the political realm and in civil society. Ethnic divisions of labor and more general cultural differences have reproduced divergent principles of stratification for different ethnic groups. To change these patterns of discrimination only at this level may no doubt take time and the work of at least more than one generation. After understanding the nature of ethnic conflicts - a job that still awaits generations of sociologists - there comes to the fore the not less demanding goal of finding out the policies of positive discrimination, both generally and for individual cases, to reduce ethnic conflicts. We are not starting here from point zero. Accumulation of various positive experiences as well as learning from them must have top priority.

There are direct and indirect ways to affect the fate of inter-ethnic relationships. The former makes itself visible through evolution and modifications of federal and confederal institutionalization of ethnic subjects. More indirect ways of affecting ethnicity are exemplified through the use of this or that electoral

system, that is something which is too often absent in both intellectual discourse and in concrete and everyday politics. In any case, a balanced use of direct and indirect means requires close study of their immediate effects and only then, if needed, corrections rather than risky further experimentation. Sociologists have so far identified the following five mechanisms of conflict reduction, all of them appropriate not for all but for carefully selected inter-ethnic cases in Yugoslavia.

First, the inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by dispersing it, that is by dispersing the main segments of power so as to take away a single focal point. One lesson from this mechanism teaches us that conflict in one region is generally less dangerous than conflict that engages the whole of the country. Second, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by arrangements that emphasize inter-ethnic conflicts which are less dangerous and violent. Third, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by policies that create incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. Fourth, inter-ethnic conflicts may be reduced by policies that encourage alignments based on interests other than ethnicity. And fifth, inter-ethnic conflicts may be reduced by reducing concrete disparities between groups so that dissatisfaction to a larger extent declines. In this last case, the emphasis lies on the restructuring the incentives for conflict behaviour.

The main aim of these five mechanisms of conflict reduction is not to eradicate conflict, but rather to contain, limit, channel, and manage its capacity to persist on the social scene. We should warn against expecting too much from political engineering in this frequently unpredictable sphere of unique social relationships. One can expect also unintended consequences which require new strategies and mechanisms of conflict resolution, and which might go beyond anything identified in the cases from 1 to 5. Sometimes costs might be too high and sometimes the distributive policies might create a new class of ethnic leaders that can fuel the existing ethnic conflicts even more.

There are also many other intervening variables that can alter our expectations when implementing one of the mentioned mechanisms. There are some cases, indeed very rare (Slovenia) where all possible modes of accommodation show as unworkable. Here applies the separation of antagonisms, very much a recommended solution where groups are territorially concentrated and historically distinct. However, there is rarely a regime that will not fight against this type of solution. There are also many cases when the assumption that partition will lead toward a more homogeneous state proves wrong because the vast majority of secessionist regions are ethnically pluralistic. The international community in most cases questions partition because of the fear that it can destabilise a much larger region or serve as an example (chain reaction) for other dissatisfied ethnic groups in the area. Some also fear that the previous state will some time in future try to *revanche* to the parting side and thus create even a larger and more critical

international problem. The prospect of independence may be threatening to many due to the historically verifiable fact that some of the ethnic group(s) within the partitioning region may side with the central government and against their new and more local authority.

Governmental responses to ethnic conflicts and in general to the challenges posed by ethnonationalisms have been quite varied. We have listed simply a few of the major alternatives. Some insist on favoring the policy of either hard or soft assimilation or are pursuing a policy of group autonomy. Some of them are even combining assimilation and autonomy hoping thus to achieve the immediate stability of inter-ethnic relations and a possible merger in the future. If the immediate goal of the government is assimilation, the dominant ethnic group is imposed as a model for all (the Hans in China, Castilians in Spain and similar attempts in the past and today in Yugoslavia). The next step in this direction might be enforced population transfers, the outlawing of the use of languages and other vital symbols of ethnic survival and identity. On the other side, political autonomy can approximate actual independence only if the loosest type of political relationship is established between the central and peripheral authorities. As the case of Soviet Union proves, ostensibly confederal and federal political structures can be largely a facade for the domination of the mightiest and numerically greatest national group (Russians). In some cases cultural autonomy with its pragmatic "hands off" policy toward cultural and symbolic rights of a minority nation offers much more than in the aforementioned case (for example in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire). Despite the great variety in approaches and techniques to reduce inter-ethnic cataclysms, one hardly shares optimism that the vast complex of ethnonationalism can be managed or accommodated within the existing political structures and values. The depth of ethnic cleavages is much more profound than are other cleavages, based upon religion, social class and thus not susceptible to Madisonian concepts of the balancing of cross-cutting interests under the rubric of cultural pluralism.

Contemporary sociological literature lists many other and additional reasons for rather pessimistic forecasts as far as the future of ethnonationalism is concerned. Intergroup contracts are at least as apt to increase discord as they are to foster mutual understanding, and already a quick review of ethnopolitical history and what we see before our eyes today strongly suggests that discord is the more likely. Cultural autonomy is extremely difficult to implement in the era of advances in the state-wide and interstate communications and transportation facilities which significantly diminish the opportunity for cultural isolation. The seemingly inevitable, uneven economic development of ethnic regions triggers animosities among both the benefitted groups (Basques, Croats, Slovenes) and the unfavored ones (Slovaks, the Irish nationalists (Catholics) of Northern Ireland). Even the progeny of ethnically mixed marriages do not necessarily

exhibit less radical national consciousness than do either of their parents - they often exhibit more. Growing manifestations of ethnic dissonance in the world and as well growing elusiveness of a viable solutions led Singapore's President Lee Kuan Yew to the following thought: "I used to believe that when Singaporeans (he had in mind bitter relations between Malay and Chinese, RR) become more sophisticated, with higher standards of education, these problems would diminish. But watching Belfast, Brussels, and Montreal rioting over religion and language, I wonder whether such phenomena can ever disappear".

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Wilfried Graf

Reflextions Concerning a Typology of the New Nationalisms in Yugoslavia and South-Eastern Europe

The modernization processes which have been taking place in Eastern Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe since 1989 have exacerbated collective and individual identity conflicts, frequently in connection with problems of an ethnolinguistic, national-cultural and religious nature. At present, it is difficult to assess the consequences. On the one hand, they are dramatizations of what appear to be collective, "pre-modern" identity conflicts of nationalities or peripheral regions which were suppressed by administrative and violent means for too long - this applies particularly to regions with poorly developed and, in some cases, pre-industrial structures and cultures, such as the Caucasus and the Kosovo. On the other hand, they are "post-modern" identity conflicts characterized by the individualism and consumerism of more developed and privileged social strata and geographical regions or the radical sections of a new "intelligentsia", and the generally "impatient" younger generations e.g. of Slovenia and the Baltics. These "poles" of historical and cultural identities create polarization in some conflicts and facilitate coalition-building in others. They also reflect the different historical experiences of "(Eastern) Central Europe" on the one hand and "(South)- Eastern Europe" on the other. Any reductionist approaches operating with sweeping concepts such as "(post)-Stalinism" or "(neo)-nationalism" will be of no use; indeed, they will only pave the way for new labels and stereotypic interpretations.

Today Central Europe is above all an area dominated by political imagination and historical memories, generating regressive collective myths, although perhaps also some forward-looking collective fantasies. In a socio-political sense, the term Eastern Central Europe mainly refers to the "rebellious" reformist

countries in the "west" of Eastern Europe, i.e. Poland, The CSFR, and Hungary. "The socio-political nature of this Central Europe is militantly anti-communist or reform-communist and multi-national rather than international. It is a Europe of nations, not a supra-national Europe".¹ Historically speaking, Eastern Central Europe refers to the "Central Europe of Versailles" extending from Germany to Russia and including parts of the Baltic states and the South-Eastern European Carpathian and Balkan states. On more latent, historically deeper socio-cultural levels it refers to the Eastern, Slavic-Hungarian "Danubian Central Europe", and to the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian urban cultures within the traditions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, above all, those of Budapest, Prague, Krakow and indeed also Ljubljana. These cities developed their national and political identities in the process of their struggle for differentiation, separation and liberation from the Habsburg Empire, although their political imagination continues to bear the mark of Habsburg Central Europeanism. When this process of finding a national-cultural identity was brought to a halt by the military and structural violence of "Sovietization" after 1945, these countries developed various methods of resistance or adaptation in the form of Reform Communism, radical democracy, or by bureaucratic and technocratic means. However, there also arose a longing for that imaginary Central Europe, and this has become considerably stronger in recent years. Along with Austria and northern Italy, it was above all those Eastern Central European countries which felt themselves being driven east by Sovietization, that the new importance attached to "Mitteleuropa", originated. This longing for the status quo ante reflects, on the one hand, the actual experience of decades of alienation and powerlessness, and of regional conflicts which seemed to be insoluble within the framework of the geopolitical "constraints" of a bipolar security policy; and it indicates that there has always been this notion of (or even fascination with) the possibility of violent uprisings. On the other hand, there is a revival of long-standing nationalist and deeply-rooted Euro-centrist stereotypes of an "undeveloped" and "uncivilized" Eastern Europa (i.e. mainly Russia) and South-Eastern Europe (the Balkans). These areas have been (and are) frequently regarded as essentially ahistorical and oriental or Asian in character, and their historical ties to Europe denied.

In geographical terms, South-Eastern Europe includes Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and the European part of Turkey. Hungary can be viewed as a link between the historical-cultural division into Eastern Central Europe (the Danubian Central Europe) and South-Eastern Europe (the Balkan states), not least because of the issues concerning the Hungarians living in neighboring countries, above all in Romania. In a more latent, historically deeper, cultural sense, South-Eastern Europe refers to those states whose

¹E. Jahn, *Zur Debatte über "Mitteleuropa" in den westlichen Staaten*. In: *Dialog* 15, pp. 40-50

national identity derived from the process of their struggle for differentiation, separation and liberation from the Ottoman Empire rather than the Habsburg Empire, as in the case of Eastern Central Europe. The political imagination of these countries remains therefore characterized by orientalism rather than Central Europeanism. Nevertheless, traditions of Habsburg (Danubian) Central Europe can be discerned in the Balkan states (Transylvania in Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and Voivodina in Yugoslavia).

Within the cultural conglomeration of Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe represents an area with a particularly pronounced cultural and ethnic diversity, harboring major nationalities without "nations". In Eastern and especially in South-Eastern Europe, the way in which states were historically formed generally did not produce linguistically homogeneous nations. In this region, violence and counter-violence between the Versailles and Yalta systems have created more unresolved national problems, violent conflicts and attempts at resolution than anywhere else. The results of the Second War also failed to bring about largely homogeneous national states. The forced economic integration of the "cathying-up" development strategies before and after the war did not succeed in the long run in creating a common western-type national consciousness among ethnic communities; they were modelled on development processes that took several centuries in the central capitalist countries of Western Europe.

The Romanian Magyars, the Bulgarian Turks, the Yugoslav Albanians are all so-called "minorities" - although, since the term "minority" is problematic, we shall speak of nationalities instead - numbering between one and two millions, each with its respective "mother country". The 2 - 3.5 million Magyars living in Hungary's neighboring countries make them the largest nationality of Europe, while the Albanians, 35 % of whom live abroad, represent the largest divided nation in Europe. At present, states increasingly complain about the oppression of their nationalities in neighboring countries - for various reasons of domestic social policy or for reasons of opportunism in foreign or security policy - while the nationalities' efforts for more autonomy and/or closer ties to the "mother country" are gathering momentum. Any territorial claims along nationalistic lines could trigger off regional crises reaching beyond South-Eastern Europe. If attempts to the re-establish a lasting peace in Yugoslavia fail, there is a real danger of these nationalities being once again drawn into a Balkan war.

Stalinism, Titoism and the National Factor

One of the aims of the "building of socialism" in Eastern Europe was to overcome the painful experience of the nationalist policies of the inter-war period, although the spell of Stalinist power politics was present from the very

outset. In 1947, the collapse of the Allies' post-war cooperation following introduction of the Marshall plan and the severing of relations between Stalin and Tito - largely due to the plans of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to form a Balkan Federation - provided a motive for the exclusion and oppression of all non-Communist forces, as well as all "nationalists" and Titoists within the Communist parties. The forced "Sovietization" which then followed put a violent end to the eastern European peoples' searches for identities. It ran into manifold structural and cultural obstacles and eventually triggered off the revolts in the GDR (1953) and Poland (1956) and led to the military crushing of the popular uprising in Hungary in 1956.

As opposed to this, the period of "de-Stalinization" which began under Krushchev in 1956, and particularly the schisms concerning ideology, security, development and reform which occurred in the World Communist Movement after 1961 (once the non-recognition of national and cultural identities within the Socialist camp had led to the severing of relations with China) led the post-Stalinist bureaucracies to accommodate the national factor in various ways. From the late 1960s onwards, increased socio-economic, socio-cultural and military vulnerability required specific forms of bureaucratic policies on nationality, such as partial identification processes and partisanship in historical identity conflicts - policies that later revived conventional inter-state conflicts among Socialist states.

In this bureaucratic partial identification with the "national factor" in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, two main ideal types of policy could be identified: - a bureaucratic Socialist state-nation policy (the myth of those identity dramas of "Central Europe" which tended more towards the state-nation of "Versailles" or the "Danube Monarchy") in the countries of Eastern Central Europe (Poland, CSFR, Hungary), and a bureaucratic Socialist culture-nation policy (the myth of cultural-national and ethno-national identity dramas, mainly in opposition to the Ottoman Empire) in the Socialist Balkan states (Romania, Bulgaria).

By contrast, the Yugoslav model led to an early separation from the "Socialist camp"; for a long time this model of an a-national state ideology in a multi-national state represented an alternative to the a-national Stalinist state. As in the Soviet Union, however, its collapse is causing the cultural nationalism which had previously been in a latent state break out with all the more force.

The different ways in which the power elites deal with national identity can be explained by the development of the contradictions in the post-Stalinist political economy. Stalin's Sovietization of the eastern European peoples' democracies implied a gradual embracing of the Soviet development model of "socialism in

one country", which was primarily based on heavy industry and collectivization. The autocentrist tendencies of this type of economic development was in contradiction to the hegemonic dependence on the USSR within the Socialist camp. In the long term, this contradiction had to be solved in one way or another by the Eastern European countries.

In the Eastern Central European countries - the GDR, Poland, and the CSFR, which were located at the center of Soviet power and security interests, and where historical, national and cultural experiences with western and central European ideas, models and institutions eroded the loyalty to the Soviet system and produced frictions within these societies, solving this contradiction meant primarily that the self-centred national economies were adjusted to the systems of "socialist division of labour" and "limited sovereignty" in the course of the Stalinization.

By contrast, the problems of smaller nationalities remained latent and, excepting the Magyar nationalities, did not lead to any international controversies between neighbouring Eastern European states. It was above all the human rights movement and the opposition that wanted to develop and radicalize national and cultural identities and initiate a policy of national independence. However, in these countries, bureaucratic national policies were also linked to providing formerly persecuted Communist elites with an access to power and aimed at compensating the system's deficit in ideology and legitimation created by the military suppression of loyalty crises within these societies (Hungary 1956, CSFR 1968, Poland 1980/81).

In addition to the bureaucratic national policies from "above", there emerged an authentic, emancipatory, but often also ambivalent and backward-looking longing for sovereignization from "below", for the return of suppressed regional and national identity models on a historical-cultural level. Nourished by memories of the "civil" society before "Sovietization", this phenomenon was further strengthened by bureaucratic policies and was more pronounced (or perhaps only earlier?) than in Western Europe. For example, the *Solidarność* movement soon began to romanticize prewar Polish nationalism.

The peoples in the undeveloped Balkan states of South-Eastern Europe at the periphery of the sphere of Soviet influence had no contact with Western Europe. That could have made a lasting impression. Problems of loyalty to the system of etatism were less pronounced, the civilizing influence of the Christian Orthodox church and Islam was stronger than that of the Roman Catholic church, and there was continuing political oppression and material need as well as national resistance to Turkish rule. All this meant that the solution of the contradiction was usually an adjustment of state policies to the requirements of a more self-

centred national economy (Senghaas). Large nationalities were subject to partly repressive policies of assimilation aimed at subordinating them to the myth of an ideologically and administratively promoted "national culture", thus adding to the usual subordination to party centralism.

Given South-Eastern Europe's great nationality problems, lack of a national-bourgeois "civil society" and location at the periphery of the Soviet sphere of influence, it was surely no coincidence that when the "Socialist camp" became more heterogeneous, this led to "national Communism" there, whereas in Eastern Central Europe "national identity" developed into a latent "Reform Communism".

In recent years, a tendency towards traditional ethno-nationalistic and inter-state conflict patterns became manifest in the Romanian-Hungarian conflict about the Magyars in Romania, the Bulgarian-Turkish conflict about the Turks in Bulgaria and the intra-Yugoslav and Yugoslav-Albanian conflicts about the Albanians in Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo.

Different Types of Nationalism in the Post-Tito Period

In the search for a solution of the crises of bureaucratic socialism in Yugoslavia the Slovenes, and to some extent also the Croats, represent the "spearhead" of modernization occupying the position of a periphery that is relatively privileged vis-a-vis the centralist federal state, and seeking to consolidate their special status as "Central European" and westward-looking. The standard of living in Slovenia is twice the Yugoslav average. It was there that the willingness to reform and develop a democratic public has been most advanced. In this way, an historical national identity, frequently religious and anti-modern in the past, functions as a strategic resource for the process of modernization, and increasingly takes on the characteristic of a centrifugal nationalism.

In the contrast to this, the Serbs are located at the opposite, bureaucratic-centralist pole: on the one hand, the history of the Serbs as the dominant nation in the interwar period, as well as during the antifascist liberation struggle, made it seem as if equality with its "brother nations" within the socialist multinational state was a withdrawal of privileges. On the other hand, the Serbs seek to compensate their present, economically peripheral position vis-a-vis the more developed northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia by emphasizing their historical identification with the center and the centralist interests of the federal state and the army. There is also the fear of further loss of privileges that could

result from the regional separation of their own periphery, the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina. It is for this reason that the Serbian leadership has fought for strengthening of the central federal authorities, the annulment of the decentralization of the 1974 constitution, limitations on the consensus principle in fundamental issues, and the political unification of Serbia by nullifying the autonomy of the Kosovo and Voivodina provinces. In a memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences of November 1987, the decentralization laid down in the 1974 constitution is even evaluated as establishing a "Croatian-Slovenian dictate over Serbia".

Within this Slovenian-Serbian conflict, Kosovo Albanians represent a third position: the position of a periphery within the periphery. Their "emancipating" nationalism is aimed at compensating their historical lack of identity, their loyalty to the Albanian mother country, and their unequal development and unsuccessful modernization. They want to overcome their underprivileged status, escape from the economically and culturally incoherent pressure for modernization being applied by federal or Serbian centralism, leave the Serbian Republic, membership to which they perceive as artificial, and develop their own regional identity, and also their relations with the "motherland". While the Slavic nations have all been trying to slow down the Albanian struggle for emancipation ever since 1981 by means of the imminent amendment to the constitution, the Albanians themselves at last see an opportunity to establish themselves as a republic like those of the Slavic nations.

In the present economic circumstances in Yugoslavia - with great differences in development and an all but complete economic isolation for the individual republic - an independent republic is seen by many of the young elite as a prerequisite for catching up with more developed regions. Albanians are also struggling for independent economic development and not only for an ethnically pure Kosovo, or the right to special relations or indeed unification with the neighboring "motherland". However, there is also the dramatization of their fear that the balance of power between the Slavic nations might tilt towards the Serbs, a fear that stems from their historical experience of Serbian assimilation policies even as late as the 1960s.

The violent suppression of the revolts, the imposition of state of emergency and draconian court sentences passed on activists, most of whom are still young, amounted to a profound humiliation of an entire, accentuated by fact that their collective identity remains embedded in pre-national and, in part, even in tribal cultural traditions.

Many Serbs by now rightly fear the re-emergence of the historical ambitions of Kosovo Albanians to re-unite with Albania, which were once skilfully

exploited by Fascism and National Socialism. It is neither the simple structural "constraints" of modernization policies, nor the creation of a mythical status for cultural reminiscences that have caused nationality conflicts to flare up; both of these are only being used as traditional and symbolic means of expression by the political elites at a time when the integration force of modern ideologies has failed to produce the desired effect. Behind this, one can detect political power interests, familial group processes and psychological factors.

The economic crisis has increased the fear of the individual states and republics that they will be left standing in the cold, particularly in view of the developments in western and eastern Europe. However, what has triggered off nationalistically oriented action is the final collapse of the system of bureaucratic Socialism both as an ideology and as a political system. This system of government, usually centered around powerful personalities, had a consistent, widely accepted ideology which defined its goals and political strategies and, above all, provided the political cultures of south-eastern Europe with quasi charismatic leaders that were either widely accepted or else feared. Ethno-nationalism, therefore, is being used by the Communist leaders of the republics and autonomous provinces in order to compensate for the degeneration or loss ideology and to create political loyalty and legitimation. The production of nationalist guidelines for political action seems to have a different function now to the one that it had during the interwar period. Nationalism is no longer simply the driving force behind a generally anti-modern, agrarian policy aimed at delaying or stopping time and history, nor is it simply a vehicle of modernization. Instead, it seems that it is something like a "postmodern" relapse, a bloodily staged simulation. Nationalist policies and rhetoric no longer promote homogeneity and integration; they seek to compensate the collapse of an outdated ideology and its politics.

The war in Yugoslavia cannot be explained either as a civil war or as a conflict between nationalities; instead, it should be viewed as a complex war about new state-building, centered around ethno-political and socio-economic lines of conflict. Neither can it be understood simply as a war between Croatia and Serbia, because the Croatian Serbs play a part of their own: while the Croatian nationalists struggle against Serbian post-Titoist centralism, the Serbs of Croatia fight Croatian neo-fascism. Again, it is not "Stalinism", "Titoism", or new "nationalism" that is causing the multinational Yugoslav state to disintegrate, but mutual autisms and self-fulfilling prophecies.

Muhamed Filipović

Conditions and Circumstances of Peace Keeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to judgments of most observers and analysts of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of conflict in that country is ever increasing. That judgment is based on the following facts:

1. Democratic government in Bosnia and Herzegovina that came into power after the elections in November of 1990, did not manage to stabilize any of the aspects of political, economic and general situation in the country. Moreover, all aspects of inner relations and conditions have enormously worsened, and especially relations between various nations.

2. The formula of three-party-rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina is founded on the theory of three constitutive peoples and their right to establish ethnically founded power on the territories where they represent majority, proved contrary to the expectations. It did not lead to the appeasement and decrease in tension. The appetites of the representatives of the so-called people's parties only grew, and their rule became the main source of conflict escalations and rivalry. Dissolution tendencies and processes sprung out of it, which is reflected in implemented division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the principle of nationally dominating territories which are being shaped as ethnical states thus producing the tendency of legalization of such division in the form of request for cantonization and confederalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic principle.

3. Due to the given political situation, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not function as an undivided political and administrative body. Thus it is paralyzed and it does not realize its power on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One third of its territory is exempt from the authority of the Bosnia and Herzegovina government, while on one part its power is

reduced to minimum. This process is intensified by the fact that the Presidency itself became, in this situation and contrary to the constitutional rights, a parallel center of the executive power in relation to the government. The Home Office (Ministry of Inner Affairs) also functions as an independent political subject, beyond influence and control of the government. All this contributes to increase in illegal actions, strengthens particular interests and stimulates dissolution processes which are threatening the territorial unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unity of power and legality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. Divided ethnic groups lead by national parties armed their followers on the criterion of paramilitary formations in order to strengthen its own positions in the fight for power and control over territories. Thus separatism and illegal actions are ever increasing, being supported by the real armed force beyond the control of legal organs of the government producing additional tensions and menacing by the escalation of conflicts.

5. Yielding attitude of the Presidency and government of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the ambitions of Yugoslav army to concentrate its troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina for fights in Croatia lead to the enormous concentration of men and weapons of Yugoslav army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5 corpses of Yugoslav army, each with three divisions, two separate grupations of army and three strong air formations are concentrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian territory is occupied by Yugoslav army troops on the scheme of possible division of Bosnian and Herzegovinian territory between Serbia and Croatia, so it is obvious that Yugoslav army has political and not defensive function here. Since Yugoslav army has identified itself with the policy of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević and incomplete Presidency of Yugoslavia, it does not have a role of the common army and it functions apart from the will and intentions of Presidency, Parliament and government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and apart from the will and interests of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yugoslav army became a source of permanent conflicts, tensions and illegal actions, which is reflected in forced mobilizations and persecutions of those who refuse to be mobilized.

6. The situation and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are worsened by the aspirations of Serbia and Croatia, expressed on many occasions in numerous ways to solve Serbocroatian conflict by division of Bosnia. Such division would, according to the intentions of its protagonists, be a chance to correct the boundaries between Serbia and Croatia and complete the uniting of Serbian and Croatian people within ethnic countries. Bosnian Muslims are viewed as religious group which makes a part of a total Serbian or Croat ethnic corpus. This tendency is getting stronger not only outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. in Croatia and Serbia, but also within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is expressed in negotiations and requests for transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order

to secure the particularities of Serbian and Croatian ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina was a genuine historical creation, a country that originated the 10th century and existed as sovereign and independent country until the mid 15th century, keeping its territorial integrity and political identity through Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian period, recently it became a battle-field of Serbian and Croatian nationalism. Everything that happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina was connected or under the influence of Serbia and Croatia. The present war between Serbia and Croatia, especially the fact that Yugoslav army is involved in the war and is executing its operations from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is seriously involving this country in warfare threatening to make this land a battle-field. Furthermore, there is a real danger that this conflict which could not be resolved on the territory of Croatia, gets transferred to be resolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8. Finally, one of the elements which implicitly and independently on the will of today's forces in power in Bosnia and Herzegovina can lead to the conflict is a lack of a clear strategy of the development of democratic life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and aims common to all democratic forces in this area. For example, Mr. Izetbegović, whose party is in power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has changed six different concepts on solution of Bosnian and Herzegovinian and Yugoslav crisis. He started with the idea of Federation, correcting it by requesting that Federation gets transformed with the needs of the time, expressing it by the notion of "rational federation", suggesting afterwards "stair" federation, the idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina enters into federal relation with Serbia and Monte Negro, while with Croatia and Slovenia it would have a confederal relation. After that he proposed a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, only to replace it by total independence, and in the meantime he also put forward a concept of a loose link between former republics of Yugoslavia. All these concepts he transformed into an official policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina without the consent of his partners from the coalition which lead to doubts, tensions, mistrust, and in the end, open conflicts. This produced confusion in the view of intentions of the governing parties, and on the other hand these aims were beyond range of real political practice. Thus the gap between the government goals and practical possibilities of its realization became deeper and deeper. The above-mentioned situation is full of tensions and threats which could lead to grave conflicts. All elements are ready for the conflict: the unsurmountable gap in political concept and aims, concentration of manpower and weapons which could be used in reaching the goals in a violent way. Moreover, there is no policy nor mechanisms which could enable an efficient removal of this danger. Only a policy of consensus and coordination of all forces involved within the plan of peaceful action could remove the threats of conflicts

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mere maintenance of status quo expressed through the policy of "let us avoid the war" with persistence of all other negative elements cannot prevent the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a state is favourable for the negative elements. In addition to that, the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is on verge of collapse, menacing with social riots and hunger. These riots were always the basis for violent leftist or rightist adventures, and that situation is acute in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina produces only 16% of food necessary for its population. Since its industry is not functioning, there are no funds, no exchange, Bosnia and Herzegovina is blocked from all sides, except via Zvornik with Belgrade, it is clear to what extent is Bosnia and Herzegovina dependent on the will of Croatian and Serbian government.

Peacemaking actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very complex requiring great attention, clear policy and energy in realization. The foundation of this action must be a clear request of international community towards Yugoslav army, Serbia, Croatia and Monte Negro in the view of territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and peace in this country. Another moment of this policy would be a maximum of awareness of the real situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by European and international factors. The third moment would be the active role of the international factors in securing the main routes between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world and in urgent and large humanitarian help to the people of this country. Finally, it would be of utmost importance for the international public to respect all the factors of the political relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ones in power and the ones in opposition, and to help the negotiations in constitutional identity and relations within Bosnia and Herzegovina and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries of former Yugoslavia. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Yugoslavia cannot be maintained if only political ideas and practice of the forces in power are recognized, for they are responsible for the present state of affairs. For a permanent peace and opening of the perspectives of political solution it is necessary to make a communication between the government and the opposition, so that the real political opinion, and not the one originated under pressure, could become a basis for creating a realistic image and realistic policy in this area. The international factor became the prime factor in resolving the total crisis in our country. Therefore it is of vital importance that this factor sees the real causes and solutions to the crisis. It would be wrong to agree to temporary solutions. If extorted ideas and solutions caused by war become permanent and internationally recognized, the area of former Yugoslavia will once again become a crisis area. Therefore it is important to look for the permanent solutions on the basis of wide consultations of all relevant political, cultural and other factors which are active on this territory.

Part 3: Conflict Resolution

Hania M. Fedorowicz

The Yugoslav Case: What Can Conflict and Dispute Resolution Models Offer?*

Introduction

Social conflicts of a nationalist, ethnic, religious, economic or resource nature are a major potential source of insecurity in a post-Yalta, post-bipolar Europe.¹ Legal and constitutional measures, however, are not enough to guarantee a democratic and pluralist Europe. Social awareness of broadly shared democratic values and norms and the evolution of a civil society are a necessary complement to a political transition to democracy.

The key to the expansion of fledgling civil societies in post-communist countries is the development of informal as well as institutionalized procedures for communicating and negotiating about differences. Such procedures are a prerequisite for deescalating, managing and resolving both local disputes and broader social-political conflicts and as such present an essential tool for learning to live with pluralism.

Historian Drago Roksandić has noted that "the meaning of democracy is certainly also the assurance of the possibility of living with differences - from the differences between individuals upwards"². Roksandić characterizes this social

* The author wishes to acknowledge the use of the library and kind bibliographic assistance of Susan Connell and Vesna Knežević at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

1 See conclusions of Times Mirror Center poll regarding Central European attitudes towards ethnic minorities and discussion in **Stephen S. Rosenfeld**, "Western Europe Owes the East a Family Reunion", *International Herald Tribune* (hereon *IHT*) October 19-20, 1991, p. 8.

2 Interview with **Drago Roksandić**, *Falter* 40 and 41/91.

challenge in post-communist countries as a project of "modernization", that is, a catching up with or reintegration of values developed in western Europe during the enlightenment and embodied in modern liberal democracies.

He fails to note, however, that "modernity" and the limitations inherent in representative democracy are being questioned in the west. As one advocate of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) put it, the legislative and judicial institutions of liberal, representative democracy are unable to regulate public life in other than adversarial ways: "our existing system... must change in order to continue to serve us... we are each responsible to play a part in a solution which empowers individuals to deal with conflict constructively"³. Indeed, the role of civil society is being reconsidered.

Thus a discontinuity emerges between eastern efforts to "catch up" with a process which is itself in the west at a new point of departure. The repeated failure of western European efforts to create a "Yugoslav" solution underscore the fact that the Yugoslav war is a microcosm of larger historical processes taking place in the whole of Europe both east and west, whose outcome will determine the future shape of Europe⁴.

In the view of this paper, the "east" must seek its own way to what could be called a challenged modernity, based on universal values of the enlightenment, while also drawing assistance or nourishment from citizens' efforts to problematize and rethink democracy "from below"⁵.

The democratic modern state plays a fundamental role in the settling of disputes and the enactment of justice, both domestically and internationally. A necessary component, however, in the building and renewal of a post-bipolar democratic world is the role played by self-organised citizens, in spreading new political and social values and methods of co-operative or creative disputing, which have evolved in the last twenty years out of an ethnic of peace, "authentic

³ **Gregory D. Kells**, "A Common Objective" in *Tribute to Conflict Resolution Day of Ottawa-Carleton*, edited by J.M. Tannis, Captus Press, York University, 1990, p. 2.

⁴ **Joscha Schmierer**, "Ein Drama mit offenem Ende, Im Jugoslawischen Konflikt ist 'Europa' nicht mehr Tribune, sondern Schauplatz", *Der Standard*. (DS) 9/10. November 1991, s. 31.

⁵ **Hania M. Fedorowicz**, *East-west Dialogue: Detente from Below*, Peace Research Reviews, vol. XI, n. 6, Peace Research Institute-Dundas, June 1991. A combined analysis of democratization in post-communist countries and in "real existing" democracies can be found in the work of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. See *News Bulletin*, n. 1 and ff, 1991.

pluralism"⁶ humanism, and personal empowerment. At both state and citizen levels of action, a historic turn towards non-violent and further, non-coercive, methods can be observed.

Conventional means of settling disputes, like litigation or arbitration, operate on the assumption of a "fixed-pie" or winlose outcome. Gains made by the one side entail a commensurate loss by the other side, and thus often require coercion or the threat of force to impose a solution.

Traditional political methods of conflict resolution between states, insofar as they define international conflict as objectively perceived conflicts of scarcity and use power tactics to manage them (i.e. with threat or the withholding of benefits), often end in a self-defeating spiral of stalemates/escalations or unsolved, protracted conflicts. Solutions often tend to favour those with greater political clout or legally recognized rights, thus leaving some parties to the conflict dissatisfied and likely to revive the conflict at some future point⁷.

In contrast, alternative, inter-active, problem-solving, consensus-building or win-win approaches see conflict as a shared problem to be solved by the face-to-face participation of the parties to the dispute or conflict, with or without the assistance of an impartial or neutral third party. All of these approaches focus on the relationship or communicative basis of the dispute or conflict and assume an outcome of mutual (not necessarily the same) benefit. Using this form of logic, my success (peace, security, power) depends on the success of the other side and not on their loss or insecurity.

Alternative approaches display an interest to enhance democratic practice, to provide people with more choices and with the possibility of directly participating in the processes which shape their lives. The development of options for mutual gain leads to jointly determined outcomes which are more likely to be considered legitimate. It must be stressed that a view to co-operation does not presuppose avoiding disagreement, but rather seeks outcomes which will satisfy one's own interests without destroying the other party.

Such practices, produce *better* outcomes than power bargaining or imposed solutions, in that they seek greater satisfaction of underlying needs and/or short

⁶ **Douglas Wurtele** and **Ken Melchin**, "Conflict resolution: a new field of study" in *This Week at Carleton*, Carleton University, July 13, 1989, vol. 10, n. 20, p. 4.

⁷ **Ronald J. Fisher**, "Third Party Consultation, A Problem-solving Approach for De-escalating International Conflict", in *Towards a World of Peace, People Create Alternatives*, edited by **Jeannette P. Maas** and **Robert A.C. Stewart**, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 1986, pp. 18-32.

and long-term interests for both sides. They are also more *efficient* than conventional procedures such as litigation and usually take much less time, *wiser* (fact-finding through collaborative inquiry), *fair* (according to the process created by the disputants and by virtue of values held in common, i.e. belonging to the community, which disputants seek to uncover) and ultimately more *stable*, inasmuch as they are based on realistic expectations and feasible goals⁸.

Above all, by separating the substantive issues of the conflict from the relational/communicative basis of the resolution process, procedures for talking about differences can be developed which improve or possibly even heal shattered or adversarial *relationships*, which are at the source of all conflicts, but also provide the entry for change or healing⁹.

Limits to liberal, representative democracy and its ability to deal equitably with disputes between competing levels of government jurisdiction, business, citizens' groups and other interests, have propelled the search over the last two decades for new means of achieving consensus¹⁰.

The rational spirit of modernity and its implicit drive to domination has produced European-derived cultures addicted to winning. Coupled with a competitive theory of evolution, modern thinking has considered conflict, violence and the survival of the fittest as "natural". However, new studies in ecology and the social sciences have noted a relation between co-operative evolutionary principles in biological systems and co-operative strategies in human history¹¹.

8 Criteria of a good negotiate outcome developed by **Roger Fisher** and **William Ury** with **Bruce Patton**, editor, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, Business Books, London 1981. German edition, *Das Harvard-Konzept, Sach-gerecht verhandeln-erfolgreich verhandeln*, Campus Verlag, 1984.

9 The terms "conflict" and "dispute" are often used interchangeable. In this paper, "conflict" refers to deep-rooted, complex or systemic social-political disagreements, while "dispute" refers to a single-instance, local or limited disagreement. **Roger Fisher, Scott K. Brown**, *Getting Together, Building Relationships As We Negotiate*, Penguin Books, 1989. In German, *Gute Beziehungen. Die Kunst der Konfliktvermeidung, Konfliktloesung und Kooperation*, Campus Verlag, 1989.

10 **Lawrence Susskind** and **Jeffrey Cruikshank**, *Breaking the Impasse, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes*, Basic Books, New York, 1987. See especially pp. 35-79.

11 **Wurtele** and **Melchin** (footnote 6).

The need to rethink democracy and the cultural, not natural, basis of conflict, brings together people, "sharing a common urge that the world be made safe for diversity"¹².

Differences, whether objective or subjective, are not the source of conflict; rather a cultural predisposition to fight over differences has prevented the seeking of discursive means and procedures to manage, settle or fundamentally reconcile differences in building consensus and accepting pluralism.

Emerging inter-disciplinary theory and practice

This paper does not aim to provide an integrated overview of a subject which is characterized by tremendous diversity in terminology and perspectives and has emerged as the confluence of many social and political trends.

One important impetus is to be found in the American law reforms of the seventies and the work of professors at Harvard Law School to develop "mutually respectful problem-solving" with applications in family, neighbourhood, intra-institutional, consumer, environmental, inter-governmental and even international conflicts.

The field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has evolved in the legal and social-psychological professions, with extensive applications in the educational and corporate sectors. Over two dozen uses of third parties have been identified to assist in the process of non-litigated dispute settlement, containment or management, as an adjunct range of procedures alongside the American court system¹³.

Diverse organizations have been formed in the U.S., such as the National Institute for Conflict Resolution, the National Association for Mediation in Education, the National Institute for Citizen Participation and Negotiation (NICPAN), the Children's Creative Response to Conflict Program, as well as

12 "*Proclamation*" in *Alternative Dispute Resolution That Works*, by **E.G. Tannis**, Captus Press, York Univ., 1989, p. 140.

13 "*Origins of ADR*" in **Tannis** (footnote 14), pp. 7-22 and p. 29, 44, 68.

numerous neighbourhood justice centres or professional dispute resolution consultant firms, to name but a few¹⁴. More recently, efforts have begun to set up a unitary professional field, dispute systems design¹⁵.

In the corporate sector, ADR is increasingly recognised as a necessary part of management and organizational development and as a cheaper, less time-consuming way to settle claims with customers, for instance in the insurance or tourism businesses.

Consensus-building approaches to negotiation are a successful tool for solving intractable, multi-party public disputes, which involve confrontation over policy-making, setting of standards or allocation of public resources¹⁶. Consensus-building approaches also lead to solutions which are more satisfying for all parties than is the case with partisan lobbying and court action and has been directly or indirectly utilized in policy development at all three levels of jurisdiction.

In Canada, where a number of neighbourhood, commercial and legal/consultant initiatives have developed in the last ten years, some ADR enthusiasts note that the introduction of ADR has been less explosive in "a society... more inclined to negotiate and co-operate than to fight"¹⁷.

This brief glimpse should serve to give a sense of the broad range of practices which have by no means developed in a linear way. They are part of a social trend to change existing social patterns of behaviour as well as belief systems about how to deal with conflict.

In addition to *professional input*, another key stimulus has been the *ethical impulse* arising out of various inter-related forms of social activism such as social justice (anti-discrimination, anti-systemic violence), peace (anti-nuclearism, anti-militarism) social faith (particularly originating with Quaker and Mennonite communities, but also Christian ecumenism), ecology, local or participatory

14 See *Directory, Appendix F* in **Tannis** (footnote 14), pp. 145-150 and "*Resources for Conflict Resolution Education*", CICR.

15 **Tony Simons**, "*Practitioners of a New Profession? A Discussion Summary of the First Dispute Systems Design Conference*" in *Negotiation Journal* vol. 5, n. 4, October 1989.

16 **Susskind** and **Cruikshank** (footnote 10), introduction.

17 **Mr. Justice Allen M. Linden**, "*In Praise of Settlement: The Need for Co-operation*", *Canadian Community Law Journal*, vol. 7, n. 1, 1984, quoted in **Tannis** (footnote 14), p. 124.

democracy and minority rights (especially native North Americans, cultural minorities and gay rights)¹⁸.

The ethical impulse raises the value of participation over paternalism, pluralism over conformity and holds that individuals (particularly non-experts) as well as the communities to which they belong (in other words, non-state institutions) have a pivotal role to play in both local and global peace and justice and in the functioning of democratic societies. The corollary is that peace is not the absence of violence, but a positive condition which is actively created by both agencies of the state and by citizens themselves.

In turn, democracy is seen less as solely the delegation of decision-making to periodically chosen representatives, as it is the building of consensus, the cornerstone of democracy so to speak. Consensus is seen as a self-renewing process spanning the tension between agreement and difference, between the constitutional order of the state and the pluralist diversity of its citizens.

While conflict resolution as a field of *academic study* has existed for approximately three decades, early approaches tended to assume competitive over co-operative solutions¹⁹. It was pointed out by pioneers such as Anatol Rapoport that expectations about adversity may unnecessarily limit the range of alternatives available to conflicting parties. Recent win-win approaches which see conflict resolution in terms of a process of negotiation, emphasize either interest-based distributive negotiations involving trade-offs or need-based integrative negotiations, joint problem-solving and attention to underlying needs, or a mixture of both²⁰.

Approximately eight American universities carry inter-disciplinary programs dedicated to conflict resolution and/or negotiation. In Canada, the Inter-university Consortium on Dispute Resolution has recently been formed²¹.

18 I am indebted for the first three examples of the "ethical" stream to an interview with **Gerald Pottery**, executive director, Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution, (CICR) July 19, 1991. For background on second three examples see **Susskind** and **Cruikshank** (footnote 12), pp. 249-253.

19 For breakdown of the fields of conflict resolution, international negotiation, game theoretical approaches and third party roles, see *Conflict Resolution and Negotiation, Studies in International Relations: A Bibliography*, compiled by **Steven P. Douville**, **Michael Pearson**, **Bradley Feasey**, ed. by **Vivian Cummins**, Bibliography Series, 8, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1986.

20 **John H. Sigler**, "*Intro.*" Bibliography (footnote 21) p.v.

21 Director is Prof. **Brian Mandell**, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

It has been noted that how one deals with difference is rooted in culture and in one's belief system²². Attempts to export ADR or other techniques for dealing with conflict without concern for their cultural boundedness may hinder local "ownership".

In 1990, conflict resolution training was extended into eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with the Center on Applied Conflictology being founded in Moscow and the Centre on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution created at the University of Warsaw. Raymond Shonholtz, president of San Francisco-based NICPAN, sees negotiating models and collaborative problem-solving processes as a new way of "promoting citizen dialogue" during a period of rapid social, political and economic change in post-Communist countries. Some of the first trainees have included educators, trade unionists and others considered to be key players in the processes of shaping democracy, including members of social movements. Plans for training programs are underlay in Hungary and Bulgaria. The European Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution has been founded in Subotica in Voivodina²³.

A variety of techniques may be implemented to solve what appear to be very specific, even temporary disputes, such as may arise in schoolyards or neighbourhoods, as well as to address deep-rooted, systemic conflicts such as inter-ethnic strife or racial discrimination, which require expert intervention. All cases reflect a broader social and political challenge: to affirm non-adversarial discursive ways of dealing with difference and co-operative consensus-building as a legitimate part of our post-Cold War democratic culture.

The Yugoslav Case

The recognition by the international community that the Yugoslav union will not hold in its hitherto existing constitutional form, indeed, that no federal

22 **Neal Milner** and **Vicki Shook**, "Thinking About Inter-disciplinary Inquiry On Culture and Disputing", in *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 5, n. 2, April, 1989, pp. 133-147.

23 **Raymond Shonholtz**, "Teaching Conflict Resolution in Poland and the Soviet Union", *U.S. Institute of Peace Journal*, III (3) August 1990, p. 67; "Conflict Resolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", *U.S. IoPJ*, III (4) October, 1990, p. 13; *HCA News Bulletin*, n. 3 winter, 1992, p. 9.

institution is any longer functional, has been a long time in coming²⁴. Indeed, the view that the war is a symptom of the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, rather than its cause has come to prevail. Historical resentments, political manipulation and instrumentalization of the desire for self-determination, nationalist self-pity and self-aggrandizement and a profound disrespect for minority and civic rights both within and across republican borders have led to a spiral of violence and vengeance which at times escapes rational understanding.

It is not the intention of this paper to explain the origins of the conflict. To determine which conflict resolution method might be of relevance, however, some highlights of the conflict need to be outlined.

Many players in the multiple sets of dyadic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia display a fatalistic acceptance of military conflict, and violence and force as the arbiters of right. The new Croatian defence minister said last August of the impending battle: "We have been waiting for this moment for eight centuries"²⁵. Yet the broader significance of the war on Slovenian and Croatian territory which threatens to spread to other republics and other peoples, must also be noted: "it is a war which puts in doubt not only some recognition or other of national rights, not only the principles of self-determination, sovereignty and territorial identity, but all fundamental human values"²⁶.

As the conflict between Serbs and Croats first escalated into protracted fighting, suggestions were made for adjudication procedures in order to settle the dispute over sovereignty and territory without arms. One early proposal by Robert Badinter, head of the French constitutional court, saw the creation of a new European court²⁷. Another suggestion, first introduced by Austrian Foreign

24 Compare reactions in June ("The U.S. and the European Community... will not support the breakup of Yugoslavia..." in **Flora Lewis**, "Europe should prevent Civil War in Yugoslavia", *IHT*, June 1, 1991) and mid-October, when the EC attempted to broker a plan to transform the Yugoslav state into six independent republics in a common economic space, the first western recognition that Yugoslavia's dissolution was unavoidable, "Konfliktparteien ordneten zum zehntenmal Waffenruhe an", *Salzburger Nachrichten*, (SN) 19. Okt. '91, p. 4.

25 **Blaine Harden**, "Croatia and Serbia: Good Guys vs. Bad Guys, but Who's Who?" *IHT*, June 19, 1991, p. 6 and **William Pfaff**, "Poland is Providing a Lesson in Forgiving the Unforgettable", *IHT*, October 10, 1991, p. 6.

26 **Roksandić** (footnote 2).

27 **William Pfaff**, "Settle the Yugoslav Dispute in an International Court", *IHT*, July 3, 1991.

Minister Alois Mock, saw the creation of a mediating commission of "wise persons" made up of eminent people experienced in statecraft, perhaps convened by the CSCE²⁸.

However, any court's role is limited to interpreting the law and cannot resolve deep-seated psycho-social disagreements between the opposed sides. In addition, not all "stakeholders" in the conflict may be part of international, legal procedures. Some 18 disparate militias carry arms in Croatia, putting the lie to western assumptions about verticality of command structures²⁹.

Furthermore, the Serbo-Croatian conflict is only the tip of the iceberg. As Ervin Hladnik Milharčić has noted there is no single all-Yugoslav conflict. All conflicts are primarily of a local nature despite the attempt by political elites to construct themes part of overarching national struggles³⁰. Thus many more talks in addition to high-level government talks between republican and/or federal leaders must be instituted, to reach all local stakeholders.

This point could perhaps be met by the second suggestion, a body of eminent ex-politicians who would "listen to all sides". However, inclusivity of stakeholders is by itself insufficient. Unless attention is paid to the dynamics of the relationship between the disputants, quite apart from the substantive issues, negotiations will be unable to go beyond staking out the polarized and uncompromising positions which have already been articulated and which aim for unacceptable concessions or capitulation of the other side. Statements such as "we will fight, regardless of the cost, and we will win", or "the holding of the cease-fire will depend on the other side"³¹ exemplify win-lose, scarcity assumptions.

Given such a constellation, the use of outside coercive force to "settle" the conflict, that is, to impose an outcome, is inevitable and inevitably unstable. Any such imposed settlement, even if sanctioned by international law, inasmuch as it addresses only surface symptoms of the conflict, as in the respective *positions*

28 "Jugoslawien-Vermittler UdSSR", DS, 5/6 Okt. 1991, p. 3.

29 Vlasta Jalušić, "Es gab nie wirkliche Multikulturalität", Der Kranich, Dezember, 1991, pp. 11-14.

30 Quoted in Tomaz Mastnak, "Jugoslawien-ein Sammelbegriff fuer Konflikte" in Alpe Adria, Informationsblatt der Alpe-Adria Friedensbewegung, n. 4 Herbst 1991, pp. 9-10.

31 Croatian foreign minister Šeparović, echoing opinion of "man-the-street", in "Die Kroaten fuehlen sich von der ganzen Welt in Stich gelassen", SN, 21. Sept. 1991, p. 4. Federal deputy defence minister Negovanović in "Das Eroberte steht nicht zur Diskussion" in SN, 19. Sept. 1991, p. 4.

and *interests* of the sides involved, would leave out some festering resentment or unaddressed *needs*, i.e. the underlying subjective sources of the conflict.

Given the unsuccessful record of EC and UN attempts to mediate in the fighting in Yugoslavia, the question must be posed: how to sequence outside intervention to: a) stop the fighting and b) assist the development of working relationship(s) between political elites which will allow the warring sides to perceive negotiation not as defeat but as a viable option?

However, working on the relationship at the highest level, is not enough. Even a cursory look at recent events suggests that the military conflict over territory and sovereignty between the Serbs and the Croats is embedded in a larger, historical conflict. As one Serb justified military action: "we must first have justice for the crimes the Croats committed against us in the (Second World) War"³².

Reports of wanton violence and revenge on both sides suggest a situation which fits Deutsch's model of a malignant social process; i.e. an anarchic social situation with no regard for the welfare of the other side, irreconcilable competition and hostility, cognitive rigidity including stereotypes which are not matched by reality, self-fulfilling prophecies, vicious, escalating spirals and a gamesmanship orientation or abstract conflict over images of power³³.

While many Croats do not feel responsible for "Tudjman's" war and are reluctant to put on the shirt of Croatian extreme nationalism (mirrored by similar responses among Serbs to "Milosević's" war), others take up the nationalist parsing of the situation.

Fuelling the war is the destructive form of nationalist group identity fanned by political leaders on both sides. Gyorgy Konrad describes the nationalist atmosphere as a kind of *deja vu* of the passions of the Second World War: "What is now being played out is not politics, but a vendetta all over again"³⁴.

32 William Pfaff (footnote 27).

33 "Deutsch's Social Psychological Approach" adapted from M. Deutsch, "The Prevention of World War III: A Psychological Perspective" (1983) in Ronald J. Fisher and Loreleigh Keashly, "Toward a Contingency Approach to Third-Party Intervention in Regional Conflict", Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-party Mediators, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Working Paper, n. 12, May 1988, pp. 47, 50-1.

34 Gyorgy Konrad quoted in Alpe/Adria 4/91, p. 11.

According to needs theory, the need for identity is considered to be the first and most fundamental need³⁵. While basically a positive force, it can also seek negative satisfaction by escalating conflict given certain external conditions. In order to interrelate positively in the social and also international context, each group must receive the necessary recognition and experience the security necessary to support its unique identity.

Nationalism, according to social psychologists³⁶, is thus the distortion of the legitimate need for group identity and the normal tendency to see one's own group in a favourable way, into a competitive evaluation of one's own group as unique and superior to others. Thus ethnocentrism compensates for a threatened group identity by in group glorification and selective solidarity, reinforced by negative attitudes towards other groups.

In situations where the conflict evolves over time or escalates (see Glasl's four stages of conflict escalation)³⁷, the image or perception of the other moves from respect and accuracy to stereotype to attribution of evil to disqualification of the other as inhuman. In such a polarized relationship, dominated by a total lack of communication and the impulse to attack or hurt the other, negotiation itself may be perceived with a sense of danger. Consider Kelman's analysis of the decades-old conflict between Israelis and Palestinians: "the psychological essence of the conflict is a zero-sum clash between two nationalist movements each struggling for national identity and existence and making claims on the same territory"³⁸.

The parallels with the relationship between those Serbs and Croats who are at war are obvious. In the Yugoslav context, Tudjman and Milosević are partly fanning the fires of nationalism and partly responding to the public mood. The margin of people in all republics who resist the pressure of interpreting the conflict along ethnic lines of "us" vs. "them" and who see the need to enlarge the space for citizens' anti-war activities in a common, though not necessarily identical, democratic struggle, is preciously slim.

35 **Ronald J. Fisher**, *Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict*, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, ed. by **John Burton**, St. Martin's Press New York, pp. 89-112.

36 **R.J. Fisher**, "Pre-negotiation problem-solving discussions: enhancing the potential for successful negotiation", *International Journal*, (IJ), XLIV spring 1989, p. 452.

37 See **Fisher** and **Keashley** (footnote 35), pp. 48, 54 and **Loreleigh Keashly** and **Ronald J. Fisher**, "Towards a contingency approach to third party intervention in regional conflict: A Cyprus illustration", *IJ*, XLV spring 1990, p. 435.

38 Summarized in **Keashly and Fisher** (footnote 39), p. 460.

Facilitative conditions can be created for inter-group contact to reduce prejudice and hatred, i.e. to de-escalate conflict. The problem-solving workshop developed for international conflicts (Fisher following Burton, Doob, Cohen and Kelman)³⁹ in order to influence political decision-makers can only be a partial initiative. As authors of this approach all agree, the key question is how to transfer the perceptual and other positive effects experienced by the participants of the problem-solving workshop to the broader social relationship.

Kelman, Fisher and others largely operate out of a conventional paradigm of international relations which concentrates on processes engaging politicians, diplomatic officials and "influentials". Thus they have concentrated on transferring these effects to foreign policy decision-makers and have designed the workshops and selected "influentials" with this impact in mind.

I would argue that a complementary tack must be taken to attempt to transfer these effects, especially the improvement of the inter-ethnic relationship, onto the public at large. In an open society where freedom of information and the press is guaranteed, it would be relatively easy to select problem-solving workshop participants, such as journalists, scholars, writers, artists, who play a role in forming public opinion. In societies where nationalist conflict intersects with an interrupted or halting process of democratization, press freedom has been severely curtailed⁴⁰. A sensitive selection of opinion-forming representatives engaged in anti-war activities could strengthen the independent, democratic forces of civil society⁴¹.

What is urgently needed is skill-training which will empower ordinary citizens to integrate discursive, non-adversarial conflict resolution into their daily lives.

39 **Fisher** (footnote 9).

40 For restrictions against journalists and press on both sides: "News aus dem Lautsprecher", *DS*, 20. Sept. 1991 and "Kroatien: Journalisten sprechen von 'Mediensauberung'", *DS*, 22. Okt. 1991. See also "Warby, for and on the media", *Yugofax*, n. 3, 21. Sept. 1991. For role of media in conflict resolution and training of "CR journalists" see "The media as mediator" in *The Australian Conflict Resolution Network news*, vol. 18, April 1991, p. 1.

41 Substantive disagreements between Yugoslav participants at the Schlaining meeting (Nov. 13-17, 1991) at times suggested ethnic partisanship was getting in the way of rational argument. Lacking a psycho-social framework for reflecting on these dynamics, the meeting ignored them. Such frictions suggest, however, that intellectuals cannot merely dismiss the question of nationalism as irrational. It is uncanny how nationalist claims creep in through the back door the more one denies them. Third-party consultation could accommodate the need of intellectuals to reflect on their national bias in a safe context. For insight into what many intellectuals fear see **Slavenka Drakulić**, "The Smothering Pull of Nationhood", *Yugofax*, October 31, 1991, p. 3.

Fisher's social-psychological model has also been used to create facilitative conditions for inter-group contact in a multi-ethnic, majority/minority situation⁴². A comprehensive programme should be considered for those regions where no amount of constitutional or border "fixing" will alter the fact that diverse cultural or religious groups must live side by side. Based on socio-psychological principles, activities stressing intercultural dialogue, action research projects and the creation of local joint-committees, could help each group maintain and strengthen its own identity, autonomy and security, while reducing ignorance and prejudice on all sides and promoting inter-relationship and collaboration on matters of common concern.

However, conflict resolution measures at the inter-group level will not have a lasting effect without changes at the policy level. Intercultural understanding, as Fisher points out, also requires comprehensive and integrated policies of bi- or multi-lingualism and bi- or multi-culturalism, inter-cultural education and training programs to encourage the development of a multicultural society founded on integration (acceptance) and equality anchored in constitutionally recognized rights.

The advantage of Fisher's eclectic model of third-party consultation derives from its concentration on the subjective, underlying causes of conflict with a view to improving the relationship between the parties and preparing them for functional co-operation⁴³. A limitation to this approach is that it requires the involvement of trained, specialized social scientists/practitioners. They must be adequately funded to accompany an extended programme of workshops and a range of supplementary activities, including recruiting and training. The institutionalization of interactive conflict resolution for use in international conflicts must be urgently addressed⁴⁴.

Given the extensive requirements of the social-psychological approach, other activities should also be considered, utilizing a complementary but distinct methodology which can be learned in relatively short training workshops by non-specialists. In contrast to approaches which focus on the relational, subjective aspects of conflict, these methods concentrate on the substantive, objective, interest based aspects of conflict (without disregarding the former). Some form

⁴² Fisher (footnote 37), p. 94-100.

⁴³ Fisher (footnote 38), p. 447.

⁴⁴ Ronald J. Fisher, "Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Training, Funding and Institutionalization", paper for International Society of Political Psychology, Jul, 1991.

of ADR, consensus-building, principled negotiation or peer mediation, could be taught on a community basis by experienced mediators and negotiation practitioners.

Models popularized by the "Getting to Yes" approach of the Harvard Project on Negotiation, which highlights unassisted negotiation, as well as forms of assisted negotiation which emphasize community peacemaking would be appropriate⁴⁵. Some of these approaches will be briefly outlined in the next section.

A corollary to this effort would be the introduction of conflict resolution skills curriculum and peer mediation training into schools, if the heritage of hatred, distrust, violence and revenge is to be replaced with a culture of co-operation and enhanced self-esteem⁴⁶.

Finally, the issue of cross-cultural transfer of knowledge should be raised. Some highlights follow of conflict resolution training on the Mohawk Akwesasne Reserve in May, 1990. Their experience has shown that no amount of well-intentioned outside meddling can be effective, unless the process of conflict resolution is "fully owned" by the people who engage in it and who are ultimately to benefit from it.

Matching the Conflict to a Process⁴⁷

1. A Social-psychological Approach

From the brief analysis of the Yugoslav case given, it would appear that the complexities and diversity of conflicts in Yugoslavia require approaches which are flexible, have potential for profound social healing or integration, address social *needs* quite apart from *interests* and are based in an articulated ethos of

⁴⁵ See Jennifer E. Beer, *Peacemaking in your Neighborhood: Reflections on an Experiment in Community Mediation*, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1986; M. Scott Peck, *The Different Drum-Community Making and Peace*, Touchstone, New York, 1987; Christopher C. Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the consultant's role*, Nicholas, New York, 1981.

⁴⁶ For example, workshop entitled "Classroom Management and cultural diversity" recommended by CICR.

⁴⁷ Matching a dispute to a process was first set out by Frank E. A. Sander in "Varieties of Dispute Processing" (1976), cited in Tannis (footnote 14), p. 44.

democratization. The third party consultation approach developed by Ronald Fisher meets all three requirements⁴⁸.

Fisher constructs his scientific inquiry within the broader philosophy of humanism, which stresses participatory democracy, democratization of institutions and individual freedom with responsibility in realizing one's full potential⁴⁹.

In a recent comprehensive volume on the social psychology of intergroup and international conflict⁵⁰, Fisher presents a new paradigm for linking theory development and empirical research in natural settings: the social scientist/practitioner. His objective is to explicate high intensity, protracted conflicts and to present methods of third-party intervention which can facilitate their resolution.

A key to Fisher's "eclectic model of conflict" is the interaction of variables at multiple levels of analysis: individual-level variables (perceptions, attitudes, cognition), group-level variables (norms, identity, cohesion) and the intergroup level (communication, interaction, cultural distance). The context for inter-group conflict may be organizational, communal, societal or international. The model is dynamic, identifying when these variables gain prominence (antecedents, orientations, processes, outcomes) and stresses the process rather than the content of conflict. Fisher's model further provides ten inter-group, five group and five individual "principles or laws of interaction"⁵¹.

Using Fisher's eclectic model of conflict, Keashly and Fisher have developed the contingency approach to third-party intervention, according to which the analysis of the symptoms, sources and stages of escalation of the conflict provide a rationale for the type and sequencing of intervention required⁵². States of low-intensity conflict, according to this approach, are amenable to traditional forms of dispute management, such as negotiation, mediation or arbitration, which emphasize objective or substantive aspects of conflict.

48 **Fisher** (footnote 9). Space does not permit listing all of Fisher's publications since 1972, beginning with "*Third party consultation: A method for the study and resolution of conflict*", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16, pp. 67-94.

49 **Fisher** (footnote 37), p. 90.

50 **R.J. Fisher**, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution*, Springer Verlag, N.Y., 1990.

51 **Fisher** (footnote 37), p. 103.

52 **Keashly and Fisher** (footnote 39).

High-intensity conflicts consist of threats to fundamental needs which are not met by interest-based settlements. Third-party consultation broadens the range of experiences which are open to analysis, including an analysis of underlying social needs. This form of intervention concentrates on controlling the process of interaction, rather than controlling the contents or outcome.

Third-party consultation aims to: a) transform attitudes in the direction of mutual positive motivation for problem-solving, b) increase openness and accuracy of communication, and c) improve the relationship as a prerequisite for de-escalating the conflict to the point where the substantive issues of the conflict can be addressed by traditional dispute management⁵³.

Using the contingency approach to third party intervention, Keashly and Fisher have analyzed the evolution of the Cyprus conflict and the history of outside interventions which included third-party consultation workshops on several occasions⁵⁴. They match historical events against Glasl's conflict escalation sequence: debate, polarization, segregation, destruction. Each stage is typified by changes in four dimensions: interaction, images/perceptions of the other, main issue, possible outcome. One of the reasons for "failure" of third party intervention in the Cyprus case was that its application was inappropriate to the stage of escalation in which it was attempted.

From the model, it is evident that attempts to negotiate substantive issues cannot be effective at the fourth stage, when communication between the parties is non-existent, national images have eroded to non-human form, and the relationship is characterized by hopelessness. This is confirmed by an analysis of the protracted Cyprus conflict. While other hurdles also impeded a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, a "lack of co-ordination and sequencing of third party efforts combined with the under-utilisation of consultation may have rendered a whole host of efforts impotent". Keashly and Fisher further suggest that intervention based on the interests of outside powers, instead of on an analysis of the conflict, was not only unsuccessful but possibly contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Applied to the Serbo-Croatian case, which by all accounts has reached the stage of destruction, it is not difficult to assess why attempts to mediate negotiations have been unsuccessful. At the fourth level of conflict escalation, the nature of communication is too distorted, commitment to the relationship is lacking, and belief in joint possible gain is replaced by a tendency to think that

53 **Ibid.**, p. 439.

54 **Keashly and Fisher** (footnote 39). Quote at pp. 452-3.

there can be no winner and that survival must be defended at the cost of the opponent's destruction.

Working from Fisher et al. models, the primary aim at the moment should be to de-escalate the conflict back down through the stages of escalation, beginning with a power intervention to separate the warring sides and to control the violence. This step could be followed by arbitration if acceptable to the parties or mediation with muscle, i.e., a mediator with the power to influence the parties by providing rewards or inducing costs. The outcome of such interventions is a temporary settlement to control hostility long enough to undertake consultation in order to establish functional co-operation and to pave the way for negotiations on substantive issues.

Third-party consultation is seen as crucial to re-establishing communication, improving the relationship and reaching a commitment to joint problem-solving. Only then can the parties to the conflict productively begin to identify the key issues. Strategies such as negotiation are dependent on this stage. The third-party refrains from offering solutions to the conflict, but rather assists the parties in jointly identifying the key issues and possible solutions themselves.

Given what is known about complex, intense and intractable conflicts, of which some main lines have been given here, failure to actively sequence and co-ordinate third party interventions can have disastrous and long-term consequences.

2. "We Can Work it Out" - the Community Approach

The promise of personal empowerment and enhancement of justice has led to the popular spread of basic dispute resolution concepts and skills (ADR) in North America. By ADR, I mean non-adversarial, discursive means and procedures for resolving disputes (as opposed to conflicts), including both unassisted and assisted forms of negotiation, conciliation, mediation or simply peacemaking.

The approach popularized by Roger Fisher and William Ury in *Getting to Yes* is particularly useful in the community and neighbourhood setting. The text is a classic which is required reading in ADR training and forms the basis for applications in diverse settings, wherever people want to handle their differences discursively rather than with force, while seeking mutual gain.

Without presenting the method in detail, I would like to suggest some of its advantages, appropriate contexts for application, as well as some limitations.

MIROVNI INŠTITUT
Ljubljana

Principled negotiation presupposes a communicative or discursive commitment, regardless of the distribution of power as defined by social standing, affluence or political influence. For Fisher and Ury, negotiation "is back-and-forth communication designed to reach agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed"⁵⁵. Haggling over the price of antique furniture, discussions to avert a workers strike or arguments between landlords and tenants are all circumscribed by a commitment to talk. Since this competence lies within the reach of every person above the age of 3 or 4, it has potentially universal application.

Key notions in this method include the separation of the people from the problem, treating the latter as a shared task which both sides address side-by-side. Secondly, the separation of the process or negotiation procedures from the substantive issues to be discussed, allows for an articulation of the process itself, an essential task in so far as social or cultural differences affect each party's communicative competence. Identifying the process allows it to be altered or improved, even unilaterally.

Developing options for mutual gain is the essence of principled negotiation. A win-win posture which concentrates on satisfying the broader *interests* of both sides rather than on splitting the difference between their entrenched *positions* or "bottom line" is perhaps culturally the most challenging idea of principled negotiation. It assumes that non-adversarial postures can release the creative inventiveness necessary to bridge, resolve, combine, but not compromise, apparent differences.

Interests here are defined very broadly to include needs, concerns, fears and hopes. In looking beyond positions, both sides may discover some interests which are shared or compatible in addition to those which are opposed.

Deciding the issues on their merits, that is, according to some objective standard of fairness or justice which both sides subscribe to, not only settles the dispute but allows both sides to leave the negotiation with their relationship intact, while building community at the same time. In appealing to standards independent of the will of either side, principled negotiation serves to uncover and affirm what we hold in common as members of the same neighbourhood,

⁵⁵ Fisher and Ury (footnote 10), p. xi.

region, country or planet, that is, the "overarching framework of shared values"⁵⁶. Broadening the context within which we define the common good is a key element.

Principled negotiation implies a theory of communication which holds that the source of conflict is not an objective reality per se as much as it is in the way we think and talk about our differences. The communicative basis of principled negotiation aims to allow each side to see the problem as the other sees it. Due to factors which can impede or constrain communication between the sides, outside mediators are sometimes required to control the dialogue, slow down its pace, encourage active listening, exchange roles or restate intended meanings. Different approaches to mediation vary the extent to which the mediator controls the process, the content and even the outcome.

The elaboration of Fisher and Ury's basic method by Fisher and Brown in *Getting Together*, focuses on the relational aspects of negotiation captured with the term, "a working relationship". The latter requires: rationality, understanding, communicativeness, trust, persuasion and existential acceptance. Relationships in which these qualities are developed are better able, it is argued, to deal with disagreement. At the same time, a method is provided for improving the relationship through unilateral action or unconditional constructivity.

Principled negotiation and relationship-building, while compatible with the use of a neutral third party, build upon unassisted negotiation. They are thus useful in community settings by providing a general model for the non-expert. The methods are presented in accessible, colloquial language and integrate common sense notions in a popular psychology.

Versions of this negotiation strategy for mutual gain have been adapted for children of all ages, as young as kindergarten level. The teaching of affirmation, co-operation, communication and peaceful resolution of conflict, especially in multi-ethnic communities, represents a cultural shift of values⁵⁷.

Several limitations affect the application of principled negotiation and derived ADR approaches in Yugoslavia. These approaches assume a culture of talking

⁵⁶ For "framework of shared values" and the concept of cultural democracy see J.J. Smolicz, *Who is an Australian?, Identity, Core Values and Resilience of Culture*, Univ. of Adelaide, Multicultural Education Coordinating Committee, July 1989.

⁵⁷ Elmwood area school Conflict Resolution Project, objective no. 8: "to prepare students better for life in a multicultural world by emphasizing listening to others' point of view and the peaceful resolution of differences" in *Common Ground*, vol. 1, n. 2 (spring) 1991, p. 10, published by CICR.

out disagreements, a predisposition to discursive contention. As the Beatles once sang: "life is very short, and there is no time for fussing and fighting my friend... we can work it out". They assume relationships which are clearly demarcated by a specific context: the merchant and buyer, the boss and employee, the divorcing couple, the hijacker and the police. A situation such as civil war, where the "sides" are less clearly defined, is more difficult. Part of the task faced by nationalist forces in the Yugoslav conflict is to convince the population to "line up" on either one side or the other. War propaganda plays a particularly vital role in this regard. ADR applied in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods could help uncover the common standard of fairness and justice which once allowed these communities to live peacefully side-by-side.

ADR assumes that interests (needs, concerns, hopes) can be articulated. What if these are contradictory or unknown? Separate procedures are needed for uncovering interests. In the case of negotiations between representatives of organizations, intra-group communication and consensus-building procedures are required for authorized representation during negotiations, as well as to ensure that the community is not left behind in the educational and transformative process which takes place during negotiations.

In cases where a neutral third party is required, problems arise in cultural settings where neutrality is viewed with suspicion. Mediators who enjoy the trust of all parties or carry undisputed moral authority may be preferable, even if they are not neutral.

These problems may not apply in limited settings such as neighbourhoods or communities. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that no single method of ADR, principled negotiation or plan for a working relationship will work for everybody. In this field, eclecticism may be of great advantage.

3. Conflict resolution at the Mohawk Akwesasne Reserve

In May of 1990, the Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR) was asked to assist the 10,000 member Mohawk community of Akwesasne in finding alternatives to the prevailing method of settling disputes, which was to call in the police⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ "Summary of the Report to the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne Concerning a Peacemaking Process", CICR, Sept. 12, 1990.

Two consultants from the CICR⁵⁹ arrived along with dozens of other people, many of them expert professionals in conflict resolution. In the end, the experts were sent away and the CICR self-acknowledged "dedicated amateurs" remained as process consultants or conveners. Central to their "success" was sensitivity to the question of "ownership" or legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the community. First and foremost, this involved setting up a process perceived as independent of any entrenched interests at the reserve, which would in turn set up the process of conflict resolution to be operated and used by the community. This two stage-procedure was called "a process to set up a process".

Together with the community's spiritual elders, the one institution invested with unchallenged respect, the conveners designed a process for peacemaking, which retrieved traditional native values rooted in non-violence and embedded in the ancestral Great Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy.

Community ownership would not have been possible if the conveners did not "hook up" with native traditions. Interestingly, these values lay dormant, even if they had fallen into disuse after centuries of colonization and dispossession and more recent crises of identity in the community.

In contrast to other experts, the CICR conveners did not arrive with preconceived notions, but rather worked to develop credibility by offering to create a process together with the community, indeed to "grow" into it together. Likewise ownership within the native community could not be imposed from the top. Continuous efforts were made to avoid marginalization, to seek balance and acceptance by all, even by extreme "factions".

It is difficult to assess what "model" of conflict resolution was adopted in this community. One convener called it a "model which is not a model", more like an eclectic framework of options whose elements could be adapted by the community. Sken-nen-kowa, or an "organization for peace" was the name given to a new community service, including native mediators trained in 2-3 day courses.

The process of adaptation of conflict resolution methods, such as mediation or consultation, had much in common with translation or mapping of certain notions onto the native experience. "Spiritual healing" or "reconciliation" might be a more pertinent way of contextualizing these processes in native culture⁶⁰.

59 Interview with **Gerald Pottery** (footnote 18).

60 Interview with Prof. **Brian Mandell**, October 1, 1991.

The question of community ownership and acceptance is a fragile one. The need for time so that such a process can be fully integrated by the community was emphasized over and over, bearing in mind that "not all people are at the same stage of readiness for the process". By one estimate, it could take 10-20 years for the peacemaking process to be fully owned by the community.

The CICR conveners resisted the temptation to be regarded as "experts" (so described by natives) who are distinguished by their professional status or formal certification. Approaching those who need assistance from this perspective induces permanent dependency, possibly jeopardizing the goal of community ownership. Conflict resolution, as one nonvenor emphasized, is easy. "Anyone can do it".

The Akwesasne example not only illustrates the many factors affecting community ownership of ADR and related methods. It also suggests that "pre-modern" societies cannot hope to live peacefully with pluralism simply by applying social, political or judicial structures fashioned according to liberal democratic principles. Democracy, insofar as it means not only a political practice but the day-to-day experience of "living with difference", requires a cultural shift towards authentic pluralism. Dialogue-enhancing, dispute-resolving techniques can empower ordinary citizens non-violently, while the constitutional and legal infrastructure of representative democracy evolves.

Conclusion

A brief overview of conflict and dispute resolution from a North American perspective has been given, in particular as it offers a possibility for rethinking the cultural and social foundations of democracy.

Recognizing the diversity of alternative approaches, two models for application in complementary settings in the Yugoslav case are discussed. The Ronald Fisher et al. social-psychological contingency approach to third-party consultation would be appropriate at the political or diplomatic level for decision-makers and influentials, as well as for opinion-leaders within civil society. A precondition is an end to the fighting, which according to theories of conflict escalation will not occur without outside peacekeeping intervention.

The Roger Fisher et al. method of principle negotiation and relationship-building is appropriate to community-based efforts at local dispute resolution.

One form of application might be in the post-war reconstruction period when multi-ethnic neighbourhoods seek means of healing.

Problems connected with cross-cultural transference of conflict and dispute resolution methods, especially the importance of community ownership, have been discussed in the third case.

One of the most eloquent spokesmen for living peacefully with difference is the Polish politician, editor and moralist Adam Michnik. On the occasion of receiving the Shofar award, in April, 1991, he said: "I accept this award as one of those who are for a tolerant state, a state in which there is room for many cultures, many different personal histories, and many points of view. I am for a country that will create a stable democracy; for an open society that will be able to protect itself against the invasion of barbaric hatred... I speak for a therapy that will emerge from the effort to understand the disease. Such therapy, a permanent therapy, is what all countries need today"⁶¹.

In reflecting on how to achieve such a goal in Yugoslavia, we may also consider how far our own societies have yet to travel.

⁶¹ Adam Michnik, "Poland and the Jews", *The New York Review of Books*, vol. 38, n. 10, May 30, 1991, pp. 11-12.

Paula Gutlove

Psychology and Conflict Resolution: Toward a New Diplomacy

Protracted, violent conflicts rooted in ethnic, religious, racial, cultural or ideological differences beset the world and appear immune to traditional attempts at resolution. Such ethno-national enmity is complex and derives from the interaction of psychological, economic and cultural forces. Psychiatrist John Mack has described these forces as including "individual and group fear and hostility (which are often intimately related); competition over scarce resources (or resources which appear to be limited); the need of individuals to identify with a larger group or cause that gives their lives transcendent meaning; a human tendency to externalize responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions; and a peculiar susceptibility, more dangerous and easily exploited in this age of mass communications, to being manipulated emotionally by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest."¹

Unresolved ethnic and sectarian conflict may surge to the surface when authoritarian or totalitarian regimes dissolve. Such is the case in Yugoslavia, which held together peacefully under the authoritarian rule of Tito. Conflict now rends the fabric of life within Yugoslavia, with ramifications felt beyond its borders. Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands (host of September's European Community peace conference) has asserted that the Yugoslavian crisis not only threatens the security of the Balkan region but that of Europe as a whole. Moreover, the struggles being waged in Yugoslavia may foreshadow ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the disintegrating Soviet Union and elsewhere.

As we see in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, deeply ingrained belief systems are extremely resistant to attempted change by political leaders

¹ Mack, J. E. (1990). "The Enemy System", In Volkan, Julius and Montville (Eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.

especially if beliefs are reinforced by intense feelings of victimhood by the parties involved. The bitter conflict in Yugoslavia is characterized by intense enmity and violence among ethnic groups, rooted in each group's historic experience of traumatic loss and its perception of victimhood. Under such circumstances, communication among parties in conflict is nearly impossible because they see, across the bargaining table, not the faces of other human beings but the embodiment of a feared or hated stereotype. Thus, the search for peaceful, sustainable solutions depends on the ability of conflicting parties to correct misperceptions, break down stereotypes, establish constructive avenues of communication, and adopt a problem-solving approach to the substantial differences in values and needs that exist between them.

Is such a transformation of public consciousness possible? Mass communication can help to create knowledge about new ideas, but it doesn't necessarily cause people to adopt them. Attitudes tend to change when interpersonal communication networks are created whereby respected opinion leaders at a variety of levels gradually accept new information as valid. Communications studies show that once an innovative idea is accepted by 15-20% of a population, the idea can take hold and spread throughout the population by informal networks.²

Changing the attitudes and belief systems of parties in conflict demands interactions among parties that reverse the processes which have fed, escalated and perpetuated the conflict. Psychologically sensitive intervention by a neutral party can facilitate such interactions and can address the emotional distancing, negative stereotyping and dehumanizing that typically exist between adversaries. Intervention is likely to be minimally effective in the midst of acute violent conflict, because the necessary process of gradual confidence building between representatives of groups in conflict will be overwhelmed by the passions of the moment. However, intervention can be enormously productive when applied after violent conflict or during a break in the violence, such as a cease-fire, and can help parties engage in negotiations toward a lasting peace.

It has not been in the purview of traditional diplomacy to address the underlying psychological sources of conflict nor to use psychologically sensitive techniques to promote communication among adversaries. An alternative to traditional diplomacy, called multi-track, or track two diplomacy, has evolved to fill this gap. Track two diplomacy, as defined by U.S. Foreign Service officer Joseph Montville in 1981, is "unofficial, informal interaction between members

² Montville, J. V., (1991) The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution, in Sandole, and H. van der Merwe (Eds) *Conflict Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester University Press.

of adversarial groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that resolve their conflict."³ This intermediate form of diplomacy is more structured and goal-directed than is most citizen diplomacy. It is also more oriented toward relationship-building than are traditional diplomacy and mediation. Recently, the term multi-track diplomacy⁴ has been used to describe a wide range of activities that contribute to peacemaking, including with track one and track two diplomacy, peacemaking initiatives made through the business community, religious community, citizen groups and others.

Track two diplomacy serves as a complement to traditional diplomatic efforts and can be particularly useful when formal, track one efforts do not allow officials the latitude to develop a collaborative relationship or the freedom to creatively explore solutions to joint problems. By providing an opportunity for confidential interactions among high-level but unofficial representatives of parties engaged in protracted conflict, track two diplomacy can allow participants to explore new ways of relating to each other.

It is difficult to document specific successes in unofficial diplomatic interventions because of the need for confidentiality and the difficulty of tracing the roots of change to their "unofficial" sources. However, many people believe some substantial achievements have been made in this realm in Soviet-American relations⁵ and in the Middle East.⁶ Many significant Track Two efforts took place in the 1970s and 1980s between leading American and Soviet citizens, and between Israelis and Palestinians. The dramatic change in US-Soviet relations in the last ten years undoubtedly owes a great deal to track two efforts. A member of the Policy Planning staff in the State Department, Aaron Miller, has commented that many of the positive developments in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship during the 1980s can also be attributed to track two efforts.⁷

³ Montville, J. V. (1987). "The Arrow and the Olive Branch", in J. W. McDonald and D. B. Bendahmane (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*. Foreign Service Institute, U.S. State Department.

⁴ Diamond, Louise, and McDonald, John (1991). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis*. The Iowa peace Institute, Grinnell, Iowa

⁵ Stewart, P. D. (1987) "The Dartmouth Conference: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations", In J. W. McDonald and D.B. Bendahmane (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*. Foreign Service Institute U.S. State Department.

⁶ Montville, Ibid.

⁷ Personal communication from Joseph V. Montville, 1991.

Over the last twenty years a growing number of practitioners and scholars, representing a wide range of disciplines and philosophies, have facilitated communication in a track two context. In carefully designed small group settings, third party facilitators have applied methods from human relations training, organizational consulting, and a range of other disciplines including psychology, psychiatry, sociology, law, and diplomacy. Workshops have been held to address a variety of conflicts, including those in: Northern Ireland; the Middle East; Malaysia-Indonesia; Horn of Africa; Cyprus; Sri-Lanka; Falklands-Malvinas; and Lebanon; and the U.S. - U.S.S.R. confrontation.

Some of these track two efforts have sought to address protracted ethnic and sectarian conflicts through a process of interactive problem solving, or interactive conflict resolution⁸. Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) has four basic premises: (1) an emphasis upon transforming relationships between conflicting parties; (2) sensitivity to social and psychological dimensions of conflict; (3) attention to basic human needs (i.e. identity, recognition, security and equity); and (4) the promotion of collaborative problem-solving.

ICR utilizes a third party consultant who facilitates interactions between conflicting parties in small group or workshop sessions. The participants in the interactions are usually unofficial but influential members of the groups in conflict. The objectives of the interventions vary. Participants might come together with the primary goal of improving their understanding of the other and moving beyond one-dimensional stereotyped images. Groups may choose, in addition, to search for deeper understanding of the underlying roots of conflict. Some ICR interventions provide a context for airing grievances, for accepting responsibility for hurts inflicted and for mourning of losses.

This interactive approach to solving problems draws philosophically and practically upon a psychotherapeutic model, as discussed by one of its founders and most eminent practitioners, social psychologist Herbert Kelman.⁹ The work has a healing purpose, and is designed to create conditions for attitudinal and structural changes, with the ultimate goal of transforming the relationship between adversarial parties. There is an attempt to create a "working trust" based

⁸ **Fisher, Ronald.** (1990) "Defining and Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution", Appendix C in Gutlove, P. (1990) *Facilitating Dialogue Across Ideological Divides, a Report on a Workshop*. The Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA.

⁹ **Kelman, Herbert C.**, (1990) "Interactive Problem Solving: The Uses and Limits of a Therapeutic Model for the Resolution of International Conflicts". In Volkan, Julius and Montville (Eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.

upon a mutual recognition that the parties have common interests in spite of their profound differences. The third party is usually a common repository for this working trust and is there to assure that the interests and confidences of members of the group will be protected. The parties analyze the conflict, putting aside their typical adversarial mode of interaction to probe the meaning of the conflict, its causes, its history, and the constraints to its resolution. They focus on basic human needs (identity, security, recognition and acceptance), each party setting out its own needs before any attempt is made to search for solutions. This may serve to redefine the parameters of a dispute. For example, a dispute that appears to be over territory might be recast as a dispute over identity and security needs, thus opening new options in the search for resolution. The parties are encouraged and guided to move away from their usual mode of behavior, the conflict mode, to alternative modes, including listening openly, speaking honestly, analyzing problems, and engaging jointly in the search for resolution of problems. Only solutions that are jointly created will reflect the concerns and needs of the different parties involved and will engender their commitment.

A frequent component in ICR intervention is a multi-day private meeting, known as a problem-solving workshop¹⁰, which brings together conflicting parties and a third party. As with most ICR interventions, the workshop participants are usually "unofficial" but high level, influential members of the communities in conflict. Official interactions are frequently characterized by communications directed more to one's constituencies than to other participants. Such interactions serve to reinforce existing images and strengthen polarized positions. Participants engaged in "unofficial" interactions, on the other hand, can interact with minimal commitment and thus see the problem-solving workshop as an opportunity to learn about the adversary rather than to make a political statement. In this context they can have the freedom to explore new ideas and shift from rigidly held positions. The "third party" is charged with bringing the conflicting parties together and facilitating constructive communication between them. This is done by providing the participants with an appropriate context in which to interact, by providing an alternative set of "norms" to govern the parties' interactions, and by judicious interventions. These interventions might be theoretical inputs (which could provide tools for analysis of the conflict), content observations (providing interpretation or pointing out implications of what is actually being said), or process observations (relating the behavior of the parties in the workshop to the conflict within the communities they represent). Throughout the workshop, an effort is made to preserve a

¹⁰ **Kelman, Herbert, C.** (1986) "Interactive Problem Solving, A Social Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution" In W. Klassen (Eds.), *Dialogue Toward Interfaith Understanding*, Tantor/Jerusalem: Ecumenical Institute for Theological Research.

balance between having the participants engage as individuals and having them interact as representatives of their community.

Participants discuss their views of the underlying forces that sustain the conflict, the spectrum of opinion within their communities; and where they place themselves within that spectrum. The last is very important as it helps the participants understand to whom they are talking and what their political affiliations are.

The central function of the workshop is to put on the table the fundamental fears, needs and concerns of each group so that each side will better understand what motivates the other. In this way the solutions the group designs together can be responsive to the concerns of each party. The group also discusses the political and psychological constraints each group works under and explores ways to overcome these constraints, with emphasis on shared actions.

Ultimately the goal is to create an environment of mutual reassurance and cooperation, in which collaborative efforts can be made to create mutually acceptable, sustainable solutions to jointly held problems. The goal is not limited to fostering individual change in the participants; in fact it is usually a crucially important feature of this work that individuals re-enter their communities empowered to promote change in the larger political system. Conflict resolution in this model requires changes in individual attitudes and stereotypes as a conduit for changes in societal actions and official policies.

There are other processes that utilize a therapeutic model to set alternative norms and create a forum in which to promote constructive interaction and effective communication among parties who are distanced by hostility or ideological differences. Such processes are now being considered for incorporation into interactive problem-solving work.

One such process has been developed by the Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, a project of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, which has, since 1986, led workshops on cultural and ideological stereotyping in a variety of international settings.¹¹ This project utilizes techniques from family systems therapy to help people express curiosity and compassion in their exchanges with one another, while gently challenging rigidly held belief systems. The project was initiated by Dr. Richard Chasin, a

¹¹ For more detailed discussion of modes of analysis and intervention utilizing family systems therapy please see **Chasin, Richard**, and **Herzig, Margaret**, (1988) *Family Systems Therapy and Soviet-American Relations*, In *The Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, Compendium of Project Reports, 1987-1991*, Center for Psychological Studies in The Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA.

psychiatrist and family therapist who sought ways in which the systems thinking of family therapists might help open doors to the new thinking so clearly needed for human survival. Family systems theory emphasizes relationships, interactive patterns and context. Although their original application was to families, many of the techniques have suitable application to large group contexts. Nations, just like family members, have complex relationships in which all elements are interconnected and influenced by one another. In order to achieve new thinking, both nations and families must be able to recognize when their belief systems are based on obsolete and constricted habits of thought that lead to undesirable actions and outcomes. Family systems therapy strives to foster an openness to new information and the creation of fresh solutions.

A fundamental concept in systems thinking is *circular causality*. A systems view looks at a whole system, not at any one individual. Problems are not attributed to any single entity, be that a person or nation state, but are assumed to occur in a broad context, embedded in complex systems of beliefs and behaviors. In individuals, families and larger groups, there are belief systems which once may have been highly adaptive but which now are restrictive, hampering growth and leading to obstructive or even destructive behaviors. While these belief systems may have become obsolete, their obsolescence may be hard to recognize and harder to leave behind. New thinking in international relations will involve recognition of such obsolescence and the construction of more adaptive patterns of thought and behavior.

In family therapy, the therapist tries to disrupt and transform old patterns of belief and behavior. The intervention typically involves questioning family members in ways that bring their conflicting perspectives and assumptions to the surface. Family therapists have a repertoire of techniques that they use to reveal and shake loose rigidly held, maladaptive belief systems. One particularly fruitful technique is called "circular questioning". (It was nicknamed "organized gossip" by its inventor, Mara Selvini Palazzoli.) A therapist using this technique does not ask anyone directly what he or she thinks or feels, but rather, asks each person what another person feels or thinks about a particular relationship or behavior in the group. For example, "What assumptions do you think your wife has about your values and goals regarding family discipline assumptions that may interfere with family harmony?" In an international setting, the question might be, "What assumptions do you think a particular adversarial country may hold of your own country's goals and values that may interfere with world peace, (whether those assumptions are true or not)?"

When such questions are posed in a group, everyone pays rapt attention to the answers, because everybody is being talked about. The sheer quantity of new information that is generated by this process is really quite striking. This flood

of *confusing, stimulating information*, that challenges existing belief systems can open a space for the creation of new ways of thinking.

New thinking is most likely to be fostered in an atmosphere of this kind, which features curiosity and low defensiveness, without accusations. Participants do not tend to become defensive, as they are not engaged in an exchange of accusations about good and bad behavior. They are exploring aspects of thinking and relationships never before discussed or even considered. The participants also have the opportunity to see how much their behavior might be influenced by what they *assume* others think or believe, and how often these assumptions are flawed. They are in a position to appreciate the role of circular causality among different behaviors and perceptions.

The technique of circular questioning in experiential workshops has been used by the Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue in workshops in Moscow, Montreal, Australia, Stockholm and Hiroshima. At the 1987 Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, in Moscow, the project ran a workshop with people representing both superpowers and their allies. Within their own national groups they had been asked to list assumptions they thought others held about their own group. Assumptions and perceptions were revealed with compassion and good humor. At one point, a Russian participant reported to the whole group on the discussion his group of compatriots had just had about assumptions they thought Americans had about Russians. He said, "We think Americans think Russians have a low level of culture. We think Americans think the Soviet Union seeks world domination by force. We think Americans think we have no mind of our own." Although instructed not to interrupt, one American rose, hypnotized by the responses, and called out in spite of himself, "I am amazed to hear you saying these things. This is exactly what I am thinking. But I can't help but tell you that I feel like someone told you to say these things. The Russian looked at him and smiled: "Yes, in our group we discussed that you would also have that thought." The laughter was resounding and healing.

At these workshops, participants have safely raised concerns about how they are perceived by others and have seen the impact of their beliefs and behaviors on others. They have had an opportunity to engage in dialogue with people representing other cultures and ideologies and to do this without either risking hostile confrontation or engaging in a shallow unfulfilled exercise.

In conclusion, the end of the second millennium brings with it a challenge to rethink the ways that nations relate and to look for new diplomatic tools. Traditional diplomacy was not designed to address the psychological basis for ethnic conflict, including the unmet basic human needs (i.e. identity, recogni-

tion, security and equity) of the parties involved. Track two diplomacy offers an opportunity for a wider range of players to become involved in the peacemaking process. A track two process that has a particular sensitivity to social and psychological dimensions of conflict and utilizes a third party intervener is called interactive problem solving, or interactive conflict resolution. Interactive conflict resolution emphasizes transforming relationships between conflicting parties and promoting collaborative problem-solving. Lessons have been drawn from family systems therapy, whose techniques and theories have been adapted to promote effective dialogue among parties whose perceptions of each other may be distorted by hostility and/or ideological differences.

These innovative alternatives to traditional diplomacy are among the most promising lights on the diplomatic horizon and should be seriously considered by the global community. Alternative ways to resolve conflict could help to transform combative stand-offs into cooperative relationships. They can create the opportunity for both influential leaders and ordinary citizens to rethink basic assumptions about social conflict and its roots, transform their confrontation mentality, and empower them to take effective action to achieve a peaceful, sustainable future.

Srdjan Vrcan

A European Lebanon in Making or a Replica of Pakistan/India Drama?

I

There is nothing in the recent turn of events in Yugoslavia which should have come as a surprise to an attentive observer. In substance, there is nothing unexpected or unpredictable in the course of events which have recently led Yugoslavia to the very brink of a large-scale war conflict, which has already taken thousands of human lives, made several hundred thousand of wounded and has driven hundreds of thousands away from their homes. Certainly, no superior intelligence, nor exceptional wisdom were needed to predict long ago that events in Yugoslavia would go the way they have indeed gone lately. An attentive and unbiased observer with a modest sociological imagination could have easily predicted such a development some time ago, but obviously under three critical conditions. First, by not being taken in by vociferous official propaganda, denying publicly up to a very recent time that there has been any realistic possibility of a tum to war in order to improve the selling potential of their political programmes and to obtain the maximum support. Second, by approaching events in Yugoslavia not as isolated and discrete episodes, but as moments in a chain of events which has its own logic, easily to be identified. And, third, under the most difficult condition of being able to resist to pressures analogous to pressures in the case of many Lebanese intellectuals, described by Ahmad Beydoun in such words: "De retours occasional au bercail communautaire ont permis a certains intellectuels, habituellement sereins, de contribuer a l'alimentation du conflit en images voyantes et en slogans incendiaires"¹. To illustrate this, one should remember that a far-seeing and famous Croatian sociologist did predict almost two years ago that there was a civil war already

¹ **Beydoun, Ahmad**, *Les civils, leurs communautaires et l'Etat dans la guerre comme system social en Liban*, Social Compass, 35(1988) 4, p. 600.

looming on the horizon². The author of these lines also asserted in a paper, written in October 1990, that some events having happened up to that time may be reasonably interpreted as the first moves in the coming civil war (for instance, arming one section of the population and disarming the other), or even as the first skirmishes in the war just around the corner (for instance such as the first incidents with shooting).³

To be more precise, there is absolutely nothing surprising in the fact that exacerbated controversies, leading to armed conflicts, have been essentially running and are going to be running in the near future along national and ethnic lines of divisions and that they would be practically conducted under national flags and with national political slogans. Furthermore, there is almost nothing surprising in the fact that initially a creeping and then an open war is going to be characterized by unusual cruelty and brutality, which - as history demonstrates abundantly - are hardly to be avoided in armed conflicts along national and ethnic lines in a territory inhabited by ethnically and religiously mixed populations where the front line divides family from family, neighbourhood from neighbourhood and village from village, turning them into military outposts and strongholds. And such cruelty and brutality are hard to avoid in such a territory where a strong narcissism of small differences and distinctions has become culturally and politically dominant.

It is certainly necessary to raise the question why such a turn in recent events in Yugoslavia has been so easily predictable.

First, it seems evident that there are some long-term trends operating in Yugoslavia, which have become dominant recently. And it is such trends that have primarily brought about a rapidly progressing deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia at all the levels of social life. And they have been responsible for an ever-increasing social and political conflictuality. With such trends in operation in the near future, one may paraphrase an assertion referring to Lebanon saying that the war is going to be "a well-orchestrated, controlled and managed business".⁴

² It is professor **Josip Županov** from Zagreb University who since his prevision in summer 1990 has become from a widely quoted public personality an unperson never again to appear in the mass media.

³ Paper entitled "*Election in Croatia: an Analysis and Prospects*", presented at the international conference "Renewal of Political Dialectics in Central and Eastern Europe", held in Milan November 27 - 29, 1990, to be published in the acts of the conference.

⁴ **Chaoul, Melhem**, *The Layout of War in Lebanon: Political and Confessional Aspects of a Function of Reduction*, Social Compass, 35(1988), 4, p.608.

With such trends persisting and retaining a crucial role in shaping actual situation, all - even the most sincere - appeals to dialogue and negotiations are doomed to failure even when formally welcomed by all the parties concerned. Therefore, there is another similarity to Lebanon in this particular respect. Namely, even "those who do not wish the war remain hostile to the preconditions of peace".⁵

In substance, they are not willing to negotiate about their political objectives having led to armed conflicts, but they would simply prefer to have them realized without recourse to war, if possible.

It is possible but not very realistic to claim that the trends, which are referred here to are a quasi-necessary consequence of an essentially non-intended, purely casual and uncontrollable convergence of some very unfavorable social, political, economic and cultural events of a purely random nature. There is, of course, something random in the course of events, but their matrix is not random.

It seems also very unrealistic to believe that the trends in action are a purely natural or quasi-natural consequence of a historically prepared natural happening. It is more realistic to realise that they have been so far closely associated to some long-term political strategies, consciously elaborated and promoted. Such political strategies have succeeded in becoming dominant political strategies and they succeeded in eliminating from the political scene all the other alternative strategies. It is the fundamental political options, induced by such strategies, that are responsible for the actual turn of events in Yugoslavia. The crucial feature of such political strategies, in spite of all differences, is, that they all have been articulated in exclusivistic national terms, sometimes adorned with democratic verbiage. They are formulated in such a way that their main and long-term political objectives are best expressed in the well-known formula: "One nation, one state, one faith, one language, one flag, one national political philosophy, one national television and broadcasting network, raised to a cathedral of the national spirit, one national truth, one true national political party, one leader or father of the nation etc.". Consequently, everything that in a complex ethnic reality is not in accordance or deviates from the political ideal is considered to be politically either illegitimate, or at best a shortcoming to be only temporarily tolerated as a necessity, but to be eliminated as soon as possible in this or that way. And such political strategies exist and persist under different national flags and using different national symbolism, but follow essentially the same pattern. And they are most easily identified in action in regard to some very critical situations and specific ethnic groups. For instance in Serbia in regard to Kosovo

⁵ **Beydoun, Ahmad**, op. cit. p. 600.

and the Albanian ethnic group; in Croatia in regard to Krajina and the Serbian ethnic group living in Croatia; in Macedonia in regard to the western parts of the country and the Albanian ethnic group living there etc.

The fundamental fact about such political strategies has been evident: they have been moving in substance along collision courses, owing primarily to their long-range objectives to be realized in as complex a national, ethnic and religious area as the present-day Yugoslav area certainly is with the only exception of Slovenia. And they are moving necessarily along collision courses in spite of all peaceloving declarations. In the final analysis they reckon with the use of force and include the willingness to recourse to war or to use the threat of war to realise their main political objectives if such a recourse to arms and an armed conflict is deemed to be promising. Therefore, increasing hostility and exacerbating conflictuality are to be considered a necessary consequence of the impact of such political strategies upon the social and political life in general. And such hostility and conflictuality cannot but be constantly renewed and reinforced. And support and legitimacy to such political strategies depend to a degree primarily upon the persistence of the hostility and conflictuality. Since each of such political strategies calculates that its political victory presupposes the total defeat of the opposing national strategies, which seems rather unlikely under present circumstances, it is very realistic to expect the perpetuation of the existing conflicts and a continued walk along the very brink of war. There is no doubt that the logic inherent to such political strategies has so far led from conflict to conflict, each subsequent one being more widespread and more exacerbated.

There is no doubt that there has been a gradual radicalization and totalization of all the conflicts generated by such political strategies. And it is difficult to presume that the same logic would not be operating tomorrow and in the near future. A conclusion is to be drawn: the existing conflicts, having led the country to the very brink of a major war, have not been either purely random, or simply natural, or clearly spontaneous and blind. They have had their idealizers, planners, promoters, servants, propagandists etc. pursuing mutually contradictory political objectives and playing consciously a risky game with force, arms and war and peace.

II

It seems rather realistic to assert that no exceptional intellectual effort is needed to identify and describe some significant trends in current politics and in current political discourse. And such trends are indicative from another crucial standpoint, i.e. not only from the standpoint of a durable pacification of life in

the area, but from the standpoint of democratic developments. There is no need to produce an elaborated argumentation to prove that there is a very strong tendency in political life to creation of so-called fatherland fronts (*Heimatsfront*) as the only legitimate and acting political organizations, absorbing in their ranks all possible political groups. It is evident that such fatherland fronts are essentially based upon well-known dichotomous political distinction: "friend / or foe", "true sons of fatherland / or a traitor". Consequently, all mediating political forces and orientations are practically eliminated or are going to be eliminated. And there is no legitimate place for any kind of political mediation. Political pluralism is being reduced and political opposition is turned into a purely symbolic or token opposition. And, what is more important, the principle of division of power does not function any more as well as the traditional mechanism of "checks and balances". In the final analysis the civil society is blocked or is in peril of losing its autonomy and of being colonized by state politics. Closely associated with such a trend there is an inclination in political discourse, particularly the official one, to operate with a so-called conspiratorial theory of society. And some of the current political events are primarily interpreted in terms of some grand conspiracy. In fact some crucial political events with negative political effects are interpreted as results of an almost century-long grand conspiracy against this or that nation or state. The suggested image of political life is the following: there is a small group of evil people, hidden somewhere, who never get tired of conspiring against this or that nation and of planning dishonest and evil acts. They allegedly decide what to do and then have nothing else to do, but to pull some strings to activate immediately some distant people to do inimical acts of violence and fraud. In that way the people acting politically in this or that part of the country in a way which is opposed to official politics are presented at best either as dupes or as mindless marionettes playing prescribed roles in a theater of dolls arranged by conspirators, or as evil people themselves. On the other side of the coin there reappears the theory of treason to explain all defeats.

There is obviously no need to prove here that it is the very matrix of official political discourse which abounds with assertions to some kind of grand conspiracy against Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Yugoslavia etc. respectively as well as with hints at some kind of treason in operation here and there.

Furthermore, there is a visible tendency in political discourse to dehumanize and stigmatize political opponents and political dissenters. In substance, there is an almost permanent dehumanisation and satanization in official discourse in Yugoslavia today of something and someone: some political personalities, some political organizations, some places and regions, some ethnic groups and nations etc. are being almost constantly demonized and satanised by different ideological apparatuses in operation in the country. There is also an inclination

to consider all the dissenting, oppositional and opposing political groups and initiatives as substantially identical and belonging to the same political family, best represented by the extremists. Therefore, all the dissenting, truly oppositional political groups and personalities are quickly stigmatized as traitors, potential traitors, fifth column or as dangerous extremists. They are all put in the same political bag labelled as a rule with the political label "extremist". This is the ideological and propaganda pattern historically best exemplified in Germany in the 30s when Social Democracy was labelled by the Third International as twin-brothers to Nazism or as social fascism. As a consequence a political situation has been induced in which there seems to be no possibility but to be politically either an ustasha or a chetnik.

Finally, there are some indicative tendencies in the current political discourse, primarily the official one, at least in some of the republics.

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Firstly, there is a visible inclination to introduce some kind of religization of the political discourse. The religization, of course, is not to be identified with the well-known confessionalization of politics which has been present in modern Europe since the end of the last century and which became visible particularly in the formation of confessional political parties such as the so-called popular or Christian Democratic parties. The religization in this case is to be identified as an inclination to give essentially religious connotations to some important political ideas and use them as religious ones, immunized by sacralization from questioning and contestation in spite of their mundane and secular origin and content. This is best to be seen in official speeches referring for instance to "sacred Croatia" and to "eternal Croatia" as well as to "sacred Serbia" and to "celestial Serbia" which is to be a model for earthly Serbia. The same reappears in referring to the "sacred land of the fatherland" as well as to the "sacred frontiers of the fatherland", but also to the "sacred political will of the people" etc. Therefore, it may be argued that there is a visible de-laicisation of political discourse in some parts of Yugoslavia. And no doubt such de-laicisation is a function of political mobilization and exacerbation of political conflicts and not a function of developing an autonomous, competent and critical public opinion.

Closely connected to the religization of political discourse, there is some kind of ontologisation of the existing social, political and cultural differences. The persisting political conflicts have been constantly taken out of their actual social, political, ideological and cultural context and intentionally projected to an overarching ontological and metaphysical background. Therefore, the current conflicts about precise political issues here and now and with concrete political interests at stake are transformed into conflicts quasi sub specie aeternitatis or sub specie grand history between opposing human, cultural and civilizational types of almost suprasocial, quasi-metaphysical nature. In that way the current

ethnic conflicts are interpreted, for instance, as new examples of the century-long conflict between a quasi-metaphysical grounded West European - Roman Catholic - Modern democratic - Enlightened rational - Peaceful - cultural and civilization type, on one side, and a Eastern - Orthodox - Byzantine - Non-European - Pre-modern - Non-Enlightened irrational - Undemocratic - Uncivilized cultural type, on the other. The same is being done in another way: dramatis personae then are: an Orthodox - Christian - Peaceful - Democratic cultural and civilizational type and an aggressive Islamic type, fundamentalist, irrational, pre-modern, untouched by Enlightenment and rationalism etc. type, engaged in penetration to the West and allegedly waging a sacred war (jihad) on Yugoslav soil.

III

Parallel to this ontologization of current conflicts, there is a visible inclination to Manichaeism interpretation. Namely, some of the parties engaged in the current conflicts are presented and depicted as personifications or quasi of the absolute Good and their side as the side of absolute Good in operation, while the opposing party or parties are stigmatized as personifications of the Evil and their side is depicted as the side of Evil as such. There is no doubt that the ontologization of current conflicts and their parallel Manichaeism mean that there are no realistic chances for their possible negotiated resolutions: conflicts are turned into allegedly life or death conflicts and the living people, engaged or involved in conflicts, are transformed somehow into organs or instruments of some superior supra-social entities and instances, they serve consciously and willingly or they are practically forced to serve. It is an undeniable fact that the implosion of the communist system has opened the gate for important steps in direction of democracy in the area. And some initial steps have been made, in some parts more important than in others. However, with such tendencies and inclinations, dominating the political scene, it may be reasonably argued that the chances for genuine democracy to be established soon are rather modest. Namely, it seems rather obvious that such tendencies and inclinations are not in substance consonant with the development of a coherent democratic culture and democratic practice.

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The crucial sore point in such political strategies and tendencies is their inability to consistent recognition in theory and practice of the universality of human rights and freedoms, both individual and collective, regardless of all particularities characterizing citizens. Such political strategies and tendencies may hardly serve to reconcile their crucial political objectives with universal democratic rights which means, for instance, that the same rights - individual and collective - that are enjoyed or ought to be enjoyed by all the citizens of the

republic of Serbia of Serbian nationality should be enjoyed in the same manner by all the citizens of the same republic of Albanian, Hungarian etc. nationality. The same is valid for human rights in the republic of Croatia in regard to the citizens of Croatian, Serbian, Italian etc. nationality. There is in fact a fundamental discriminatory momentum in such political strategies and tendencies, regardless of the colors of national flags they wave. Some citizens are treated as citizens in the modern democratic sense, but others are treated in some way as subjects according to their nationality. Therefore, it is not exaggerated to be very sceptical about their coherent democratic orientations or about the range of such an orientation. It seems that at best a kind of plebiscitarian democracy in M. Weber's term, or a populist caudillismo are developing and not a parliamentary democracy with strong opposition, consistent division of power, an effectively functioning system of checks and balances, an autonomous, competent and critical public opinion (*Offentlichkeit* in J. Habermas' term) and advanced autonomous civil society etc. This is probably not as valid for Slovenia as for other parts of the country.

IV

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If this diagnosis of the present-day situation is valid or highly plausible, what are the prospects for the near future? There are some crucial points to be emphasized. First, the existing hostility, enmity and hatred along national and ethnic lines, caused by recent events, have certainly reached such an extent and intensity that they make an explosive mixture hardly to be dismantled or substantially reduced in a short time by some miraculous political arrangement or gesture and move. The Lebanese experience is very instructive in this respect. It shows that "civil war is a system of hatred"⁶, but also indicates that a system of hatred leads to war, feeds the war and feeds on the war. There is a *circulus vitiosus* which is hard to break: a system of hatred leads to a system of war and a system of war reinforces a system of hatred.

Unfortunately, it is very realistic to assume today that with the dominant trends remaining in force and with the political strategies having their present impact, very high levels of the existing and persisting hostility, hatred and conflictuality will remain dominant political and cultural facts for the next ten years or so. Even if the optimal solutions - democratic, peaceful, mutually agreed and freely consented to - were reached in a week or a month, the consequences and the tales of hostility, hatred and conflictuality would remain present for years to come. That means that there is no prospect at hand for final normalization and

⁶Ibidem, p.604. **Beydoun** writes that the war "is not feeding itself on the dead it brings about, but also on what it imposes upon the living people".

durable pacification either at the institutional or everyday levels of social life. Least of all, a final normalization and durable pacification is not to be expected by any solutions imposed and enforced upon any conflicting party. Second, there is little hope with the dominant trends remaining in operation and the political strategies retaining their present impact that any of the constitutional solutions proposed for the present crisis so far would effectively bring a stable peace and the flourishing of genuine democracy to the area either immediately or in the near future. Under the present circumstances, there is no constitutional solution which would be workable and which would eliminate or reduce substantially the persisting conflictuality, exacerbated hostility and widespread hatred and would lead to an immediate diminution of conflicts and clashes, or slow down the arms race, or, finally, push far away the danger of war by making highly improbable a recourse to arms by any of the parties involved. Nor even to eliminate persistent war-mongering. Any proposal if adopted tomorrow would at best redefine the legal statuses of the major actors in conflict and would relocate some of major foci of their controversies and confrontations, as well as at best assuring shorter or longer periods of precarious armistices, but not permanent peace and durable pacification of the area and of inter-ethnic relations. One may venture to say that under present circumstances, there is no permanent peace to be reasonably expected at the institutional, intergroup and interpersonal levels of social life whichever constitutional solution would be adopted either by mutual agreement or by enforcement and constraint upon all the parties involved in conflict or upon just one party.

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It means, to be more precise, that it is not realistic to expect a durable normalization and stable pacification in the area - either by the creation of a new federation, as proposed by some, or by a new, very loose confederacy as suggested by others, or by establishing a new Commonwealth of Nations similar to the British Commonwealth as hinted by thirds, or by partition into several, totally independent states as dreamed of by many, or by a replica of the Cypriot green lines imposed by the international community and protected by their armed forces. Some of the solutions, mentioned here, offer at best - with the persisting trends remaining dominant - shorter or longer periods of armistices and precarious peace, based almost exclusively upon a precarious equilibrium of fear, or upon an equally unstable balance of forces, supported essentially by the quality and quantity of arms and manpower at the disposal of the parties in conflict and/or by possible alliances to be activated on their behalf by each party in conflict. Paraphrasing the famous von Clausewitz saying that war is the continuation of politics by other means, one may say that politics in this case and this area in the near future is bound to be a continuation of war by other means. Consequently, there is no easy, durable and peaceful political reorganization of the present-day Yugoslav area. This area would certainly remain a critical and highly conflictual area in Europe in the years to come. It seems highly paradoxical

cal but realistic to assume that this area is getting ready to join the Europe of 1992 by the tragic way of resurrecting at least to some degree the Europe of the late 30s or a situation similar to the Europe of that time.

V

There is no doubt that there have recently been some highly optimistic dreams about the transition from a communist society to a post-communist one. And particularly in the case of Yugoslavia, which not so long ago seemed to be the first one to make such a transition in the easiest and quickest way. Primarily as a transition from the old collectivism, already eroded, to a new individualism, already growing up, as well as a transition from weakened and weakening authoritarianism to a new democratic anti-authoritarianism. Or the first one to make a rather easy transition from a not rigid state-controlled economy, generating a society of scarcity, to a free market economy which produce by a short cut a society of prosperity and affluence just around the corner.

More particularly, there is an over-optimistic dream of a solution to the Yugoslav crisis along the lines of the so-called Scandinavian model. The recent turn of events has made the Scandinavian solution highly improbable. And that for some major reasons.

First, owing to the fact that the existing hostility and hatred along national and ethnic lines have already attained such an extent and intensity that a peaceful solution along the Scandinavian model - mutually agreed and freely consented to - has become an illusion. An imposed and enforced solution comes to be the only feasible one, but it remains very precarious, projecting the existing conflicts into the future and generating new conflicts. Second, owing to the specific position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems very clear that any partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be as difficult as the partition of a leopard's skin and certainly would create more conflicts and lead to widespread hostility rather than eliminate and resolve them. At the same time an independent republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would hardly be a durable peaceful solution if the whole area was characterized by the perpetuation of exacerbated conflicts between Croatia and Serbia and if Serbians and Croatians would act as each other's arch-enemies, not being able to live peacefully in any kind of common association or good neighbourhood. It is highly improbable that a political consensus could function effectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina, assuming that Muslims, Serbs and Croats may live peacefully side by side in a Bosnian state as equal and free citizens, while the whole ex-Yugoslav area is being politically reorganized upon the contrary political philosophy of the formula "One nation, one state etc." and assuming that there is no possibility of living together in a

democratic, peaceful and equal way in any kind of political community or any kind of association of Croats and Serbs.

Consequently, the explosive charge of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not going to be dismantled or substantially reduced in the near future.

It seems more realistic to fear that the eventual solution of the Yugoslav crisis by partition would follow at least partially another well-known model with contrary connotations, i.e. the model exhibited on the Indian sub-continent in dismantling the British Dominion of India.⁷ It is a model which led to the creation of two new independent states of Pakistan and India, both obtaining quick universal international recognition as independent states, both entering into the UNO and both becoming members of the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, all this did not stop the two new independent states waging at least two major wars in the meantime with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded, with a mass of people fleeing from one side of the border to the other, many of them being driven by force from their native homes, with occasional massacres of civilians on a religious and ethnic basis, and, finally, with the new state line, dividing the new states, turned practically into a front line on some sections of which guns have never been silent since partition and with specific regions becoming areas of permanent interstate crisis and of perpetual armed clashes and conflicts. Consequently, developments on the Indian sub-continent since partition indicate more about the probable consequences of the Yugoslav crisis than developments on the Scandinavian peninsula more than a century ago. It seems very realistic to predict that a solution along the Indian model could be applied, but it would result in recourse to arms and in perpetuation of hostility and conflictuality with almost permanent walking on the very brink of war for years to come.

There is another historical experience which ought to be taken into consideration. It is the Lebanese experience. Let us underline only some crucially relevant points in that experience.

First, the Lebanese experience demonstrates that "a state of things which persists has a tendency by generalizing to establish itself in a system". Therefore, "civil war is not synonymous with death, but by establishing itself it may become a way of life and even to organize itself in a social system".⁸ It is evident that the same is valid for a prolonged movement in the direction of a war, or for a

⁷The writer of these lines formulated such ideas in September 1990 in a public debate on the book "*Četvrti Jugoslavija*" (Fourth Yugoslavia), written by **Slaven Letica**, later reported by the weekly "*Nedjeljna Dalmacija*".

⁸**Beydoun, Ahmad**, op. cit., p. 604.

protracted walk upon the very brink of war in an ethnically and religiously mixed territory. Namely, in such a case, events leading to the walking upon the very brink of war or preparing for a war have their own logic and it turns the war, being prepared or being waged, into a functioning social system or a way of life overlaying the whole society. Therefore, playing a political game with war and peace is not an innocent political game which may be abandoned at any chosen moment without consequence.

Second, the Lebanese experience, which is the longest modern experience of a civil war in an ethnically and religiously mixed area, indicates that preparing to wage a war and / or walking a long time upon the very brink of a major war makes the end of war and establishing durable peace becomes a very complicated and difficult affair. In substance, peace under such circumstances is not simply the end of the war and least of all the end of the shooting and of open hostility. Ahmad Beydoun concludes that "elevating itself to the dignity of a social system, war becomes less and less comparable to different ruins it has produced or to anomalies it has imposed upon thousands. A consequence of this transformation is the fact that peace could not be any more a pure end of war. It has to be no less and no more but replacing - complex and progressing - of a system by another one."⁹

Third, the Lebanese experience shows that it is wrong to expect that "peace, whatever its formula may be, would bring immunity against a return to war. This is evidently a nonsense: the system of war should be patiently dismantled since it is nothing else but a way of the actual organization of the Lebanese society. Another system ought to replace it".¹⁰ Therefore, it is not rational and promising to expect that "establishing peace is to be a matter of belligerents". Moreover, A. Beydoun warns that it is erroneous to suppose that the "belligerent forces are those which should supervise the imposition of a new system".¹¹

Finally, the Lebanese experience shows that political strategies oriented to wage a civil war or to prepare for such a war and in fact making the war a way of organization of social life, are at the same time doomed to be self-fulfilling and self-defeating. Namely, preparation for a civil war in an ethnic and religious mixed territory usually ends with enhancing the chances of war and leads to actual war conflict, and it does not in the long run reduce or eliminate the danger of war or armed conflicts. At the same time, such political strategies easily lead to a state of things which is to a high degree contrary to initial expectations. A.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 588.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 602.

¹¹ Ibidem.

Beydoun, analysing the Lebanese situation, concludes instructively: "The Lebanese are today very far from all the mirages which have led them to the war. They are far from the national dignity and sovereignty of the State. They are distant also from an equal participation of all in government and from justice in prosperity. They are far from enjoying an authentic citizenship in the context of a democratic regime of freedom of their "retrograde" traditions. They have even lost a large part of their old liberties".¹²

Only a freely agreed and consented to solution by all the parties involved would offer a perspective for a durable peace and stable pacification and normalization of social life as well as for genuine democratic developments in the area, but such a solution is very unrealistic to expect under current circumstances. An imposed and enforced solution - which seems more likely - upon any party in conflict would not eliminate the roots of the conflicts and, therefore, such a solution would remain essentially unstable and precarious with a new round of recourses to arms being prepared behind the curtain.

Written in August 1991.

¹² Ibidem, p. 604.

Mats Friberg

The Need for Unofficial Diplomacy in Identity Conflicts

Introduction

The Yugoslav conflict has some unique features but it also shares some characteristics with other conflicts, such as those in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine etc. This family of conflicts can be described as conflicts over deep-rooted social identities. There are more than seventy actual cases in the world today (Azar 1990a:2). Such conflicts share most of the following characteristics:

- ethnic, religious or cultural cleavages,
- protracted conflicts with a long history of conflict cycles,
- irrational and violent behavior motivated by very deep emotions,
- underdevelopment, economic disruption and disparities between groups,
- breakdown of centralized state agencies,
- external interventions usually reinforcing the crisis.

The sources of the conflict are mainly internal to the region, not systemic or international. The conflict ultimately springs from unsatisfied basic human needs in the population involved, particularly the needs for security, identity, recognition, autonomy, participation and material development (Azar 1990b:146; Burton 1990:25-47). Such needs are basic in the sense that they are not within the ability of the individual to control. When people perceive that they are denied a separate identity, physical and material security and effective political participation they must protest, at least when this occurs under modern conditions. The key explanatory concept is social identity which refers to an individual's self-image as it is derived from the social categories to which he or she belongs. The social identity is a very significant driving force because people are deeply attached to their self-concept and the need to increase or maintain self-esteem.

What conclusions concerning resolution of identity conflicts can be drawn from this brief analysis? The general conclusion is that sustained conflict resolution can only be achieved by measures that fulfill the basic needs of the people involved. That is to say, only by treating the sources of the conflict, not the symptoms. Otherwise it will only be temporarily settled. Basic human needs can be suppressed but they can't be eradicated.

An identity conflict can't be solved by traditional power politics. Real power doesn't lay with external forces, neither with official authorities. It lays with the identity group because it is backed by the energy of the people. A small Catholic minority in Northern Ireland could not be controlled by a large British army (Burton 1990:34). A foreign power can only suppress the conflict, not solve it. Neither can the conflict be solved by an internal law and order approach of the relevant state agencies as will be seen below. The coercive machinery of the state is part of the problem rather than of the solution. If the centralized state agencies can't deal with the unmet needs they become sources of the conflict.

The empirical facts of this type of conflicts also show that the official representatives of the conflicting groups are unable to solve the conflict by the usual methods of direct bargaining and negotiation. This is particularly so in the initial stages of the violent phase of the conflict. Even a simple cease-fire is difficult to establish by so-called official diplomacy. One reason for this sad fact is that official diplomacy is carried out within a power-oriented bargaining framework. Such a framework implies that the conflict is about a cake that can be divided - a zero-sum conflict ending in one winner and one loser or in a compromise. However, social identity is an indivisible value and not a cake that can be cut into slices. Human identity needs can't be traded, exchanged or bargained over. They are not subject to negotiation. Therefore elite agreements based on negotiations don't last (Burton 1990:39).

Another very important reason for the failure of official diplomacy is the tenuous link that exists between the people directly involved in the conflict and their official representatives. Lacking a real understanding of the sources of the conflict the authorities are prepared to use coercive power to contain the situation, believing that there is an obligation on the part of the minority to obey. The result of using coercion is resistance and a loss of legitimation on the part of the authorities. In most identity conflicts people have very little trust in the established authorities. Cynicism is widespread.

They trust only people they know personally or people belonging to their own community. Thus, even if the authorities were able to devise adequate policies catering to the needs of the people, they would no longer have the power to implement them.

To summarize the argument so far, the main points are the following:

- the conflict must be solved at the level of its source, that is to say the solution must deal with basic human identity and security needs as they are perceived by the people directly involved in the conflict,
- the conflict must be solved by a decentralized and cooperative process among the people and not by power-oriented negotiations or decrees by the elite. The solution, then, has to come through so called unofficial diplomacy.

Unofficial diplomacy

Unofficial diplomacy is a communication process in which participants from the warring parties meet face-to-face in a safe space to explore the needs of both parties and the ways and means to satisfy them. It requires the presence of an independent third party acting as a facilitator in the communication process. The most important task of the third party is to control or frame the communication between the parties in such a way that it does not revert back to a zero-sum bargaining situation. The participants have to agree beforehand that the exploration of the conflict and its solution has to be carried out as a common task and not as an adversarial process. The conflict should not be seen as something to be won or lost or compromised about, but as something which must be solved to the full satisfaction of all parties - the win-win-concept (Burton 1987, Crum 1987 & Cornelius & Faire 1989, Fischer & Ury 1983, Parry 1991).

The third party should not enter the resolution process as a traditional mediator making proposals or putting pressures on the parties to accept an agreement. The responsibility for solving the conflict rests fully with the warring parties themselves. The parties are the only ones who know the deepest sources of the conflict. Therefore they are the ones who have the capacity to redefine the conflict and to find new ways to satisfy all the relevant human needs involved in the conflict. To impose a solution from the outside would be to rob them of this very important learning experience. The conflict should be seen as the property of the parties and this property should not be taken away from them (Christie 1977).

The idea that everybody can win may seem utopian to some people. However, it is the only guarantee that the conflict will not erupt again. Furthermore, a basic hypothesis is that a conflict may be unsolvable on the level of declared elite interests and positions, but when they are translated into basic human needs of people, they are not necessarily incompatible with each other. For example, if the conflict is over possession of territory it is certainly a zero-sum game. But if the parties find out that the underlying human need is security and that

possession of territory is just one way to obtain security the door is open to a win-win solution. Security is not a scarce resource which is diminished by consumption. It is possible to think of many situations in which an increase in the security of one party leads to an increase in the security of the other. The same holds for many other basic human needs such as social identity, recognition and participation. They are basically positive-sum values.

Another objection is that the warring parties see each other as enemies. They are not willing to cooperate with their adversaries in exploring the sources of the conflict and its possible solutions. Cooperation with the enemy would be seen as an act of treachery. But no conflict is all out. Even in a war there are always persons and groups who have a cooperative and long-term perspective on the situation. They will look for possibilities to solve the conflict on a deeper level. They are willing to meet the other side provided certain conditions are fulfilled. It has to be done in an unofficial way so as not to risk condemnation from their own group. A safe space must be found, that is to say a place where the participants feel free to share their vulnerabilities without risking attack or criticism. And the participants must have trust in a third party to provide neutral leadership and facilitation of the communication process.

Unofficial diplomacy is based on the idea that everybody in a warring group is responsible for solving the conflict - not just the official leaders. Thus it is sometimes called citizen diplomacy. There is an unfortunate tendency to think of a conflict as one big object that has to be solved in one stroke by the official representatives of the parties. This is to put too much faith in the power of the leaders. If their domestic constituencies are mobilized in an all out war against an enemy they don't have the necessary political space to explore cooperative solutions. But if there are a number of links between influential people in both camps, skills in dialoguing are widespread and a measure of understanding of the other party has been established in a significant segment of the population, the political conditions are ripe for official moves towards a cooperative solution of the conflict.

The more intensive and violent the conflict, the more likely that official diplomacy will fail to solve the conflict. Positional bargaining may even aggravate the conflict by adding new elements of contention to an already very tense relationship. Unofficial diplomacy could be the only viable alternative in such a situation. The idea is that numerous initiatives in unofficial diplomacy will change the political culture towards a peace culture. At some point in time this peace culture will penetrate the commanding heights. From then on official diplomacy will have a chance to be successful and lead to a sustainable resolution of the conflict. Thus we are thinking about a trickle up process from the grassroot level to the intermediary level of opinion-leaders ultimately

reaching the political leaders. In this sense unofficial diplomacy can be seen as a necessary step preparing the ground for official agreements (Fisher & Keashly 1991).

There are two main approaches to unofficial diplomacy; the analytical problemsolving workshop and the process-promoting workshop (See figure 1). Both types have very active and articulated spokesmen (See below!) The first approach is modelled on the academic seminar. The facilitators are most often university professors from different social science disciplines. It is usually aimed at directly influencing official opinion and therefore invite participants who are close to the key decision-makers. The idea is to deal directly with the substantive issues of the conflict in an analytical and rational way with the intention to reach an agreement that can be communicated to the political leaders.

The second approach is modelled on the therapeutic session. The facilitators have a background as psychotherapists, clinicians or communication specialists. Here the idea is to heal the relation between the parties before any substantive issues can be treated. Intellectual analysis can't be successfully engaged in until the emotional problems are processed and an adequate communication process established between the parties. For this reason the participants are trained in communication and conflict resolution techniques as well as involved in joint work projects such as tree planting or desert reclamation. The participants are often recruited from local communities with a long history of violent conflict. The process-promoting workshop influences leadership indirectly by contributing to the building of a peace culture at the grassroot level.

Figure 1. Three types of conflict resolution and diplomacy compared.

	Official diplomacy	Unofficial diplomacy	Citizen diplomacy
Process	bargaining	analytical problem solving	promotion of improved communication and healing
Focus on	power relationship	substantive issues	emotional relationship
Goal	formal agreement (compromise)	informal agreement (win-win)	reconciliation, change of heart (win-win)
Participants	official representatives	informal representatives close to the decision-makers	people at the grass-root level
Typical 3:d party	politician or diplomat	university professor	professional therapist
Role of 3:d party	mediation with muscle	facilitation and diagnosis	facilitation connecting the participants at the heart level
Spokesmen	Henry Kissinger	John Burton Edward Azar	Danaan Parry Marshall Rosenberg ¹

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¹ Henry Kissinger was US Secretary of State 1973-77. John Burton is the founder of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University College London, and presently associated with the University of Maryland Center for Development and Conflict Resolution directed by Edward Azar. Danaan Parry is the founder of the Earthstewards Network which sponsors citizen diplomacy in various conflict areas all over the world. Marshall Rosenberg coordinates the Center for Nonviolent Communication, a network with similar activities.

Conclusion

History teaches us that it is extremely difficult to solve conflicts over deep-rooted social identities. At best such conflicts can be contained by security forces but only for a while. Typically they erupt again like a volcano that never dies completely. Traditional power policies, law and order approaches as well as power-oriented negotiations and mediations more often than not aggravate the conflict. These methods do not take the real motivating force - unmet human needs - into account. Therefore official diplomacy has to be supplemented by alternative methods of conflict resolution, if a sustainable solution is sought. Courageous people belonging to the different sides of the conflict have to meet face to face in an unofficial context to explore of the deep roots of the conflict, find creative solutions in a spirit of cooperation and spread their proposals in ever widening circles.

We have distinguished between two types of unofficial diplomacy: the problem-solving workshop, which is analytical-rational-objective, and the process-promoting workshop, which is emotional-therapeutic-subjective. A main point is that the different methods have to be matched to the hierarchy of authority and put to work in a particular sequence for positive results to occur. Process-promoting citizen diplomacy at the grassroot level is a long-term process of conflict resolution, which improves the conditions for problem-solving workshops at the intermediate level. Together they will generate a trickle up effect and finally a sustainable solution might be implemented or confirmed by the official authorities.

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Part 4:
Peace Process

Hylke Tromp

The Yugoslav Crisis: Back to Sarajevo

The civil war in Yugoslavia is usually described as the result of a struggle for independence between several of the Yugoslav republics, which is aggravated by ethnic conflicts and border disputes. It is more correct to describe the civil war as a struggle for power, which was the inevitable result of the end of the cold war.

During the cold war, Yugoslavia received substantial financial and military support from both sides to prevent it from joining the Warsaw Pact or NATO. The end of the cold war meant the end of this kind of support. The consequence was a gradually increasing budget deficit. However, none of the six autonomous republics and two autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia, nor the federal army, was willing to decrease its level of expenditures. This left the federal government with no other option than to print money to cover the deficit, which resulted in hyperinflation, up to 2600 % in one year. The austerity measures subsequently taken by the federal government came to a deadlock, since some of the republics and in particular Serbia, used their legal rights to print money.¹ Therefore, inflation started to spiral again.

At the same time, the end of the cold war led to the collapse of communist parties all over Europe. That started a general struggle for power, in which the members of the former communist parties tried to keep their positions while at

¹ According to **Bogomil Ferfila**, following the collapse of the Serbian economy, the Serbian Parliament adopted three secret resolutions by which the National Bank of Serbia and the National Bank of Vojvodina credited from their printing of money the purchase of 9 billion dinars worth of hard currency in Serbian banks, payment of pensions to Serbian pensioners of 5 billion dinars, and the subsidizing of agricultural production to an amount of 5.2 billion dinars. The total amounted to 18.2 billion dinars, which was at the time the equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars. This was the "robbery of the century" which according to this author, completed the destruction of Yugoslavia: "... the assault on Yugoslavia's financial and credit system, which was engineered by Serbia in December 1990, may have destroyed the last chance for negotiations among the republics over a new confederal structure. It left secession as the only alternative for republics seeking to distance themselves from the chaos and disorder in Yugoslavia."

the same time, a division of power, democratization and decentralization was inevitable. In Yugoslavia, this struggle was seriously aggravated by the economic collapse. The real issue was to decide who had to pay the bill, i.e. to cover the federal deficit.

If Yugoslavia would have invested the financial support earned by staying neutral during the cold war, the same way as Western Europe did, i.e. by investing the billions of dollars of the Marshall Plan, the inevitable conflicts in Yugoslavia would not have resulted in a civil war. In that case, a transition period of gradual transformation into a more democratic and decentralized system of political decision-making would certainly have led to turmoil and disturbances, but necessarily to the massive use of violence. But at the end of the cold war, Yugoslavia turned out to be still a poor, developing country, with a centralized command-economy that was as inefficient and corrupt as all other communist command economies.

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Yugoslavia in 1990 was therefore inhabited by millions of people who had nothing to lose and everything to earn - which is a recipe for criminal behavior, as well as war. The billions of dollars given to Yugoslavia during almost four decades of the cold war - probably 100 billion - were not invested, but consumed. They were, in other words, not used to increase the production capacity, but they were spent in distributing favours and grants, almost as bribes to keep everybody content, especially the members of the Yugoslav nomenclature - the "new class" already described by Djilas in 1958. The federal army was favoured too, not only because much of the foreign support was in military hardware, but because the federal army was regarded to be an essential instrument for keeping Yugoslavia together. Military expenditures, however, are not economically productive.

During the cold war Yugoslavia appeared to be economically strong, thanks to the foreign aid. The dinar belonged to the hard currencies. Yugoslavs used to go shopping in Italy. Expensive western cars were imported (even if the road system remained underdeveloped). Therefore, its system of "workers' self-management" was believed to be working efficiently.

After the cold war and the decrease of foreign aid, the system collapsed. What remained was a society dependent on Western dollars and a societal structure based on their distribution, dominated by a federal army and a communist nomenclature, both eager to keep their power and their level of expenditures, in total disregard of the collapse of the economy.

Under these circumstances, the dissolution of Yugoslavia became inevitable when the members of the communist nomenclature started to change horses in order to keep their political power. They exchanged communism for national-

ism, were formally elected, and found themselves subsequently on a collision course. Since only Slovenia had developed an economic infrastructure which came close to Western standards, and since the only profitable investments had been made in the tourist trade along the long Croatian coastline, the newly converted nationalists in the poorer parts of Yugoslavia - especially Serbia - wanted Slovenia and Croatia to cover most of the federal deficit. This was politically made possible, when Serbia in 1990 ended the autonomy of the "autonomous provinces" Kosovo and the Vojvodina. The representatives of these provinces were subsequently appointed by the Serbian authorities, and this destroyed the balance of power between republics and provinces, which was Tito's remarkable inheritance. It gave Serbia and Montenegro the power to block all decisions with the votes of Kosovo and Vojvodina, against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. This made Serbia the dominant, hegemonial power. It left Slovenia and Croatia with the prospect of having to pay for the old nomenclature and the federal army until the final economic collapse of Yugoslavia. Instead, they sought a more decentralized political system. Their attempts to achieve a more decentralized Yugoslavia in a "confederation", however, failed because it was unacceptable to the Serbian part of the former nomenclature, now in charge in Belgrade. Their subsequent threat to declare independence did not change the Serbian position.

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The attempt to get more independence within a confederation was doomed to fail because it would have left Serbia and other, underdeveloped parts of the country in a hopeless situation. Even more important, it would have meant the end of the federal army, because it could not survive in its present strength without the financial support of Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, a civil war became inevitable when Slovenia and Croatia finally declared independence on June 25th, 1991.

Communism in all its variations - from Pyongyang to Havana, from Tirana to Belgrade - meant fundamentally a total centralization of all political and economic power. After the cold war, a necessary process of decentralization, however, is often misunderstood and misrepresented as a struggle for sovereignty and independence, which is out-of-date as it is impossible. This is demonstrated in Western Europe, where developments since 1945 have gone in exactly the opposite direction. Formally independent states have step by step given up parts of their sovereignty and their (formal) independence in favor of centralized political decision-making in the European Community. In the long term, East and West will probably meet in the way their political systems distribute power, that is, in their adoption of political structures to political realities and necessities. In the immediate future, however, changing the political systems will lead to severe political conflicts in the former Soviet empire. In Eastern and Central European countries, there is no tradition or experience in dealing with conflict in a

democratic way, which presupposes that both parties are conscious of the fact that they need each other, that they are mutually dependent and therefore vulnerable, and that they cannot win a conflict by defeating or destroying the other side. There exists for that reason to find a compromise, and they tend to continue to manage conflicts as if they could be decided by the use of violence. Therefore, all forms of political violence known from history are bound to reappear in Eastern and Central Europe: inter-national war, intra-state (civil) wars, revolutions, coups d'etats, political assassinations and all other forms of political terrorism that have been developed in the recent years: such as hijacking, bomb-throwing, bank-robbing. Even nuclear blackmail is not to be excluded, as has been demonstrated already by one Serbian leader (Šešelj) who threatened to blow up the nuclear energy reactor at Krško in Slovenia, if Slovenia declared independence (the government of Slovenia closed it down after declaring independence). All of this will be seriously aggravated by the mobilization of the consciousness of ethnic differences, of economic discrimination, and of historical antagonisms for the power struggle, and it will not be neutralised by some awareness of the sober lessons of recent history, because these lessons have never been taught.

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The solution for the crisis in Yugoslavia could have been the granting of more regional political and economic autonomy within a (con)federation with a central government, followed by economic liberalization and the encouraging of foreign investments, and accompanied by a radical reduction of the size of the federal army. What had to be guaranteed simultaneously in order to prevent ethnic conflict, would not have been the one or other line of demarcation between regions, but the same basic rights and possibilities to all wherever they live. This is not utopian: it is even normal, and much can be learned from the experiences in the United States. Moreover, this is the situation that is coming into existence within the European Community, whose member-states have decided to abandon their internal borders.

Instead, the newly elected communists-recycled-into-nationalists buried the real problems under purposefully mobilized feelings of ethnic separatism and antagonism. The mobilisation of such feelings, however, is not easily undone. It created new problems, first about minority rights, then about borders, and the war is now seen by most participants as a war to conquer or to defend territory. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the attempts made by the European Community (Lord Carrington) and on behalf of the United Nations (Cyrus Vance) have only resulted in making clear that it has become impossible to reach a peaceful solution.

The war in Yugoslavia has now escalated into several wars simultaneously. It has the characteristics of an international war, fought between official armies for

Croatia and Serbia. At the same time, it is a war of independence, fought by irregular militias. It is civil war resembling the Spanish civil war, because the regular army seems to be the dominant force on one side. It is a civil war resembling the Lebanese civil war, because there are many different irregular groups and militias, fighting each other for no clear purpose at all, except revenge, and willing to use all means available, including the murder of unarmed civilians. Moreover, it is a war which threatens to escalate outside the Yugoslavia borders, because it involves minorities of its neighboring countries, in particular in Kosovo and Voivodina, while the Islamic population in Yugoslavia eventually looks for help from Turkey. Finally, it is a war which might easily escalate into mass-murder and genocide, not only because of the awakened reminiscences of the second world war, but because all kinds of weaponry have been piled up already and are easily available from the stockpiles accumulated during the cold war. Since "peaceful nuclear explosions" might be offered on the free market as a result of the collapse of Soviet empire, this civil war might become a nuclear war too.²

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² *International Herald Tribune*, November 6, 1991: "For Sale: Soviet Nuclear Blast" (p.3) and commentary by **William C. Potter** "Psst, Wanna Buy a Nuclear Bomb or Two?"

Dušan Janjić

Can the War be Stopped and Yugoslavia Survive

Today's Yugoslavia is living under the shadow of total civil war. In fact, hidden within Yugoslavia are processes of democracy, free economy, and the action of citizens, groups or ethnic communities, but the tendencies of nationalist totalitarianism, belligerent chauvinism and militarization are strong. Viewed in this light, the latest escalation of the nationalist armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and strong commitment to secede by resorting to arms, if necessary (in case of Slovenia and Croatia) or by preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia by arms, can be considered at two levels. *The first* and more relevant level at this stage is the internal one. A lasting and devastating crisis has caused social collapse, imposing at the same time a nationalist-chauvinist option to enable the denouement of a deep crisis or agony of a society. *The second* level is placed in the European context. Strong, conservative impulses and trends from Europe threaten to overwhelm European support for the modernization of Yugoslavia as a state. But, there is no doubt that the attempts to divide and fragment Yugoslavia are linked to similar efforts inside Yugoslavia. The strong disintegration and chauvinist processes in Yugoslavia inspire similar conservative processes and movements in Europe: Therefore, Yugoslavia has become a priority concern and issue in Europe.

Yugoslavia furnishes an example of how to perceive and resolve many previously suppressed, issues, doubts and hesitations concerning the latest European developments. For that, establishing the new security order in Europe or, the best, demilitarizing Europe is one of those primary issues a part of their activities should focus on. The arms concentration in Yugoslavia (a gravely sick patient in the heart of Central Europe and Balkans) imposes an obligation on all relevant actors in Europe to voice their concern and responsibility for this situation. Therefore, the disarmament of Yugoslavia is one of the primary questions, related to a future, peaceful and democratic development.

At the same time, this means that European public opinion and governments should refrain from extending support to any of the ruling nationalist elites in Yugoslavia. They should promote peace and other initiatives to reduce further

militarisation in these areas. A comprehensive study of all peaceful ways to resolve conflicts through the system of CSCE, EC, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and UN should be made. This implies the ability to "consume" all feasible consequences, including disintegration, in the aftermath of the East-European collapse. Europe must exploit all means to prevent its return into a pre-political state where the "ethnic" - the call of blood and soil, irrationality and emotions - overwhelms reason, tolerance and Demos.

Over the past twenty years, Yugoslavia has hesitated regarding the modernisation road, although it was faced with the prolonged crisis and the breakdown of the state-socialist model. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia has irrevocably taken the path of nationalism leading ultimately to civil war. National interests, allegiance to national leaders and the call of blood have become the guiding ideas of most political parties and citizens in present day Yugoslavia. The political jargon has become permeated with words such as readiness to sacrifice, retaliation, defence, war and victory, while simultaneously, words like peace, community, socialism, solidarity, man and love, have silently disappeared from the language, in large part unnoticed. There is an upsurge of ethnic controversies, intolerance and detachment. With the triumph of nationalism in the absence of genuine democracy, the outcome is familiar. The conflicts have been sharpened at all levels:

(a) The first level implies conflicts among federal units that because of their status as nation-states necessarily assume the properties of ethnic conflicts.

(b) The second level of the problem is reflected in the conflicts between particular national/ethnic collectivities. This issue is pending in all multi-ethnic communities. The question posed is how to avoid polarisation and grouping into the opposed blocks in a situation of fear of the hegemony of the most populous and influential ethnic community, like the Serbian nation. At this level, the Serbian-Albanian and the Serbian-Croatian conflicts are manifested most drastically. The deterioration in inter-ethnic relations, especially between Serbs and Croats, hampers the final denouement of the crisis. The impact of Serbian-Croatian relations is directly devastating for the very survival of Yugoslavia.

(c) Escalation of conflicts, inter-ethnic as well, is manifested *at all levels of daily life and communications* (at work, in family, socializing etc.).

At this level, the prevalence of collective - and national - ethnic consciousness and identification is visible. There is a pronounced politicization of everyday life, too. Unfortunately, a lot of people are ready to go to war for the protection and defence of their own nation or national interest. Because people are really on a war footing, there might be many victims in Yugoslavia's civil war. And it is just

now that it has to demonstrate that civil war is a game with a nil to nil score. Civil war brings casualties, not the solution to any problem. Therefore, I look towards the activity and all democratic and peace-loving forces in their commitment to a peaceful and democratic settlement of all conflicts.

Can Yugoslavia Survive?

In the situation of extremely sharp ethnic and other political tensions and conflicts with the shadow of total civil war enveloping all parts of Yugoslavia, it seems that Yugoslavia exists on the map, but no longer in reality. A long process of fragmentation and overall disintegration is coming to an end. The question raised at this moment is the following one: Can Yugoslavia survive, at all? Or, after Yugoslavia, what?

The political will to preserve Yugoslavia has almost vanished. The dominant political will is manifested in a wide range of options, starting with the idea that Yugoslavia as a state is untenable (this attitude is notably supported by the authorities and public opinion in Slovenia) to the prevalent stance in Croatia where Yugoslavia is viewed as a "prison of nations" and as such it should be buried since it is no longer capable of surviving. The third option favours the maintenance of Yugoslavia on new foundations, one of these being the creation of sovereign nation-states that would arrange interrelations on an equal footing (the attitude supported at the latest referendum in Macedonia and favoured by most people and parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Yugoslavia should be defended as long as it can "serve" the purpose of one's own nation-state building in compliance with the international law provisions in this respect (the position held by the incumbent authorities in Serbia and a large segment of public opinion, but also by the political parties of Serbs both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia).

However, there is also a significant portion of public opinion hopeful that there is a chance to modernise Yugoslavia and establish an entirely new state and social order in its present geopolitical space. Of course, this new state would respect European integration standards. But, with civil war raging in Yugoslavia, this segment has turned into a "silent majority", deprived of a chance to accomplish its own objectives. Hence, in the domain of political will, the hitherto Yugoslavia has been dead for some time now. At the same time, the will to preserve Yugoslavia and reconstruct it on new grounds is not voiced strongly enough.

Nevertheless, this does not imply the absence of the necessity for a gradual transition into some new relationships. This need is substantiated by the very fact of Yugoslavia's existence and it should be taken into account by all means. At this stage, the question "What is Yugoslavia today?" remains open. The answers to this question have become less certain or definite, particularly with the nationalistic rejection of Yugoslavia, both as a state and as a social community. Contrary to the view which perceives Yugoslavia as a mere sum of self-sufficient nation-states, it can also be seen as an embodiment of Europeanism in terms of plurality and the necessity for regional integrations.

Yugoslavia is a pluralist society, heterogeneous ethnically. Generally speaking, not a single Yugoslav nation (not even the Serbian nation which had a "classical" national movement and, as a consequence, its own nation state) has been organised into a state along ethnic and national boundaries, not even at the time of "national burgeoning". Some of the nations - if we are to neglect the often unreliable historic memory of medieval states - had gained their statehood only in the postwar Yugoslavia. Against this, only strong nationalistic political bureaucracies were developed. There was a marked polarisation in all nations between the social strata strongly in support of chauvinist aspirations in their own nation, and those strata that genuinely fought for the emancipation of their nation, promoting at the same time the idea of communal living with all other nations.

All these circumstances will make the political factors, especially states, a "value" worth attaining, and capable of acting as a significant "promoter" of historic and national development. Consequently, the political aspects of the current ethnic conflicts are still dominant, blurring at the time being the social background of these conflicts.

A complex national structure, and the different historic conditions in which the Yugoslav nations have developed, make social and political life in Yugoslavia rather complicated and disputable, and Yugoslavia itself a very heterogeneous and potentially a conflict-ridden society. Therefore, the solution is not in any violent disruption of national plurality. This is one of the major counterarguments to increasingly strong attempts to resolve the crisis by abolishing every form of plurality and individuality with the exception of one's own national particularity. This can only aggravate existing problems, ultimately resulting in an atmosphere of widespread fear for one's own national survival, and potentially at the same time the national isolation within national-state boundaries, and potentially provoking some new conflicts. All this implies the need to grasp the conflicting nature of our social reality, and also to undertake efforts so as to direct and control conflicts, instead of resorting to violent suppression as a means to resolve them.

In addition to a danger provoked by nationalism and nationalistic totalitarianism, and in the light of historic experience, there is no doubt that no collapse of any state in history has occurred without major armed conflicts. The division of Yugoslavia under present circumstances is the safest way of dividing Europe into East and West again. One should bear in mind that Yugoslavia represents a sort of European microcosm. If Yugoslavia fails to attain the cooperation and co-existence of various nations and the most influential religions over the globe (i.e. Islam and Christianity) and different Christian Faiths (Catholic and Orthodox), and the integration of the undeveloped South and the developed North, it is less likely that Europe itself will be successful in attaining its goals.

Because of all this, the question of whether Yugoslavia is capable of making a new start, liberal-democratic and federalist by nature, is at the same time a test of whether the united Europe is feasible at this moment. It is also well-known that no war waged after 1945 has brought about the final settlement of any conflict. Besides the arguments expounded above, there exist genuine reasons to preserve all sorts of links established in Yugoslavia so far. This pertains not only to economic reasons (such as common market, interlinkage of economic structures, regional integrations, but also the enormous costs related to setting up new economic subjects and independent markets, especially in view of the imminent economic-financial collapse in Yugoslavia). Besides, all kinds of social and human links have been established, comprising all levels of communication, especially, inter-ethnic and inter-cultural, mixed marriages and over two million "international" individuals, claiming to have a multi-ethnic self-identity. In this context, there is a growing need for a lasting, democratic settlement of controversial issues in order to avoid the vicious circle of continued irredentist aspirations on the one hand, and unification wars, on the other hand. In present circumstances, with only two options at stake - the nationalist one and civil war - there is no chance of fulfilling the need for a peaceful settlement. The imposition of the rule of law is the only way to disrupt the vicious circle of political voluntarism, war and senseless bloodshed, all this in order to create the conditions where a reliable answer to whether a new beginning is possible, could be given. At this point, the emphasis should be placed on resolving the key questions in order to prevent further escalation of war conflicts. Simultaneously, problems in the domain of the protection of human and civil rights and the rights of minorities, should also be addressed. To my mind, the current situation in Yugoslavia is like a shock-phase with many primitive and aggressive traits and Yugoslavia's tribal war is only a bloody transitional period. Compromise between peoples must be reached and only democracy should be the future for Yugoslavia. In fact, democracy is the main long-term goal in Yugoslavia. The present ethnic animosities and struggles are an historical cul-de-sac, which will, unfortunately, take many victims.

In fact, at the present moment, Yugoslavia is facing the same problems as at the time of its constitution. These problems are as follows: *first*, how to arrange relations among particular parts of a state community. Very sharply opposed views are offered as an answer to this question. In fact, the major question posed in Yugoslavia today does not concern the matter of federal or confederative order, but the question whether there is the readiness, strength and relevant social and political interest in making a new start. The *second* problem is a fear of the danger of hegemony of the most numerous (Serbian) nation and the greatest nation state (Serbia). This fear is spreading, strengthening at the same time, a kind of anti-Serbian block. Thus, society as a whole and each ethnic community is directing an enormous and unproductive waste of energy in permanent conflicts that even result in human casualties.

In the present circumstances, a model that could avoid the most drastic outcome of the conflicts, which would naturally affect the security in the Balkans, Central-Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole, is one which would quit the narrow optic of extreme nationalism but also the optic that understands Yugoslavia as a melting pot for all ethnic and other peculiarities and differences. But, at the deepest level, radical reform must be carried out, primarily in the economic sphere. Economic revival and the transfer of state property should lead us to a market-oriented economy, free competition and communication. This should be accompanied by the instruments and procedures of "complicated democracy" which is the only feasible democracy in multi-ethnic and pluralist societies. One step in this direction is the establishment of a powerful civil society and democratic public.

To begin with, there has to be consensus about the legitimacy of all national interests that have emerged. Upon this, we should start realising the above interests differently from the steps undertaken so far. First, we should revive the economy and solve the pressing life and social problems of citizens. A break should be made with a political role of the military and police apparatus by placing them under the control of Parliament and the democratic public. Then, a consensus that is binding on all parties, about a limited moratorium should be reached until finding a final solution with regard to Yugoslavia's future. In this manner, we could ensure the indispensable transitional period. In which the relations could be regulated by a Constitutional Charter or a Peace Treaty.

Every problem could be solved by negotiation. But a big Yugoslav problem is the lack of people who are good at negotiation. The Yugoslav political scene is full of belligerent figures and democratic and peace-loving opinion is undeveloped. Apart from various monitoring missions, threats and cease-fires to impose the blockade and sanctions, it should support all projects, social strata, politicians

and individuals competent and ready to accomplish democracy and modernisation. There is no doubt that the ruling political elites do not fall into this category. In fact, escalating the violence and waging war area sign of their failure, not of success. It's a sign that effective problem-solving and conflict-resolution have failed too.

In the long-term process of peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and, finally, conflict-resolution, there have been many concrete steps to stop the war in Croatia; to develop a new order with peace-keeping and reconciliation; to demilitarize and to develop common security; to re-democratize and build a long-term social justice etc. All that needs the new internal and international concepts and strategies of no easy ways out of past and the current Yugoslav turbulent times to a better future.

How can the War be Stopped?

The starting point of the strategy for a peaceful and democratic settlement of a grave political, social, economic and cultural crisis in Yugoslavia must take into account the true situation. This is primarily the recognition of the raging civil war in Yugoslavia. With this in mind, the first question is how to get out of this war. At stake is first, *the refusal of war* and second, *the termination of war and restoration of peace*.

The refusal of the actual civil war can be understood as a moral, political and intellectual position corresponding to the appropriate cognition. The gist of this knowledge lies in the refusal of chauvinist culture and the dominant state of awareness on the political and public scene in Yugoslavia at this moment. The refusal of war is a logical consequence of an awareness and recognition of the character of the war itself - it is viewed as a bloody cul-de-sac in historic terms. The intensification of war substantiates the thesis that conflicts are no longer controlled, especially in the domain of inter-ethnic relations. In essence, the indispensable and long-awaited liberation from the totalitarian rule and (Communist-Socialist) collectivism can on no account be achieved through the ideas of nationalistic totalitarianism, national homogenisation and mobilisation of masses on these grounds. However, the truth is that the above figure as the guiding principles in the programmes of the incumbent national-republic authorities. Consequently, the fulfillment of individuality and individual's identity and his "ego" have been hampered together with the disruption of the process of creating an open society. With the collapse of the former system of values and the then legitimate power and its institutions, people have embraced what has been left to them, i.e. deeply rooted tradition, culture and communal

gathering. In the background of all these deeply-rooted layers there is one common denominator, i.e. nationalism, existent since an earlier date as a personal and political position of people, but also as an adverse position to "others".

In reality, we witnessed a controversial process which was at work in Yugoslavia from 1945 to the late 1980s. On the one hand, national conflicts were suppressed for the sake of the dominant image of a socialist society as a conflict-free society. In the sphere of values, priority was given to class, proletarian and the so-called socialist values under the slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity". The authorities helped the suppression process which was also accepted by most citizens who had long considered this ruling order to be legitimate. National conflicts, on the other hand, seem to have been incited with the collapse of the totalitarian system of state socialism. It was at this point that parts of the Communist elites had tilted to nationalistic ideology and its elites in an attempt to maintain power, without offering anything new.

At times, conflicts can have a very stimulating and beneficial effect, particularly when they challenge people to do their best in order to create a new set of values. Adversely, there are conflicts which are destructive by nature, and as such, totally unproductive for the promotion of democracy. Such conflicts tend to bring into question the democratic procedures and institutions themselves, that have basically been built to serve citizen and not any national or some other collectivity. The national conflicts themselves are emotionally loaded and difficult to control. Once control over these conflicts is lost, civil war can easily be ignited. This is especially true for a society such as Yugoslavia with an enormous strength of state socialism still at work. This social setting is also convenient for a special type of the authoritarian personality, strongly oriented towards the state-building concept. In this social milieu, the refusal of involvement in civil war supposes the existence of another kind of political culture unlike the authoritarian or etatist. This newly-emerging political culture is to rely on the conscious recognition of the inevitability of conflicts in a society. One can live with them, once people are prepared and taught how to resolve conflicts in order to be able to live together. This is quite important for the inter-personal level of communication.

Ethnic groups make it possible for us to assert and name the sides in conflicts (such is the example of the Serbian and Croatian ethnic groups that have come into conflict). Unfortunately, not a word is uttered about the cause of this conflict situation. The answer to this could be found in the following elements: *first*, in the inability to transform the former state-socialist regime into a modern society without undergoing serious and great social, political, inter-ethnic and all other kinds of upheavals; *second*, in the collapse of the previous system of social

organisation and in the absence of the appropriate mechanisms of conflict-resolution; *third*, in a deep global and structural crisis that has existed for a long period without a proper solution. Thus, the crisis had been reduced to a political one while later it assumed the form of an inter-ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the reduction of inter-ethnic relations to a Serbian-Croatian conflict has brought into the question the viability of Yugoslavia as a state construct. In turn, this has triggered off the new border claims violating the existent balance of power in this corner of Europe, threatening at the same time global peace and security in this region; *fourth*, in the unresolved past which is primarily mirrored in the historic awareness and memories of one's own ethnic identity and its social development, later to turn into a historic perception of the other group which is involved in the current conflicts and the analysis of their communal living since earlier. The fact that the legacy from the past had not been addressed properly is quite evident in the vocabulary people have turned to, but also in respect of the guiding ideas and political demands. Notably, people have returned into the past, first and foremost, into the 1941-45 period. This period was the time of inter-ethnic war imprinted in our social memory as "a fratricidal war". This past appears to be one of the major reasons for total fanaticism in conceiving the overall political or public life. Finally, at work is the excessive fabrication of contemporary history which is a sign of great political voluntarism that cannot be so easily surpassed. Thus, the dormant national antagonisms have turned into open conflicts, ultimately leading to civil war because of a long-lasting social crisis in the conditions of the institutional democratic system. This was aggravated by the fact that the former political elites were determined to maintain power, even at the expense of further sharpening of conflicts and acquiescence to chauvinism.

The incumbent political elites have played a significant role in the current war conflict and they can equally contribute significantly to the settlement of political and armed conflicts. Although, a great number of political leaders can be labelled as irresponsible, incompetent or even sick, their most outstanding problem is related to the lack of the corresponding political programmes that could promote the democratic model in their respective nation-states. The concept of arranging relations in the space of the hitherto Yugoslavia is also missing. There is pressing need for sound economic programmes, while in the area of human rights, the prevalent formula and solution is grounded on the Communist doctrine of "equality of all citizens and peoples". In view of the actual armed conflicts, the incumbent leaderships lack a clear-cut conception and they are unable to exert further control over the forces in conflict. At the time being, there is neither the assessment of the toll nor the prediction how long the armed conflict is to last. Nevertheless, the incumbent leaderships share one common point: the desire to gain a high profile and promotion in the current conflict, naturally enough, at the expense of "others", particularly the remnants of the federal state. With this

goal in mind, the leaderships endeavour to improve their position within their own nation-states (republics) or ethnic communities/nations. In this, they are confronted with a serious problem, namely, with the obvious social and national heterogeneity (with the exception of Slovenia to some extent). This heterogeneity is a specific phenomenon of Yugoslav (and also Soviet) society, which in turn, should imply a greater extent of tolerance. Yet, in Yugoslavia today this increased tolerance is to be found among citizenship and not the leaderships (totally opposite to the practice in democratic societies).

The leaderships in Yugoslavia have become radical and fanatical, gathered on the grounds of chauvinism and hatred. It is exactly on these grounds that they attempt to mobilize people, provoking simultaneously fresh conflicts that can be hardly controlled. In general, there is an upsurge of the forces of destruction which are by rule more pervasive, efficient and quicker in comparison with gradual building and promotion of new relations. The war crisis is at the same time the period of learning and building of a new order which is, however, unthinkable if the way out of this war is not found promptly. This can be achieved only by the penetration of "rational forces". The burgeoning civil society can be considered as such a rational force although weak and jeopardized at the present moment. Its members are potentially exposed to prosecution and discrimination as "national traitors". Nonetheless, only on the basic principles of civil society can a way out of the war be found. Specific social groups - such as mothers, soldiers, young people and intellectuals - could perform a significant role in a civil society. It is just because of the above said that further support should be extended to the efforts undertaken, so far, by peace movements, independent mass media, groups of intellectuals etc. An awareness about the absurdity of war should further be fostered and encouraged so as to increase anti-war sentiments and halt the war. In opposition to this are extremely strong pro-war sentiments, officially encouraged by the ruling authorities and mass media expressed in the war propaganda. This is also helped by the support of certain segments of European and the world public opinion in favour of one of the sides in conflict. All this war-mongering is aimed at proving that it is not feasible to back the strategy of peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem of how to live with "others". However, this incites again a new chain of war conflicts and victims resulting in hate.

Undoubtedly, war is not a means of resolving any problem. On the contrary, it only multiplies them. The problems themselves cannot remain as mere inter-ethnic conflicts but, due to the logic of international linkage as a method and content of the internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis up to now, they inevitably become the problems of a wider community, especially the European, and of this particular area of Europe. The Yugoslav crisis will most certainly destabilise neighbouring countries. The ethnic principle can be activated but

there is a danger of possible territorial disputes. This prediction is substantiated by the research of Times Mirror Center For The People and The Press from Washington. According to them, 84% of people polled in Russia, 81% in Czechoslovakia, 56% in Hungary and 54% in Poland perceive an "enemy" in a neighbouring state. Accordingly, the critical trouble spots are viewed along almost all border points between Yugoslavia and its neighbouring countries (with the exception of the Romanian-Yugoslav border). This research, like other knowledge, indicates the further strengthening of ethnic prejudices, conflicts, xenophobia, chauvinism and even racism throughout Europe. In this context, the current events in Yugoslavia should be viewed as an integral part of the emerging "neoconservative chain" in Europe. This war must be halted in order to provide some new forms of communal living. This implies that not all questions are to be left for the "post-war" period. The basic assumption to halt the war is to give an answer to some political issues (such as the principles of the future state order in these regions). At this point, we must bear in mind that people will go on living side by side in this area, if not as "brothers" then, at least, as civilised neighbours. Of course, this will be aggravated by the historic and the latest experiences of utter hate and bloodshed too. In spite of everything, it is possible to establish relations among the existing ethnic groups, even in their future nation-states, on the model of co-existence and peaceful living instead of the principle of the domination. It is true that main preconditions for the establishment of such a model are democratic procedures and institutions, but also a new, democratic political culture. This culture presupposes the recognition of the identity of "others", politics pursued on professional lines and living in a multi-ethnic community on good-will principles. Because of this, the principles and foundations of this new order should be established without delay. In order to halt the war flame, it is necessary to establish a force that would mediate between the forces involved in the war. In the present situation when each of the contending sides estimates that with some "additional effort" it can win the war and, in this way, impose its own conditions, the chances of ensuring a complete cease-fire are very slim. Yet, there is still some hope. As regards the conflict, the current civil war can primarily be recognized by violence between two nation-states (Serbia and Croatia) and the remnants of the federal authority, represented by the Yugoslav People's Army. In compliance with the internal balance of power, the Yugoslav Army has taken the side of Serbia. Besides the general escalation of war, there are still areas free from open and violent ethnic conflicts, but there also exist some "islands of tolerance". These areas can easily be destabilised and destroyed because their present exemption from violence is not an indication that they are conflict-free zones (in support of this we can give the example of the existent conflicts between Macedonia and Serbia, Serbs and Albanians or Serbs and Muslims). However, there is a possibility to avoid violence there. Therefore, the localisation of conflicts and prevention of their spreading to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo or Sandjak, appears a priority task.

Related to this is also the need to stop hostilities in the regions of Croatia that are at war at present. To attain this goal, it is necessary to establish an international rule which can ensure peace and the security of all citizens regardless of their nationality (this implies the involvement of peace-keeping forces from the United Nations and Europe but also the engagement of local militia and other armed formations including the Yugoslav People's Army). This rule should help the return of refugees and their adjustment to living in the areas that are ethnically mixed. Furthermore, it is of vital importance to revive economic, political and cultural life on the provisional foundations determined by the Peace Treaty. Normal life should be restored in order to make it possible to stage a referendum where people can have a say about more lasting options related to the political order in the area (the options being for one of the nation-states, for the association of nation-states or possibly for an independent state organisation). Such a solution can also provide a "decent way out" of the war for all the contending sides. In other words, the final resolution of the political and administrative status of minorities and ethnically-mixed areas is to be left for some calmer and more sensible time period.

On the whole, the actual contending sides and the would-be ones, should acknowledge a simple fact, i.e. the impossibility of successful engagement in a war conflict without the ultimate experience of defeat and shame. In fact, the ruling political and military elite must be brought to the wall without any exit left. In Yugoslavia at present, this can be achieved on the following grounds: *first*, by strengthening anti-war sentiments and by a stronger support for peace from the ruling political parties and their institutions; *second*, by appealing to reason both internally and externally, particularly in Europe; the role of intellectual elites could be very prominent in this endeavour, but the world community itself should exert a stronger pressure on all the contending sides to end a war which can ultimately result only in failure and loss; *third*, by further promoting civil society, peace and other citizens' actions (which implies international support as well); *fourth*, by extending support to institutions, groups and ideas that teach people how to live in multi-ethnic societies and ethnic conflicts; *fifth*, by ensuring true information about war destruction, and first of all, by lifting the embargo, imposed by the war regimes, on war casualties. We must bear in mind that in a society such as Yugoslavia, only the so-called Vietnam or Afghanistan syndrome (namely, an awareness about the victims from one's own family, neighbourhood or local community) can considerably strengthen the anti-war sentiments, and in this way, refute national homogenisation as a mobilisation for war. Therefore, it is very important to impose sanctions on all mass media which spread war psychosis, mobilize for war and take part in the war propaganda (to begin with, exclude them from the international communications system, bar their access to information and the like). In the end, all those involved in the Yugoslav crisis, should change their attitude with regard to problems of social

development and transition to democracy. This implies to pass from sanctions to selective support for democracy. The precondition for this must be creation of circumstances for new, free and democratic multiparty elections in all nation states under the control of the international community.

David Atwood

Peacekeeping Force

At the start of 1991 the attention of the different branches and groups of the organization which I represent, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, was focused on the march to war in the Persian Gulf, as was that of most "peace" organizations in the western world. Our energies, although preventive in intention, were, nevertheless, spent reacting to a chain of events which quickly built a momentum well beyond our capacity to respond in any truly effective way. Hardly were the guns silent in the Gulf before the crisis in Yugoslavia began to deepen sufficiently to get our attention. In this crisis too, ideas about appropriate responses are ambiguous and there is a sense of powerlessness to affect events.

Just as in the Gulf crisis, the Yugoslav situation grabs attention. It will not go away. Organizations like my own feel compelled to try to "do" something. But what we can do and in what ways our actions might have any effect are not at all clear. On the one hand, the Yugoslav situation is not like the Gulf crisis, because there actually do appear to be some things which we can "do", some of which will be discussed briefly below. But, like the Gulf crisis, that range of things is circumscribed by the fact that we are again "reacting", after the locomotive of conflict is already moving at considerable speed. How we are able to act on the opportunities which exist is also limited by our knowledge, our understanding, our resources, and our organization. The Yugoslav crisis is important, therefore, not only for itself but for what it can teach us about our capacity as part of the civic culture of Europe and the world to respond to the whole series of challenges now rolling towards us following the end of the Cold War.

The meeting at Schlaining ("Nonviolent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia: Domestic and International Concepts and Strategies", 13.-17. November 1991, Stadtschlaining, Austria) was in many ways a reflection of this reality. A courageous attempt was made to seek for possible steps which could make an impact on the Yugoslav crisis. However, the reality of people dying in Vukovar and elsewhere focused our attention mainly on the "war" and not on the places of "(non)war", on the steps governments singly or collectively "should" take rather than on the collective organization of nongovernmental resources for

nonviolent intervention at a range of levels in the situation. And what a pity we did not have the vision three, two, even one year ago to ask the question about what might be applicable from the theory and practice of conflict resolution elsewhere to the ethnic and nationalist tensions in Yugoslavia, tensions which are, as was so clearly pointed out at Schlaining, certainly not new. A question which recurred to me during the meeting and since was, why does it seem to be that a certain level of threatened or actual death, destruction, and human tragedy is required to get our attention sufficiently to mobilize resources, which in the end so often feel like too little, too late?

Perhaps this is too pessimistic a way to begin what are intended to be constructive reactions to the content of the Schlaining conference. That pessimism arises less from the meeting itself than from the knowledge that, five weeks later, after yet another cease fire has broken down, the spiral of violence continues in Yugoslavia. It comes also from my personal knowledge that, however important the Yugoslav situation, it must take its place with a whole range of other settings and issues pressing in on the available attention and resources of a small organization such as my own.

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I want, therefore, to comment in this paper from this organizational perspective because I think it is a very important reality to keep in mind when seeking to apply theoretical knowledge about conflict resolution to a specific situation, like Yugoslavia. The model of inquiry utilized at the Schlaining conference first an examination of the situation through the authentic voices of Yugoslavs themselves describing their situation (the "empirical" approach), then hearing from those with knowledge of different approaches to conflict resolution (the "theoretical" approach), then seeking in some ways to bring the two together (the "constructive" approach) was a very useful one. But even if we had entirely succeeded at this, we would still have been left at the end of the day with the "how" questions about ways and means to bring into effect the directions which could be seen. The organizational realities and who is actually available and able to undertake any of the proposed steps must then come to bear on the thinking. For example, in terms of the practical commitments which emerged informally from the meeting, one of the most immediate, Žarko Puhovski's idea of a trans-Yugoslav call for a "cease fire" to be signed by intellectuals in all the republics, was in itself not realizable until a means was found for transmitting the text and information about signatures to all the republics, communication between republics now being virtually impossible. In fact, this transmission has happened through the determined efforts mainly via FAX of the international office of War Resisters International in London, with help from my own office in the Netherlands. However, generally, it seems we are often blocked not only by our limited capacity to see what actions might be of use in such a conflict situation but also

by our ability to generate a response of the magnitude necessary to make an effort really count in the anticipated way.

Part of the sense of powerlessness in situations like that taking place today in Yugoslavia, comes also, it seems to me, from holding what appear to be small possible efforts up against the magnitude of destruction currently taking place. To the Yugoslav participants in the conference, caught up emotionally and physically in the war situation itself, some of the discussions of models of conflict resolution must have seemed abstract and a long way from having any immediate applicability to their own reality; some of the possible actions offered must have seemed trivial and irrelevant. Their goal, understandably, was to find a way to stop the war. But it seems to me that we must keep a sense of scale and of time when we are talking about "conflict resolution". To some extent I think we lost perspective on this at the Schlaining conference. While important clarifying work was done on the necessity of a "cease fire" and on the conditions under which such a cease-fire should take place, far too little attention was in the end given to a concrete exploration of possible "peacebuilding" and "peacemaking" efforts, activities and approaches which are often small in scale, long-term rather than short-term yet cumulative in effect. We did not get very far in Schlaining in identifying these, clarifying how they might work, and, importantly, developing a strategy for trying to put them into effect.

My own understanding of the tangle of issues at stake in Yugoslavia is very limited. There do, however, seem to me to be a number of directions and approaches which suggest themselves as being appropriate for further exploration.

1. The careful formulation of the proposals for political steps, such as the Puhovski proposal, are necessary. But we must think also about ways and means of feeding such ideas into the governmental structures - national, EC, CSCE, UN - which are involved or may become involved in the Yugoslav situation and also using such ideas to influence these elements. The effort which has gone into gathering signatures across Yugoslav republics for the Puhovski cease-fire proposal has had as one of its aims the strengthening through solidarity those elements across Yugoslavia which are genuinely trying to find a peaceful way forward. It is also an apparently sensible and workable approach. But little attention has been given to how, strategically, to bring this idea to bear on particular governments or on the European Community process. Good, solid, well researched, well thought out, pragmatic, workable ideas are needed. But so are political strategies for making them count.

2. War in the former Yugoslavia, as terrible as it is, is still confined mainly to one region. At this writing, war has not spread to any degree to Bosnia and

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Herzegovina or to Macedonia, the two regions where, due to their great ethnic and nationalist complexity, there is the threat of something far worse than what is currently happening in Croatia. At Schlaining examples were given of how mixed communities of Serbs and Croats, who had been previously living rather peaceably together, had, through rumour and incident, dissolved into chaos and death. What are the factors which are keeping this from happening elsewhere? How can those elements and factors which are cohesive ones be identified, supported, strengthened? We need to understand better these peace preserving processes and to find ways of supporting them. We do not appear to have developed this very far to date in our attempts to apply conflict resolution approaches and strategies to Yugoslavia.

3. What this suggests is that we have a war/non-war spectrum of situations across the former Yugoslavia. Different strategies and approaches are needed depending on the different circumstances and settings. For example, in the case of Kosovo, the resistance which has taken place there has been largely nonviolent. How can this nonviolent resistance be maintained and strengthened? In mixed areas, how can rumours be controlled, communication and dialogue facilitated, joint goals identified, conciliators supported or protected? Today a huge range of methodologies for developing skills in such areas as community organizing, mediation, "listening" and communication, nonviolent resistance and struggle, etc., exist. We have hardly begun, however, to understand how these might be matched with the specific cultural settings and current realities of the complex of the situations in Yugoslavia.

4. Other directions for strengthening the peace promoting potentials within the republics of Yugoslavia also suggest themselves: e.g. the facilitation of trans-republic communication, professional networks, sister cities, alternative media to counter government propaganda. Some of these activities are currently being explored and developed. But there is a great need to identify more clearly what is possible. For me, an area which is mysteriously absent at the moment, but perhaps I do not know enough, is the consideration of the actual or potential role of the religious communities (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim) in being a force for peace, rather than fuel to the conflict. Can, for example, the European and world-wide ecumenical and inter-religious bodies which exist play a larger role in fostering peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Yugoslavia? Also, what is the potential for third-party work in conflict management or reduction from the governmental on down to the village level? What resources are available from within Yugoslavia itself for this? How can this work be supported? What nongovernmental actors from outside Yugoslavia have the skills and availability for becoming involved in this delicate work in this conflict setting?

In these comments, I am doing little more than raising additional questions. At the very least, all I have done is to identify a small range of potential areas where it seems to me much more thinking and analysis, to say nothing of programmed action, needs to happen. At the beginning of this paper, I suggested that "reaction" often dissipates our energies. Part of the Schlaining meeting was indeed pro-active in its intention. It seems to me our job as peace researchers and peace activists should be more about that kind of thinking, strategy and action. However, we also spent considerable time at Schlaining debating such things as the advisability or not of a surgical military strike as a solution to the threat being posed by the Yugoslav Federal Army or the desirability of some form of international law developing to be able to impose order where it has broken down. We spent far too little time, from my perspective, identifying and contemplating how we can support those peace promoting activities which, in however small a way, could make a difference.

One of the things which gives me hope is the ingenuity of peoples and groups which comes from their concerns for other human beings and which emerges at crisis moments, like a beautiful flower in the desert. The Yugoslav situation has generated many different kinds of activities and efforts which are now being undertaken by groups all across Europe. Praise be for all of these. However, without wishing to take away from any efforts currently (being made-peace caravans, nonviolence training, communication workshops, international communication links, etc.) it does seem to me that, so far, actions have been largely "reactive", and for the most part uncoordinated. All contributions to be sure, but largely people "doing" as opposed to the systematic focusing of limited energies and resources on those activities and approaches most likely to both lessen the violence and develop peace processes.

Two further thoughts occur to me in this. First, if I look at my own organization, we have attempted to apply some of our capabilities (in our case, nonviolence training and international networking) to the Yugoslav situation. The dilemma we face is that, even if we were able to give exclusive attention to the Yugoslavia situation, all of our resources would be quickly used up. Since we are trying to do many other things as well (Yugoslavia is not the only conflict setting in the world) our own efforts have been minimal, at best. This is true for most groups or organizations with some skills or resources relevant to the Yugoslav situation. This reality adds to the ad hoc character of the current nongovernmental efforts over Yugoslavia which are being made. In the case of our organization, we have recognized that we need to concentrate more fully on those types of work where we already have some expertise, background and available resources. Therefore, we shall in the years ahead be devoting more of our energies to the area we are calling nonviolence education and training. Overall, we hope that this will mean that this international network will in the future be able to offer a greater

service to the transnational organization of energies and resources for situations like Yugoslavia. Other efforts are greatly needed for the strengthening of the capacity of putting into place appropriate "conflict resolution" programs and other actions relevant to actual or potential conflict settings.

Second, both governments and nongovernmental organizations are almost completely unused to thinking of each other in anything but adversarial terms. The relative dead-end of European Community efforts over Yugoslavia is due to a lot of factors. But isn't it possible that there may be some within the different governments, even within some of the Yugoslav republics themselves, which have a genuine interest in pursuing all possible approaches and avenues for altering the direction of events in Yugoslavia? The skills, the knowledge, the understanding of peacebuilding and peacemaking processes which exist within nongovernmental constituencies are simply not being made use of by governments to any substantial extent. And isn't it really the case that, without the financial and organizational resources which only governments have at their disposal, the mounting of the sort of "pro-active" efforts which I have hinted at above as being needed simply will not be possible on the scale necessary to make any substantial impact in the short run?

To illustrate this, let me give just one example, a thought which came to me during the Schlaining meeting. For the last decade or so, a small organization which calls itself Peace Brigades International has done important nonviolent intervention work in places like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka. PBI volunteers, by their presence in these places, have provided protection, for example, for human rights lawyers and other social justice activists to be able to continue to carry out their work. During the Reagan years, Witness for Peace volunteers from the US and elsewhere physically put themselves on Honduras/El Salvador border as international observers and a non-governmental presence in that conflict setting. In the Yugoslav situation, the Helsinki Citizens Assembly organized a peace caravan of people from around Europe who travelled to several of the Yugoslav republics to be with those struggling for peace and as an international witness for peace in Yugoslavia. The work of the Gulf Peace Team prior to the Gulf War is another example. There are many such efforts which could be pointed to. However, organizational and financial limitations are a fact of life and a permanently debilitating feature of this kind of work. There is an obvious desirability of "peacekeeping forces" in Yugoslavia. UN and other intergovernmental efforts at this are confounded for various reasons. Suppose that, instead of an intergovernmental peacekeeping force, a nonviolent "army" of 100,000 *trained* European citizens were available, to put themselves on the borders, within the mixed communities, between the militia, etc., in Yugoslavia? This could be possible, but only with the finances an infrastructure which is currently available only to governments. Is this such a crazy vision?

I mention this idea, with all the flaws that it probably contains, only to illustrate the fact that it seems to me that it is time, in relation to the challenges facing Europe at the moment, that peace and social change organizations and governments and intergovernmental bodies find new ways of building bridges to each other.

I have tried here to give a sense of how the present Yugoslav situation and how the exercise at Schlaining feel for me as a worker in an organization actually trying to be in the business of the "delivery of peace services". I think the organizational, strategic, mobilizational variables must be central components in our thinking as we try to apply the theory and practice of conflict resolution to particular settings. Yugoslavia is important in itself. It also provides significant evidence of the current strengths and weakness of efforts, governmental and nongovernmental, to reduce conflict and build peace, and of the task ahead in the cauldron of issues developing in the new Europe.

Josef Binter

Conditions and Elements of a Peace Process

The cold war is over and the world has not become more peaceful! After the euphoria of the moment, the day to day paralysis seems to be encroaching, mixed with feelings of powerlessness and resignation. *Have peace research, peace movement and policies for peace failed?*

The end of the cold war and of the East-West conflict have been viewed by most peace researchers as an historic turning point, bringing about *both* chances and challenges. Thus it should have been clear, that the cold war could be replaced by something "better", but also by something "worse": in short, peace through democracy - or violent conflicts due to nationalism. If the latter is happening now within the transformation processes of East-and Central Europe, then this is happening quite often because quite a lot of politicians cover up and divert from their incompetences and helplessness in regard to the current and upcoming economic, social and political problems by instigating nationalist ideologies.

For one of the essential forms of the (old) East-West conflict, i.e. the "Western" as well as the "Eastern" *universalism*, were both in the same way *averse to nationalism*. Thus, with the end of the East-West conflict - hopefully - the danger of an all-European hegemonic conflict has waned, but the once looming threat of a "big war" has turned into the sad reality of everyday violence "just next door". Especially where some atrocities that happened to our neighbours in Yugoslavia are concerned, the question comes up, how blind and destructive rage could blow up to one extent, where it seems to have already far surpassed its original grounds (discrimination of nationalities, minority protections, etc)? It seems almost as if the *same "acceleration of time"* which we have witnessed at the end of the last decade, has on one hand swept away the top of peaceless structures, while at the same time due to its very peace - making it impossible to "fast enough" build up long-term institutions and mechanisms that are necessary for a civilized handling of conflicts. These institutions and mechanisms would be "cornerstones" of a *peace culture*, where war as a social institution could be banned in the future just as it has been the case with slavery and the feud in the past. What is here referred to as "peace" or "conflict culture", would as a matter

of fact not aim at the avoidance and prevention of -many times necessary conflicts, but provide for an as much as possible non-violent handling of conflicts and an early "prevention" (Burton) of such conflicts which could escalate to violence and war. And that kind of conflicts are themselves quite often based on structural and cultural conditions of violence incompatible with "positive peace", since they deny or hamper an essential potential for human development.

Obviously it has reappeared in Yugoslavia what peace researchers at the times of the East-West conflict have described on the level of inter-systematic confrontation: *the emergence of "security dilemma"* (which in this case do not appear any more on the level of states and military blocks, but on the level of communities and ethnicities).

Summarizing a recent paper of the Scandinavian peace researcher Hakan Wiberg, one could in short describe the Yugoslav crisis as follows:

- One people tends to see itself as the state-carrying one, but is actually only the biggest minority group in the state (Serbs)
- Another people insists on either sharing the state-carrying role or opting out altogether (Croats)
- Some relatively rich peoples want to live altogether (Slovens)
- There are some underdeveloped Muslim parts (Kosovo)
- Boundaries inside the federation were largely drawn on the premise that the existence of the federation made their exact location unimportant.
- If the union is dissolved into its individual parts, that leaves sizable parts of the state-carrying people outside its own republic (more than 3 millions Serbs, more than one third of them all)
- In some nationally mixed republics (Bosnia), the populations are intermingled that there is no practicable way of dividing them up in uni-national political units.

Where the issue of secession and boundaries -the cause of the conflict- is concerned, there seem to be two contrasting cases:

1) In Slovenia, only a few percent of Slovenians live outside Slovenia and only a few percent of Sloven inhabitants are non-Slovens. Boundaries should hardly become a problem, if secession is agreed.

2) In Croatia, by contrast, there is a sizable Serbian minority (600 000 people, 12 percent of the population in Croatia), a great part of which forms a local majority in the part of Krajina.

Here the issue of secession becomes almost inseparable from the issue of boundaries, leading to a deadlock situation.

The Croatian government insists both on an independent Croatia and on that being the present republic of Croatia (or even inclusion of Croat-inhabited in Bosnia and in northern Serbia).

It is impossible to yield on either demand without risking a coup d'etat from even more fervent nationalists. The local Serbian population in frontier areas insist on not becoming part of an independent Croatia, asking Serbs elsewhere and the government of Serbia for support.

The Croatian government is in the following dilemma: it cannot get Croatia out of Yugoslavia without abandoning some predominantly Serbian areas; but it cannot abandon these areas without risking its political life (or more)! On the other hand, the government of Serbia must support the local Serbs in Croatia to safeguard its (!) political life; if not, these Serbs are anyhow likely to resist to the bullet.¹

The notion of "security dilemma" during the cold war era was an expression for the objective or perceived incapacity of one state or military alliance to have certainty of the "real" intentions of the other part, and thus always to have depart from a "worst-case" -thinking. "Security" in that context was perceived as "holding one's own" by mobilizing proper power-resources, while striving for delimitation and encapsulation, which in turn had as consequences a *"pathological-autodynamics" of fear* (Senghaas), fear-projection, competitive arms-building and enemy fixation.

So it seems as if in Yugoslavia the same kind of problematic auto-dynamics takes place, only this time at an intersocietal and/or intra-state level. Maybe it would be possible therefore to apply certain praxeologies of peace research that were elaborated in an inter-state context characterized by the East-West conflict -such as confidence building measures, "common security", unilateralism, gradualism, etc...?

So far peace researchers have argued for an inter-systemic co-evolution and "common security", now the far more complex task would be to lay theoretical and practical foundations for a "multi-national" co-evolution and "common security". There might even still be hope that the civil war in Yugoslavia would lead to a "dead end", because more and more soldiers would just leave the armies

¹Hakan Wiberg, "Divided Nations and Divided States", Working Paper 11/1991, Center for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen.

and national guards, or that a peace movement would form itself as "civil society from below" and by hundreds of activities for non-violent conflict resolution enforce a change in thought, policy and action of the people in charge. Nevertheless it seems necessary, however, to start thinking and acting also in a long-term perspective. *Which theories, concepts and experiences of peace -and conflict research could be made applicable and constructive regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia, or on the other hand, what could we learn from this crisis for our goal of a more peaceful Europe?* I will try here to sketch some basic *principles, approaches and core elements of such a peace process.*

Approach the problem without presumption and simplification

Taking into consideration the experiences so far, *the complexity of the crisis* would call for a differentiated perspective which avoid any thinking in categories of black and white and also stays aloof of any attempt to achieve seemingly fast and clear "solutions" with military means; a perspective, according to which the "bad" is definable and tractable always and anywhere, and could easily be battled with the adequate and reliable military means, is surely not appropriate; for part of the problem is exactly the fact that in most cultures of the world, recourse to military violence is an "accepted" option, which in turn seems to block any outlook for more constructive possibilities. Our societies and cultures unfortunately take the risk for a military security policy much more readily than the "risk" of peace-policy. This risk of a military security policy has become obvious in Yugoslavia with a development that started with the establishment and armament of "each owns", territorial military in Slovenia and Croatia and escalated with the occupations and inroads on the side of the "national people's army". At the moment it is exactly the danger of nationalism and militarism, as it is currently becoming most obvious on the Serbian side, which calls for a differentiated reaction that takes into consideration the complexity of the problem.

Participation, Equality and Symmetry

Without symmetry and fairness in regard *to all parties* to the conflict, and their involvement and participation with *equal rights*, responsibilities and duties a peaceful solution will hardly develop. Therefore there may and cannot be "second-class" parties (i.e. the Albanians in Kosovo, for instance). *Symmetry*, however, would also mean that each of the sides is ready to grant "their"

minorities the same rights as they claim from the other side for "their" ethnicity or countrymen.

Primacy of inner-Yugoslav dialogue rather than "pacification" from outside

The role of "third parties" should at first be focused on the promotion of an *inter-Yugoslav dialogue* as a priori foundation for a comprehensively accepted "peace-plan".

As main actors in this process rather than the EC, institutions with a more comprehensive set-up such as the CSCE and the UN should become more active, since the Yugoslav crisis concerns not only Western Europe. Yugoslavia is already a member state of the CSCE and the UN, and it is to be expected that any future yet to be created mechanisms for international conflict resolution would be built within the framework of these comprehensive institutions.

Future orientation

Even if realistically a peace-plan will have to depart from the fact, that "Yugoslavia" as such does not exist any more, any attempt at solving the issue will have to take into consideration the given realities of intermingled populations in a nationally mixed geographical area. Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and Bosnians will also in the future have each other as neighbours. Any approach to peace will have to *lie in the future* and not in the past. Such an orientation towards the future might, without "suppressing the past" be capable to accept and "endure" differences, this attitude being the *modus vivendi for "peaceful coexistence"*. Out of many and various blueprints for a common future that kind of "meta-option" might accrue, which without constituting a menace to any of the parts to the conflict best reflects common future interests beyond all contradictions.

Needs-orientation

Ethno-nationalist mobilizations, as they have emerged ie. also in Yugoslavia, mostly become immanent when the "protection of possessions and positions", and the rejection and defence against "foreign infiltration" and "coerced assimi-

lation" are at stake.² However, this mechanism is in principle based and dependent on basic economic, political and cultural interests. The core of such a conflict is therefore competing strategies to regain and/or secure "life-chances" (ie. language, economic welfare, self-development, perspectives for identity formation and development). These *basic needs*, which certainly set the criteria for any peace order, have been characterized as follows by Johan Galtung in his broad notion of violence: survival needs, well-being needs, identity, meaning needs and freedom needs.³

Self-determination "without limits" in the framework of democracy

If it holds true that there are no alternatives to "self-determination", then it must in the long term come about without "vertical" and "horizontal" limits and *without creating new "delimitations"*: which means self-determination and its recognition as a right and duty not only for the republics, but also for the minorities living therein (e.g. the Croatian government has to evenly grant to its Serbian minority, what it demands "one level higher" for the republic of Croatia in the framework of "Yugoslavia"). This would in turn imply that in the future "self-determination" should be viewed and determined *both as an individual as well as a collective right* on various levels which in principle can only be realized in the framework of democracy.

Dis-"Etat-ize" national self-determination/ de-territorialize "nationhood"

One should as a matter of fact not overlook the fact that in Europe democracy has been realized above all in the course of the establishment and constitution of nation-states. Less and less, however, in our time and space transgressing industrial society, in the era of international complexity and interdependence is nation-state "sovereignty" thinkable as a total and indivisible one. At the end of the 20th century the nation-state has lost more and more of its "sovereign rights" to higher supra-national and lower communal entities. It also is less and less capable by itself to fulfil these already mentioned basic needs for security, welfare, freedom and identity, which are also a crucial factor in many nationality

² Dieter Senghaas, *Therapeutische Konfliktintervention in Europa*, Juni 1990, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen.

³ Johan Galtung, *Cultural Violence*, in Journal of Peace Research 3/1990, pp. 291-305.

conflicts. Apparently this objective development contradicts the subjective desires of certain nationalist movements, where a "state of their own almost automatically" would fulfil the needs and promises for "status-protection" and "identity-defence". If it is to be prevented in the future, that "national" conflicts almost automatically convert into "territorial-military" ones, one could have recourse to the theories and proposals of the Austro-marxists concerning the Danube Monarchy. Expressed in short: "nationality" should not be strictly defined according to a certain territory, but should rather become operative more on a personal level ("cling" with constitutionally guaranteed rights to a respective person). According to eg. Karl Renner, a far-reaching "de-territorialization" of "nation" should take place which could in turn be replaced by the establishment of "nations" as "personal-associations" and collective legal subjects with quasi state-competences.⁴

Peaceful co-existence instead of "autistic escalation-dynamics"

Another mechanism at the level of "international politics" that could serve as a model for peacefully dealing with conflicts would be the principles and experiences of the CSCE process which could be applied at the "intra-state" or regional level of Yugoslavia. For the daily growing security dilemmas can be step-by-step decreased only through the creation of "*reliabilities of expectation*" (2), and Confidence Building Measures based on armed control (this would in the first place imply curtailment and control of the military apparatus of the conflict-parties. It would have been very desirable to prevent the conflict from turning into "autistic escalation-dynamics" (Senghaas), which becomes almost insoluble from inside: this is a major part unfortunately already seems to have happened in Yugoslavia. This "autism" is characterized by encapsulation, fixation to enemy images, cut off of communication, narrowing of intellectual horizons as well as irrational and fearful warding off of the "other", which supposedly might destroy one's own identity.

⁴ Egbert Jahn, *Die Bedeutung der oesterreichischen sozialdemokratischen Nationalitätentheorie für die gegenwärtige Nationalitätenproblematik in Europa*, Manuskript, Mai 1991, Frankfurt am Main.

Transformation of "identity-conflicts" into conflicts of interests

What would be the main point in such a stage, would be to use the well-considered support of a third party (UN, CSCE) to "empower" the conflicting parties to liberate themselves from the perceived fixation of non-soluble identity-conflicts and regress this again to the level of negotiable and reckonable conflicts of interest. to learn such a "constructive culture of dealing with conflicts" would mean in the first place to attempt to see the *context*, in which certain problems find their expression, as one that is *changeable and capable of change*, so that basic conflicts of interest not immediately lead to "autistic blindness" and emotional self-reference characteristic for identity conflicts.

Peace Keeping as a first step towards "peace making" and "peace building"

Of course, all these ideas and proposals have two preconditions: the will and the possibilities to engage in long term, comprehensive, and fair negotiations, during which as a matter of fact the fighting must stop. from today's perspective, if one wants to secure that precondition, military "*peace keeping*" might have to be taken into consideration as necessary *precondition* but not as *substitute* for "peace making" and "peace building". If at all military measures should play a role, then they should be carried out rather in the framework of Europe as a whole (CSCE) and *not* from parts of Europe dominated by states with significant historic burdens regarding that area. Where the peace keeping measures of the United Nations are concerned, they are at the moment based on a legal "improvisation" somewhere between Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter 7 (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace...). There is no doubt about the necessity to use this instrument in a more flexible and broad manner also concerning the so-called "inter-state" conflicts, which in the long run would make necessary to improve and extend the legal and political bases of this principle in the UN charter.

Towards a con-federation with "border-transformation"

Realistically speaking there are no conditions existing right now that would enable the preservation of any kind of Yugoslav federal state. What seems possible still is a loose con-federation model where every part has its own foreign-

finance-and security policy based on non-offensive structures (the loosest kind of con-federation would be the model of the Benelux-states). Based on and departing from a recognition of the status-quo, future border-changes might become a topic in the negotiation process, while it is to be hoped and expected that these future "borders" along with all European borders at that time will become much more open than they are now between many states in the world. While it still seems necessary to acknowledge the fact of "borders" so to speak as a "necessary evil", measures of practical politics towards a pan-European perspective should or will at the same time transcend them to an extent where state-borders might have lost their character as "military borders" in favour of approaching the status of merely "administrative" borders.

Nationalism and European Peace Order

What can be concluded after the events of 1991 for the perspectives of a "Future European Peace Order", which should still be on the agenda? One of the main principles of the CSCE, to both in principle respect *territorial integrity* but also agree to the *right of self-determination* (which in this course mostly implies the change of given borders) seem at first sight to contradict themselves; in any case, both of these principles are only executable in a peaceful manner and in the frame of democracy as has last been mentioned in the 1990 Charter of Paris, which as a step further could be complemented with a special Charter for minorities (Group Rights) in Europe.

In the spirit of these above mentioned principles a peaceful Europe should understand itself as being *more* than just *the sum of territorial states*; in such a Europe, which does not totally abolish the traditional nation-state but rather "stores" it within supra-regional structures, new formations and political units such as e.g. "autonomous territories", "federations and associations of nationalities" which would allow for the justifiable national aspirations at hand, would have their political existence and relevance assured.

Žarko Puhovski

Cease-fire as the Real Problem

Peace negotiations are, of course, the most important subject of the present discussions, especially among the activists of the peace movement (however weak it is) in the whole of Yugoslavia. It is of utmost importance for all the inhabitants of the country (and states emerging within), but it is also already clear that there is, for weeks, no progress in those negotiations. The reason is, unfortunately seldom discussed even within the groups of activists of the peace movement, in the fact that there is no realistic possibility to end those negotiations with real success. First of all peace treaties have been very seldom formulated and signed with the war going on during the discussions about the final agreement. Second, peace treaty presupposes some kind of long term decision about the political and legal context in which the origins of the war actually occurred, and that is almost certain impossible in a short period in which everyone needs the end of fighting. Third, the parties which make the peace treaty are not always the same which were involved in war (as in the situation after the World war I). Fourth, all the versions of the peace treaty suggested in The Hague are too ambitious and too long for the real possibility of the involved parties to agree upon (it is well known that with every new word the possibility for misunderstanding and refusing among seven parties rises almost with geometrical progression). Fifth, and most concrete in the actual Yugoslav situation, the parties which have proven for dozen times that they are unable to formulate the conditions for a cease-fire, are almost certainly unable to reach agreements needed for even moderately lasting peace.

That's why we have to understand that the real goal for the next period has to be achievement of a cease-fire, but of a cease-fire which would fulfil some extremely important preconditions. Firstly, it has to be a cease-fire able to provide more or less stable situation for some years (because the parties involved in the war seems to need quite a long period for serious negotiations about the future, that is about the lasting peace). Secondly, it has to be a cease-fire open to all "final" solutions, possible as content of the future peace-agreement. Thirdly, it has to be a cease-fire with the elements which all the involved parties

can regard as the parts of their program, in order to motivate them to accept it without the military intervention.

The beginning of winter seasons is, as it is well known, the best period of the year to stop the fighting, because the weather conditions are going to minimize the intensity of operations anyway. That's why the discussions about such an agreement have to start (they have not even really started yet) and finish the shortest possible time.

The elements of such an agreement could be:

(a) Withdrawal of the federal troops to the barracks from which they have started their actual intervention; beginning of the demilitarization of all the republics (including gradual dissolving of the federal army, and of all the existent paramilitary forces - of course with international help and monitoring (and control over the arms left by the troops in withdrawal or dissolving), and with necessary financial help for the pensions and requalification found for the army professionals;

(b) Suspension of all the federal Yugoslav institutions (which would give freedom of action - even in the international scene - for the republics constituted within Yugoslavia, but would also preserve a possibility to reactivate at least some of those institutions after the agreement, if all parties agree);

(c) Agreement that the borders within Yugoslavia are de facto borders, but are not to be touched or even discussed in formal way for the next three years (again, for one side that would mean the possibility to claim its right to negotiate in future at least some changes of the borders, for the other at least temporal guarantee for the security of the borders);

(d) International guaranties for all the Yugoslav republics for the right to legally represent and protect their ethnic minorities in other republics (as it was formulated in article 7, Austrian State Treaty in 1955);

(e) International observes (in the first period probably peace-troops) in the areas of Croatia with the Serbian majority, and with the mixed population, in which the fighting were concentrated;

(f) The constitution of a temporary committee for further negotiations about peace, with a board, constituted by the representatives of all republics and federal administration which would take care about the interrepublic (economical and political) communications, and about the federal legacy;

Of course that is not much (maybe that is why such a proposal could stand a chance), but, at least, it seems to be more realistic than the proposals of European politicians and diplomats. (The text is the shortest version of a proposal discussed among colleagues and friends in Zagreb and Beograd in the past few weeks).

Tonči Kuzmanić

Understanding the War in Former Yugoslavia

The reason that Yugoslavia as a concrete state and, perhaps more importantly, as a form of the state expired in a natural way (its weakening came about directly as a result of internal rivalries, and not through outside interference¹) provides also opportunities to analyse some of the principles of that "inherent" outcome in the Balkans. Here however I will attempt to develop something of a new concept, namely that of Yugoslavhood, through which it becomes possible not only to follow the historical evolution and logical composition and decomposition of the form(s) which actually have lasted circa four hundred years, but also to comprehend the nature of this genuinely complex and unique situation. Namely in tandem with the process of disintegration of the state it become clear that Yugoslavhood as a historical desire and dream of the small nations of the Balkans was both outmoded and out-dated, and further it is just that element of "estrangement" from Yugoslavhood that gives feasibility to the "abstract", conceptual way of its theorisation.

The Missing Element

When one speaks or even thinks of national movements or nation-states in former Yugoslavia it has become natural that one could see only disparate "national conflicting units" such as the Slovenes, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Albanians etc. The public and scientific picture of these "national conflicting parties" operates in the synonymous way. What one sees is a series of chaotic strifes taking place among diverse national movements. Through this kind of perception one type of nationalism (nation-state) operates as the more "realistic", the other as permissive, while a third version is seen as "aggressive", or a fourth as "dangerous"... This matrix offers a picture of numerous unrelated battles which remind us of strifes among different groups which can be religious or tribal in nature. This perception of "nationalism" in former Yugoslavia reinforced by the mass media, is and was possible above all solely as a result of

¹The "intervention" (for the time being, not yet military) came later, when European Community made some efforts in order to stop the "War in Slovenia".

a misunderstanding of the situation. The very essence of the multinational, multicultural set-up in former Yugoslavia was overlooked. As a matter of fact, this is due precisely to the analytical lack of an examination of the concept/notion which I will term "Yugoslavhood".

Namely, all mutual relationships among various nationalities and national movements in the former state and today among different nation-states were and are still *mediated* by Yugoslavhood or by the remnants of that historic "phenomenon" (common history!). For example, national conflicts between Slovenes and Serbs were primarily conflicts between "Slovenes" (Slovenhood) and Yugoslavhood on one side and Serbs (Serbhood) and Yugoslavhood on the other. Secondly, *only as the mediated conflict*, one could discuss about the national "battle" between Slovenes and Serbs. Almost the same thing occurs with all varying "conflict relations" in former Yugoslavia as at national as well as at other distinct conflict levels. To put it in other words, the decisive problem was that mediated space, the space of mediation among the various nation-states movement(s). More exactly, incomprehension of this mediating space is the principal reason why "everything in Yugoslavia" looks a mess. Of course it is possible to start an explanation of the national situation in former state with the investigation of this or that "individual" national constitution movement, and yet sooner or later one collides with the question of the "mediation" between them; with the "ground" on which national movements operate and with the "space" on which they work.

Panslavic and Southslavic

Historically and logically speaking nationalism can not function without the ingredient of mythology in some form. The mythology of Yugoslavhood was part of the larger Slavic "mythological family". Essentially it belongs to the Panslavic mythology, which has its roots in the 17th century, a period when talking about Germans, Slavs, Romans, etc., and also about race was something very customary. This Panslavic mythological construction served as a "defensive mechanism" against Pan-Germanic mythology and also was a part of the actions of survival against the German and likewise Italian use of naked power.

As with any other mythology the Panslavic example was one that was paradoxical in nature, it defended itself by attacking others. As a result of this paradox, there arose the well known theological "enemy construction". Owing to the "Enemy" - the mythological thinking concludes - "We have to be united/re-united" for "Unity is strength". From the Panslavic point of view, the Enemy was defined as both the "Germans" and likewise Italians neighbours, and hence

the holding of this perception also served to solve the problem of Panslavic unity. To put it more concisely, the *re-unification of Slavs*, since Panslavic mythology had large difficulties with the existing religious cleavage. Namely, the large "Panslavic family" had been sundered between the Catholic and orthodox religion, between Western and Eastern Churches².

Meanwhile, it was soon to become transparent that the macro panslavic project was unreasonable and unrealistic. However the desire and the necessity for security remained. Panslavic mythology was replaced by the more realistic conception of so called "*Jugo-Slav unity*" in the 19th century. "Jugo", namely, means "South". Hence, the "South Slav" ideological conception of the multinational community substituted the Panslavic one. Early mythological conception based upon the racial and religious foundations of the unity yield the place for multinational integration.

It is highly important to be aware that the conception of a Yugoslav multinational community and Yugoslavhood as the ideological foundation of these desires did not arise in the "East", among Serbs and Bulgarians³, but rather they were rooted in the *West*. In the first place, among Slovenes and Croats, among Istrians, Dalmatians, Bosnians also and among those Serbs who had been living within Habsburg Monarchy. Serbs, Montenegrins and Bulgarians, namely, had their own nation-states, while Slovenes, Croats, Dalmatians, Bosnians, etc. had not. They instead resisted within the confines of Austro-Hungary, which was termed a "prison of nations". Speaking in religious terms, Catholic Southslavs, who lived in an alien and foreign state, wanted to build one of their own in order to both preserve and develop their identity. However the Orthodox Southslavs were wary of this aspiration of their Catholic counterparts for two reasons. Firstly, they, having a state of their own, feared the possibility of loosing their identity in a larger common Southslav state. Secondly and more importantly, they had the opportunity *to extend the borders* of the Serbian Kingdom over the western territories.

With the decline of the Austro-Hungary, the mythology of the "Southslavs", Yugoslavs, began to become a political and revolutionary option. With the

²The border between the two religious kingdoms ran through former Yugoslavia. It was the border between Croats and Serbs and approximately was also the border between Austro-Hungary and the Serbian Kingdom until 1914, and simultaneously between Bosnia and Serbia.

³Bulgarians were perceived as a part of a great south-Slavic family near to 1948!

demise of the Austro-Hungary this multinational and multicultural concept⁴ of the Yugoslavians began to become more and more realistic. In 1918 one part of the old mythology become a component part of the new state *multinational ideology*. The State of "Slovenes, Croats and Serbs" (as it was termed) was in part the realisation of the Southslavic, "western Yugoslav" mythology and ideology.

Serbhood

Yet, the Yugoslav ideology which became part of the politics and even the state (for one month in 1918) was primarily turned against Vienna. The main problem facing unified Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire was how to defend themselves from the German and Italian politics of expansion. At that point the Serbs and Montenegrins could have been described loosely as being "*brothers in blood*". In fact they did not know much about Serbian state, about democracy, autocracy or perhaps even theocracy, within the internal borders of their brothers in blood. What they were all too well aware of only was the religious cleavage between Catholic (Slovenes and Croats) and Orthodox (Serbs and Montenegrins)⁵. From the perspective of the Serbian nation-state the idea of a "Southslavic state", of Yugoslavia was viewed like something that was very dangerous, thus they rejected it as part of "*Western ideology*". They had their own state and they would prefer not to loose it because of theirs "*western brothers in blood*"⁶.

⁴ A crucial point for understanding relationships in this part of the Balkan is contained in the fact that the point of departure in building that kind of state was multinational, multicultural and not (one)nation as in western parts of Europe!

⁵ In those time Muslims did not play any important political role in those relations. The Macedonian nation was divided between Greeks, Bulgarian and Serbian and yet "did not exist" at all.

⁶ Serbian perception was logically connected with the existence of their state. Still today one can observe very strong presence of the "*one-nation-state-mentality*" among Serbs, which is even stronger due to the lack of the Serbian state in the last half century.

In 1918, at the time of the fusion of the state of the "Slovenes, Croats and Serbs" (which emerged from Austro-Hungary⁷) and the monarchies of the Serbs and Montenegrins into a single, unique monarchy, it became completely apparent that this new state could not function at all. The results of the political, religious, national, ethnic and cultural etc. differences was the establishment of *the dictatorship of the Serb King* (1929) and the installation of Serbian power over all other nations.⁸

At that historical point the idea of the Southslavs, the idea of Yugoslavhood, for the very first time became the official *one-nation-state ideology*. More precisely, it became the ideology of the unique nation-state called Yugoslavia. In the hands of the Serbian Monarchy and the leading role of Serbian nation (one-nation/one-state/one-leader ideology) previous forms of Yugoslavhood as multinational and multicultural ideology became the apology of one, Serbian nation power, of the Serbian dictatorship. It was the first endeavour of the Serbian politicians to govern the non-serbian nations in Yugoslavia through the "western" ideology of Yugoslavhood.⁹

⁷ Shortly, SCS-state was consequence of the fact that in the moment of developing of the new state (1918) of Western Slavs Italy started to realise the promises which it had got from the First War allies (the secret London agreement in 1915). Western neighbours of the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs started to occupy parts of Adriatic coast. Consequently, the SCS-state was forced to look for the army protection. The Serbian Kingdom was that power (a part of allies too) which "gave" an army. Nevertheless, *the result of this "armed participation" was not Yugoslavia*, but a new kind of state. Again SCS, but this time the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes". To put in briefly, in order to preserve their territory and inhabitants the Western part of former Yugoslavia joined the Serbian Kingdom. Together with Serbs and Montenegrins they formed a state. But incompatibility between at least two different political, national, religious, cultural... structures resulted in Serbian dictatorship. In 1929 the Serbian king declared a "direct relationship" between himself and the "people", abolished Parliament and the Constitution and announced a "new state". The name of that was Yugoslavia. Hence, *Yugoslavia was born as a monarchy, as the dictatorship of the Serbian Kingdom in 1929 and not before!*

⁸ Remembering this part of history becomes extremely important in the present day situation in former state! Especially today's Slovenes, Croats, Boschniacs and Macedonians do not want to repeat mistakes, which their precedents made building the common state.

⁹ Discussions at the end of eighties in former Yugoslavia about the federation and confederation had a very close connection with that period of the common Southslavic history. Namely, in every undertone of these discussions one could hear the fears which arise from the *Serbian one-nation royal dictatorship from the thirties*. That was especially applied to communists, because as defenders of the federalist and class conception of the state they were the very first object of Serbian royalist repression. And vice versa. One of the central point of the today's Serbian national movement was concentrated at the royalist Serbian future.

The Second World War and Revolution

The Serbian monarchy disappeared from the face of the earth in 1941. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was occupied and fragmented by several neighbouring countries (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria...). The goal was to destroy the state with the help of the establishing "divide and rule" principle. Inside each nation have appeared division between collaborators with the occupying forces and the "People's Liberation Movement" (Tito's partisans). For five years fratricide lasted, quislings state-structures were set up. According to some approximations 60% of the population were killed in struggles among a single nations or between nations and 40% in battles against occupying forces. The numbers of people killed was between one and one and half million. The country was completely destroyed.

The main lines of division during the war and the social(ist) revolution were threefold: (1) religion, (2) nation and (3) ideology. For example, in Slovenia communists fought Germans, Italians and also against Slovenian nationalists and the church pro-German movement. In Croatia there was established a so-called "Independent Croat State" (similarly the Slovakia model) with clear Nazi ideology and practice. The main enemies of that state were communists, Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies, who were assassinated in concentration camps.¹⁰ In Serbia royalist nationalist forces against communist, Hungarian (in Vojvodina), Jews, Gypsies, Macedonians, Muslims, Albanians (Kosovo) and of course again Croats. And so on, and so forth.

Decisive aspect at that stage of the history of Yugoslavhood is that previous form in which the Serbian Kingdom takeover the "west-Yugoslavian" ideology of "brothers in blood" in violent times of war and with a "little help" from the communists, became the ideology of "brothers in arms".¹¹ Tito's communist movement for liberation provided the *preservation of "the state integrity"* on the platform of the "brotherhood and unity" among nations and national minorities, including Macedonians, Albanians and Boschniacs.

¹⁰The main fears for the Serbs in "Knin Kraina" resulted from those events. Any form of the Croat state they dismiss with "arguments" that Croats are "nation of genocide" and therefore that Croat state by definition should be and it is a "fascist" one.

¹¹One of the strongest expression of that form of Yugoslavhood was the War slogan of Serbs and Croats as "brothers in arms". Ironically, thanks to the extensive TV War propaganda, not allowed from the point of view of international conventions, the song "Brothers in Arms", written by the American pop-group Dire Straits, has become the most popular war-song in Croatia. Meanwhile the serbian side was still under the deep influence of traditional or, more exactly, rearranged traditional "folk songs ideology", it is not yet completely clear what sort of music is dominant at Bosnian, traditionally the best rock-side in former Yugoslavia.

Understanding the "Communism"

The victor of the Second World War in Yugoslavia seemed to be the Communists. However, as a result of the war and the social(ist) revolution, the only victor was that force which used violence, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). In comparison with the pre-war circumstances, the communist post-war situation was essentially different. The leading "national" role of the Serbs in the pre-war monarchy, after the second World War was replaced by the "*sub-national*" communist ideology of revolution, brotherhood and national unity.¹²

It seemed that the "national level" as such did not exist any more. Greyness of the class, of the proletarian ideology covered up all national, religious and ideological differences among the various nations in Yugoslavia. All pre-war animosities and, especially those from the war-times, "disappeared". Every particularity submerged under the surface of the "communist community", under the ideology of work and "liberation through work". The cause which made possible this sort of covering of all differences first of all was the brutality of expression of the differences in the war-time. The Communist system, especially in the early era (first ten years after the War), was brutal post-war answer to the brutalities of war.

However, it was impossible to develop a total, closed system of repression over the various religions, nations, ideologies, and their particularities and individualities as a whole. "Ideologies" of the various nations have been *banished underground*, as well as the religious convictions. But at the same time has emerged the "*New Nation*" in the heart of the communist ideology. Namely, the Communist working class, the community of workers was named by "*Working People*". In other words, various nations and national minorities were subordinated by the "Working Nation". The Working Nation became a common name for all members of the Slovene, Croat, and Serb... nations. The fact that they still were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs became a sort of "private thing", as their religions or any other signs of particularity and individuality.

Meanwhile the "Working Nation" did not have just a "negative role" in the meaning of suppression of the nations. It had not been merely a non-nation, but

¹²The reasons for the characterisation of this kind of the "communist nationalism" as "*sub-national*" are twofold: first, which has ironic undertones, proceeds from the communist self understanding of the class struggles as the "underlying" truth of the national, religious and other phenomenons, and secondly, from the fact that nationalism, national movements and nation-states outlive communism as such.

also it had a "positive role". Namely, to impose one single, working-Nation.¹³ Whilst all other "normal", "natural" "historical" nations were "forbidden", this transhistorical, subnational one was desirable. Various national movements as possibilities for pluralisation of the communist uniformity were forbidden, Yugoslav nationalism as a cement of the regime, was permitted and desirable. The Yugoslav-nation was also proclaimed as a nation "among" all other nations in Yugoslavia and on the occasion of the census one could declare oneself as a Yugoslav.¹⁴

In that way Yugoslavhood as a part of an old mythology became the content of the armed *communist national patriotism* which is still today preserved by the power of the "Yugoslav People's Army", of Serbs and Montenegrins.

But this is only a one-sided picture of the complex post-war multinational situation in former Yugoslavia. It is obvious that this kind of one-sided matrix is carried out from the "well known" Soviet situation. Nevertheless, former state was not and it newer has been like the Soviet Union in spite of some similarities. There are three main points of difference. The time at which the revolution took place was basically different in the Soviet Union than in Yugoslavia. The Bolshevik state originated from the kind of the "coup d'etat" which was a consequence of the First World War situation. The revolution in Yugoslavia was part of the broader liberation War in circumstances of the Second World War. The Soviet revolution was carried out under the platform of the Soviet Communist party, first of all "against domestic bourgeoisie", in Yugoslavia it originated as a national liberation movement guided also from the different national centres and with participation of the different political subjects and was a part of the broader anti-occupation battles. It is true that the role of the Yugoslav communist party was decisive, but rebellion against the occupation of 1941 was all-nations and include great deal of national movements and other non-communists subjects within a single nation. The Communists were only one (the strongest one) force among others. The defence of the state's integrity took the form of numerous patriotic forces. Endeavours of the Communist Party after the War to take up the

¹³As A. J. P. Taylor once put it, the main difference between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on the one hand and the France, Italy, Germany... on the other lies in the nascent stage. When Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were formed after the fall of Austro-Hungary, there was nothing like a Yugoslav or Czechoslovak people. Masaryk and Tito had "to invent" *their own people or make up a new nation*. This kind of "nation-production" run simultaneous to communist attempts to build up a state-nation in multinational circumstances.

¹⁴The "members" of the Yugoslav nation, Yugoslavs, were the people who were closely connected with the communist ideology and with the regime. Hence, YPA staff, members of the Communist party, employees of the state apparatus... and also those ordinary people who believed that repetition the horrors of the second World War could be prevented by the withering away of the nation and national minorities.

space of the so-called front-defence was not completely successful. The pluralism of the state defence and also pluralism within the revolutionary forces guided by communists¹⁵ resulted in a more pluralistic post War conception which comes to expression throughout all post-war Yugoslav history. This was not because "Yugoslavs were good communists" but first of all because of pre-war political pluralisation and of the strong communist opposition which defended the state from foreign occupation together with the Communist party. One post-war result was that Tito's communists have been forced to build up a concept of communism which had also some features of anarchism. It also was less ascetic and much more enjoyable in comparison with the Soviet type of communism. In the period of the first two post-war decades, the economic development in Yugoslavia was strong, even in comparison with western societies and industries. The other result was that communist Yugoslavia was established as a federation of equal nations.¹⁶ After strong national movements in the sixties (also within the Communist Party) a new constitution (1974) proclaimed powerful independence of the all republics and also provinces of the Voivodina and Kosovo (within Serbia) and, of course, strong central government in Belgrade.¹⁷ So Yugoslavia for the last twenty years has worked as a sort of *confederation* of different nations-republics and *simultaneously as a strong communist centralised state*.¹⁸ This opposition was the key element as well for the situation today.¹⁹

¹⁵The situation in Slovenia was the most significant due to the common rebellion against occupation and cooperation between Communists, Catholics and Liberals in the war and revolution events. The anti-occupational situation within each nation was different. In Croatia rebellion against the occupation was mainly in the hands of communists. Similar it was also in other parts of the splintered Yugoslav state throughout the War.

¹⁶Foundations of the multinational federal state have been set up in the wartimes.

¹⁷It could be productive to distinguish in former Yugoslavia at least between two kinds of sovereignty: "national sovereignty" of all single nations-republics and "communist sovereignty" in Belgrade.

¹⁸It is an extremely important and significant sign that serbian national-communist movement (Milošević) did not criticise the gradual progress to independence of the single nation (Slovenia and Croatia) but the lack of power in the federal-communist centre, in fact a small degree of centralisation!

¹⁹There are two significant extremes which can also help us understand the present war situation. Whilst Albanians from Kosovo, starting from the national level (attack on the Serbian national occupation of Kosovo), put only indirectly into the question the central communist power in Belgrade, the Slovenian national movement attacked from the opposite position. They criticised the communist power centre and directly put into question also "Serbian domination" in the state as a whole. Serbians desire for a nation-state ignores the fact that Serbia itself was the dominant nation that leads the state and the communist apparatus of power (YPA).

In this new, post-war situation every nation and national minority (including the Serbs) was equal among themselves ("brotherhood and unity"). Actually they were equal in front of the sub-national communist ideology of Yugoslavhood. Put in other words, one could talk about equality among nations and nationalities only in the conditions of communist dictatorship in which every single nation by definition was regarded as nationalist and this was immediately suppressed by all means. That was the principal cause that every nationalism in Yugoslavia in the last 45 years took a form of the decentralisation and of the struggle against the symbolic centre of the regime in Belgrade.

Decomposition and War

The relatively monolithic house of subnational Yugoslavhood started to split at perfectly logical locus. At the point of that nation which was by definition *non-(Yugo)Slav*. Albanians, who are not a Slavic nation first seriously jeopardise Yugoslavhood and Yugoslavia as such. This was the natural effect of the history in which Albanians usually lived in violent confrontation (as a matter of fact in brutal occupation!) with stronger neighbouring states like Serbia. In the last period in which Albanians were divided between two states they had no real possibilities for development and for surpassing traditionalism and backwardness. The exception to this was the time of Tito's rule between the 60s and 80s when the university in Prishtina (capital of Kosovo) also was formed. But events in Kosovo for the last ten years (after Tito's death) proved that Serbian politics have other intentions.

It is very interesting that the Serbian national movement in its first period (1986-89) begin to appear, not as an attack on Yugoslavhood (as, for example, in Slovenia) but from an opposite direction. It starts out as a "defence" of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavhood in fact as an brutal police and army attack on the Albanians.²⁰ Logically: from 1930s Serbian national consciousness was so closely linked with Yugoslavia and Yugoslavhood²¹ Albanians from Kosovo counter-

²⁰The brutal Serbian assault (army and police occupation of Kosovo) on Albanians was one of the principal reasons for "national" conflict between Slovians and Serbs (and as the consequence between Serbs and Croats). Symbolically the withering away of the communist Yugoslavhood and Yugoslav state *started just with the "new" (actually, very old one) serbian politics in Kosovo.*

²¹However, much of the national conflict in Yugoslavia proceeds from *the identification between Serbs and Yugoslavs*, from the fact that Serbs have largely lost their own national identity on account of Yugoslavhood. Serbians often experienced Yugoslavia just as an *enlarged Serbia* and it looks like that they are going "to pay" for this kind of "historical and logical misunderstanding". But the present War is showing us that also all those "historical misunderstandings" are going to be paid by Muslims and Croats and not Serbs.

attack on Serbia they experienced not as an assault on Serbian superpower but as a attack on Yugoslavia. Afterwards they tried to grasp distinction between Yugoslavia, Yugoslavhood and Serbian "national essence".²² Decisive distinction between two different kinds of nationalist movement in Yugoslavia, among Slovenes and Croats on the one side and Serbs (Montenegro on the other) is contained in the fact that national movements in Croatia and in Slovenia were in opposition and that opposition necessarily took *the form of anti-communism*. In Serbia and in Montenegro the nationalist movement was imposed from above. Actually, the birth place of the serbian national movement and of its leader Milošević was Kosovo with the violent "defence" of the Serbs from Kosovo from the Albanians.²³ The relatively productive split among nationalists and communists within the Croat and Sloven nations, which also lead to the first post-war democratic elections, did not take place in Serbia. The national homogenisation of Serbs²⁴ was the result of the fact that the national and communist movements as well were (and still are) in the hands of the same man - Milošević.

Therefore the anti-communist national movement (Drašković is one of the leaders²⁵) had little possibilities and also less space for developing a strong and at the same time anti-communist position of the Serbian national movement. In addition, one of the consequences of that *interior serbian paralysis* was the extreme form of the anti-communist national movement in Serbia. Namely, the national assault on communist (as a non-democratic, dictatorship...) was not sufficient and Drašković sought a national ideology much deeper in history. He found it in the existence of the Serbian mediaeval State and Church, in Serbian mythology or in these periods of history in which the Serbian nation and Serbs were "victims" of other nations in Yugoslavia. The result was an extremely backward and overstretched nationalist ideology which mainly talked of blood,

²² Unfortunately it seems that the constituent component of the Serbian "national essence" is oppression of the Albanians in Kosovo, which is very hard to distinguish from racism.

²³ Approximately 95% of the population living in Kosovo are Albanians.

²⁴ Albanians as the enemy, than Slovians and Croats and finally the Moslems as the main enemy, was the "logical chain" made by the serbian national movement in different phases of the pre-war era and war events which took a place in last 12 years.

²⁵ His "political" positions from the end of eighties are of the extremely importance as for the development of nationalism in Serbia as well for the War(s) in different parts of the previous state. Namely foundations of his nationalism one could find simultaneously in the texts of today's president of "Yugoslavia" Mr. Čosić, as well in papers and speeches of Šešelji, leading person of post-nazi Chetnichs movement in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia and in parts of Croatia.

church and mediaeval rulers,²⁶ and on the victims and remained without answers to the present day Serbian questions and problems.

The battle between communism and nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia (as well as in Macedonia and Bosnia) was finished at the end of eighties and became a part of parliamentarism, but in Serbia (as well in Montenegro, Voivodina and Kosovo as two occupied "Serbian's provinces") was not. Exactly this kind of "out-of-parliament conflicts" was the principle reason, firstly, for the instability in ex-Yugoslavia, and latterly also for the war. Namely that was the paramount basis for the national revolutions of the Serbian enclaves all over the former Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding, the questions which arise could be: in what manner could one apprehend diverse forms which Yugoslavhood had taken throughout the long history of the nations, whose possibility for survival was found in it? What is alive and what is not from the Yugoslavhood past in this moment of the War in former Yugoslavia?

All itemised forms which has been taken by Yugoslavhood one should understand in a cumulative way. *Each "past" form is still alive, including the first, mythological one. And exactly that is the main problem: as for understanding the events as well for the termination of the bloody war in Bosnia.*

The Panslavic mythology as such does not exist any more²⁷. Development among Catholic Slavs (especially in the period of the Venice and Austro-Hungarian colonisation) was so profound that it became impossible to think about any chance for unification on the Panslavic conception, and also on

²⁶The lack of the "modern" national ideology within the political opposition, serbian national movement resulted also in a extremely dangerous form of declaration of the Holy War against Muslims (Albanians and Muslims from the Serbian Sandiak) and Catholic (firstly Croats). Just this point of "serbian war-structure" was among the decisive ones which opened possibilities for ethnical cleansing of "serbian territories" in Bosnia and Croatia and also was very prolific with regard to the similar "politics" coming from the different enemies sides.

²⁷Except perhaps in the minds of some minorities in the underdeveloped, rural parts of Montenegro and Serbia. In today's circumstances this form might be more or less connected solely with that "Pan Slavic" mythology whose shape used to be the community of all Orthodox Slavs (and not Slavs as such) with Moscow as the centre. This traditionally strong connection between Montenegrins and Serbs with Moscow was a great problem also in 1948 when Tito's communist party parted company with the Soviet Union.

religious grounds as well.²⁸ Nevertheless it is different from East, Orthodox Slavs where it seems that some desires for this solution still exist.²⁹ Secondly, liberal and multinational, multicultural form is likewise still alive in Croat, Bosnian and Macedonian politics (also in Slovenia). No more than as a kind of desirable solution but as result of necessity³⁰. After the period of the national revolutions at the end of eighties it seems that it is not possible any more to play on the third form of Yugoslavhood, on the unification of the "Yugoslav people" which had been a central element of the Serbian Kingdom from the thirties. However, due to the fact that Serbs live also in Bosnia and in Croatia this form of Yugoslavhood could be the ground on which is possible to defend that solution.³¹

More or less similar is with the form of Yugoslavhood from Tito's period. It was one of the strongest positions in Yugoslav politics as well as in the mind of population. Not only because of fears, but for the ideological education during the last half of this century which left deep traces in the consciousness of generations and generations of the Yugoslav inhabitants.

Shortly, all forms of Yugoslavhood through which we have tried to take a kind of historical journey are still alive in the present day "Yugoslav situation". Infrequently one can find pure forms of their appearance (like it was YPA until the armed intervention in Slovenia), but usually they take another form. Connected with each other they mould *new combinations* with other modern and

²⁸Simultaneously one must bear in mind the processes of "catholicization of Europe", elements of which are present in western parts of ex-Yugoslavia specially through the writings of the lord of Habsburg and in the form of the activities of different Christian-democrat political parties in Slovenia and especially in Croatia.

²⁹Some steps taken by Serbian politicians in the last few years (attempt to mix together Serbs, Montenegrins and also Macedonians on the excuse of belonging to "the same-orthodox-religion") announce that also this community building principle is still alive.

³⁰For example, in the middle of Croatia, as the consequence of the mediaeval Turkish occupation, lives a strong Serbian community (today's Kraina of Knin). So realistically Croat politicians can not play on the card of the one-nation-state. They are, nolens-volens, forced to count also the existence of Serbs and different regions (Istra, Dalmatia, Dubrovnik...) in Croatia as well. Existence of the Serbs and regions in Croatia is at the same time a powerful correction with regard to strong Croat drives to the rigid nation-state which should end in elimination of all not-Croatian-differences.

³¹Just this was constant in Serbian politics, and it is also in today's times even in the broader spectrum of the political opposition as in Serbia as well as among Serbs elsewhere in former Yugoslavia. Just this point could offer the most important possibility of interpretation when one would try to explain the war events in former Yugoslavia.

postmodern elements³² The very first problem about Yugoslavhood, about various forms throughout which they passed, was the fact of the communist oppression which took place lasted half a century. The possibilities of the numerous forms have been downtrodden and accumulated. Now in the decline of communist power space for different expressions of all these forms and differences come out. But not as preserved forms and possibilities but as distorted and trampled down by communism. Consequently they work first of all as retaliation, as *revenge*. Not just as a revenge in respect of communism but with regard to all other differences and possibilities as well. The principle shape of their appearance was and it is the explosive retaliation and exactly this feature represents one of the basis on which so bloody war could be possible. Namely the explosion of the *mythological sort of thinking* has not taken place solely among ordinary people, but even among leading politicians and in the mass media as well. All other steps, including the mass mobilisation for war, were just the problems of the "techniques" and that of the "time".

All shapes of thought and action too, all metaphors (metaphorical language concerning the enemies was and remain the dominant form of observation in "Yugoslav policy") which once upon a time served to maintain the Yugoslav community from outside risks and enemies, were used, and, so to speak, applied for the battles within the state. Germans or Russians, for example, as yesterday's symbols of the enemies, abruptly becomes the symbols of friendship for one part of the state, their place (the place of the enemies) was taken up by some other nations within the borders of the previous state... In short, *all these instruments, concepts, interventions, ideologies which in the past served to preserve the traditional Yugoslav community together were turned over and works as the elements, instruments of disintegration. Exactly historic forms of the common survival of Yugoslavia, of preservation of the "small nations" which lived in this "common house", become the main cause of disintegration. It was the main source for the war(s) among different nations (states) and national minorities (semi-states).*

However, simultaneously one should emphasise that former Yugoslavia and Yugoslavhood did not include only Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Yugoslavhood was not and it is not any kind of content at all, the content which could be occupied, possessed by anybody. It was and remain a "pure", "floating" form, it was rather a "position", "location" or "situation" in which one could be situated or "find oneself". It was a net in which (every)one could be caught. Exactly because Serbs, Croats and Slovenes become "self-consciousness nations" with

³² As in Slovenian mixture between the new social movements and the national movement(s), in Croatia and Serbia mixture among nationalism and slight form of liberalism...

their "coming sovereignties" (sovereign states), all other elements from which former Yugoslavia was created are now in an "original Yugoslav position". Namely, their survival is jeopardised. For that reason "the basis" of the "new Yugoslavhood ideology", new forms of collective battles for survival are still alive. But they are not installed in Serbia, neither in Croatia nor in Slovenia, they are "situated" first of all in Bosnia (partly in Macedonia and Montenegro), tomorrow it could be a similar scene in Voivodina, Sandiak...

The multinational substance of Yugoslav ideology was nothing more than an answer to the threat of "surrounding nations" ("enemies", "states"...). It was the result of the situation in which one subject or more of them "could not stand on their own feet" and when for own selfpreservation necessarily needs one another subject in similar position. It was and it is a kind of natural ideology of so-called "small nations", their answer to the dangerous surrounding politics of the "big nations", their way to survival. Nothing more, but simultaneously nothing less!

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Contributors:

David Atwood, General Secretary of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Spoorstraat, Alkmaar, Netherlands.

Josef Binter, General Secretary of the European University Centre for Peace Studies, Schlaining, Austria.

Hania Fedorowicz, Researcher, Salzburg - Toronto, Austria, Canada.

Muhamed Filipović, Professor of philosophy, University Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mats Friberg, Associate Professor, Peace and Development Research Institute, Goeteborg University.

Johan Galtung, Professor of Peace Studies, Universities of Bem, Hawaii, Saarland, Witten-Herdecke.

Wilfried Graf, Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Schlaining, Austria.

Paula Gutlove, Research Associate of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, Mass. USA.

Dušan Janjić, Senior Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences, Center for Sociological Research, Belgrade, Serbia.

Tonči Kuzmanić, Political scientist, Faculty of social sciences and Peace institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Julie Mostov, Researcher, political scientist, USA.

Vesna Pešić, Profesor of sociology, University Belgrade, Serbia.

Žarko Puhovski, Professor of philosophy, University Zagreb, Croatia.

Rudolf Rizman, Professor of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Miroslav Stanojević, Research Centre for Labour and Management, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Hylke Tromp, Professor of International Relations and Peace Research at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.

Arno Truger, Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Schlaining, Austria.

Srdjan Vrcan, Professor of sociology, Split, Croatia

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